There is little question that Hobbes's Leviathan and Behemoth are largely responding to the civil conflicts that were tearing seventeenth-century England apart, but scholars disagree in their interpretations of Hobbes's diagnosis and prescription for the civil war. Complementing previous interpretations, my MA thesis suggests that Hobbes also traces the source of the civil conflicts to Western philosophical tradition (WPT) itself both methodologically and substantially. Methodologically, ancient Western philosophers do not start their ratiocination process with definitions of the terms used, and Hobbes argues that this lack of adequate method leads to all kinds of absurdities and consequently a whole false reference world. This critique is largely based on Hobbes's materialist accounts of philosophy and mind. Substantially, Hobbes suggests that Aristotle's natural, moral and civil philosophies in particular contribute to the chaotic opinions and the civil conflicts. After detecting this source, Hobbes undertakes perhaps the most ambitious endeavor to exorcise the demon of the tradition in Western history, by radically scientizing the philosophical tradition and establishing a science of politics.

There is little question that Hobbes's Leviathan and Behemoth are largely responding to the civil conflicts that were tearing seventeenth-century England apart, but scholars disagree in their interpretations of Hobbes's diagnosis and prescription for the civil war. Complementing previous interpretations, my MA thesis suggests that Hobbes also traces the source of the civil conflicts to Western philosophical tradition (WPT) itself both methodologically and substantially. Methodologically, ancient Western philosophers do not start their ratiocination process with definitions of the terms used, and Hobbes argues that this lack of adequate method leads to all kinds of absurdities and consequently a whole false reference world. This critique is largely based on Hobbes's materialist accounts of philosophy and mind. Substantially, Hobbes suggests that Aristotle's natural, moral and civil philosophies in particular contribute to the chaotic opinions and the civil conflicts. After detecting this source, Hobbes undertakes perhaps the most ambitious endeavor to exorcise the demon of the tradition in Western history, by radically scientizing the philosophical tradition and establishing a science of politics.

There is little question that Hobbes's Leviathan and Behemoth are largely responding to the civil conflicts that were tearing seventeenth-century England apart, but scholars disagree in their interpretations of Hobbes's diagnosis and prescription for the civil war. Complementing previous interpretations, my MA thesis suggests that Hobbes also traces the source of the civil conflicts to Western philosophical tradition (WPT) itself both methodologically and substantially. Methodologically, ancient Western philosophers do not start their ratiocination process with definitions of the terms used, and Hobbes argues that this lack of adequate method leads to all kinds of absurdities and consequently a whole false reference world. This critique is largely based on Hobbes's materialist accounts of philosophy and mind. Substantially, Hobbes suggests that Aristotle's natural, moral and civil philosophies in particular contribute to the chaotic opinions and the civil conflicts. After detecting this source, Hobbes undertakes perhaps the most ambitious endeavor to exorcise the demon of the tradition in Western history, by radically scientizing the philosophical tradition and establishing a science of politics. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Hobbes' argument in Leviathan can be viewed as a response to the question of why rational human beings should choose to organize themselves into a state. In Hobbes' words, the argument, in large part, attempts to establish the 'causes' of a 'commonwealth'. However, the fact of the matter is that human beings do not organize themselves into a. state; rather, they organize themselves into a plurality of states. The question then becomes one of determining — again in Hobbes' words — the 'causes' of a plurality of 'commonwealths'. In other words, why do rational human beings choose to organize themselves into separate states? It is not clear to me that Hobbes' answered this question; nor is it clear to me that Hobbes' arguments can be extended in order to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Since international theory is concerned with the plurality of states, it seems reasonable to suppose that an 'Hobbesian' tradition in international thought would have provided at least some insight into the question of the 'causes' of such a plurality. In other words, an 'Hobbesian' tradition in international thought must have at least considered why it is that several Leviathans would emerge from the state of nature. However, having examined the current conception of the 'Hobbesian' tradition, I found that it was simply the 'realist' tradition under a different label; a tradition to which Hobbes' name had been appropriated. Furthermore, I found that the appropriation of Hobbes' name was justified on the basis of his chapter 13 analogy which compared— albeit in a limited way — his theoretical inference of the state of nature with his observations of relations among sovereigns. I argue that the analogy, being neither a definition nor an inference, has no theoretical relationship with Hobbes' main argument; in which case it cannot form the basis of a genuine Hobbesian tradition. Having established that the current Hobbesian tradition is not a genuine one, I propose that a genuine tradition should a least render an account of the emergence of several Levaithans from the state of nature and conclude that this cannot be done without compromising Hobbes' account of the state. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Thomas Hobbes first law of nature states that 'each rational man shall and ought to endeavor peace'. Simultaneously, Hobbes first law of nature is perhaps the antithesis of his conception of man in nature (homo naturalis), where man is simply defined as an animal residing in an amoral and arbitrary environment in which every notion of "right and wrong" are connected to the individual's capacity for self-maximizing rationality. In turn, the social creature - zoon politikon - is the contradiction of Hobbes' homo naturalis: he is the impersonated restraint of the impulses and passions that leads him away from a life of an unending state of war into a moral and social community. Hobbes' social and moral creature is the result of a transition involving the creation of a social contract between an arbiter and the masses, binding them together in a shared fate: the excommunication of war and fear into the installment of peace and security. This essay addresses the transition of Hobbes conception of homo naturalis to his implicit understanding of zoon politikon; the transition from the amoral to the moral man. What implications does such a transition have for the egoistic-rational creature? What political and moral obligations are to be found between man and man, and between man and state? Finally, what is rational for the social creature to demand of the state?

