The Coinage Bill of 1816 was a turning point in monetary history, establishing Britain on the gold standard and making provision for a major recoinage and exchange of silver. The intention in this thesis has been to examine why the reform happened when it did, what its legacy was for the nineteenth century and what the surviving records, particularly of the exchange, reveal about the nature of the circulating medium. In Chapters 1 and 2 the eighteenth-century background is explored in order to clarify why government chose to allow the condition of the silver coinage to decline. The argument is advanced that economic stability for many years lessened the necessity for reform and the importance of gold in the economy made ministers wary of damaging its position through change. An investigation into the wear of silver coins has also been conducted which demonstrates that by the 1780s they were likely to have lost virtually all trace of design details. The reasons why reform was enacted in 1816 are discussed in Chapter 3, the explanation offered being the importance of war with France having ended and the Bank of England's needing to prepare for the resumption of redeeming its notes in gold. In Chapter 4 the political reputation of William Wellesley Pole is assessed together with his contribution to the recoinage, while in Chapters 5 and 6 the administration of the reform is described and analysed in detail. The traditional view of its being a success is confirmed by new research. The accounts from exchange stations set up to effect the change-over, listed in Appendices 3 and 4, and discussed in Chapter 6, reveal that although there were trading centres and manufacturing areas in which the old silver currency was concentrated, it was nevertheless fairly well distributed across Britain. I have attempted throughout to link the silver coinage to the other elements of the money supply. This approach is particularly evident in Chapter 7 in which the impact of the political and economic forces pressing for a resumption of cash payments are seen to shape the survival of the settlement of 1816-17.

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Ce travail cherche à défendre une théorie objectiviste des couleurs en conciliant deux thèses tenues habituellement pour incompatibles : le physicalisme, selon lequel les couleurs sont des propriétés physiques décrites par la science, et la thèse de la révélation, selon laquelle la nature des couleurs est révélée par l’expérience. Ces deux thèses sont tenues pour inconciliables parce que les couleurs se présentent comme des qualités, alors que la science traite de quantités. Après être revenu sur l’histoire du problème en montrant comment on peut comprendre la controverse moderne sur les qualités secondes à partir de la thèse de la révélation, je montre comment comprendre cette dernière thèse et je soutiens que toute théorie plausible des couleurs doit soutenir la révélation. Je soutiens que les couleurs sont des événements transitoires, et non pas des propriétés permanentes des objets. La lumière ne se contente pas de révéler la couleur des objets, mais la produit : les couleurs sont des effets de l'interaction de la lumière avec l'objet ou, quand il s'agit de sources primaires de lumière, des événements se produisant en leur sein. Cette thèse semble offrir une réponse, au moins partielle, à des arguments classiques à l'encontre de l'objectivité des couleurs, notamment certaines versions de l'argument de la relativité. Surtout, cette catégorisation nouvelle des couleurs permet de concilier les descriptions qualitatives et chromatiques des couleurs avec leurs descriptions quantitatives et physiques, permettant ainsi de concilier l’image manifeste et l’image scientifique du monde. / This work tries to defend an objectivist theory of colour by a reconciliation of two theses generally considered as incompatible: physicalism, the theory that colours are scientific properties of objects, and revelation, the thesis that the nature of a colour is revealed by an experience of this colour. Those theses are considered as incompatible because colours are presented as qualities, while science is only about quantities. After a chapter about the history of the problem, showing how we can understand the modern controversy on secondary qualities thanks to the revelation thesis, I show how to understand revelation, distinguishing it from phenomenology, and claim that a correct theory of colour must support revelation. After that, I argue that colours are transitory events, not standing properties: light produce colours, which are effects of the interaction of light with matter or, for primary light sources, events happening in them. This thesis gives a partial answer to some arguments against objectivism, notably variability arguments. Above all, this new categorization of colour reconciles the qualitative chromatic descriptions of colours with their quantitative physical descriptions, thus allowing reconciliation between the manifest and the scientific images of the world.