In Joyce's Myth of Morality, Joyce proposes an error theory about morality. He then argues that, once we accept an error theory, we have three options: we can be abolitionists and jettison moral discourse, be conservationists and maintain our false moral beliefs, or be revolutionary fictionalists and assent to and act in accordance with moral discourse while believing it's false. In this paper, I argue that Joyce has ignored a fourth option—limited revisionism, or slightly changing our moral terms to avoid problematic commitments—and that this option is superior to the three aforementioned possibilities. Along the way, I show that Joyce has unfairly ignored limited revisionism because of faulty views about what makes a concept or term normative, and that limited revisionism ignores some expected pitfalls, such as overgeneralizing to legitimately error-theoretic discourses. / Master of Arts / In this paper, I argue against Joyce’s assertion that if our moral terms centrally implicate falsehoods, we should act as though morality is true (because it’s useful) while also believing that it’s false (because doing otherwise would be epistemically irresponsible). I show Joyce’s position rests on a specific misunderstanding of how language operates, and argue instead that, if we accept that our current moral talk centrally implicates falsehoods, we should be open to slightly revising our moral terms to avoid implicating such falsehoods instead. I also show that my position, limited revisionism, avoids a few expected pitfalls—most importantly, it doesn’t overgeneralize and apply to terms like “witch” and “phlogiston,” which also centrally implicate falsehoods but seem like terms that shouldn’t be open to conceptual change.

In my dissertation I argue that prominent descriptivist metaethical views face a serious semantic problem. According to standard descriptivism, moral thought and discourse purports to describe some ontology of moral properties and/or relations: e.g., the term `good' purports to refer to some property or cluster of properties. Central to any such theory, then, is the recognition of certain items of ontology which, should they actually exist, would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts. And since one commonly accepted feature of moral thought and discourse is a supervenience constraint, descriptivists hold that any ontology suitable for morality would have to supervene upon non-moral ontology. But this lands descriptivists with the task of providing a semantic account capable of relating this ontology to moral terms and concepts. That is, they must explain why it is that certain items of ontology and not others would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts, in a way that is consistent with the supervenience constraint. I argue that this important explanatory task cannot be carried out. And because the problem generalizes from metaethics to all normativity, we are left with good reason to pursue alternatives to descriptivist accounts of normative semantics.

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, 2017 / Any comprehensive theory of the realist position in metaethics must be equipped with a version of moral ontology. Metaethical theological voluntarism, which purports that supernatural facts, i.e. commands issued by a divine being, determine moral states of affairs, has been accused for a long time of rendering morality ‘arbitrary’. Implicit in this widely-accepted objection is the idea that a moral theory cannot have an arbitrary ontological foundation because then anything could have been right or wrong. This paper gives a detailed analysis of this objection that theological voluntarism is arbitrary and makes the case that a commitment to avoiding arbitrariness imposes constraints on the formulation of a moral theory. In particular, this paper argues that accounting for such a commitment decreases the significance that natural facts play for moral theories that maintain a naturalist account of moral ontology. / XL2018

This dissertation explores a number of interrelated metaphysical and epistemological issues regarding pleasure, suffering and their apparent value and disvalue, thematically tied together by the broad idea that pleasant and unpleasant experiences are, respectively, experienced as good and bad. More specifically, I try, firstly, to advance the debate regarding the nature of pleasure by arguing for what I shall call the "Self-Experiential View" - the view that pleasant experiences are pleasant in virtue of being experienced as good. Secondly, I assess the merits of the "Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis" - the natural conjecture, expressed by a number of authors, that our especially intimate experiential relationship ("acquaintance") with the evaluative features of our hedonic experiences grounds a particularly robust kind of epistemic status enjoyed by our hedonic-evaluative beliefs, which makes them less vulnerable to sceptical doubt. In chapter 1, I lay some groundwork for the ensuing discussion, by introducing a number of background claims which help to motivate these two theses. Moreover, I isolate two specific important ways of unpacking the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis and clarify some central concepts which feature prominently in the subsequent chapters. In chapter 2, I defend the "Self-Experiential View." I proceed by addressing a number of objections which have been levelled against the view in the literature, and locate it in relation to the views which currently dominate the debate regarding the nature of pleasure. In chapter 3, I assess and ultimately reject the first important version of the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis singled out in chapter 1, the "Naïve Realist Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis," which states that Naïve Realist acquaintance with pleasure's evaluative nature grounds a distinctive, especially robust kind of epistemic status enjoyed by our hedonic-evaluative beliefs. In chapter 4, I assess the "Introspective Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis", the attempt to vindicate the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis by extending an acquaintance account of phenomenal introspective justification to the hedonic-evaluative case. By carefully unpacking a range of different candidate conceptions of introspective acquaintance, I home in on what I consider the most appealing acquaintance account of phenomenal introspection, and argue that it should not be extended to the hedonic-evaluative case, which means that this proposal also fails. A brief concluding chapter summarises the key conclusions of the dissertation and highlights some questions raised in the course of my discussion which would seem to warrant further investigation.

