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1	Making sense of response-dependence Busck Gundersen, Eline January 2007 (has links) This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettit’s ‘ethocentric’ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones – in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses in subjects in favourable conditions, and fulfilling some further conditions such as non-triviality and sometimes necessity – may not be the best approach. I also discuss two general problems for response-dependence theses: the problem of ‘finkish’ counterexamples, and the problem of specifying the ‘favourable conditions’ a priori, yet in a non-trivial way. The discussion of response-dependence is informed by a framework based on the idea that some realism disputes can be viewed as location disputes: disputes over the correct location of the disputed properties among several levels of candidate properties. The approach taken in this work is a charitable one: I try to make sense of response-dependence. The conclusion is the correspondingly optimistic one that the idea(s) of response-dependence makes sense. 100
2	La réalité des couleurs Dunand, Stéphane 22 October 2011 (has links) Ce travail cherche à défendre une théorie objectiviste des couleurs en conciliant deux thèses tenues habituellement pour incompatibles : le physicalisme, selon lequel les couleurs sont des propriétés physiques décrites par la science, et la thèse de la révélation, selon laquelle la nature des couleurs est révélée par l’expérience. Ces deux thèses sont tenues pour inconciliables parce que les couleurs se présentent comme des qualités, alors que la science traite de quantités. Après être revenu sur l’histoire du problème en montrant comment on peut comprendre la controverse moderne sur les qualités secondes à partir de la thèse de la révélation, je montre comment comprendre cette dernière thèse et je soutiens que toute théorie plausible des couleurs doit soutenir la révélation. Je soutiens que les couleurs sont des événements transitoires, et non pas des propriétés permanentes des objets. La lumière ne se contente pas de révéler la couleur des objets, mais la produit : les couleurs sont des effets de l'interaction de la lumière avec l'objet ou, quand il s'agit de sources primaires de lumière, des événements se produisant en leur sein. Cette thèse semble offrir une réponse, au moins partielle, à des arguments classiques à l'encontre de l'objectivité des couleurs, notamment certaines versions de l'argument de la relativité. Surtout, cette catégorisation nouvelle des couleurs permet de concilier les descriptions qualitatives et chromatiques des couleurs avec leurs descriptions quantitatives et physiques, permettant ainsi de concilier l’image manifeste et l’image scientifique du monde. / This work tries to defend an objectivist theory of colour by a reconciliation of two theses generally considered as incompatible: physicalism, the theory that colours are scientific properties of objects, and revelation, the thesis that the nature of a colour is revealed by an experience of this colour. Those theses are considered as incompatible because colours are presented as qualities, while science is only about quantities. After a chapter about the history of the problem, showing how we can understand the modern controversy on secondary qualities thanks to the revelation thesis, I show how to understand revelation, distinguishing it from phenomenology, and claim that a correct theory of colour must support revelation. After that, I argue that colours are transitory events, not standing properties: light produce colours, which are effects of the interaction of light with matter or, for primary light sources, events happening in them. This thesis gives a partial answer to some arguments against objectivism, notably variability arguments. Above all, this new categorization of colour reconciles the qualitative chromatic descriptions of colours with their quantitative physical descriptions, thus allowing reconciliation between the manifest and the scientific images of the world. Couleur Qualités secondes Locke Berkeley Reid Métaphysique des couleurs Colour Secondary qualities Locke Berkeley Reid Metaphysics of colour
3	Mental activity in Descartes' causal-semantic model of sensory perception Ortín Nadal, Anna Pilar January 2018 (has links) The aim of this thesis is to defend a reading of Descartes' theory of sensory perception in which, against a widespread interpretation, the mind is not a passive receiver of inputs from the environment, but an active decoder of neural information that contributes to the representational content of ideas. I call this the 'mental activity thesis' and, in the overall picture, I identify it as one of the philosophical implications of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution. Within Descartes' dualism, to offer a theory of sensory perception amounts to describing the interplay between the natural world, the brain, and