Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Delineating the relevant product and geographic market is an important first step in competition inquiries, as it permits an assessment of market power and substitutability. Critics often argue that market definition is arbitrary and increasingly unnecessary, as modern econometric models can directly predict the competitive effects of a merger or anti-competitive practice. Yet practical constraints (such as limited data) and legal considerations (such as case law precedence) continue to support a formal definition of the relevant market. Within this context, this dissertation develops three tools to improve market definition: two empirical tools for cases with limited data and one conceptual decision-making tool to elucidate important factors and risks in market definition. The first tool for market definition involves a systematic analysis of consumer characteristics (i.e. the demographic and income profiles of consumers). Consumer characteristics can assist in defining markets as consumers with similar characteristics tend to switch to similar products following a price rise. Econometric models therefore incorporate consumer characteristics data to improve price elasticity estimates. Even though data constraints often prevent the use of econometric models, a systematic analysis of consumer characteristics can still be useful for market definition. Cluster analysis offers a statistical technique to group products on the basis of the similarity of their consumers. characteristics. A recently concluded partial radio station merger in South Africa offers a case study for the use of consumer characteristics in defining markets. The second tool, or set of tools, for defining markets involves using tests for price co-movement. Critics argue that price tests are not appropriate for defining markets, as these tests are based on the law of one price - which tests only for price linkages and not for the ability to raise prices. Price tests, however, are complements for existing market definition tools, rather than substitutes. Critics also argue that price tests suffer from low statistical power in discriminating close and less close substitutes. But these criticisms ignore inter alia the role of price tests as tools for gathering information and the range of price tests with better size and power properties that are available, including new stationarity tests and autoregressive models. A recently concluded investigation in the South African dairy industry offers price data to evaluate the market definition insights of various price tests. The third tool is conceptual in nature and involves a decision rule for defining markets. If market definition is a binary classification problem (a product is either 'in' or 'out' of the market), it faces risks of misclassification (incorrectly including or excluding a product). Analysts can manage these risks using a Bayesian decision rule that balances (1) the weight of evidence in favour of and against substitutability, (2) prior probabilities determined by previous cases and economic research, and (3) the loss function of the decision maker. The market definition approach adopted by the South African Competition Tribunal in the Primedia / Kaya FM merger investigation offers a useful case study to illustrate the implementation of such a rule in practice. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Mededingingsake neem gewoonlik 'n aanvang met die afbakening van die relevante produk- en geografiese mark. Die markdefinisie-proses werp dikwels lig op markmag en substitusie-moontlikhede, en ondersteun dus die beoordeling van 'n mededingingsaak. Markdefinisie word egter deur kritici as arbitrer en selfs onnodig geag, veral aangesien ekonometriese modelle die uitwerking van 'n samesmelting of 'n teen-mededingende praktyk op mededinging direk kan voorspel. Tog verkies praktisyns steeds om markte formeel af te baken op grond van sowel praktiese oorwegings (insluitend databeperkings wat ekonometriese modellering bemoeilik) as regsoorwegings (insluitend die rol van presedentereg). Hierdie proefskrif ontwikkel dus drie hulpmiddels vir die definisie van markte: twee empiriese hulpmiddels vir gevalle waar data beperk is sowel as 'n denkhulpmiddel om o.a. risiko's rondom markdefinisie te bestuur. Die eerste hulpmiddel vir die definisie van markte behels die sistematiese analise van verbruikerseienskappe, insluitend die demografiese en inkomste-profiel van verbruikers. Verbruikerseienskappe werp lig op substitusie, aangesien soortgelyke verbruikers neig om na soortgelyke produkte te verwissel na aanleiding van 'n prysstyging. Ekonometriese modelle maak derhalwe van data omtrent verbruikerseienskappe gebruik om beramings van pryselastisiteit te verbeter. Hoewel databeperkings dikwels ekonometriese modellering beperk, kan verbruikerseienskappe op sigself steeds nuttig wees vir die afbakening van die mark. Trosanalise bied 'n statistiese metode vir 'n stelselmatige ondersoek van verbruikerseienskappe vir markdefinisie, deurdat dit produkte op grond van gelyksoortige verbruikerseienskappe groepeer. 'n Onlangse ondersoek in Suid-Afrika rakende die gedeeltelike samesmelting van Primedia and Kaya FM radiostasies bied data om die gebruik van trosanalise en verbruikerseienskappe vir markdefinisie-doeleindes te illustreer. Die tweede hulpmiddel vir markdefinisie behels statistiese toetse vir verwantskappe tussen prystydreekse van verskillende produkte of streke. Hierdie prystoetse is gebaseer op die wet van een prys en beklemtoon prysverwantskappe eerder as die vermoë om pryse te verhoog (wat die uiteindelike fokus in mededingingsbeleid is). Hierdie klem verminder egter nie noodwendig die insigte wat prystoetse bied nie, aangesien markdefinisie dikwels 'n omvattende analise verg. Prystoetse se statistiese onderskeidingsvermoe word ook dikwels deur kritici as swak beskryf. Hierdie tegniese kritiek beskou prystoetse as eng-gedefinieerde hipotesetoetse eerder as hulpmiddels vir die verkenning van substitusiepatrone. Voorts ignoreer hierdie tegniese kritiek 'n verskeidenheid nuwe prystoetse met beter onderskeidingsvermoë, insluitend nuwe toetse vir stasioneriteit en nuwe autoregressiewe modelle. 'n Onlangse mededingingsondersoek in die Suid-Afrikaanse melkindustrie verskaf prysdata om die verrigting van verskillende prystoetse vir geografiese markdefinisie te ondersoek. Die derde hulpmiddel vir die definisie van markte behels 'n besluitnemingsreël. Hiervolgens word markdefinisie as 'n binêre klassifikasieprobleem beskou, waar 'n produk of streek 'binne' of 'buite' die mark geplaas moet word. Gegewe dat hierdie klassifikasie onder toestande van onsekerheid geskied, is markdefinisie blootgestel aan risiko's van wanklassifikasie. Praktisyns kan hierdie risiko‟s bestuur deur gebruik te maak van 'n Bayesiaanse besluitnemingsreël. Sodanige reël balanseer (1) die gewig van getuienis ten gunste van en teen substitusie, (2) a priori waarskynlikhede soos bepaal deur vorige mededingingsake en akademiese navorsing, en (3) die verliesfunksie van die besluitnemer. Die benadering van die Suid-Afrikaanse Mededingingstribunaal in die saak rakende die gedeeltelike samesmelting van Primedia en Kaya FM bied 'n nuttige gevallestudie om hierdie beginsels te demonstreer.

