O sujeito de direito é uma forma social específica do capitalismo. O seu desenvolvimento completo pode ser verificado apenas em vista do advento de relações de produção que determinam a redução da força de trabalho à forma de mercadoria. A sua universalização é a universalização de sujeitos proprietários de si, que se realizam como sujeitos de direito na medida em que dispõe de si mesmos como mercadorias. Em Kant, pode-se verificar uma concepção imperfeita deste sujeito: o ius realiter personale, que guarda resquícios da produção feudal, permite a posse de um trabalhador como se fosse uma coisa e, assim, implica sacrifício da universalidade da personalidade jurídica. Em Hegel, o sujeito de direito encontra o seu conceito mais desenvolvido, aparece como sujeito capaz de realizar plenamente a sua liberdade pela coisificação e alienação de si mesmo, em sintonia com uma sociedade capitalista já consolidada. Em Marx, por fim, o sujeito de direito pode ter desvelada a sua determinação histórica real e encontra a sua crítica mais contundente no conjunto da crítica da economia política. / The legal subject is a specific social form of capitalism. Its complete development can be achieved only with the advent of relations of productions that require the reduction of labor power to the form of commodity. Its universalization is the universalization of proprietors of themselves that act as legal subjects in so far as dispose of themselves as commodities. In Kant, it is found an imperfect concept of this subject: the ius realiter personale, which retains some remnants of the feudal production, allows the possession of a laborer as if he was a thing and so implies the sacrifice of the universality of the legal personality. In Hegel, the legal subject finds its most developed concept, appearing as a subject able to fully accomplish his freedom through the reification and alienation of himself, in accordance with an already consolidated capitalist society. In Marx, finally, can be unveiled the real historical determination of the legal subject and this form can find its sharpest critic within the overall of the critique of political economy.

O sujeito de direito é uma forma social específica do capitalismo. O seu desenvolvimento completo pode ser verificado apenas em vista do advento de relações de produção que determinam a redução da força de trabalho à forma de mercadoria. A sua universalização é a universalização de sujeitos proprietários de si, que se realizam como sujeitos de direito na medida em que dispõe de si mesmos como mercadorias. Em Kant, pode-se verificar uma concepção imperfeita deste sujeito: o ius realiter personale, que guarda resquícios da produção feudal, permite a posse de um trabalhador como se fosse uma coisa e, assim, implica sacrifício da universalidade da personalidade jurídica. Em Hegel, o sujeito de direito encontra o seu conceito mais desenvolvido, aparece como sujeito capaz de realizar plenamente a sua liberdade pela coisificação e alienação de si mesmo, em sintonia com uma sociedade capitalista já consolidada. Em Marx, por fim, o sujeito de direito pode ter desvelada a sua determinação histórica real e encontra a sua crítica mais contundente no conjunto da crítica da economia política. / The legal subject is a specific social form of capitalism. Its complete development can be achieved only with the advent of relations of productions that require the reduction of labor power to the form of commodity. Its universalization is the universalization of proprietors of themselves that act as legal subjects in so far as dispose of themselves as commodities. In Kant, it is found an imperfect concept of this subject: the ius realiter personale, which retains some remnants of the feudal production, allows the possession of a laborer as if he was a thing and so implies the sacrifice of the universality of the legal personality. In Hegel, the legal subject finds its most developed concept, appearing as a subject able to fully accomplish his freedom through the reification and alienation of himself, in accordance with an already consolidated capitalist society. In Marx, finally, can be unveiled the real historical determination of the legal subject and this form can find its sharpest critic within the overall of the critique of political economy.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:27:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RenataDOF_DISSERT.pdf: 868746 bytes, checksum: 067689295a5629c5bc7d8c741575c19e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-04-12 / This work has the main goal on the recognition of the inherent value of nonhuman animals, under the constitutional framework. It is presented the main philosophical formulations of the current pattern of behavior that rules the relationship between man and animals: first those that have excluded animals from moral consideration and then the thinkers which do have included, in some way, in order to elucidate the origin of the anthropocentric thought over the natural world. In this way, the analysis these thinkers that have included animals in moral consideration will contribute to a paradigm change from the anthropocentric view, initiating legal debates. It will be made a simplified analysis of different philosophical and legal points of view that have been demonstrating the posture in which the human beings have been dealing with the environment, with the replacement of the anthropocentric thinking for the biocentric view, in which life becomes the center of existence. Life is life, no matter whether it is human or not, has a value in itself, and must be protected and respected by the legal system. Then, it will be analized the constitutionalization of the nonhuman animal dignity in comparative law; the infraconstitutional legislation which concerning the intrinsic value of all life forms and, finally, the 1988 Constitution. It will be advocated for non-human animals the condition of subjects, presenting some cases that the Habeas Corpus was used in animal defense. In this new Brazilian Habeas Corpus theory of for apes the argument of genetic proximity was used in order to overcome the literal meaning of natural