the mind. Given his mechanistic, micro-corpuscular conception of matter, Descartes developed detailed physiological descriptions of the interaction between external objects and the brain. He envisaged it as an isomorphic relation in which the characteristics of objects are transmitted through the nerves to the brain as patterns of geometrically reduced properties. This process is often read as culminating with the mind being passively affected by a corporeal isomorph. Descartes' doctrine becomes elusive in its mental phase, but the passivity reading, so I contend, remains inadequate. I argue for the mental activity thesis through four claims. First, I subscribe the known view that Descartes is concerned about a version of the mind-body problem that is not equivalent to the problem of substance interaction. It is rather a problem of dissimilarity between mental representations and mechanistic explanations. The question is how the qualitative character of sensory experiences can arise from the quantitative notions of physical science. As a way of emphasising the weight that the problem of dissimilarity has for Descartes' philosophical decisions, I show that it motivates a metaphysically interesting distinction between types of causes for the case of brain-mind interaction. Second, I defend the position that, despite not holding a perfectly unambiguous doctrine, Descartes' introduction of natural signs is the closest that he got to formulating a full-fledged theory of sensory perception. The appeal to natural signs has been normally deemed as metaphorical in the literature. I argue that, on the contrary, it is possible to reconstruct a causal story for brain-mind interaction along the lines of a semantic model based on Descartes' identification of neural events with natural signs. A causal-semantic model emerges as a charitable, plausible reading that reveals the mind as an active interpreter. Third, in light of the mental activity thesis, I read Descartes' late appeal to the innateness of all ideas (notably in the Comments on a Certain Broadsheet) as a strategy to account for a type of representational content needed for sensory ideas that, while produced by the mind, is different from that of his paradigmatic innate ideas. I assist Descartes in exploring how the category of innateness captures mental activity within a causal-semantic theory. Fourth, in the course of this argumentation, and for further support, I address the role of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in Descartes' theory. I tackle a pervasive objection stemming from his alleged association of the perception of primary qualities with the intellect. By reassessing Descartes' views on mental activity, this interpretation aims at a lucid description of sensory perception that goes beyond the rigid rationalism that is often credited to him.
4	O ceticismo de Hume no Tratado da natureza humana : uma abordagem a partir da discussão sobre a distinção entre qualidades primárias e secundárias Santos, Rafael Bittencourt January 2016 (has links) A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented. Filosofia moderna Filosofia inglesa Ceticismo Fideísmo Qualidades primárias e secundárias Faculdade da razão Razão (Filosofia) Skepticism Fideism Primary qualities Secondary qualities Reason
5	O ceticismo de Hume no Tratado da natureza humana : uma abordagem a partir da discussão sobre a distinção entre qualidades primárias e secundárias Santos, Rafael Bittencourt January 2016 (has links) A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented. Filosofia moderna Filosofia inglesa Ceticismo Fideísmo Qualidades primárias e secundárias Faculdade da razão Razão (Filosofia) Skepticism Fideism Primary qualities Secondary qualities Reason
6	O ceticismo de Hume no Tratado da natureza humana : uma abordagem a partir da discussão sobre a distinção entre qualidades primárias e secundárias Santos, Rafael Bittencourt January 2016 (has links) A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented. Filosofia moderna Filosofia inglesa Ceticismo Fideísmo Qualidades primárias e secundárias Faculdade da razão Razão (Filosofia) Skepticism Fideism Primary qualities Secondary qualities Reason
7	Technik und Bildung in der verwissenschaftlichten Lebenswelt Lumila, Minna 02 June 2023 (has links) Die Studie versucht, Husserls Modell einer nicht-wissenschaftlichen Lebenswelt für pädagogische Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Technik und Bildung in der verwissenschaftlichen Welt zu öffnen. Sie diskutiert Entwicklungsprobleme der Spätmoderne unter pluralen Fragestellungen und führt Ansätze und Traditionen zusammen, die unterschiedliche Wege zur Weiterentwicklung der modernen Bildungstheorie beschritten haben. Im Zentrum steht die Frage, wie moderne Technik einerseits als lebensweltliche Entfremdung des Menschen problematisiert und andererseits als Produkt menschlicher Freiheit und Weltgestaltung gewürdigt werden kann. In vier Kapiteln werden die methodischen Ansätze und Antworten