This thesis examines the contribution of the Private Military and Security Industry (PMSI), as an element of the United States (US) total force, to the US military capability in pursuing Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003 until 2011. In order to do so, the study proposes a typology of five types of contribution categories which define the link between the ends demanded by the US government (strategic goals) and the use of the PMSI as a tool to help achieve them. By incorporating a model from the operations management field, the Hayes and Wheelwright's Four-Stage model, this thesis identifies the categories of Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter, Driver, and Spoiler as distinct forms of engagement, constituting a framework for the assessment of the nature of the relationship between the contractors’ activities and the strategic goals they sought to help achieve. Applied to the case studies of armed private security services and base support services, this framework reveals that contractors became the Crucial Supporter of the US military efforts in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. In the aftermath of the ill-planned regime-change, followed by unforeseen operational circumstances on the ground, and constrained by the US domestic policy reservations towards prolonged nation-building efforts, the US government found both armed security contractors and base support contractors to be a critical asset of the US military strategy on the ground. Through their constructive contribution towards the size of the deployable force, the available timeframe, the objectives and the strategic goal of these operations, they became a key partner of the US military efforts in Iraq. Utilising a descriptive and exploratory approach, and relying on a range of sources, including official documents, semistructured interviews and publicly available video testimonies of US veterans from Iraq, this thesis highlights the PMSI’s strategic value in a complex expeditionary operation while providing a detailed insight in the complexity of modern warfare.

The belief that Scotland showed undue patriotism by providing a high proportion of volunteers in 1914-16 needs to be looked at in a new light. While the New Armies of 1914-16 may have been volunteer in concept, they were not volunteer in actuality, and, while there was no doubt a proportion of men in Scotland, as elsewhere in the British Empire, who were prepared to come forward for purely altruistic or 'patriotic' ideals, the majority enlisted for more practical or realistic reasons. External forces either pushed or pulled those men and enticed or forced them to enlist. Previous analyses have been primarily top down. We know how many men served, and with what units, but not why. This thesis is an investigation of Scottish recruitment from the bottom up, to determine whether or not those who enlisted came from any particular section of Scottish society. This investigates and explains the driving forces behind voluntary recruitment in Scotland, August 1914 - December 1915, its methods, course taken, and its impact on the country as a whole.

Thesis (MMil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As South Africa entered the transitional period towards establishing a multi-party democracy, its defence policy changed fundamentally. The African National Congress (ANC) as the upcoming governing party established the Military Research Group (MRG), to help formulate its defence policy positions, which subsequently largely determined South African defence policy. Through this think-tank the ANC leadership became interested in and supported the idea of non-offensive defence (NOD). NOD is a European idea of the Cold War era, which was aimed at preventing the security dilemma, arms races and accidental war between states. The aim of this study is to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa since 1994, by describing how NOD became prominent. Non-offensive defence ideas influenced South African defence policy significantly and appeared in all legislation and policies pertaining to defence. NOD complemented the ANC’s domestic policy goals with the new security paradigm, which like NOD, originate from the Peace Research school of thought. As a defensive idea, NOD emphasised South Africa’s intention to improve relations with Southern African states, as well as its strategic defensiveness, which determined the military doctrine of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The ANC used NOD to transform the SANDF, especially to scale down its power projection capabilities. Two arguments are made in this study to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa when the prominence of NOD is considered. Firstly, that South African defence policy-makers are open to ideas and models from industrialised states, despite the limited applicability and shortcomings of such models. Secondly, models can be used in various ways by interest groups to influence policy. NOD was used as a theoretical tool by the MRG and the military to influence defence policy according to their interests. Several characteristics of South African defence policy-making were also identified. Firstly, that the Constitution does not prioritise state or individual security as more important. This makes conflicting world-views of realism and idealism about defence possible. Defence policy therefore often has to involve a compromise between these views. Secondly, although the Constitution makes provision for public participation in defence policy-making, there is no equal distribution of power for interest groups to influence policy. In this regard the legislature and parliamentary defence committees are also weak compared to the executive authority. Thirdly, the use of non-governmental organisations in defence policy-making has created a form of direct and unrestricted lobbying, as well as the privatisation of policy-making. