Abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) have recently been proposed as a versatile generalization of Dung's abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs). In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of the computational complexity of ADFs. Our results show that while ADFs are one level up in the polynomial hierarchy compared to AFs, there is a useful subclass of ADFs which is as complex as AFs while arguably offering more modeling capacities. As a technical vehicle, we employ the approximation fixpoint theory of Denecker, Marek and Truszczyński, thus showing that it is also a useful tool for complexity analysis of operator-based semantics.

These are the proceedings of the International Workshop on Reactive Concepts in Knowledge Representation (ReactKnow 2014), which took place on August 19th, 2014 in Prague, co-located with the 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2014).

This thesis is a study on object-oriented knowledge representation. The study defines the main concepts of the object model. It also shows pragmatically the use of object-oriented methodology in the development of a concrete software system designed as the solution to a specific problem.The problem is to simulate the interaction between several animals and various other objects that exist in a room. The proposed solution is an artificial intelligence (Al) program designed according to the object-oriented model, which closely simulates objects in the problem domain. The AI program is conceived as an inference engine that maps together a given knowledge base with a database. The solution is based conceptually on the five major elements of the model, namely abstraction, encapsulation, modularity, hierarchy, and polymorphism.The study introduces a notation of class diagrams and frames to capture the essential characteristics of the system defined by analysis and design. The solution to the problem allows the application of any object-oriented programming language. Common Lisp Object System (CLOS) is the language used for the implementation of the software system included in the appendix. / Department of Computer Science

Most of the work investigating the representation of concrete nouns in the brain has focused on the locations that code the information. We present a model to study the contributions of perceptual and semantic features to the neural code representing concepts over time and space. The model is evaluated using magnetoencephalography data from different paradigms and not only corroborates previous findings regarding a distributed code, but provides further details about how the encoding of different subcomponents varies in the space-time spectrum. The model also successfully generalizes to novel concepts that it has never seen during training, which argues for the combination of specific properties in forming the meaning of concrete nouns in the brain. The results across paradigms are in agreement when the main differences among the experiments (namely, the number of repetitions of the stimulus, the task the subjects performed, and the type of stimulus provided) were taken into consideration. More specifically, these results suggest that features specific to the physical properties of the stimuli, such as word length and right-diagonalness, are encoded in posterior regions of the brain in the first hundreds of milliseconds after stimulus onset. Then, properties inherent to the nouns, such as is it alive? and can you pick it up?, are represented in the signal starting at about 250 ms, focusing on more anterior parts of the cortex. The code for these different features was found to be distributed over time and space, and it was common for several regions to simultaneously code for a particular property. Moreover, most anterior regions were found to code for multiple features, and a complex temporal profile could be observed for the majority of properties. For example, some features inherent to the nouns were encoded earlier than others, and the extent of time in which these properties could be decoded varied greatly among them. These findings complement much of the work previously described in the literature, and offer new insights about the temporal aspects of the neural encoding of concrete nouns. This model provides a spatiotemporal signature of the representation of objects in the brain. Paired with data from carefully-designed paradigms, the model is an important tool with which to analyze the commonalities of the neural code across stimulus modalities and tasks performed by the subjects.

Humans are experts at understanding what they see. Similarity and analogy play a significant role in making sense of the visual world by forming analogies to similar images encountered previously. Yet, while these acts of visual reasoning may be commonplace, the processes of visual analogy are not yet well understood. In this dissertation, I investigate the utility of representing visual information in a fractal manner for computing visual similarity and analogy. In particular, I develop a computational technique of fractal reasoning for addressing problems of visual similarity and novelty. I illustrate the effectiveness of fractal reasoning on problems of visual similarity and analogy on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Miller’s Analogies tests of intelligence, problems of visual novelty and oddity on the Odd One Out test of intelligence, and problems of visual similarity and oddity on the Dehaene test of core geometric reasoning. I show that the performance of my computational model on these various tests is comparable to human performance. Fractal reasoning provides a new method for computing answers to such problems. Specifically, I show that the choice of the level of abstraction of problem representation determines the degree to which an answer may be regarded as confident, and that that choice of abstraction may be controlled automatically by the algorithm as a means of seeking that confident answer. This emergence of ambiguity and its remedy via problem re-representation is afforded by the fractal representation. I also show how reasoning over sparse data (at coarse levels of abstraction) or homogeneous data (at finest levels of abstraction) could both drive the automatic exclusion of certain levels of abstraction, as well as provide a signal to shift the analogical reasoning from consideration of simple analogies (such as analogies between pairs of objects) to more complex analogies (such as analogies among triplets, or larger groups of objects). My dissertation also explores fractal reasoning in perception, including both biologically-inspired imprinting and bistable perception. In particular, it provides a computational explanation of bistable perception in the famous Necker cube problem that is directly tied to the process of determining a confident interpretation via re-representation. Thus, my research makes two primary contributions to AI theories of visual similarity and analogy. The first contribution is the Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) algorithm, the computational technique for visual reasoning that automatically adjusts fractal representations to an appropriate level of abstraction. The second contribution is the fractal representation itself, a knowledge representation that add the notion of self-similarity and re-representation to analogy making.

