Fideism, or basing one’s religious belief on faith, is popular especially amongst modern Protestant Christians. For the fideist, religious belief-systems are not subject to rational evaluation, and faith as the act of belief forms the essence of truth and the ultimate criterion for embracing a religion. Critics of fideism say that epistemologically, a hierarchy of methods can be used to derive the truth, and each method gives us varying confidence levels. These methods include mathematics and logic, science, personal experience, history, expert testimony, inference and Faith. Among these, the critic says, pure faith in something is the least successful in getting at the truth. Radical fideists like Kierkegaard do not cite logical reasons for defending their belief that God exists. Personal reasons are instead offered for their decision to believe. In this thesis I seek to demonstrate that the radical fideism advocated by Kierkegaard constitutes good justification for belief in the Christian God. I will begin with a discussion on fideism and some of its proponents, followed by a discussion on the place of faith (as a non-rational belief in God’s existence) in religion. I will then appeal to Kierkegaard’s philosophy in defending my view that religious belief in God is a matter of faith and personal commitment, feeling and passion, and this is an inner process not grounded in arguments. References will be drawn from Kierkegaard’s themes of faith, subjectivity and inwardness. I conclude by saying that even if no objective grounds exist to justify our belief, Kierkegaard standpoint remains right in two ways: Firstly, the fideist rejection of the attempt to justify his belief through offering reasons for it is precisely what makes his decision to believe deeply meaningful in his life. Secondly, those who ‘try to judge faith by objective, critical reflection will go on forever that way, and will never reach the point of having faith and of being religious’. (Peterson et al, 2003:53)

<p>The philosophical work of Ludwig yvittgenstein divides into two periods. His earlier philosophy is found in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and his later philosophy is most clearly presented in the Philosophical Investigations. In this dissertation I present an interpretation of these two works which demonstrates a fundamental continuity between them concerning the essential relationship of language and reality. The origins of my argument lie in a recent discussion of the question of the nature of religious belief which has been called 'Wittgensteinian Fideism'. The 'Fideists' offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy which asserts that language constitutes an epistemologically prior framework which forms a linguistic community's view of reality. In this sense language and its grammar are said to be autonomous from reality and construct an essentially formless world.</p> <p>I argue against this interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work by showing that in both periods of his life he taught that language and its structural principles are one with reality and that this unity is established in human nature. Wittgenstein argues that language is an objective order of facts in the real world, and that the human production of linguistic facts shows the essential unity of all language as well as the essential unity of language and reality. The assumption that human beings are the source of linguistic facts also enables Wittgenstein to argue for an ethical-religious view of man's place in the world. By means of this interpretation of Wittgenstein's works I am able to refute the epistemological approach to Wittgenstein's later work as well as to offer an alternative view of the implications of his philosophy for understanding religion.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Chapter one: A perennial (if controversial) concern in both theology and philosophy of religion is whether religious belief is ‘reasonable’. Austin Farrer (1904-1968) is widely thought to affirm a positive answer to this concern. Chapter One surveys three interpretations of Farrer on ‘the believer’s reasons’ and thus sets the stage for our investigation into the development of his religious epistemology. Chapter two: The disputed question of whether Farrer became ‘a sort of fideist’ is complicated by the many definitions of fideism. Chapter two thus sorts through these issues so that when ‘fideism’ appears in subsequent chapters a precise range of meanings can be given to it, and the ‘sort of fideist’ Farrer may have become can be determined more accurately. Chapter three: Although Farrer’s constant goal was to develop ‘a viable and sophisticated natural theology,’ an early moment of philosophical illumination involved recognising the limits of reason. Chapter three begins with a sketch of Farrer’s life, looks at his undergraduate correspondence where some ‘fideistic’ themes are first articulated, and then focuses on his classic text of ‘rational theology,’ *Finite and Infinite* (1943). Chapter four: In subsequent years, Farrer became increasingly open to placing a greater emphasis on faith. And yet, he continued to press the question: ‘Can reasonable minds still think theologically?’ Chapter four argues that, stimulated by Diogenes Allen’s doctoral dissertation and citing it explicitly, Farrer’s *Faith and Speculation* (1967) attempts to blend Allen’s more fideistic position with a continuing concern for legitimate philosophical critique. Chapter five: The fifth chapter evaluates the significance of Farrer’s final position in the context of contemporary religious epistemology and the current wide-spread interest in spirituality. In conclusion, Farrer finally seems to locate theistic evidence not primarily in nature or reason, but in holy lives and our own attempts to live by faith: ‘It is solved by sacrifice’.

