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The relationship between party organisation, class consciousness and workers’ struggle has been a basic issue in Marxism since its foundation, and particularly since the rise of revisionism at the end of the last century. To the very limited that a “mainstream” literature on Lenin sought to locate him within the Marxist tradition that tradition was identified with a determinist interpretation of Marx developed by the revisionists and centrists. This approach has been countered by a generally sympathetic view of Lenin’s comments on party organisation, argued by a recent set of “critics” of the “mainstream” view. Yet despite their wish to make a comprehensive critique of the “mainstream”, most of the critics have failed to do so due a residual element of determinism in their understanding of the relation between workers’ struggle and the development of class consciousness.This thesis seeks to complete the critique of the “mainstream” through establishing the role of conscious intervention in realising the material possibilities for workers’ struggle. It does so through a case study of the labour movement in St. Petersburg between the “Emancipation” of 1861 and the “Stolypin Coup” of 3/6/1907. A pivotal point in the development of this movement was “Bloody Sunday” (9/1/1905), and the thesis is structured around that moment to show what changes, as well as what does not change, in the role of conscious intervention in periods of mass struggle relative to times of more limited protest.

Two long-standing and erroneous claims have plagued Marxism for the past century. First, Marx held no static view of human-nature. Second, Marx's theory of alienation was the naive view of a young Marx, which was jettisoned in his wiser adult years. Both views are demonstrable false. Moreover, the validity of his theory of human nature, and alienation, are contingent upon the acceptance of each other. One cannot fully comprehend his view of alienation without understanding his view of human nature, and vice versa. Upon demonstrating Marx's theory of human nature, and defending it as a crucial bedrock for the theory of alienation, mainstream rejections of each will be considered, and critiqued. The constant misunderstanding of Marx's theory of human nature comes in his unique theory of essence. He is an essentialist, with a fluid conception of man's essence. One's historical essence is an ensemble of socio-historical reflections, dialectically interplaying off a historically transcending essentialism.

<p>Splatterpunk was a short-lived, but explosive horror literary movement birthed in the 1980’s that utilized graphic depictions of violence in its prose. Drawing parallels to other subversive and radical art movements like Dada and Hardcore Punk, this paper examines through a Marxist lens how Splatterpunk, influenced by the destructive nature of 1980’s neoliberalism, reflected the violence, categorized as direct and structural, of its period of creation and used extreme vulgarity as an act of rebellion against traditional horror canon.</p>

<p>I argue in my dissertation that the Marxist ethical claim against capitalism could be bolstered through: 1) a recognition of the inaccurate human ontology that capitalist theories of entitlement presuppose, 2) a reconceptualization and replacement of that old paradigm of human ontology with a concept that I call “organicism” and 3) a normative argument for why this new paradigm of human ontology necessitates a new political economy and a new way of structuring society. I use the debate between Robert Nozick and G.A. Cohen as a launching point for my case.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In his book, <i>Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality</i>, G.A. Cohen argues that Robert Nozick’s “entitlement theory” is unable to produce the robust sense of freedom that libertarians and capitalist proponents aggrandize. According to Cohen, the reason for this is due to the limitations and consistency errors produced by the libertarian adherence to the “self-ownership principle.” (the moral/natural right that a person is the sole proprietor of their own body and life). Namely, that the pale freedom that the proletariat enjoys within capitalism is inconsistent with the Libertarian’s own standard for freedom. So, Cohen argues for the elimination of the self-ownership principle. My project picks up where Cohen’s leaves off, claiming that the consistency errors don’t lie in entitlement theory’s use of the self-ownership principle (it is important that we don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater). Rather, the errors lie in the principle’s metaphysics - specifically in the ontology of the human being. The self-ownership principle is only faulty because it presupposes an impossible self. I show that entitlement theory heedlessly presupposes the self (or a human ontology) as a “rational, autonomous, individual.” I then deconstruct each of these three features (rationality, autonomy, and individuality) to show that this picture of the human being is not necessarily incorrect, but it is incomplete.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Although we are indeed rational, autonomous, individual creatures, these are only emergent characteristics that merely arise after the organic and socially interconnected aspects of our selves are nurtured. I encompass these latter features of our selves under the heading: “organicism”. So, my contribution is to provide a different ontological foundation of the human being – “organicism” – to replace the Enlightenment grown: “rational, autonomous, individual”. I draw heavily from Karl Marx’s philosophical anthropology, and G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of Geist/Spirit, with a little inspiration from Aristotle and ecological theory to construct “organicism” – a pancorporealist, naturalistic materialism. It is the theory that the human being is, in essence, an organic creature, inseparable from nature, but <i>through </i>the nurturing of these material, organic, symbiotic relationships (with other humans and with the ecosystem) that these “super”-natural capacities of rationality and autonomy arise along with and because of a <i>full</i> self-consciousness.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Finally, I infer the normative implications of this ontology of subjectivity. This organicist conception of the self has transformational effects on our notions of property and the way we structure society. So, I contend that organicist ontology then serves as the foundation for a normative theory of political economy that sees the flourishing or health (broadly speaking) of the organicist human as the primary ethical goal. I speculate on an alternative political economy that can provide the robust sense of freedom that Nozick’s entitlement theory (capitalism) was lacking because it actually produces the <i>conditions</i> necessary for rationality, autonomy and individual freedom.</p>