Diss.--Universität Mainz, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 249-252.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University. Page 7 misnumbered. / From the year in which John Locke's volume, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding was published (1690), to the present time his theory of Innate Ideas has received both praise and criticism, some of which, in each case was justified and some unwarranted. It is the purpose of this thesis to defend Locke's theory of Innate Ideas against such extreme criticisms as "Locke's polemic is a straw man argument", "No man in his right mind ever claimed ideas to be innate in the sense which Locke attacks them", and "Locke destroyed innate intelligence with his polemic" [TRUNCATED]

A presente dissertação busca analisar como a concepção de representação é desenvolvida na filosofia de Leibniz tendo como pano de fundo a crítica que o filósofo faz ao modo como Descartes e Locke compreendem o conceito. Tomaremos como ponto de partida a crítica que Leibniz formula ao conceito de ideia tal como ele se encontra em Descartes, e a reformulação do conceito que ele opera a partir da compreensão da ideia como um gênero expressão. A partir dela, podemos compreender em que sentido Leibniz se vale do paradigma imagético da ideia em um sentido completamente diverso de Descartes. Ademais, ele nos permitirá compreender como, aos olhos de Leibniz, as noções de representação em Descartes e Locke se aproximam, por mais que suas concepções sobre a origem das ideias sejam opostas. Pretendemos com isso mostrar que, apesar da doutrina leibniziana da representação estar implicada em seu sistema, ela é profundamente marcada pela oposição ao cartesianismo e ao empirismo de Locke. / The following thesis aims to study how the concept of representation is developed in the philosophy of Leibniz having as a background the philosophers critic of the way Descartes and Locke understand the concept. We will take as our starting point the critique that Leibniz formulates the concept of idea as it is in Descartes, and the reformulation of this concept understanding the idea as a genre of expression. From this, we can understandin what sense Leibniz make use of the imagetic paradigm to understand the representative content of the idea in a completely diferente sense as Descartes. Furthermore, it will allow us to understand how, in Leibniz point of view, the concept of representation in Descartes and Locke are similar, albeit the description of its origins differ completely in both philosophers. We intend to show that despite the fact that Leibnizian doctrine of representation is implicated in his system, this doctrine is deeply marked by the opposition to cartesianism and Lockes empiricism.

A presente dissertação busca analisar como a concepção de representação é desenvolvida na filosofia de Leibniz tendo como pano de fundo a crítica que o filósofo faz ao modo como Descartes e Locke compreendem o conceito. Tomaremos como ponto de partida a crítica que Leibniz formula ao conceito de ideia tal como ele se encontra em Descartes, e a reformulação do conceito que ele opera a partir da compreensão da ideia como um gênero expressão. A partir dela, podemos compreender em que sentido Leibniz se vale do paradigma imagético da ideia em um sentido completamente diverso de Descartes. Ademais, ele nos permitirá compreender como, aos olhos de Leibniz, as noções de representação em Descartes e Locke se aproximam, por mais que suas concepções sobre a origem das ideias sejam opostas. Pretendemos com isso mostrar que, apesar da doutrina leibniziana da representação estar implicada em seu sistema, ela é profundamente marcada pela oposição ao cartesianismo e ao empirismo de Locke. / The following thesis aims to study how the concept of representation is developed in the philosophy of Leibniz having as a background the philosophers critic of the way Descartes and Locke understand the concept. We will take as our starting point the critique that Leibniz formulates the concept of idea as it is in Descartes, and the reformulation of this concept understanding the idea as a genre of expression. From this, we can understandin what sense Leibniz make use of the imagetic paradigm to understand the representative content of the idea in a completely diferente sense as Descartes. Furthermore, it will allow us to understand how, in Leibniz point of view, the concept of representation in Descartes and Locke are similar, albeit the description of its origins differ completely in both philosophers. We intend to show that despite the fact that Leibnizian doctrine of representation is implicated in his system, this doctrine is deeply marked by the opposition to cartesianism and Lockes empiricism.

