以色列國土面積2.1946萬平方公里，人口675萬，與台灣3.6萬平方公里、人口2300萬相較，土地約為台灣的60﹪，人口不足台灣的三分之一，自然資源並不十分豐富，然而，在歷次的戰爭或軍事衝突中，以色列空軍藉著自創的想法與技巧圓滿達成任務，表現的十分獨特與突出，並贏得其人民與軍隊的尊敬，成為他國空軍欽羨的對象，研究隱於其後的建軍、備戰的思想與作為是本論文的主要目的。 藉由以色列國家安全政策、國防戰略、「空中武力」思想的起源、以及歷史的回溯，重建以色列空軍建立與發展的脈絡，並由「空中武力」的初期角色和「空軍」的角色理論進一步探討以色列空軍在歷次戰爭中扮演的角色，然後從以色列空軍的任務賦予、以色列空軍達成任務的情形、兵力現況和敵國相對戰力的比較以計量和非計量的基礎數據展現以色列空軍實質戰力情況，最後再以以色列國家安全政策、國防政策、戰爭型態歸納以色列空軍未來的發展，歸納整理以色列空軍致勝因素八項、陷入困境的因素兩項以及研究心得六項。

本論文研究的主題是泰國為維護其邊界安全作出的國家安全政策。泰國位在印度支那半島的中心點，當周邊國家發生動亂時，泰國就成為政治難民逃難的目的地，而且入侵的人數非常多。先後進入泰國的政治難民有泰北孤軍、馬來亞共產黨及柬埔寨難民。本文探討他們進入泰國的原因、在泰國的行為、及泰國政府處置政治難民的政策及最後的歸屬。當時泰國國內也深受共產主義的迫害，使得泰國政府除了要消除來自國外的威脅，還要利用這些難民來協助阻止泰共的活動，或者利用這些難民團體構建其邊疆的防衛圈，成為防衛泰國邊界的前沿軍隊。最後泰國政府以其維護邊境安全有功的理由給予泰北孤軍和馬來亞共產黨人泰國籍，對柬埔寨難民則採取遣返回國或送至第三國安置的辦法。總之，泰國政府以包容性的政策，容納週鄰政治難民，藉以防衛其邊境並開發其邊疆荒蕪之地，是乃泰國邊境安全政策成功之道。 / This paper focuses on Thailand’s national security policy for its boundary issue. Due to the central position in Indo-Chinese Peninsular, when there happened the political turmoil of the surrounding countries, territory of Thailand has been used as a shelter for a large number of political refugees. Those political refugee groups include the Chinese Nationalist troops (KMT), Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), and Cambodian refugees. The reasons of political refugees entering into Thailand, activities and Thai government policy towards them, would be discussed in this paper. Since the 1950s, Thailand suffered from rebel activities of the Communist Party of Thailand, so Thai government took advantage of combating experience of political refugees to fight against those Thai Communists in bordering area. Thai government even gave them the land and agricultural instruments to cultivate in bordering area and encouraged them stay by giving Thailand nationality to KMT troops and members of CPM, but repatriated those Cambodia refugees to back to Cambodia or to resettle in the third country. Thai government adopted an accommodate policy towards those political refugee groups, by using them to defence its border area and develop the economy, successfully to maitain its border security.

雖則蘇聯已經解體，世界進入了後冷戰時代。在冷戰時期相互抗衡的美蘇關係，仍是學界研究的熱點之一。自1990年冷戰終結之後，蘇聯、原本在舊蘇聯中的國家及中國大陸檔案資料的陸續開放，對韓戰研究可說有了新的突破。以美國學者John Lewis Gaddis為首的冷戰國際史學派補充或批判了前面包括傳統學派、修正學派等研究的不足之處。 本文引用檔案和韓戰研究學者的論點與分析，重新梳理在韓戰前後蘇中的國家安全政策考量，並深入析論有關下列幾項當今學者尚未分析或深入研究的種種問題。 本研究嘗試結合國際關係與冷戰國際史(Cold War International History Project)兩學門之跨領域研究，藉以澄清韓戰時期國際體系成員的互動及其造成的影響。另外，也試著使用理性決策模式來分析中蘇兩國領導人的國家安全決策。 研究結果顯示中蘇兩國領導人都是以理性判斷認為自己的決策是正確的，然而事實結果卻並非如此。莫斯科對平壤所提之韓戰計畫錯誤地開放了「綠燈」，北京在多次以外交方式警告華盛頓無效之後，認為美國可能進攻中國東北，並對其新興政權造成威脅，以致最後出兵介入韓戰。戰爭的結果最後還是在38度線附近簽署了停戰協定，但南北韓仍舊尚未統一，無數人員卻因此喪失寶貴的生命。 本文結論提出在美軍進逼鴨綠江和蘇聯的雙重壓力下，中共最後決定出兵介入韓戰，主因是國家安全利益。中共軍事戰略因戰局轉變而改變其戰略：前期是「間接路線」與「殲滅戰」，後期則是「消耗戰」。不論是在軍事戰略或是外交戰略上，莫斯科扮演之角色是在背後指揮協調北京和平壤。蘇聯使中共成為「責任承擔者」(buck-catcher)，本國則扮演「離岸平衡者」(offshore balancer)的角色。中共和北韓事事都要通報莫斯科，由莫斯科做出最後決定─即使北京和平壤兩方都想停戰，莫斯科仍堅持不停戰。戰爭後期蘇聯為削弱美國和中共實力，支持中共續戰。 韓戰停戰協議之簽署是因史達林去世之後。莫斯科認為戰爭再繼續有損蘇聯國家利益，乃通知平壤和北京有關停戰的解決方針的策略。韓戰協議的簽署基本上是在莫斯科新政府的領導與調停之下，北京和平壤最後遵循了莫斯科的指示才停戰。 中蘇兩造在共同利益驅使之下為追求個別利益，在利益衝突之間尋求合作利益。兩國且於韓戰之中各自為該國的國家利益著想，盟友關係只是暫時的而非永久的。 / In this study, an attempt is made to clarify the interactions between the members of the international system during the Korean War in an interdisciplinary approach combining the International Relations and the Cold War International History. Based on the materials from opened archives in the former Soviet Union and Communist China, the considerations, objectives and national security strategies of the leaders are analyzed in the light of the rational decision-making model. The results show that although the leaders made their own judgments based on rational thinking, the outcome of the war is the armistice agreement demarcating the 38th parallel as the borderline between the two Koreas with minor changes; North and South Korea are still yet to be reunified, despite numerous soldiers and civilians losing their precious lives. The conclusion is as follows. China decided to send troops to intervene in the Korean War mainly due to national security interest to cope with the threat of the approaching US forces and the Soviet Union pressure. To cope with the varying war situation, China’s military strategy changed from the “war of annihilation” and the “indirect approach strategy” in the former phase, to the “strategy of exhaustion” in the later phase. Whether in the military or diplomatic field, Moscow played a commanding role and coordinated of Beijing and Pyongyang behind. Soviet Union made China the “buck-catcher”, meanwhile played the role as the “offshore balancer”. Soviet Union pushed for the continuation of the war to weaken the strength of United States, in spite of the reluctance of China and North Korea. It was after Joseph V. Stalin’s death than the Armistice Agreement was finally signed. The signing of the agreement was essentially under the lead of the new leadership in Moscow. Both Soviet Union and China sought their own national interest during the Korean war. The Sino- Soviet alliance was only temporary rather than permanent.