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-27T13:48:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ANTONIO SEVERINO DE AGUIAR NETO.pdf: 1179897 bytes, checksum: db638f53ee8efc6bbda61bd65283e2d7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-11 / Religious freedom was one of the most debated topics in the seventeenth century in England. This issue was closely related to the extent of the problem of civil jurisdiction or even the relationship between the civil power and ecclesiastical power. The philosopher of Wrington, John Locke, actively participated in the discussions of the time. He devoted several writings to the subject, including the Charter on Tolerance (1689). Our research suggests that the Lockean tolerance is outlined above all, by political issues and not exclusively religious, as is advocated by many. The issue of tolerance with regard to defense and the preservation of the natural rights of men, called Locke in his Second Treatise on Government, such as the right to property. For this reason, at first, we stop to speak about the civil state, as this will constitute the reference framework for our considerations about tolerance. Then we try to talk about the excessive entanglement, presented by Locke in his Letter, between the religious sphere and politics, which resulted in the full enjoyment of these rights to some and deprivation or denial of these to others. And lastly, we demonstrate that tolerance is not something to be unrestricted grant, for any person or group acting against equal enjoyment and free of natural rights should be excluded from tolerance. / A liberdade religiosa foi um dos temas mais debatidos no século XVII, na Inglaterra. Essa questão estava intimamente relacionada com o problema da extensão da jurisdição civil ou, ainda, da relação entre o poder civil e o poder eclesiástico. O filósofo de Wrington, John Locke, participou ativamente das discussões da época. Ele dedicou vários escritos ao tema, entre eles a Carta sobre Tolerância (1689). Nossa pesquisa sugere que a tolerância lockeana é delineada, antes de tudo, por questões de natureza política e não exclusivamente religiosa, como é defendida por muitos. A questão da tolerância diz respeito a defesa e a preservação dos direitos naturais dos homens, designado por Locke, em seu Segundo Tratado sobre o Governo, como o direito à propriedade. Por esse motivo, em um primeiro momento, nos detemos em dissertar sobre o Estado civil, visto que este se constituirá como o quadro referencial para nossas considerações acerca da Tolerância. Em seguida, procuramos discorrer sobre o entrelaçamento desmedido, apresentado por Locke em sua Carta, entre a esfera religiosa e a política, que resultavam no usufruto pleno desses direitos a uns e a privação ou a negação destes, a outros. E, por último, demonstramos que a tolerância não é algo que se deva conceder irrestritamente, pois, qualquer pessoa ou grupo que atentem contra usufruto igual e livre dos direitos naturais devem ser excluídos da tolerância.

Esta dissertação reserva-se à analise do conceito de intradutibilidade presente na teoria da linguagem desenvolvida por John Locke, no Livro III, das palavras, de seu Ensaio sobre o entendimento humano, de 1690. Essa teoria visa rejeitar conceitos em voga no séc. XVII, especialmente o inatismo, advogando em favor do argumento de que o entendimento é adquirido por meio da experiência sensorial, sendo esta particular a cada indivíduo. Nesse sentido, a forma como as ideias são apreendidas na mente de cada indivíduo é também particular; a linguagem, portanto, é vista pelo autor como o instrumento responsável por socializar essas ideias particulares e permitir a comunicação. Entretanto, somada à crítica ao inatismo, Locke, no Livro III, questiona i. o emprego abusivo das palavras no contexto científico, ao elencar uma série de ações realizadas por debatedores para impressionar seu ouvinte muito mais do que transmitir um conhecimento e refletir sobre a Verdade e ii. a natureza imperfeita das palavras que compõem a linguagem especialmente devido ao seu comportamento arbitrário, ou seja, sua relação com as ideias que devem representar não é natural, mas imposta pelo homem. Ademais, Locke afirma, também como contraposição às discussões da época, haver duas essências: a nominal, acessível à nossa apreensão e delimitada pelas palavras, e a real, cuja totalidade é inapreensível pela experiência e, por extensão, pelas palavras. Assim, ao defender a intradutibilidade, argumenta em favor de um novo método de investigação filosófica, que leva em consideração a particularidade do falante, a arbitrariedade na relação entre as palavras e as ideias e a impossibilidade de 7 se acessar a realidade em sua totalidade. A afirmação da intradutibilidade não exclui a prática da tradução, reconhecida por