Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wyoming, 2005. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on Oct. 16, 2007). Includes bibliographical references (p. 36-39).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Open University. BLDSC no. DX196536.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2009. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 200-210).

The ability to infer the invisible displacement of objects has long been thought to elude most species with the exception of humans and great apes. However, in recent years, a number of researchers have proposed that this elusive capacity, rather than reflecting profound differences in the conceptual abilities of monkeys and other nonprimates, may instead reflect differences in processing capacities (such as inhibition and working memory). This thesis investigated knowledge of occluded object movements involving gravity, in rhesus and stumptail macaques (Macaca mulatta and arctoides), and two- and three-year-old children (Homo sapiens). In the first part of the thesis, using manual search tasks, a behavioural analysis revealed a number of biases that influence search on invisible displacement tasks, but also showed that contrary to the contentions of some authors, these biases do not mask the existence of correct representations. One study did reveal how seemingly mundane differences between tasks might lead to markedly different patterns of search and emergence of biases. In the second part of the thesis, in the first direct test of the prediction-postdiction hypothesis, an analysis of anticipatory eye gaze suggested that an inability to predict the location of an object does not account for the looking-searching dissociation that has become so prevalent in both the developmental and comparative literature. In attempting to bring together the findings from all the chapters, a framework is suggested in which representations are viewed as differing in strength such that the strength of a representation may determine whether or not a pre-existing bias surfaces in behaviour.

This study explores characteristics of students’ repertoires of representations in two mathematical contexts: whole number multiplication and the comparison of common fractions. A repertoire of representations refers to a set of representations which a student can reconstruct as needed. Of particular interest are (1) how multiplicative relationships among units were represented, and (2) whether continuous measurement was an underlying conceptual framework for their representations. In addition, the characteristics of students’ representations and interpretation of units of linear and area measurement were explored. Data were collected through a series of interviews with Grade 5 and Grade 7 students. Some results of the study were as follows. Each repertoire of representations was exemplified by a dominant form of units, either discrete or contiguous. Within a repertoire, all forms of units were related, first through a common system of measurement (either numerosity or area), and second through their two-dimensional characteristic. In the multiplication context, some repertoires were comprised only of representations with discrete units, but others also included some representations with contiguous units. Students sought characteristics in their representations which reflected those based on continuous measurement, however linear or area measurement was not used as a conceptual framework. Instead, all representations were based on the measurement of numerosity. Also, students exhibited different limits in their representation of multiplicative relationships among units. Some represented no multiplicative relationships, but most represented at least a multiplicative relationship between two units. Relationships among three units were seldom constructed and difficult to achieve. Common fraction repertoires were based on the measurement of either numerosity or area, but the physical characteristics of the units varied. Some repertoires had only contiguous representations of units, others also included representations with discrete units, and a few did not represent fractional units at all. Students’ representations reflected characteristics of area-based representations, however area measurement was not necessarily a conceptual framework. In addition, students’ beliefs about what constituted units of area measurement were variable. As a result, they either represented no multiplicative relationships among units, or fluctuated between representing two-unit and three-unit relationships. Linear measurement was notably absent as a basis for representations in both mathematical contexts. The one-dimensional characteristic of linear measurement did not fit students’ dominant framework for constructing mathematical representations. With respect to measurement, students represented linear units in terms of discrete points or line segments. Counting points and interpreting the count in terms of the numerosity of line segments was problematic for nearly all students. When partitioning regions into units of area, a few students also equated the number of lines with the number of parts. The direct relationship of action and result in counting discrete objects was generalized without consideration of other geometric characteristics. When comparing quantities having linear or area units, numerical reasoning was not always used. Alternatively, either quantities were transformed to facilitate a direct comparison, or only perceptual judgements were made. No students consistently used numerical reasoning to compare fractional units of area. In the latter situations, the part-whole relationship among units seldom was observed. In general, there was no direct relationship between the forms of representations used by students in the two mathematical contexts and the characteristics of their representations of units of the measurement contexts. The development of repertoires of representations appears to be context specific. The repertoires were strictly limited in terms of the forms of representations of which they were comprised. / Education, Faculty of / Curriculum and Pedagogy (EDCP), Department of / Graduate