Abstract With the phenomenal growth of electronic data and information, there are many demands for the development of efficient and effective systems (tools) to perform the issue of data mining tasks on multidimensional databases. Association rules describe associations between items in the same transactions (intra) or in different transactions (inter). Association mining attempts to find interesting or useful association rules in databases: this is the crucial issue for the application of data mining in the real world. Association mining can be used in many application areas, such as the discovery of associations between customers’ locations and shopping behaviours in market basket analysis. Association mining includes two phases. The first phase, called pattern mining, is the discovery of frequent patterns. The second phase, called rule generation, is the discovery of interesting and useful association rules in the discovered patterns. The first phase, however, often takes a long time to find all frequent patterns; these also include much noise. The second phase is also a time consuming activity that can generate many redundant rules. To improve the quality of association mining in databases, this thesis provides an alternative technique, granule-based association mining, for knowledge discovery in databases, where a granule refers to a predicate that describes common features of a group of transactions. The new technique first transfers transaction databases into basic decision tables, then uses multi-tier structures to integrate pattern mining and rule generation in one phase for both intra and inter transaction association rule mining. To evaluate the proposed new technique, this research defines the concept of meaningless rules by considering the co-relations between data-dimensions for intratransaction-association rule mining. It also uses precision to evaluate the effectiveness of intertransaction association rules. The experimental results show that the proposed technique is promising.