John Locke no mesmo livro III, defende apenas o supracitado. Por isso, esta dissertação também apresenta uma tradução desse Livro III para uma demonstração prática da teoria predicada por esse autor e uma reflexão das escolhas realizadas no intuito de adequar-se aos argumentos levantados e analisados ao longo de toda a dissertação. / It is intended to analyse the concept of translatability in John Lockes theory of language, which is developed in the Book III, of words, of his Essay concerning human understanding, in 1690. He rejects the 17th century scholars and the inatism theory claiming that the knowledge is apprehended by sense experiences, which are particular to each one. Hence the ideas are also particular, the language, by that means, is the main instrument used by the humans to convey their thoughts and whose chief end is communication. Locke also rejects other two things: i. the abuse of words causing obscure discourses whose only purpose is to impress the hearer, not to present the truth and ii. the imperfection inherent to the nature of words, because its relation to the ideas is arbitrary and not based on any pattern in nature. Thus, Locke arguments that there are two types of essences: a nominal defined by words and a real, which is impossible to describe, because we have only access to reality through our senses. By defending intranslatability Locke is actually defending a new philosophical method which includes the fact that language is particular to each speaker, the arbitrary relation between words and ideas and the impossibility to comprehend thoroughly reality. However it does not excludes translation itself, recognized by Locke in the same Book III; translating it portrays his theory and proposes a debate concerning the choices made to better convey his view.

Ce mémoire a pour objectif de présenter le rôle des idées dans la connaissance singulière chez John Locke. Les « idées » constituent la pierre angulaire de la théorie de la connaissance chez Locke. Selon lui, la connaissance est la « perception d'une liaison » de concordance ou de discordance entre les idées. L'idée est, pour lui, le matériau de notre connaissance. Le rôle des idées dans la connaissance singulière est de nous représenter les existants réels. Les idées singulières sont reçues et perçues par l'esprit pour former des propositions singulières. La perception de la liaison de concordance ou de discordance entre les idées constitue la connaissance singulière ou la connaissance générale. Dès lors le rôle des idées consiste à faire connaître les êtres qui existent, à établir une correspondance entre le sujet connaissant et la réalité extérieure. L'idée en tant que fondement épistémologique est le principe de toute connaissance et, précisément, de la connaissance singulière. Nous utiliserons la principale oeuvre de Locke, à savoir l'Essai sur l'entendement humain, pour réaliser cette étude. Il s'agit donc de réexaminer la pensée de Locke en épistémologie en reconstruisant les concepts du corpus de sa théorie de la connaissance sous l'angle spécifique du rôle que jouent les idées dans la connaissance singulière. Pour réaliser cette étude, nous procéderons à une analyse systématique en exposant d'abord, dans une première partie, le cadre conceptuel de la théorie lockienne des idées, puis, dans une seconde partie, nous montrerons en quoi celles-ci consistent dans la connaissance singulière. Dans la première partie du mémoire, nous présentons, la conception lockienne des idées en montrant leur origine sensible. Pour montrer le caractère sensible des idées, nous utilisons particulièrement le livre 2 de l'Essai sur l'Entendement humain. Dans le chapitre 1, nous présentons les deux sources de la connaissance. Nous discutons, ensuite, dans le chapitre 2, la cause des idées tout en nous attachant à montrer que les idées sont causées par les pouvoirs des objets extérieurs que Locke appelle qualités. Et, dans le chapitre 3, nous analysons les opérations de l'esprit en montrant le rôle des idées en général. Après l'analyse de la théorie des idées, nous essayons de montrer comment les idées se déterminent en connaissance, dans la connaissance singulière, ce qui constitue l'objet des chapitres de la seconde partie. Le livre 4 de L'Essai sur l'entendement humain est ici notre référence principale. Dans notre chapitre 4, nous tentons de définir la connaissance singulière. Dans le chapitre 5, nous analysons la connaissance de l'existence des êtres réels en montrant le rapport des idées aux choses existantes et la certitude. Ensuite, dans le chapitre 6, nous examinons les limites de la connaissance singulière liées à l'impossibilité de connaître la substance. Et, enfin, dans le chapitre 7, nous pouvons avancer ce qui nous apparaît être la position sceptique de Locke en épistémologie. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Philosophie, Épistémologie, Connaissance, Idée, Existence, Êtres réels, Locke.