While a substantial body of research has documented how consumers' levels of progress, in general, influence their motivation in goal pursuit, the changes in the determinants of motivation in different stages of goal pursuit and their impact on consumers' self-regulation remain largely unexplored. Specifically, what are the factors consumers focus on when they first start to pursue a goal versus when they are approaching the end point of the pursuit? My dissertation explores this important question from three different angles: the perceived velocity, the mental representation of progress level, and the perceived closeness with others who are pursuing the same goal. Through three essays, we found that when people first begin to pursue a goal and the attainability of the goal is a concern, they are motivated by a fast speed of progressing, tend to exaggerate the progress they have made so far, and seek companionship from others who are pursuing the same goal, to enhance the belief that the goal is indeed attainable. However, once they reach the advanced stage of the pursuit and the attainability of the goal is relatively secured, they switch to focus on the remaining discrepancy and seek to reduce this gap in a timely manner; therefore, in this advanced stage of the pursuit they are conversely motivated by a slow speed of progressing, tend to downplay the progress they have made to exaggerate the remaining discrepancy that still needs to be completed, and such intense progress monitoring also leads to competitiveness against others who are pursuing the same goal as them. / text

O presente trabalho pretendeu discutir teoricamente e ilustrar com alguns casos clínicos as dificuldades de atribuição de estados mentais de crianças com autismo, estabelecendo uma articulação entre alguns conceitos da epistemologia genética piagetiana, tais como representação e egocentrismo e do constructo da teoria da mente. A teoria da mente tem sido denominada, pelos seus estudiosos, como a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais (crenças, desejos, intensões e emoções) a si e aos outros, no intuito de explicar, interpretar e predizer comportamentos e tem alcançado destaque com o passar dos anos, em relação às pesquisas sobre autismo no cenário internacional. No entanto, algumas divergências entre seus autores resultam em diferentes maneiras de mensurar esta capacidade. Leslie (1987,1988) considera que a teoria da mente já esteja presente nas brincadeiras de faz de conta infantil e no emprego dos termos mentais utilizados por crianças de dois anos de idade. Diferentemente, Perner (1991) advoga que a teoria da mente só é evidente quando a criança tem a capacidade de reconhecer que a mente é um sistema de representações, por volta de quatro a seis anos de idade. Por isso, para este último autor, somente a partir da resolução das tarefas de crença falsa é que se poderia afirmar que a criança apresenta a teoria da mente, pois, assim, significa que esta diferencie entre o subjetivo e o mundo físico. A representação mental e a construção interna do mundo real, feita pela criança, foram assuntos amplamente estudados por Jean Piaget. Piaget (1947) afirma que a criança alcança um nível de representação mental que lhe habilite a diferenciar entre o que é subjetivo do que é objetivo quando supera o egocentrismo, pois enquanto pensar que todos pensam como ela, não encontrará motivos para se conformar às verdades comuns, além de não se interessar pela busca de comprovações lógicas sobre aquilo que afirma. O pensamento egocêntrico, na epistemologia genética piagetiana, é um estágio primitivo do pensamento lógico marcado por três características: predomínio da imagem sobre o conceito, certa inconsciência do pensamento e ausência de lógica. Ancorada na epistemologia genética piagetiana e com base na realização de estudos de casos de duas crianças com autismo e uma criança com desenvolvimento neurotípico, a presente investigação concluiu que os referidos autores da teoria da mente discorrem sobre diferentes estágios desta capacidade. Além disso, por meio de entrevista clínica segundo Piaget, da análise do emprego dos termos mentais e da análise das justificativas de seus participantes em relação à tarefa de crença falsa de Sally e Ann, este estudo depreendeu que a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais ao outro requer o início da superação do egocentrismo, descrito por Piaget. Por isso, crianças com autismo, apesar de poderem empregar termos mentais em seus discursos, geralmente, têm dificuldades de diferenciar entre o subjetivo e o mundo real, apresentando tendência à representação imagética em detrimento da representação conceitual, desinteresse em comprovar o que afirmam e dificuldades em diferenciar o próprio ponto de vista do ponto de vista de outrem / This research intended to discuss theoretically and illustrate with some clinical cases the assignment difficulties of mental states of children with autism, establishing a link between the concepts of mental representation and egocentrism in Piaget\'s genetic epistemology and the theory of mind. The Theory of mind has been defined by their researchers as the ability to attribute mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions) to onself and others, in order to explain, interpret and predict behaviors and it has achieved prominence with over the years, in relation to autism research in the international scene. However, some differences between their authors resulted in different ways to measure this capacity. Leslie (1987,1988) considers that the Theory of mind is already present in child\'s pretend play and employment of mental expressions used by children of two years. In contrast, Perner (1991) argues that the Theory of mind is only evident when the child has the ability to recognize that the mind is a system of representations about four to six years old. So, it is only after the resolution of the false-belief tasks that one could say that the child has a theory of mind, meaning that he distinguishes between the subjective and the physical world. The mental representation and the internal construction of the real world made by children were subjects extensively studied by Jean Piaget. Piaget (1947) argues that children reach a level of mental representation when they are able to differentiate between what is subjective and what is objective and when they overcome the egocentrism. While they think that everyone thinks like them, they don\'t find reasons to conform to common truths, and they won\'t be interested in seeking logical evidence about what they say. For Piaget, the egocentric thought is a primitive stage of logical thinking marked by three characteristics: predominance of the image of the concept, some unconscious thought and lack of logic. Based on Piaget\'s genetic epistemology and based on two studies case of one children with autism and one with neurotypical child development, this research concluded that these authors of the Theory of mind discourse on different stages of this capacity. Furthermore, through clinical interview, the employment of mental expressions and the analysis of the justifications of the participants in relation to the false belief task of Sally and Ann, this study concluded that the ability to attribute mental states to others requires the early overcoming of egocentrism, as described by Piaget. Therefore, children with autism, although they may employ mental expression in their speeches, they usually have difficulties to differentiate between the subjective and the real world, with a tendency to image representation at the expense of conceptual representation, unwillingness to prove what they say and difficulties in differentiate their own point of view from the other ones