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The contemporary personal identity debate has divided into two entrenched positions. One supports the supposedly naive and unpopular Bodily Criterion (the view that personal identity requires physical continuity). The other school is the Psychological Criterion (the view that personal identity requires psychological continuity). This has acquired the status of virtual orthodoxy. The British Empiricists, John Locke and David Hume, are both supposed to give historical weight to this orthodoxy. This thesis argues this is a dramatic misrepresentation of history. Locke is supposed to found the personal identity debate in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, arguing that personal identity is sameness of consciousness. It is argued that Locke in fact responds to a prevalent Cartesian View, called here the Compositional Account. The Compositional Account is the belief that a Human Being is composed of a Mind and a Body. Hume, in responding to Locke, is also responding to the Compositional Account. In opposition to widely established readings both philosophers are argued to be highly sympathetic to the Compositional Account. Chapter 1 establishes Descartes' version of the Compositional Account and explains why Descartes needs no philosophical treatment of personal identity. These problems emerge only for the Empiricists, Locke and Hume. Locke's sympathies for the Compositional Account are established in Chapter 2, drawing on material prior to the Essay and normally uncited passages in the Essay. Chapter 3 argues that Hume presumed the Compositional Account in his Treatise Concerning Human Nature. This is argued to explain Hume's famous later recantation of his theory. The thesis concludes by sketching a role for the Compositional Account in contemporary debate. The Compositional Account is argued to give strong support to a recently developed position known as Animalism. This provides the conceptual materials to move beyond the orthodox dichotomy between the Bodily Criterion and the Psychological Criterion.

Thesis advisor: Robert K. Faulkner / Why are men in modern societies so busy and anxious? Modern, liberal democratic society is distinguished both by the unprecedented strength and prosperity it has achieved, as well as its remarkable number of psychologists per capita. Why is this? This dissertation explores the connection between restlessness and modernity by way of an examination of the themes of liberalism and restlessness in the thought of Locke and Tocqueville. "Restlessness" refers to a way of life characterized by three features: limitless desires, mildness, and an orientation towards material goods. Tocqueville argues in <italic>Democracy in America<italic> that democracy, by way of individualism, makes men materialistic and restless (<italic>inquiét<italic>), or restlessly materialistic. The intense, limitless pursuit of material well-being is a historical phenomenon, one of the many results of the centuries-long development of equality of conditions. Modern democrats are restless; pre-modern aristocrats were not. Tocqueville is ambivalent about restlessness. According to him, the incessant, energetic movement of American life conceals an underlying absurdity and mediocrity. Many of what Tocqueville views as the more undesirable qualities of democratic American life are associated with restlessness, but any solution is likely to be worse than the problem. It could be worse: we must tolerate restlessness if we want to remain free. "All free peoples are grave." Locke by contrast could be described as a partisan of restlessness. The anxious understand the world better than the complacent or vegetative. There are two dimensions to Locke's teaching on restlessness, an "is" (found in <italic>Essay concerning Human Understanding<italic> Book II Chapter 21) and an "ought" (found in "Of Property," Chapter Five of the <italic>Second Treatise<italic>). Our desires are naturally limitless-this we can only understand, we cannot change it. But if we know what's good for us, we will orient ourselves towards a milder and more materialistic way of life. We master restlessness by becoming more restless, or restless in a more enlightened way. Locke's teaching on restlessness in the fullest sense is partly his account of necessity, and partly his recommended response to necessity. This difference in their views on restlessness points to certain important differences in their liberalisms. Tocqueville's liberalism is more pessimistic than Locke's: some fundamental problems have no solutions, and some of the highest goods cannot be reconciled with one another. Lockean liberalism is more confident about its ability to find solutions to the fundamental problems of political life, and there is no problem of the harmony of the goods for Locke. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding is considered by many to be the locus classicus of a number of influential arguments for conventionalism, according to which there are no objective, privileged ways of classifying things in the natural world. In the dissertation I argue that Locke never meant to reject natural kinds. Still, the challenge is to explain how, within a metaphysics that explicitly denies mind-independent essences, we can make sense of a privileged, objective sorting of substances. I argue that we do so by looking to Locke's conception of God as divine architect of created substances. / Philosophy

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