This thesis is about logical models of belief (and knowledge) representation and belief change. This means that we propose logical systems which are intended to represent how agents perceive a situation and reason about it, and how they update their beliefs about this situation when events occur. These agents can be machines, robots, human beings. . . but they are assumed to be somehow autonomous. The way a fixed situation is perceived by agents can be represented by statements about the agents� beliefs: for example �agent A believes that the door of the room is open� or �agent A believes that her colleague is busy this afternoon�. �Logical systems� means that agents can reason about the situation and their beliefs about it: if agent A believes that her colleague is busy this afternoon then agent A infers that he will not visit her this afternoon. We moreover often assume that our situations involve several agents which interact between each other. So these agents have beliefs about the situation (such as �the door is open�) but also about the other agents� beliefs: for example agent A might believe that agent B believes that the door is open. These kinds of beliefs are called higher-order beliefs. Epistemic logic [Hintikka, 1962; Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995], the logic of belief and knowledge, can capture all these phenomena and will be our main starting point to model such fixed (�static�) situations. Uncertainty can of course be expressed by beliefs and knowledge: for example agent A being uncertain whether her colleague is busy this afternoon can be expressed by �agent A does not know whether her colleague is busy this afternoon�. But we sometimes need to enrich and refine the representation of uncertainty: for example, even if agent A does not know whether her colleague is busy this afternoon, she might consider it more probable that he is actually busy. So other logics have been developed to deal more adequately with the representation of uncertainty, such as probabilistic logic, fuzzy logic or possibilistic logic, and we will refer to some of them in this thesis (see [Halpern, 2003] for a survey on reasoning about uncertainty). But things become more complex when we introduce events and change in the picture. Issues arise even if we assume that there is a single agent. Indeed, if the incoming information conveyed by the event is coherent with the agent�s beliefs then the agent can just add it to her beliefs. But if the incoming information contradicts the agent�s beliefs then the agent has somehow to revise her beliefs, and as it turns out there is no obvious way to decide what should be her resulting beliefs. Solving this problem was the goal of the logic-based belief revision theory developed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (to which we will refer by the term AGM) [Alchourrón et al., 1985; Gärdenfors, 1988; Gärdenfors and Rott, 1995]. Their idea is to introduce �rationality postulates� that specify which belief revision operations can be considered as being �rational� or reasonable, and then to propose specific revision operations that fulfill these postulates. However, AGM does not consider situations where the agent might also have some uncertainty about the incoming information: for example agent A might be uncertain due to some noise whether her colleague told her that he would visit her on Tuesday or on Thursday. In this thesis we also investigate this kind of phenomenon. Things are even more complex in a multi-agent setting because the way agents update their beliefs depends not only on their beliefs about the event itself but also on their beliefs about the way the other agents perceived the event (and so about the other agents� beliefs about the event). For example, during a private announcement of a piece of information to agent A the beliefs of the other agents actually do not change because they believe nothing is actually happening; but during a public announcement all the agents� beliefs might change because they all believe that an announcement has been made. Such kind of subtleties have been dealt with in a field called dynamic epistemic logic (Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997; Baltag et al., 1998; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007b]. The idea is to represent by an event model how the event is perceived by the agents and then to define a formal update mechanism that specifies how the agents update their beliefs according to this event model and their previous representaton of the situation. Finally, the issues concerning belief revision that we raised in the single agent case are still present in the multi-agent case. So this thesis is more generally about information and information change. However, we will not deal with problems of how to store information in machines or how to actually communicate information. Such problems have been dealt with in information theory [Cover and Thomas, 1991] and Kolmogorov complexity theory [Li and Vitányi, 1993]. We will just assume that such mechanisms are already available and start our investigations from there. Studying and proposing logical models for belief change and belief representation has applications in several areas. First in artificial intelligence, where machines or robots need to have a formal representation of the surrounding world (which might involve other agents), and formal mechanisms to update this representation when they receive incoming information. Such formalisms are crucial if we want to design autonomous agents, able to act autonomously in the real world or in a virtual world (such as on the internet). Indeed, the representation of the surrounding world is essential for a robot in order to reason about the world, plan actions in order to achieve goals... and it must be able to update and revise its representation of the world itself in order to cope autonomously with unexpected events. Second in game theory (and consequently in economics), where we need to model games involving several agents (players) having beliefs about the game and about the other agents� beliefs (such as agent A believes that agent B has the ace of spade, or agent A believes that agent B believes that agent A has the ace of heart...), and how they update their representation of the game when events (such as showing privately a card or putting a card on the table) occur. Third in cognitive psychology, where we need to model as accurately as possible epistemic state of human agents and the dynamics of belief and knowledge in order to explain and describe cognitive processes. The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we first recall epistemic logic. Then we observe that representing an epistemic situation involving several agents depends very much on the modeling point of view one takes. For example, in a poker game the representation of the game will be different depending on whether the modeler is a poker player playing in the game or the card dealer who knows exactly what the players� cards are. In this thesis, we will carefully distinguish these different modeling approaches and the. different kinds of formalisms they give rise to. In fact, the interpretation of a formalism relies quite a lot on the nature of these modeling points of view. Classically, in epistemic logic, the models built are supposed to be correct and represent the situation from an external and objective point of view. We call this modeling approach the perfect external approach. In Chapter 2, we study the modeling point of view of a particular modeler-agent involved in the situation with other agents (and so having a possibly erroneous perception of the situation). We call this modeling approach the internal approach. We propose a logical formalism based on epistemic logic that this agent uses to represent �for herself� the surrounding world. We then set some formal connections between the internal approach and the (perfect) external approach. Finally we axiomatize our logical formalism and show that the resulting logic is decidable. In Chapter 3, we first recall dynamic epistemic logic as viewed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki (to which we will refer by the term BMS). Then we study in which case seriality of the accessibility relations of epistemic models is preserved during an update, first for the full updated model and then for generated submodels of the full updated model. Finally, observing that the BMS formalism follows the (perfect) external approach, we propose an internal version of it, just as we proposed an internal version of epistemic logic in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4, we still follow the internal approach and study the particular case where the event is a private announcement. We first show, thanks to our study in Chapter 3, that in a multi-agent setting, expanding in the AGM style corresponds to performing a private announcement in the BMS style. This indicates that generalizing AGM belief revision theory to a multi-agent setting amounts to study private announcement. We then generalize the AGM representation theorems to the multi-agent case. Afterwards, in the spirit of the AGM approach, we go beyond the AGM postulates and investigate multi-agent rationality postulates specific to our multi-agent setting inspired from the fact that the kind of phenomenon we study is private announcement. Finally we provide an example of revision operation that we apply to a concrete example. In Chapter 5, we follow the (perfect) external approach and enrich the BMS formalism with probabilities. This enables us to provide a fined-grained account of how human agents interpret events involving uncertainty and how they revise their beliefs. Afterwards, we review different principles for the notion of knowledge that have been proposed in the literature and show how some principles that we argue to be reasonable ones can all be captured in our rich and expressive formalism. Finally, we extend our general formalism to a multi-agent setting. In Chapter 6, we still follow the (perfect) external approach and enrich our dynamic epistemic language with converse events. This language is interpreted on structures with accessibility relations for both beliefs and events, unlike the BMS formalism where events and beliefs are not on the same formal level. Then we propose principles relating events and beliefs and provide a complete characterization, which yields a new logic EDL. Finally, we show that BMS can be translated into our new logic EDL thanks to the converse operator: this device enables us to translate the structure of the event model directly within a particular axiomatization of EDL, without having to refer to a particular event model in the language (as done in BMS). In Chapter 7 we summarize our results and give an overview of remaining technical issues and some desiderata for future directions of research. Parts of this thesis are based on publication, but we emphasize that they have been entirely rewritten in order to make this thesis an integrated whole. Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3 of Chapter 4 are based on [Aucher, 2008]. Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 of Chapter 5 are based on [Aucher, 2007]. Chapter 6 is based on [Aucher and Herzig, 2007].

Thesis (Ph.D)--Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. / Committee Chair: Goel, Ashok; Committee Member: Eastman, Charles; Committee Member: Ferguson, Ronald; Committee Member: Glasgow, Janice; Committee Member: Nersessian, Nancy; Committee Member: Ram, Ashwin.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 178-200).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne, Dept. of Computer Science and Software Engineering, 2009. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-185)