person to achieve hominids in order to assure the fundamental right of physical freedom. It is realized that the fact that the great apes being recognized as a person does not preclude the possibility of other living beings be recognized as subjects of law. In this way, animals can be considered non-human subjects of law, according to the theory of depersonalized entities and may enjoy a legal category that allows a respect for existential minimum, and can hold constitutional fundamental rights / O presente trabalho aborda o reconhecimento do valor inerente aos animais n?o humanos, sob o marco jur?dico-constitucional. Apresenta as principais formula??es filos?ficas do padr?o de comportamento atual que rege a rela??o do homem com os animais: as que excluem os animais da esfera de considera??o moral e, em seguida, os pensadores que incluem, de alguma forma, com a finalidade de esclarecer a origem do pensamento antropoc?ntrico lan?ado sobre o mundo natural. Dessa forma, a an?lise dos pensadores que inclu?ram os animais na esfera de considera??o moral contribuir? para a mudan?a paradigm?tica da vis?o antropoc?ntrica, iniciando os debates jur?dicos. Buscou-se uma an?lise simplificada das v?rias correntes filos?ficas e jur?dicas que demonstram a postura com que o ser humano vem lidando com o meio ambiente; com a substitui??o do pensamento antropoc?ntrico pela vis?o bioc?ntrica, na qual a vida passa a ser o centro da exist?ncia. Vida ? vida, n?o interessando se ? humana ou n?o, possui um valor em si mesma, e deve ser tutelada e respeitada pela ordem jur?dica. Em seguida, a constitucionaliza??o da dignidade do animal n?o humano no direito comparado; as normas infraconstitucionais que abordam a tem?tica do valor intr?nseco de todas as formas de vida e, por ?ltimo, a Constitui??o de 1988. Prop?em em favor dos n?o humanos a condi??o de sujeitos de direitos, apresentando alguns casos pr?ticos com a utiliza??o do rem?dio constitucional do Habeas Corpus na defesa animal. Nessa nova teoria brasileira do Habeas Corpus para os grandes primatas, o argumento da proximidade gen?tica, foi utilizado com o intuito de ultrapassar o sentido literal de pessoa natural, para alcan?ar os homin?deos, a fim de lhes assegurar o direito fundamental da liberdade corporal. Constata que o fato de os grandes primatas serem reconhecidos como pessoa n?o impede que outros seres vivos possam ser reconhecidos como sujeitos de direito. Sob esse ?ngulo, os animais podem ser considerados sujeitos de direito n?o humanos despersonificados, de acordo com a teoria dos entes despersonalizados, podendo usufruir de uma categoria jur?dica que possibilite um respeito m?nimo existencial, podendo ser titulares de direitos subjetivos fundamentais no ?mbito constitucional

The composite right to meaningful and informed participation in the criminal process comprises the right to information, the right to understand, the right to be prepared, the right to be present, the right to confrontation and the right to present one’s case. The sub-rights are not of an overarching nature such as the right to legal representation and the right of access to the law. The various rights are grouped together because they show some connection with the ability of the suspect or the accused to participate in the criminal proceedings as a legal subject, and not as an object of the proceedings as in primitive times. These rights ensure that the accused will not participate in the criminal process from an unfavourable position. The heading ‟meaningful and informed participation” is therefore a collective term for these rights. These sub-rights form part of the comprehensive right to a fair trial. The thesis examines aspects of the position of the accused in South Africa and in foreign jurisdictions such as the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom and Islamic systems. International instruments such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee are also considered. The thesis first considers the historical perspective of the accused in primitive times when he was regarded as an object of the criminal proceedings, to the present time when he is regarded as a subject of the proceedings. The study on foreign jurisdictions reveals that for the most part, our law is in line with the law of other countries. The study also demonstrates that the various rights are not absolute. In exceptional circumstances, some diminution of the accused’s rights is necessary to protect the interests of society. Nevertheless, the courts should act cautiously and not allow the exceptions to overtake the rule. The judiciary should strive to find a better balance between the constitutional rights of the accused and the interests of society. To this end, the judicial system must be objective yet vigilant. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.D.

Title The legal status of the embryo from the perspective of European human rights protection Abstract The thesis addresses the question regarding the legal status of the human embryo in European law. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate whether the embryo stands in the position of a legal object or legal subject and whether the legal status of embryo is in compliance with natural law. For this purpose the thesis firstly defines the status in the field of natural law, i.e. the moral status of embryo. Afterwards, the thesis examines the legal position of embryo in human rights protection. The thesis answers the question whether the embryo is subject of human rights documents. The legal status of embryo is analyzed in relation to the subjectivity of human rights in general as well as in relation to specific rights. The interpretation of legal terms "human being" and "everyone" contribute to a better understanding of legal status of embryo in general. The analysis of the specific rights, namely the right to life, human dignity, personal integrity and non-discrimination, shows the complexity of the potential legal subjectivity of embryo in the area of human rights. The evaluation of the legal status of human embryo in the area of human rights protection is complemented by an assessment of legal status in other...