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<p>This thesis is a critical examination of' the claim that metaethics is ethically neutral and that it has no ethical content. Broadly speaking, I have dealt with each of the three different categories of metaethical theory - naturalist, nonnaturalist and non-cognitivist. Chapter I is an outline of the differences between ethics and metaethics and a discussion of the relation between the two in the case of a non-naturalist metaethical theory (i.e. that of G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica.) Chapter II is an examination of the various possible interpretations of the claim of ethical neutrality in an attempt to see what is being claimed and how the claim can be best formulated. Chapter III is first an explanation of the non-neutrality of Naturalistic metaethical theories and secondly a critique of the fundamental presupposition (i.e. that all naturalistic theories are false) of those who claim neutrality. Chapter IV is a discussion of further problems of and prospects for the construction of a neutral metaethic. These problems which burden even the non-cognitivist, while perhaps not insurmountable, indicate that any truly neutral metaethic will be so only at the cost of being irrelevant to ethics.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

In this paper, I call into question the thesis known as judgment internalism about moral motivation. Broadly construed, this thesis holds that there is a non-contingent relation between moral judgment and moral motivation. The difficulty for judgment internalism arises because of amoral agents: when an agent both knows the right and yet fails to be motivated to act on this knowledge. Specifically, I cite John Milton's Satan from Paradise Lost. This is a problem because it calls into question the non-contingent relation between moral judgment and moral motivation. I argue that in order for judgment internalism to be viable in reconciling judgment internalism and amoralism, it must provide plausible accounts of both (a) the relationship between judging and motivation, and (b) the conditions for defeasibility. While crude versions of the thesis fail to do this, I provide a revised thesis which I call Narrative Internalism, which assumes a narrative theory of the self. This thesis has the dual strength that it can account for both why one would typically be motivated to Φ upon judging that it is right to Φ and also the conditions that might obtain such that one would fail to be motivated. This account of moral psychology explains both (a) the relationship between judging and motivation, and (b) the conditions for defeasibility by giving an account of plausible defeasibility conditions. I conclude that unless there are more plausible accounts of judgment internalism in the offing, which doesn't seem apparent to me, we should adopt Narrative Internalism. / Master of Arts

Error theory turns on a particular presupposition about the conceptual commitments of moral realism, namely that the moral facts posited by realists need to be categorical. True moral propositions are said to have an absolute authority in their prescriptions in the sense that an agent, regardless of her own ends, needs or desires, is categorically obligated and has reason to act in accordance with their prescriptions. But, nothing in the world has such a queer property as categoricity, and therefore we ought to be suspect of the enterprise of moral discourse. Some philosophers, like Stephen Finlay, have argued that this categoricity is not a necessary feature of moral language, and in so doing hope to have shown that the error theoretic critique is thus refuted. In this article I offer a survey of the literature on this topic and then contribute independent motivations for siding with those who think moral facts need not be categorical (and that a powerful argument for error theory is defused).

Thesis advisor: Liane L. Young / Thesis advisor: Elizabeth A. Kensinger / Theory of mind refers to the process of representing others’ mental states. This process consistently elicits activity in a network of brain regions: the theory of mind network (ToMN). Typically, theory of mind has been understood in terms of content, i.e. representing the semantic content of someone’s beliefs. However, recent work has proposed that ToMN activity could be better understood in the context of social prediction; or, more specifically, prediction error—the difference between observed and predicted information. Social predictions can be represented in multiple forms—e.g. dispositional predictions about who a person is, prescriptive norms about what people should do, and descriptive norms about what people frequently do. Part 1 examined the relationship between social prediction error and ToMN activity, finding that the activity in the ToMN was related to both dispositional, and prescriptive predictions. Part 2 examined the semantic content represented by moral claims. Prior work has suggested that morals are generally represented and understood as objective, i.e. akin to facts. Instead, we found that moral claims are represented as far more social than prior work had anticipated, eliciting a great deal of activity across the ToMN. Part 3 examined the relationship between ToMN activity and metaethical status, i.e. the extent that morals were perceived as objective or subjective. Objective moral claims elicited less ToMN activity, whereas subjective moral claimed elicited more. We argue that this relationship is best understood in the context of prediction, where objective moral claims represent strong social priors about what most people will believe. Finally, I expand on this finding and argue that a theoretical approach incorporating social prediction has serious implications for morality, or more specifically, for the motivations underlying normative compliance. People may be compelled to observe moral rules because doing so maintains a predictable social environment. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

This thesis critically assesses ‘relaxed realism’ – a group of views that have entered the metaethical debate recently (Dworkin, 1996; Kramer, 2009; Parfit, 2011; Scanlon, 2014). Relaxed realism promises a novel perspective on our normative practice. In particular, it aims for a view that is genuinely distinct from traditional non-naturalism on the one hand, and sophisticated forms of expressivism on the other. This thesis calls into question whether such an aspiration can be met. The approach is twofold. First, the thesis argues that relaxed realism can meet various of its objectives better by relying on theoretical resources that expressivism offers. To argue for this claim, it discusses three challenges that relaxed realism should be able to meet according to its own objectives. With regards to each challenge, it then shows that as it stands relaxed realist views fail to adequately respond to it. Finally, the thesis suggests that relaxed realism can better respond to the respective challenges – and hence, better meet their own objectives – by endorsing certain expressivist resources. Second, the thesis argues that relaxed realism is an inherently unstable view. It does so by raising a dilemma. Either relaxed realism fails to establish the desired difference to expressivism or it succeeds, but at the expense of erasing the difference to traditional non-naturalism. The conclusion of the thesis is critical: the relaxed realist aspiration for a novel take on our normative practice – distinct from both traditional non-naturalism and expressivism – remains unmet.