vorgestellt, die der Philosoph und Pädagoge Eugen Fink (1905–1975), der Philosoph Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), der Philosoph und Erziehungswissenschaftler Theodor Litt (1880–1962) und der Soziologe Helmut Schelsky (1912–1984) auf die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Bildung und Technik gegeben haben. Im Durchgang durch ihre Positionen wird ein Konzert erarbeitet, dessen Originalität darin liegt, Abstimmungsprobleme von Bildung, Technik und Lebenswelt aus postdualistischer, praxistheoretischer sowie posthumanistischer Perspektive zu thematisieren. / The study attempts to open Husserl's model of a non-scientific lifeworld for pedagogical investigations of the relationship between technology and “Bildung” in the scientific world. It discusses developmental problems of late modernity under plural questions and brings together approaches and traditions that have taken different paths to the further development of modern “Bildungs”-theory. The central question is how modern technology can be problematized on the one hand as the alienation of human beings from the world of life and on the other hand be appreciated as a product of human freedom and the shaping of the world. Four chapters present the methodological approaches and answers that philosopher and educator Eugen Fink (1905–1975), philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), philosopher and educationalist Theodor Litt (1880–1962), and sociologist Helmut Schelsky (1912–1984) have given to the question of the relationship between education and technology. In the course of their positions, a concert will be developed whose originality lies in addressing the coordination problems of “Bildung” (education), “Technik” (technology) and “Lebenswelt” (lifeworld) from a post-dualist, praxis-theoretical as well as post-humanist perspective. Seinsphänomenologie Sprung Sein Subjekt-Objekt-Differenz Überwindung des Subjekt-Objekt-Schemas Rationalität Überforderung des Rationalen Weltoffenheit Weltoffenheit des Menschen unhintergehbare Lebenswelt Metaphysikkritik abendländische Metaphysik neuzeitliche Metaphysik Seinsvergessenheit certitudo veritas aletheia Menschenzentriertheit Gegenstand Gegenständlichkeit Vergegenständlichung des Seienden Nichtigkeit Mensch als in die Welt Geworfener mundane Kreation des Daseins Mensch als weltbildend Ek-sistenz das Sein den Menschen das Ekstatische des Menschen Vernehmen als Wahrnehmen In-der-Welt-Sein Weltlichkeit des Menschen das Anwesen des Anwesenden Erde Posthumanismus Mensch als ein werdendes Wesen vormoderne Technik handwerkliche Technik poiesis orthotes Technikkritik Bestand Welt als Inventar Bild Meister Eckhart das Ereignis Denken Philosophie ontologische Differenz Posthumanismus Natur zu Kultur Verhältnis von Mensch und Natur Primäre und sekundäre Qualitäten ursprüngliche Lebenswelt transzendentale Lebenswelt Phänomenologie Quantifizierung Entqualifizierung Entsinnlichung Bedeutungsentleerung Edmund Husserl Martin Heidegger Eugen Fink Koexistentialien Arbeit Herrschaft Liebe Tod Spiel Erziehung Erziehung als Beratung Technische Bildung kosmologische Lebenswelt Vielfalt der lebensweltlichen Praxis Fraglichwerden humanistischer Werte Dualismuskritik kosmologische Differenz menschliche Selbstverständigung Lebenslehre Nachdualistische Sozialphänomenologie Ende des humanistischen Menschen Marginalisierung der Welt Krise der allgemeingültigen Leitbilder Erziehung als Beratung Fragegesellschaft Erziehungswissenschaft als Praxistheorie das Wissen als menschliche Möglichkeit techne Fügsamkeit Einfügung Daseinsorientierung verwissenschaftlichte Welt Schöpfertum des Ingenieurs Die kreative Tätigkeit des Technikers Schöpfungskraft des Kosmos Schöpferkraft der menschlichen Freiheit Prinzipielle Unbestimmtheit des Menschen Theodor Litt Umgang Trias von Subjekt-Objekt-Methode antinomische Lebenswelt Mensch-Welt-Verhältnis Pädagogik Unverdrängbarkeit des Umgangs Freiheit der Wissenschaften Segen der Reflexion Umgangshermeneutik Hermeneutik Mit- und Füreinandersein Umgang mit der Natur zwischenmenschlicher Umgang neuzeitliche Rationalität Natur Geist Subjekt Objekt neuzeitliche Produktionsordnung Bildungsbedeutung der Naturwissenschaft Versachlichung des Weltverhältnisses Arbeitswelt Sache Vielfalt der Sinndeutungen Segen der Reflexion gegenständliches Denken rechnende Naturwissenschaft Mittel-Zweck-Relation Ursache-Wirkung-Relation Subjekt-Objekt-Verhältnis Entpersönlichung des Subjekts Formalisierung des Objekts Reflexivität Leiblichkeit Marginalisierung des Menschen Versachlichung des Menschen Mensch als Funktionär Trennung von Ich und Welt Trennung von Natur und Geist Sinnlichkeit Begegnung mit seinesgleichen Verkümmerung des Umgangs leiblich-seelische Totalität Individualität Unmenschlichkeit des Menschen Menschlichkeit des Menschen Selbstentfremdung Antinomie moderner Menschenbildung Selbstbeaufsichtigung Kultivierung des Umgangs Genealogie der modernen Technik Maschinenwelt Geisteswissenschaften Kultivierung