Thesis advisor: Frank Gollop / My doctoral dissertation consists of three essays in the field of Industrial Organization. The first two consider exclusive dealing contracts between upstream and downstream firms theoretically, while the third measures consumer substitution among geographically differentiated air travel products empirically. In the first chapter I study the ability of an incumbent seller to use exclusive dealing contracts to foreclose efficient entry when there are n downstream buyers, where n can be viewed as a measure of the degree of downstream competition. The effect of downstream competition on the ability of the upstream incumbent to use exclusive contracts anticompetitively depends on whether upstream firms compete over linear or two-part prices. The model also highlights an interesting effect of the sunk cost of upstream entry that is ignored in models with exactly two buyers. In the second chapter I investigate the ability of an incumbent monopolist to exclude a potential entrant via exclusive dealing contracts when these contracts include an agreement over price. I find that a simple entry game yields both exclusionary and entry equilibria. The exclusionary equilibrium is unique, however, under most reasonable assumptions; for example if buyers are downstream competitors, if entry or the marginal cost of the potential entrant are uncertain, or if the incumbent can commit not to compete for unsigned buyers. When buyers compete with one another downstream, the optimal guaranteed price is above (below) the marginal cost of the incumbent when downstream buyers compete over strategic complements (substitutes). In the third and final chapter (co-authored with Kyle Buika) I study the question of geographic market definition in the US airline industry. Though an accurate definition of an economic market is important for any study of industry, there is no rule governing what exactly constitutes a market. To define a market we must ask the question "between which products do consumers substitute,'' knowing that the answer to this question will depend on how "close'' products are to one another in product space, as well as how close they are to one another, and to consumers, in geographic space. We estimate a discrete choice model of air travel demand that uses known information about the locations of products and consumers, which allows us to study substitution patterns among air travel products at different airports. We evaluate the commonly used city-pair and airport-pair definitions of a market for air travel, and conclude that a city-pair is the appropriate definition. We also employ the Hypothetical Monopolist test for antitrust market definition, as defined by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, and conclude that the relevant geographic market for antitrust analysis is, according to this test, frequently more narrowly defined as an airport-pair. Finally we conduct merger simulations under different market definitions and compare the results to those obtained using our own results, and conclude that accounting for geography is important when studying mergers. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Under digital convergence, the market structure has changed which cause the traditional market definition is no longer applicable. Many industries and firms have take action of cross-industry M&A and integration. In contrast, regulations and ¡§new¡¨ market definition has not appeared which cause antitrust authorities deal with the case of the M&A under digital convergence has no quantitative tools. Our study has found that the market structure under digital convergence almost is two-sided market and multi-sided market, so we use the modified Critical Loss Analysis which Evans and Noel (2008) proposed to be the market definition tool under digital convergence. Subsequently, we use the merger case of TFN media and Kbro to do empirical analysis. By the empirical results, we find out that the relevant market of cable TV has to expand. The IPTV and online play will be the competitive product that the market structure of cable TV will be changed radically. Under digital convergence, market definition may not precisely than traditional, but it still could provide antitrust authorities an effective quantitative evidence, and with the economic theory of qualitative analysis which could make policy analysis more integrity.