“‘King Hereafter’” posits Shakespearean theater as a gateway between Reformation England’s suppressed desire to rid itself of monarchy and that desire’s expression in the 1649 execution of King Charles I. Specifically, I argue that Macbeth darkly manifests a latent Protestant fantasy in which the kings of the earth are toppled in a millenarian coup. Revolution- and Restoration-era writers John Milton and William Davenant attempt to liberate or further repress Macbeth’s apocalyptic republicanism when they invoke the play for their respective causes. Shakespeare’s text resists appropriation, however, pointing up the blind spots in whatever form of sovereignty it is enlisted to support. I first analyze Macbeth (1606) in its original historical context to show how it offers an immanent critique of James I’s prophetic persona. Macbeth’s tragic foreknowledge of his own supersession by Banquo’s heirs mirrors James’s paradoxical effort to ground his kingship on apocalyptic promises of the demise of earthly sovereignty. Shakespeare’s regicidal fantasy would be largely repressed into the English political unconscious during the pre-war years, until John Milton drew out the play’s antimonarchical subtext in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649). Yet the specter of an undead King Charles, I argue in chapter two, haunts Milton just as Banquo’s ghost vexes Macbeth because Milton’s populist theory of legitimate rule continues to define sovereignty as the right to arbitrary violence. In chapter three, I show how Sir William Davenant’s Restoration revision of Macbeth (c.1664) reclaims the play for the Stuart regime by dramatizing Hobbes’s critique of prophetic enthusiasm. In enlarging upon Macduff’s insurgency against the tyrant Macbeth, however, Davenant merely displaces the rebellious potential of the rogue prophet onto the deciding sovereign citizen. Finally, my fourth chapter argues for Milton’s late-career embrace of Shakespearean equivocation as a tool of liberty in Samson Agonistes (1671). Samson’s death “self-killed” and “immixed” among his foes in a scene of apocalyptic destruction challenges the Hobbesian emphasis on self-preservation and the hierarchical structures on which sovereignty itself depends for coherence. Milton’s mature eschatological vision of the end of sovereignty coincides with his artistic acceptance of the semantic and generic ambiguities of Shakespearean drama. / text

Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-27T13:48:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MARCINA DE BARROS SEVERINO.pdf: 1506200 bytes, checksum: 49725ed204fc403feb33199611c8691b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-11 / This paper proposes a reflection on the origin of the power of the Hobbesian Leviathan, investigating to what extent this power set is sacred and to what extent is configured profane the work Leviathan and other works of Hobbes. The text begins with an analysis of the image used by Hobbes to represent the state. Hobbes Leviathan evokes the religious symbol to enforce obedience to his subjects. The Leviathan is the people based on the social contract, a contract driven by fear of violent death and is kept out of fear of the coercive power of the state. The Leviathan monster inspires fear and dread, since only the reason is not enough for the people to accept the absolute sovereignty of the Leviathan. Beside the power positively valued by the state is necessary to use symbolic language to strengthen his power. It is understood that the theological influences present in the work Leviathan underpinning to maintain the power of the sovereign. / Este trabalho propõe uma reflexão sobre a origem do poder do Leviatã hobbesiano, investigando até que ponto este poder configura-se sagrado e até que ponto configura-se profano na obra Leviatã e em outras obras de Hobbes. O texto inicia-se com a análise da imagem utilizada por Hobbes para representar o Estado. Hobbes evoca o símbolo religioso Leviatã para impor a obediência aos súditos. O Leviatã representa o povo com base no contrato social, um contrato impulsionado pelo medo da morte violenta e que é mantido com base no medo do poder coercitivo do Estado. O monstro Leviatã inspira medo e temor, já que só a razão não é suficiente para que o povo aceite a soberania absoluta do Leviatã. Ao lado da força positivada do Estado é necessário recorrer à linguagem simbólica para reforçar o seu poder. Entende-se que as influências teológicas presentes na obra O Leviatã servem de fundamento para manter o poder do soberano.

