Univ., Diss.--Gießen. Univ., Habil.-Schr.--Giessen.

Thesis--Strassburg. / Rabbinic Hebrew-Judeo-Arabic, Aramaic-Judeo-Arabic glossary: p. [23]-40. Includes bibliographical references.

Hasdai Crescas (1340 -1411), foi filosofo, rabino e homem público, que viveu em um período muito turbulento para as comunidade judaicas ibéricas e provençais, do final da Idade Média. Crescas fez uma crítica veemente ao paradigma aristotélico recebido da falsifa, que foi usado por Maimônides para embasar e provar a existência, unidade e incorporeidade de Deus, conceituado no Guia dos Perplexos como o ser necessário absolutamente transcendente em relação aos seres contingentes. Crescas elabora, em Or Hashem ( Luz do Nome Divino), um conceito alternativo de ser necessário, no qual as duas noções antitéticas de imanência e transcendência divinas se relacionam à distinção, no seio do ser necessário entre sua essência simples e os seus infinitos atributos. A essência simples e inefável do ser necessário se expressa em infinitos atributos no ato eterno e constante de doar na univocidade do ser, seu bem, sua atualidade, aos infinitos entes contingentes. Crescas, advoga que universo apesar de ontologicamente contingente é infinito em sua atualidade. Deus é assim concebido como causa primeira eterna e constante, a enteléquia e Lugar do Mundo. / Hasdai Crescas (1340-1411) was a philosopher, rabbi and public man, who lived in a very turbulent period for the Iberian and Provençal Jewish communities of the late Middle Ages. Crescas made a vehement criticism of the Aristotelian paradigm received from falsifa, which was used by Maimonides to ground and prove the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God, which was conceptualized in the Guide of the Perplexed as the absolutely necessary transcendent being in relation to contingent beings. Crescas elaborates, in Or Hashem (Light of the Divine Name), an alternative concept of being necessary, in which the two antithetical notions of divine immanence and transcendence relate to the distinction, within the necessary being between its simple essence and its infinite attributes . The simple and ineffable essence of the necessary being is expressed in infinite attributes in the eternal and constant act of giving in the univocity of being, its good, its actuality, to the infinite contingent entities. Crescas, advocates that universe although ontologically contingent is infinite in its actuality. God is thus conceived as the eternal and constant first cause, the entelechy and Place of the World.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Graduate Theological Union, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 269-273). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2003. / Advisor: Dr. Martin Kavka, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Religion. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Apr. 7, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Thesis--ha-Universiṭah ha-ʻivrit bi-Yerushalayim. / Added t.p.: The thought of R. Zerahiah b. Isaac b. Shealtiel Hen & the Maimonidean-Tibbonian philosophy of the 13th century. Includes English summary. Bibliography: leaves 293-301.

No description available.

Philosophe de l'éthique, Emmanuel Levinas a critiqué l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale comme celle de l'ontologie réduisant l'Autre au Même. Bien que les études lévinasiennes n'aient cessé de commenter son éthique, rares sont celles qui s'intéressent à sa genèse. Ce travail tente de combler cette lacune en jetant la lumière sur les écrits du jeune Levinas et son dialogue avec ses contemporains : Jacob Gordin, Jacques Maritain, Léon Brunschvicg, Edmund Husserl et Martin Heidegger.Héritier de la « philosophie juive » esquissée par les écrits de Gordin, la philosophie de Levinas pouvait se caractériser dès les années 30 comme « d’inspiration juive », bien avant sa rencontre avec Monsieu rChouchani. Bien que le philosophe lui-même n’ait jamais tenté d’établir une « philosophie juive », la proximité et la distance que révèlent ses écrits sur Maritain (héritier de l’analogie de l’être) et Brunschvicg (représentant de l’idéalisme rationnel) tracent les contours de cette philosophie essentiellement éthique cherchant toujours la séparation avec la totalité.Le mouvement de sa pensée vers l’éthique contre la philosophie de « participation » semble avoir son origine dans la gigantomachie que le jeune étudiant lituanien aurait vue entre ses deux maîtres de la phénoménologie à Fribourg autour de la question de la monadologie « métaphysique » capable de rendre compte de l’expérience de l’Autre. C’est dans cette problématique que le jeune Levinas fait son premier pas vers le refus de la constitution analogique de l’Autre, ainsi qu’à la participation à la vérité de l’être, tout en s’appuyant sur l’éthique de séparation. / Philosopher of ethics, Emmanuel Levinas has criticized the history of western philosophy as that ofontology reducing the Other to the Same. Studies on Levinas’ philosophy has so far annotated on his ethicswithout cease, whereas they are seldom interested in its genesis. This work tries to make up for this gap byfocusing on young Levinas’ writings and his dialogue with his contemporaries: Jacob Gordin, JacquesMaritain, Léon Brunschvicg, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.Heir of « Jewish philosophy» as sketched by the writings of Gordin, Levinas’ philosophy could becharacterized, in the 1930’s, as Jewish inspired, before his encounter with Mr Chouchani. Although thephilosopher himself has not ever tried to establish a Jewish philosophy, the proximity and the distance revealedby his writings on Maritain (heir of analogy of being) and on Brunschvicg (representative of rational idealism)trace the contour of this essentially ethical philosophy always seeking the separation from totality.The movement of his thought toward the ethics against the philosophy of « participation » seems tohave its origin in the gigantomachy which the young Lithuanian student would have seen between his twoteachers of phenomenology in Freiburg about the question of the « metaphysical» monadology, capable ofexplaining the experience of the Other. It is in this question that the young Levinas has made his first steptoward the refusal of analogical constitution of the Other and of the participation to the truth of being, relyingon the ethics of separation.

This thesis investigates whether beliefs acquired by way of prophecy are safe. By ‘prophecy’ I have in mind the presentation of the prophetic method as found in the Guide of the Perplexed, which was Moses Maimonides’ philosophical masterpiece. And by ‘safe’ I have in mind the work by Timothy Williamson on the safety condition for knowledge. Both authors have proven to be dominant forces on these respective topics. The significance of this investigation derives from the centrality of prophecy to the three monotheistic religions. My main goal in this thesis is to identify those safety risks associated with the prophetic method. In this manner I aim to undermine any presumption in favor of prophetic beliefs as a whole being safe. Importantly, this general conclusion does not entail of a specific prophetic belief p that p is unsafe. Additionally, the scope of these results is restricted to the model of prophecy found in the Guide. The thesis begins with a critical elucidation of Williamson’s extensive work on the safety condition for knowledge. Particular attention is paid to those issues related to method individuation and Williamson’s cumulative conception of bases. Matters concerning these two topics inform the reading of Maimonides on prophecy found in the second chapter. In particular, I argue that Maimonides should be read as defending a cumulative conception of prophecy. As I emphasize several times during the chapter, the epistemology of prophecy cannot be reduced to the epistemology of testimony since prophecy for Maimonides does not involve the transfer of a proposition from God to the prophet. The third chapter is devoted to identifying those elements of the prophetic method that involve room for error. I argue that while all belief-forming methods in a fallibilist epistemology contain room for error, some are riskier than others. Prophecy should be considered one of the riskier sort. The fourth and final chapter shifts attention to non-standard semantics for ‘knows,’ David Lewis’s in particular. I argue that the interaction between such semantics and the laws governing prophecy in Jewish law is problematic. In particular, I demonstrate that such semantics destabilize the prophetic phenomenon. As such, we must either choose invariantism and gain stability, or choose non-standard semantics for ‘knows’ and live with this lack of stability.