O presente trabalho pretendeu discutir teoricamente e ilustrar com alguns casos clínicos as dificuldades de atribuição de estados mentais de crianças com autismo, estabelecendo uma articulação entre alguns conceitos da epistemologia genética piagetiana, tais como representação e egocentrismo e do constructo da teoria da mente. A teoria da mente tem sido denominada, pelos seus estudiosos, como a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais (crenças, desejos, intensões e emoções) a si e aos outros, no intuito de explicar, interpretar e predizer comportamentos e tem alcançado destaque com o passar dos anos, em relação às pesquisas sobre autismo no cenário internacional. No entanto, algumas divergências entre seus autores resultam em diferentes maneiras de mensurar esta capacidade. Leslie (1987,1988) considera que a teoria da mente já esteja presente nas brincadeiras de faz de conta infantil e no emprego dos termos mentais utilizados por crianças de dois anos de idade. Diferentemente, Perner (1991) advoga que a teoria da mente só é evidente quando a criança tem a capacidade de reconhecer que a mente é um sistema de representações, por volta de quatro a seis anos de idade. Por isso, para este último autor, somente a partir da resolução das tarefas de crença falsa é que se poderia afirmar que a criança apresenta a teoria da mente, pois, assim, significa que esta diferencie entre o subjetivo e o mundo físico. A representação mental e a construção interna do mundo real, feita pela criança, foram assuntos amplamente estudados por Jean Piaget. Piaget (1947) afirma que a criança alcança um nível de representação mental que lhe habilite a diferenciar entre o que é subjetivo do que é objetivo quando supera o egocentrismo, pois enquanto pensar que todos pensam como ela, não encontrará motivos para se conformar às verdades comuns, além de não se interessar pela busca de comprovações lógicas sobre aquilo que afirma. O pensamento egocêntrico, na epistemologia genética piagetiana, é um estágio primitivo do pensamento lógico marcado por três características: predomínio da imagem sobre o conceito, certa inconsciência do pensamento e ausência de lógica. Ancorada na epistemologia genética piagetiana e com base na realização de estudos de casos de duas crianças com autismo e uma criança com desenvolvimento neurotípico, a presente investigação concluiu que os referidos autores da teoria da mente discorrem sobre diferentes estágios desta capacidade. Além disso, por meio de entrevista clínica segundo Piaget, da análise do emprego dos termos mentais e da análise das justificativas de seus participantes em relação à tarefa de crença falsa de Sally e Ann, este estudo depreendeu que a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais ao outro requer o início da superação do egocentrismo, descrito por Piaget. Por isso, crianças com autismo, apesar de poderem empregar termos mentais em seus discursos, geralmente, têm dificuldades de diferenciar entre o subjetivo e o mundo real, apresentando tendência à representação imagética em detrimento da representação conceitual, desinteresse em comprovar o que afirmam e dificuldades em diferenciar o próprio ponto de vista do ponto de vista de outrem / This research intended to discuss theoretically and illustrate with some clinical cases the assignment difficulties of mental states of children with autism, establishing a link between the concepts of mental representation and egocentrism in Piaget\'s genetic epistemology and the theory of mind. The Theory of mind has been defined by their researchers as the ability to attribute mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions) to onself and others, in order to explain, interpret and predict behaviors and it has achieved prominence with over the years, in relation to autism research in the international scene. However, some differences between their authors resulted in different ways to measure this capacity. Leslie (1987,1988) considers that the Theory of mind is already present in child\'s pretend play and employment of mental expressions used by children of two years. In contrast, Perner (1991) argues that the Theory of mind is only evident when the child has the ability to recognize that the mind is a system of representations about four to six years old. So, it is only after the resolution of the false-belief tasks that one could say that the child has a theory of mind, meaning that he distinguishes between the subjective and the physical world. The mental representation and the internal construction of the real world made by children were subjects extensively studied by Jean Piaget. Piaget (1947) argues that children reach a level of mental representation when they are able to differentiate between what is subjective and what is objective and when they overcome the egocentrism. While they think that everyone thinks like them, they don\'t find reasons to conform to common truths, and they won\'t be interested in seeking logical evidence about what they say. For Piaget, the egocentric thought is a primitive stage of logical thinking marked by three characteristics: predominance of the image of the concept, some unconscious thought and lack of logic. Based on Piaget\'s genetic epistemology and based on two studies case of one children with autism and one with neurotypical child development, this research concluded that these authors of the Theory of mind discourse on different stages of this capacity. Furthermore, through clinical interview, the employment of mental expressions and the analysis of the justifications of the participants in relation to the false belief task of Sally and Ann, this study concluded that the ability to attribute mental states to others requires the early overcoming of egocentrism, as described by Piaget. Therefore, children with autism, although they may employ mental expression in their speeches, they usually have difficulties to differentiate between the subjective and the real world, with a tendency to image representation at the expense of conceptual representation, unwillingness to prove what they say and difficulties in differentiate their own point of view from the other ones

