No description available.

No description available.

Zugl.: Konstanz, Universiẗat, Magisterarbeit, 2006.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Leipzig, 1907. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-100).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität zu Bonn, 1898. / Vita.

Inaug.-diss.--Leipzig. / Lebenslauf. Includes bibliographical references.

In this thesis I propose that Alain Locke’s pluralistic cosmopolitanism can serve as a middle ground between integrationist and separatist measurements of racial progress. Using Gary Peller’s article “Race-Consciousness” as a focal point, I argue that Locke’s philosophy can adequately address concerns held by both integrationists and separatists. In Chapter One, I lay out the historical foundations and subsequent debate between integrationists and separatists, and analyze Peller’s challenge of integrationist ideologies of the sixties and seventies. Using his article to highlight the often-neglected separatist position, Chapter Two then proposes Locke’s pluralistic cosmopolitanism as a potential middle ground for addressing separatists’ concerns with integrationist ideology and vice versa. Locke’s emphasis on unity in diversity, his three working principles—cultural equivalence, cultural reciprocity, and limited cultural convertibility—his critical relativism, and his heavy involvement with the Harlem Renaissance makes his philosophical approach useful in addressing concerns not only of black separatists/nationalists but integrationists as well.

No description available.

<p> In chapter five of the Second Treatise, John Locke explains that every man's natural right in his person and his person's labour gives him an exclusive right over whatever he removes from the natural common by his labour vdthout the __ consent of all the other commoners. This natural appropriation initially has two limits. First, everyone is entitled to have as much property as he can use before it spoils. Second, each appropriation must leave enough and as good in common for others. These limits give everyone direct access to nature and restrict each man's property. </p> <p> At section thirty-six of the Second Treatise, however, Locke states that the invention of money alters original appropriation. Since money does not spoil, men may acquire as much property in it as they desire with the consequence that men now begin to acquire more of everything, especially land, than they themselves can use. Soon there is no longer enough and as good land left in common for everyone. Can men move to a mode of appropriation which does not leave sufficient land in common for all?</p> <p> Leo Strauss and C. B. Macpherson argue that according to Locke, once men introduce money they consent to transcend the limits to appropriation and move to unlimited individual appropriation. James Tully and John Dunn oppose this interpretation. Dunn argues that the notion that men may acquire property without limit contradicts Locke's view that a man's labour is his way to eternal salvation. Tully argues that once the sufficiency proviso is violated, natural appropriation in the state of nature becomes disfunctional, and men must move to reconstitute in civil society the natural mode of limited appropriation. </p> <p> This study compares and contrasts the main lines of each author's argument with respect to unlimited appropriation, and how each author employs key passages in Locke's works to support his position. This reveals how key passages in Locke's works can have radically different meaning for different interpreters. Rather than attempt to arrive at a new interpretation of Locke on property, my intention is to set side by side two opposed views of the significance of Locke's theory of property, and hence systematize a small part of the vast body of literature on Locke on property.</p> / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

In thin paper I shall examine the problem of personal Identity ns dealt with by John Locke. There are related issues that set the groundwork for his discussion of the personal identity problem. These issues include 'person' in the technical sense ns distinct from ’man,' the relation of eta terial and immaterial substance, the nature of mind, and consciousness.