In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

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本論文研究的主題是泰國為維護其邊界安全作出的國家安全政策。泰國位在印度支那半島的中心點，當周邊國家發生動亂時，泰國就成為政治難民逃難的目的地，而且入侵的人數非常多。先後進入泰國的政治難民有泰北孤軍、馬來亞共產黨及柬埔寨難民。本文探討他們進入泰國的原因、在泰國的行為、及泰國政府處置政治難民的政策及最後的歸屬。當時泰國國內也深受共產主義的迫害，使得泰國政府除了要消除來自國外的威脅，還要利用這些難民來協助阻止泰共的活動，或者利用這些難民團體構建其邊疆的防衛圈，成為防衛泰國邊界的前沿軍隊。最後泰國政府以其維護邊境安全有功的理由給予泰北孤軍和馬來亞共產黨人泰國籍，對柬埔寨難民則採取遣返回國或送至第三國安置的辦法。總之，泰國政府以包容性的政策，容納週鄰政治難民，藉以防衛其邊境並開發其邊疆荒蕪之地，是乃泰國邊境安全政策成功之道。 / This paper focuses on Thailand’s national security policy for its boundary issue. Due to the central position in Indo-Chinese Peninsular, when there happened the political turmoil of the surrounding countries, territory of Thailand has been used as a shelter for a large number of political refugees. Those political refugee groups include the Chinese Nationalist troops (KMT), Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), and Cambodian refugees. The reasons of political refugees entering into Thailand, activities and Thai government policy towards them, would be discussed in this paper. Since the 1950s, Thailand suffered from rebel activities of the Communist Party of Thailand, so Thai government took advantage of combating experience of political refugees to fight against those Thai Communists in bordering area. Thai government even gave them the land and agricultural instruments to cultivate in bordering area and encouraged them stay by giving Thailand nationality to KMT troops and members of CPM, but repatriated those Cambodia refugees to back to Cambodia or to resettle in the third country. Thai government adopted an accommodate policy towards those political refugee groups, by using them to defence its border area and develop the economy, successfully to maitain its border security.

華人至馬來亞的歷史相當長遠，但馬來亞華人參與馬來亞政治的運動卻從戰後才風起雲湧。1945年日本戰敗，大英帝國重拾對馬來亞的控制。1946年出現的馬來亞聯盟（或名聯邦）計畫（Malayan Union）擴大了馬來亞境內公民權的取得資格，並且中國與英國於1943年簽訂的中英新約，廢除過去英國對中國的不平等條約，中國與英國互為平等國家，此舉是否侵犯了馬來亞華人擁有的各種通商權益，立場不同的各界展開了一場激烈的論戰。1948年大英帝國毅然實施與馬來亞聯盟計畫迥然不同的馬來亞聯合邦（Federation of Malaya），短縮了公民權的取得，並且以馬來人的利益至上。面對此一變局，馬來亞華人團體各自採取了不同的管道來應變：有從政治層面下手的溫和手段，也有馬來亞共產黨的武裝暴動。在戰後初期，1940年代末的馬來亞地區經歷了種種巨大變革，華人就在這種劇烈變幻的世局中試圖力挽狂瀾，從公民權到通商權益的爭議，至1950年代馬來亞華人爭取官方語言與教育的權利，都是戰後一連串爭取政治平等運動的延續；最後1957年馬來亞獨立，今日馬來西亞華人的處境就在那時成形。