I outline and defend a theory of mental representation based on three ideas that I extract from the work of the mid-twentieth century philosopher, psychologist, and cybernetician Kenneth Craik: first, an account of mental representation in terms of idealised models that capitalize on structural similarity to their targets; second, an appreciation of prediction as the core function of such models; and third, a regulatory understanding of brain function. I clarify and elaborate on each of these ideas, relate them to contemporary advances in neuroscience and machine learning, and favourably contrast a predictive model-based theory of mental representation with other prominent accounts of the nature, importance, and functions of mental representations in cognitive science and philosophy.

Thesis (M. A. (Clinical Psychology)) --University of Limpopo, 2018 / Current understandings of mental illness are deeply rooted in a predominantly westernised paradigms of mental health. Constructs such as mental illness have been found to be socially constructed and rooted in historical contexts and informed by cultural and societal influences. Most of the existing research conducted on the knowledge and perceptions of tertiary-educated individuals towards mental illness have been quantitative in nature. The aim of this study was to qualitatively explore the knowledge and perceptions of undergraduates using Social Representation Theory as a theoretical framework. Purposive sampling was utilised to draw a sample of 16 undergraduate students between the ages of 18-25 years, at the University of Limpopo (Turfloop Campus). Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) was used to analyse the semi-structured interviews which were used to collect data. The results of this study found that negative views and perceptions existed amongst the sample pertaining to mental illness and the mentally ill. It was also found that participants conceptualisations of mental illness were not wholly western or traditionally African. Participants perceptions were informed through their cultural and social experiences with the mentally ill. Generally, the study pointed towards a greater need for psycho-education on mental illness.