John Locke claims both that ‘person' is a forensic term and that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness. The aim of my dissertation is to explain and critically assess how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. My interpretation of Locke's account of persons and personal identity is embedded in Locke's sortal-dependent account of identity. Locke's sortal-dependent account of identity provides an important theoretical framework for my interpretation: It makes clear that Locke's account of personhood is to be considered separately from his account of personal identity. My approach gives full credit to Locke's claim that ‘person' is a forensic term, because I argue that persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. On this basis I argue that two components explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness: firstly, his particular moral and legal conception of a person, and, secondly, his particular understanding of the conditions of just accountability and just reward and punishment. Given one accepts Locke's conception of a person and his understanding of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also sufficient. I critically assess this question by considering Locke's account of persons and personal identity within Locke's epistemological, metaphysical and religious views. I will argue that, at least from the divine perspective, the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and that it is a verbal question whether Locke's term ‘consciousness' refers not only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying ontological constitution.

In the broadest sense, the three essays that form this dissertation address certain normative features in John Locke’s philosophy. “On Revolution: Arendt, Locke, and Republican Revisionism” deals with Hannah Arendt’s early republican revisionism that removes Locke’s influence from the American revolutionary period. Her (mistaken) belief is that Locke’s political philosophy encourages social disengagement and political apathy. In “One Body of People: Locke on Amerindians, Protestant Evangelism, and the Colonization of North America” I take seriously Locke’s religious devotion and reassess his colonial philosophy through an “evangelical” lens. It turns out his colonial thought was not motivated by “punishment” but by a perceived collective good. In “Friends in the State of Nature: John Locke and the Formation of Security Communities,” I explore the routinely overlooked fact that Locke characterizes humans as highly sociable and prone to friendship. To be sure, friendship and trust not only exist in the state of nature, they are what precipitate the contractual movement into civil society. This is particularly relevant given the fact that the realist tradition within International Relations almost reflexively characterizes the relationship between states as one of ruthless self ­interest. The way Locke speaks about the formation of political communities is highly reminiscent of “security communities,” a term popularized by Karl Deustch in the late 1950s, which describes groups of people who have integrated to such an extent that conflict can be managed in nonviolent ways. Locke characterizes the international community both in terms of moral communities (where different regions of the world share different values), and also in terms of economic communities of varying degrees of interdependence.

The ideas of liberty presented in the important works of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, The Second Treatise of Government (1689) and On Liberty (1859), are often viewed as belonging to the same conceptual tradition, that of English liberalism. This thesis is an articulation of the diversity between the theories of liberty expressed by Locke and Mill in the Second Treatise and On liberty. \ am aiming to provide a corrective to the tendency to ignore or to gloss over very significant differences between the two men. The work concentrates on the philosophical aspects of each theory of liberty, arguing that they differ in four respects. These are; definitions of liberty; justifications of liberty; how much liberty and for whom they recommend it, and finally, who they believe threatens liberty and how this threat is to be curbed. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that in terms of these areas Locke and Mill are pursuing different ends. I conclude that Locke and Mill present strikingly different theories of liberty and cannot be thought of as belonging to the one conceptual tradition in terms of the definition, the justification, the prescription and the threat to liberty. Ultimately, I question the value of including Locke and Mill in the one conceptual tradition of liberty solely on the basis that they argue ‘freedom from.’

Toleration is a core liberal ideal, but it is not an ideal without limits. To tolerate the intolerant would be to violate the principles and purposes underlying liberal societies. This important exception to the liberal ideal of toleration is dangerous, however, in that we may make it too exclusionary in practice. That is, we may mistakenly apply it to peaceful, beneficial members of our communities as well as to the truly intolerant. In particular, some contemporary liberals see religion either as inherently intolerant and dangerous or as violating standards of public discourse that they feel are necessary to uphold liberalism's core ideals, including toleration. This work argues that we risk violating the liberal ideal of toleration in a hasty over-generalization about religious belief. Through an examination of the arguments of Roger Williams and John Locke, this work argues that religious belief can be compatible with toleration, and that the practice and popular value of liberal toleration has at least in part a religious origin. These authors, and believers like them, defended toleration, partially as a result of their own experiences of intolerance, but also because they saw toleration as a theological necessity. Thus, this work shows that we have misunderstood the relationship between religion and toleration. While some forms of religious belief may incite intolerance and violence, others provide a firm foundation for toleration. We must show care in distinguishing the two to avoid violating the fundamental liberal ideal of toleration. Moreover, it is important that we do so to foster civil comity and cooperation, as well as to sustain the other benefits that religious groups provide to liberal, democratic societies.

Thesis (M.A.)--York University, 2001. Graduate Programme in English. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-113). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ67713.

The increasing importance of religious and moral issues in American politics makes salient once again the question of the relationship between religion and democracy. The United States is in the midst of a debate pitting secularists and those who adapt their faith to progressive outlooks against conservatives who see a need to ground liberal-democracy in something Biblical. Taking up this debate, I argue that the viewpoints of both secular progressives and religious conservatives suffer from key oversights. While the former fail to notice that their commitment to toleration rests on certain absolute claims, the latter overlook the extent to which religion has been transformed and liberalized. Seeking a more nuanced version of this debate, I compare the Enlightenment’s case for toleration to Tocqueville’s claim that democracy requires religion for moral support. Examining Locke and Spinoza, I argue that the Enlightenment sought to achieve freedom, prosperity, and a rich cultural and intellectual life through the weakening or liberalization of religious belief. I then turn to Tocqueville’s friendly critique of the Enlightenment and try to elucidate his solution for preserving, in times of liberalism and equality, the great human devotions which he saw as inextricably linked to religion. I conclude that that by describing a civil religion capacious enough to permit tolerance but substantive enough to encourage real devotion, Tocqueville gives us a kind of moderate politics seldom found in today’s debates. / text

This thesis attempts to describe the similarities and the differences between Boyle's position and Locke's on the primary and secondary quality distinction. / It is in the Corpuscular Hypothesis that Boyle draws the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke not only accepts the Corpuscular Hypothesis but also presents some arguments to support it. / Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 respectively examine the differences in the positions of Boyle and Locke on primary and secondary qualities, in their lists of primary qualities, the terminologies they employ, and the scopes of their discussions. Little attention has previously been paid to these differences. / Chapter 3 discusses the essence of the primary/secondary quality distinction. My point is that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is really a distinction between two kinds of powers for both Boyle and Locke.

El enunciado sintético de la tesis puede expresarse así: Pese a las diversas posiciones encontradas, Locke mantendría un puesto de avanzada dentro de la corriente liberal, aunque por ciertos motivos -especialmente histórico-sociales- cabe advertir en su doctrina política un liberalismo "sui generis", con perfiles aristocráticos y colonialistas.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2007. / Thesis directed by Jennifer Herdt for the Department of Theology. "June 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 384-402).

Thesis (doctoral)--K.B. Julius-Maximilians-Universität, Würzburg, 1916. / Cover title. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [4]-6).