This thesis examines the question of how primitive states form. The first part of the thesis defines a state. I then analyse Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Acquisition (TCA), expounded in Leviathan. I conclude that this theory fails as an answer to the question of how primitive states form as it suffers from at least five major flaws. I go on to explain, modify and correct Hobbes�s TCA through techniques that have been used in modern critiques of Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Institution. The result is the strongest possible answer that Hobbes can give to the question of how primitive states form. I conclude that his attempt fails as even if the technical aspects of his theory can be fixed, the overall problem of empirical falsification occurs. I then put forward my own theory, based on the modified Hobbesian theory. The major innovation is the replacement of individuals with groups in the Hobbesian State of Nature. This move answers the problem of empirical falsification, at least initially. The theory also helps to explain several of the more technical problems with Hobbes�s theory. The resulting theory is a Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. The next step in the thesis is to match the Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation to the empirical evidence of primitive state formation, represented by anthropology. I analyse the anthropological literature and put forward that at least one recent research program in anthropology matches my Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. I conclude that Hobbesian theory, based on the TCA can be successfully modernised into a plausible answer to the question of how primitive states formed.

The period of English history between the second Civil War and the Restoration opened up seemingly unlimited possibilities for shaping the country�s future. The period likewise witnessed an unprecedented surge of political imagination, a development which is particularly visible in Interregnum utopianism. More than ever before, utopianism orientates itself to a hopeful and expectant reality. It is no longer fictional or contemplative. Its ambitions and fulfilment are political; there is a drive towards active political participation. Utopianism reshapes its former boundaries and reinvents itself as reality utopianism. Considering this new reality-orientated identity, the utopias of the 1650s are especially useful in providing an insight into the political imagination of this period. This thesis studies three reality utopias of the 1650s: Winstanley�s The Law of Freedom, Harrington�s Oceana and Hobbes�s Leviathan. Each work represents a uniquely different utopian vision: Winstanley imagines an agrarian communism, Harrington revives classical republicanism, and Hobbes stresses absolute sovereignty. These three different utopian visions not only illustrate the range of the political imagination; they provide an opportunity to examine different ways to deal with the existing political and social concerns of the Interregnum and different perspectives for ideal solutions. Interregnum utopianism is shaped by the expectations and violence of the English Revolution and accordingly it is characterised by the heightened hopes and fears of its time. Despite substantial differences in the three utopias, the elemental hopes and fears expressed in these works remain similar. The hope for change and a better future is negotiated textually with a fear of anarchy and violence. In the end a compromise between opportunity and security has to be found. It is this compromise that shapes the face of Interregnum utopianism and reflects a major aspect of the post-revolutionary political imagination in England.

This thesis examines the question of how primitive states form. The first part of the thesis defines a state. I then analyse Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Acquisition (TCA), expounded in Leviathan. I conclude that this theory fails as an answer to the question of how primitive states form as it suffers from at least five major flaws. I go on to explain, modify and correct Hobbes�s TCA through techniques that have been used in modern critiques of Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Institution. The result is the strongest possible answer that Hobbes can give to the question of how primitive states form. I conclude that his attempt fails as even if the technical aspects of his theory can be fixed, the overall problem of empirical falsification occurs. I then put forward my own theory, based on the modified Hobbesian theory. The major innovation is the replacement of individuals with groups in the Hobbesian State of Nature. This move answers the problem of empirical falsification, at least initially. The theory also helps to explain several of the more technical problems with Hobbes�s theory. The resulting theory is a Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. The next step in the thesis is to match the Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation to the empirical evidence of primitive state formation, represented by anthropology. I analyse the anthropological literature and put forward that at least one recent research program in anthropology matches my Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. I conclude that Hobbesian theory, based on the TCA can be successfully modernised into a plausible answer to the question of how primitive states formed.