This thesis is an attempt to contribute a fresh perspective on marriage and related subjects, making use of public theology in dialogue with the Christ narrative. The phenomena of post secularism, postmodernism and film hermeneutics are explored. Critical hermeneutics are used as a point of departure. This study aims to bridge the gap between the Christ narrative and public theology as it surfaces in the cinema. In Chapter 2 the terms of the concepts public theology and posttheism are investigated. Public theology is understood as the contribution of people in the public sphere participating in “God-talk”, as an exponent of post theism. Chapter 3 investigates the historical development of marriage. This investigation shows that social-political and philosophical influences caused different forms and models of marriage to evolve. It becomes clear that it is practically impossible to define one specific form of marriage that dominated history. Chapter 4 is divided into two parts. The first part explores New Testament texts related to the themes of marriage and relationships. It is shown that these New Testament texts are part of a broader context and therefore cannot be applied directly to marriage in modern times. On the other hand the Christ narrative, seen as an ancient biography, does outline important values applicable to marriage, intimacy and sexuality. These values were identified and are used in following chapters to define intimate relationships. The investigation of biblical models in the second part of this chapter shows that biblical models of marriage were also rooted within a historical situation. Certain values that are found within these models can still serve as guidelines for relationships, while others are influenced by an androcentric background. Chapter 5 is a theoretical investigation using Gerhard Ebelings’ “new hermeneutics” as model, applied to the field of the public theology of film. From a hermeneutical perspective recent films with biblical themes are important to communicate the gospel and morals in our times as the postmodern generation is primarily influenced by visual media. In Chapter 6 three films are discussed as examples of film hermeneutics and public theology: Roepman, As it is in heaven and Les misérables. Similarities with the Christ narrative surfaced, for instance: critique is expressed against destructive ideologies; selfless acts are commendable and unconditional love and acceptance, forgiveness, faith and hope are essential for an authentic existence. These films do not focus on ethical dogmas about marriage, intimacy and sexuality, although some ethical values can be derived. In the concluding chapter a bifocal melting of horizons, based on the findings of the research, are described. Both the public theology of film hermeneutics and the Sache Jesu highlight the importance of the inner values that constitute a meaningful relationship. The study argues that the church should reconsider their traditional view on marriage and sexual relationships by emphasizing the values found in the Sache Jesu instead of concentrating on enforcing the outward form of wedlock. In doing so, the church will help postmodern and postsecular people to again understand the meaning of a loving relationship in the presence of God. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / lk2014 / New Testament Studies / PhD / Unrestricted

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented.

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented.

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented.

The research undertakes a critical study of informal fallacies in some socio-political and religious discourses in Ghana. It clearly and aptly demonstrates that the aforementioned discourses are mostly, if not, always laced with fallacies which obscure and distort clear and critical thinking. The study shows that language, which is the fundamental means by which to engage in socio-political discourse, can be viewed as a complicated tool which is open to misuse and abuse. It shows that language used in socio-political discourses is more often than not utilized poorly, and as such assertions and appeals can be confused with factual/logical inaccuracies. Statements can be formulated in ways that make their content dangerously vague, ambiguous or generally misleading. The research shows that although fallacies can be committed intentionally or unintentionally, in discourses in general, they are mostly, if not always, committed intentionally in socio-political discourse so as to achieve political gains and agenda. Another area of discourse that is tackled in this work where fallacies frequently occur is the religious sector. The study notes that matters of religion are mostly matters that are delicate to handle as these matters are mostly, again if not always, based on faith. It is shown herein that many a time, religious personalities use fallacious as means to drive their religious agenda across. The research then looks at what these aforementioned fallacies imply in relation to socio-political and religious discourses. It proceeds to discuss the positive implications of fallacies before it progresses to the negative implications of same. It then asks how a fallacy will be beneficial to a person and or how it will disadvantage the same person. If fallacies often occur in socio-political and religious discourses, then one must have the ability to detect these fallacies and try to avoid them. The work discusses how to detect fallacies and how to avoid them. It makes bold claims that if one has knowledge about fallacies then one will be able to avoid them. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / Ph. D. (Philosophy)