The composite right to meaningful and informed participation in the criminal process comprises the right to information, the right to understand, the right to be prepared, the right to be present, the right to confrontation and the right to present one’s case. The sub-rights are not of an overarching nature such as the right to legal representation and the right of access to the law. The various rights are grouped together because they show some connection with the ability of the suspect or the accused to participate in the criminal proceedings as a legal subject, and not as an object of the proceedings as in primitive times. These rights ensure that the accused will not participate in the criminal process from an unfavourable position. The heading ‟meaningful and informed participation” is therefore a collective term for these rights. These sub-rights form part of the comprehensive right to a fair trial. The thesis examines aspects of the position of the accused in South Africa and in foreign jurisdictions such as the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom and Islamic systems. International instruments such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee are also considered. The thesis first considers the historical perspective of the accused in primitive times when he was regarded as an object of the criminal proceedings, to the present time when he is regarded as a subject of the proceedings. The study on foreign jurisdictions reveals that for the most part, our law is in line with the law of other countries. The study also demonstrates that the various rights are not absolute. In exceptional circumstances, some diminution of the accused’s rights is necessary to protect the interests of society. Nevertheless, the courts should act cautiously and not allow the exceptions to overtake the rule. The judiciary should strive to find a better balance between the constitutional rights of the accused and the interests of society. To this end, the judicial system must be objective yet vigilant. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.D.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Beatriz de Souza Cabezas.pdf: 803647 bytes, checksum: 85f05d629b166959e8a55f413dbe6496 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-28 / This paper outlines judicial criteria related to social and educational judicial measures and analyses their similarities and differences in relation to criminal penalties. As a consequence, both constitutional rules and legal rules other than those within the Constitution have been studied, ranging from the so-called Ordenações Filipinas up to the Children and Adolescents Act; Brazilian jurisprudence of the past 10 years as well as the way Criminal Law relates to this paper s theme. The results attained demonstrate that (1) there is juvenile criminal liability with specific characteristics and a particular set of principles; (2) non-recognition of such juvenile criminal liability hinders the access and permanence of teenagers in the system of legal guarantees and prevents materialization and onset of public policies; (3) both the under ageoriented judicial way of thinking among Brazilian judges and their inclination towards punishment gives rise to legally arbitrary social and educational measures, based on judges personal views and their particular understanding of the Law, which, in turn, produces judicial decisions without any relation to their main goal, that is to say, teenagers pedagogical needs; (4) lack of infrastructure for the execution of social and educational judicial measures in Brazilian cities is also a contributing factor which leads to non-compliance to legal criteria whenever such measures are adopted; (5) interpretation and effectiveness of the Children and Adolescents Act currently face challenges that need to be overcome, be it through judges changing their mentality, be it through the creation of new structures that enable social and educational measures, in order to establish teenagers as legal subjects in a peculiar state of development / A presente dissertação teve por objetivo estabelecer os critérios judiciais de aplicação das medidas socioeducativas, analisando as peculiaridades e diferenciações destes com relação às penas. Para tanto, analisou-se a legislação constitucional e infraconstitucional relacionada à matéria desde as Ordenações Filipinas até o Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente e a jurisprudência de nossos Tribunais nos últimos 10 anos, bem como a intersecção do tema com relação ao Direito Penal. Os resultados alcançados revelam que: 1) existe uma responsabilidade penal juvenil com nuances próprias e principiologia específica; 2) o não-reconhecimento desta responsabilidade penal inviabiliza o acesso e permanência dos adolescentes no sistema de garantias de direitos, a materialização das políticas públicas e sua operacionalização; 3) a cultura menorista e ao mesmo tempo punitiva dos juízes brasileiros gera a imposição de medidas socioeducativas sem parâmetros legais, ao sabor da convicção pessoal de cada magistrado, sua peculiar leitura da lei e compreensão do tema, acarretando a imposição de medidas sem qualquer correlação com sua finalidade precípua, ou seja, a necessidade pedagógica do adolescente; 4) a ausência de infra-estrutura para execução das medidas socioeducativas nas Comarcas brasileiras também é um dos principais fatores que levam a não-observação dos critérios legais para a aplicação de tais medidas; 4) há uma crise de interpretação e implementação do ECA que urge ser resolvida, seja como uma mudança da mentalidade dos magistrados, seja com a criação de uma nova estrutura que possibilite o cumprimento das medidas socioeducativas, e para que se erija o adolescente como real sujeito de direito em peculiar condição de desenvolvimento