Analysis of Purum Ltd., a descrition of the company, its financial analysis, definig the relevant market trends and future forecast, definition and comparism of competition, future plan

In this article, we propose an innovative way of delineating local markets based on easily accessible data. We apply this concept to the day care industry and investigate providers' location choices relative to local market characteristics to evaluate the widespread presumption that local markets for child care services are geographically very small. Using a panel of all day care centers for the metropolitan region of Vienna, Austria, for nearly a decade, as well as geographically extremely disaggregated data on the spatial distribution of children under the age of six at the 250m×250m grid cell level, we find that the location of children and day care centers are strongly related, but this relationship diminishes as soon as the distance between a child's place of residence and the day care center's location increases. We conclude that local markets for day care services in metropolitan regions are indeed very small (about 500m or 550 yards).

This dissertation aims to contribute to the field of economics of competition policy by analyzing the demand structure and the market power in the Turkish beverage industry and in the cola market in particular. First, a demand system for the beverage products has been estimated by using a multi-stage linearized Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). Using the own-price elasticity of cola in a SSNIP test (Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price), it is shown that cola market consists of a distinct relevant product market. Then, the demand elasticities of cola products at brand and package level have been estimated by the simple and nested logit models. Finally, the estimated demand elasticities of cola products have been used in measuring the degree of market power and predicting the effects of a hypothetical merger between Pepsi and Cola Turca by using a merger simulation technique. The results show that all cola suppliers have large price-cost margins for most of their products. Prices of the merging parties increase in average by 15 - 21% after the merger. The merger also causes the market price to increase by 16- 22% and consumer surplus to decrease by nearly 5% in average. Finally, depending on these results, the thesis recommends a stricter merger control criterion than dominance criterion for competition policy in Turkey.

Start-ups have played and still play a vital role in national and global economies. To grow and maintain competitiveness, companies need to innovate, and this is the engine of market growth. However, existing studies do not provide sufficient guidance and explanation on how companies in the early stages of life can successfully define a market for radical innovation. Some previous studies have focused on market niche and breakthrough innovation, others on start-ups and their radical innovation, and others on entrepreneurship and dynamic capabilities.  Therefore, the objective of this master’s thesis is to systematically address and explain how start-ups with their radical innovation can define a market and what dynamic capabilities are necessary to reach it successfully. This master's thesis presents a qualitative case study, and the results show that start-ups can face several challenges when defining a market, especially when talking about radical innovation. However, the deployment of dynamic capabilities in a constant manner can support start-ups in the complex process of the delimitation of the market. These capabilities are essential for start-ups not only to shape the offer but also to deal with uncertain environments and to adapt to changes in the market. The findings of this thesis contribute to sharpening the theoretical framework of dynamic capabilities in an entrepreneurial environment. Entrepreneurs can benefit from the results as a practical guide when defining a market. Moreover, for academia, the results improved the dynamic capabilities framework with an illustration of the application of these capabilities in a real scenario.

I uppsatsen undersöks marknadsavgränsningen vid onlinetjänster vilket är ett ämne som uppmärksammats nyligen i ett avgörande från Marknadsdomstolen där inblandade parter var OnlinePizza och Pizza24, som båda är verksamma inom onlinebeställning av mat. Yrkandet kunde inte bifallas på grund av bristande bevisning från den yrkande parten. Författarna har diskuterat hur utfallet av domen kunde blivit om tillräcklig bevisning hade lagts fram.Med stöd av svensk och europeisk rätt samt relevant praxis diskuterar författarna framförallt angående begränsningen av den relevanta produktmarknaden vid onlinetjänster, särskilt för matbeställningar.Det går inte att dra slutsatser angående den relevanta produktmarknaden för onlinetjänster eftersom tjänsterna till en väldigt stor grad skiljer sig från varandra generellt i syfte och användning. Författarna har undersökt tjänsten onlinebeställning av mat och kommit fram till att den relevanta produktmarknaden bygger på tre grundpelare. Även om onlinetjänster oftast betraktas som geografiskt obegränsade spelar dock den geografiska marknaden roll vid fastställandet av den relevanta marknaden för olika onlinetjänster.

We estimate own-price elasticities for fixed network voice telephony access and (national) calls services for private users and cross-price elasticities to mobile using time series data from 2002-2007 from the Austrian market. Using instrumental variable estimates and taking into account the possibility of cointegration we find that access is inelastic while calls are elastic. We conclude that the retail market for national calls of private users can probably be deregulated due to sufficient competitive pressure from mobile. Access-substitution on the other hand does not seem to be strong enough to justify de-regulation. / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.