von Sinnvielfalt Menschenwissenschaft Wissenschaften vom Außermenschlichen Schutz der Menschlichkeit Zwängen der Produktionsordnung Bildung als Sacharbeit Helmut Schelsky metaphysische Dauerreflexion Absterben des Staates technischer Staat metaphysischer Nihilismus wissenschaftliche Zivilisation Reales Weltbürgertum Spezialgelehrtentum Fachgelehrtentum Sachzwang Freiheit Sachgesetzlichkeiten Offenheit menschlicher Sinnentwürfe Selbstentfremdung des Menschen wissenschaftlich-technische Zivilisation Objektivierung des Menschen Naturzwang Produktionszwang Sachlogik der technischen Zivilisation Bildung durch Wissenschaft jene Freiheit einer offenen Zukunft Verwissenschaftlichung aller Praxis Vergesellschaftung der Wissenschaft Vergesellschaftung der Universität Wissenschaftlichkeit der Technik Mensch als Wissenschaft und als Arbeit Erziehung zur Wissenschaftlichkeit Überwindung der Wissenschaft Bildung als Ermöglichung von Freiheit Vielfalt des Daseins Grenzen wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis Synthese der Wissenschaften Fragmentierte Produktion des Menschen Sozialwissenschaften Joachim Ritter Mnemosyne Kompensation von Geschichtslosigkeit Gedächtnis historische Lebenswelt Michel Foucault Genealogische Rekonstruktion Friedrich Nietzsche Aktiver Nihilismus Dietrich Benner Negativität Nicht-Affirmativität Praxeologie Malte Brinkmann fragmentarischer Charakter des Menschen Dualismus-Kritik Egon Schütz Anthropologischer Zirkel C. P. Snow Erziehung und Bildung Technik Lebenswelt Verwissenschaftlichte Lebenswelt Lebenswelt als eine kritische Kategorie phenomenology of being leap being subject-object difference overcoming the subject-object schema rationality openness to the world metaphysical critique occidental metaphysics modern metaphysics Forgetfulness of being certitudo veritas aletheia human-centeredness object objectivity objectification of being nothingness mundane creation of existence human being as world-forming ek-sistence the ecstatic of the human being being-in-the-world worldliness of the human being the presence of the present posthumanism human being as a becoming being pre-modern technology poiesis orthotes critique of technology world as inventory image Meister Eckhart the event thinking philosophy ontological difference posthumanism nature to culture relationship between human and nature Primary and secondary qualities original lifeworld transcendental lifeworld phenomenology quantification de-qualification de-sensualisation coexistentials education education as counselling technical education cosmological lifeworld diversity of lifeworld practice questioning of humanistic values critique of dualism cosmological difference human self-understanding post-dualistic social phenomenology end of humanistic human being marginalisation of the world production of human being by human being education as counselling knowledge as human possibility techne existential orientation scientised world creative activity of the technician creative power of the cosmos creative power of human freedom Umgang triad of subject-object method dual of natural sciences and humanities antinomic lifeworld Umgang as a basis for modern education pedagogy resistance of Umgang to ideologies defense of democracy against fascism phenomenological motifs of Theodor Litt hermeneutics being with and for one another nature spirit subject object modern order of production objectification of world relations diversity of interpretations of meaning cause and effect subject-object relationship depersonalisation of the subject reflexivity marginalisation of the human being objectification of the human being the human being as a functionary separation of the I and the world separation of nature and spirit individuality inhumanity of the human being humanity of the human being self-alienation antinomy of modern education genealogy of the modern technology humanities cultivation of multiplicity of meaning human science advisory function of human science protection of humanity reflection death of the state technical state metaphysical nihilism scientific civilisation real cosmopolitanism specialised scholarship human being in scientific civilisation freedom scientific marginalisation of the world openness of human possibilities loss of function of the humanities self-alienation of the human being scientific-technical civilisation objectification of the human being compulsory production education in scientific civilisation fragmented production of human being Mnemosyne memory historical lifeworld active nihilism genealogical reconstruction negativity non-affirmativity praxeology fragmentary character of the human being critique of dualism anthropological circle education (Bildung) technology technical education lifeworld scientified lifeworld lifeworld as a critical category human being as thrown into the world crisis of universally valid values creatorship of the engineer 370 Bildung und Erziehung DF 3000 ddc:370

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