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Tydens die politieke oorgangsperiode en die aanloop tot die vestiging van ‘n veelparty demokrasie, het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid wesenlike veranderinge ondergaan. As opkomende regerende party het die African National Congress (ANC), die Military Research Group (MRG) gestig om díe party se standpunte rondom verdedigingsbeleid te formuleer. Sedertdien het die MRG, Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid grootliks omskrywe. Die MRG het ANC leiers aan die term non-offensive defence (NOD), wat ‘n Europese idee uit die Koue Oorlog-era is, bekendgestel. NOD is daarop gemik om die veiligheidsdilemma, wapenwedlope en toevallige oorlog te verhoed. Die ANC het NOD ondersteun en bevorder. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die aard van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking sedert 1994 te beskryf aan die hand van NOD se prominensie. Non-offensive defence idees het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid beduidend beïnvloed en verskyn in alle wetgewing en beleid wat verband hou met verdediging. NOD het die ANC se plaaslike beleidsdoelwitte binne die nuwe veiligheidsparadigma ondersteun. Soos NOD, is díe paradigma ‘n produk van die Peace Research denkskool. As ‘n defensiewe idee het NOD, Suid-Afrika se oogmerk om betrekkinge met state in Suider-Afrika te verbeter, benadruk. NOD het verder ook SA se strategiese defensiewe postuur en gepaardgaande militêre doktrine bepaal en beklemtoon. Die ANC het NOD gebruik om die Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW) te transformeer en magsprojeksievermoëns af te skaal. Twee argumente word in hierdie studie benut om die aard van verdedigingsbeleidmaking in Suid-Afrika te beskryf, met die inagneming van die belangrikheid van NOD. Eerstens, dat beleidmakers ontvanklik is vir idees en modelle van nywerheidslande, ten spyte van die beperkte toepaslikheid en tekortkomings van sulke modelle. Tweedens, dat modelle deur verskeie belangegroepe gebruik kan word om beleid te beïnvloed. Die MRG en die SANW het NOD as ‘n teoretiese instrument benut om verdedigingsbeleid tot die bevordering van eie belange te beïnvloed. Verskeie eienskappe van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking is geïdentifiseer in die studie. Eerstens, dat die Grondwet nie die staat of die individu se veiligheid bo die ander stel nie. Dit veroorsaak botsende wêreldbeskouings van realisme en idealisme oor verdediging. Beleid behels dus dikwels kompromieë tussen die twee uitgangspunte. Tweedens, alhoewel die Grondwet voorsiening maak vir openbare deelname in beleidmaking, is daar nie gelyke ‘n verspreiding van mag tussen belangegroepe om beleid te beïnvloed nie. In die opsig is die wetgewende gesag en parlementêre komitees aansienlik swakker as die uitvoerende gesag.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Armed forces the world over have three primary functions — force development, force deployment and force employment. Defence policy plays a guiding role in all of these, but is especially important in establishing the rationale for the creation of those military capabilities that force development brings about. The end of the Cold War, which coincided with a new political dispensation in South Africa, also gave rise to a new security paradigm: a theory implying both a reduction in the utility of military force, and an adjustment in the use of military forces. This phenomenon changed the context within which states generate modern defence policy, but did not affect the causal relationship between policy publications and the outcomes of a military’s force development activities. Usually, a defence policy presupposes the development of armed forces that are effective and efficient at executing their mandate — a condition that is measurable in terms of the organisation’s levels integration, skill, quality and responsiveness. The thesis uses this concept, both as a point of departure and as a structural organising device, to describe the variance between defence policy and military capabilities. A general analysis of South Africa’s defence policy publications indicates that, indeed, the policymakers had thoroughly considered the armed forces’ effectiveness when they wrote the White Paper (1996) and the Defence Review (1998). By 2006, the South African Army has interpreted national defence policy and formulated a future strategy of its own, very much in alignment with the ‘modern system’ approach of the original policy publications. However, further analysis of the actual capabilities of the South African National Defence Force indicates a major variance between the relevant defence policy publications, the military’s force development outcomes, and the present demands of the South African security environment. There appears to be quite serious deficiencies in the attribute of integration, which arise primarily from political influences; furthermore, the military’s quality is under strain, mainly because of the defence force’s seeming inability to formulate a strategy that is not only acceptable, but also suitable and feasible. While the armed forces appear to be skilful enough to execute their present (peacetime) missions, success in the type of operations that policy demands is unlikely. In summary, the study suggests that the principal reason for the large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands stems from defence’s lack of responsiveness to its resource constraints and operational realities. The thesis therefore concludes that the defence force has been largely unsuccessful in complying with the demands of defence policy, irrespective of the fact that the policy by itself may be obsolete and/or inappropriate for the South African context; furthermore, that military effectiveness in meeting current operational demands is also doubtful. Finally, the defence force’s schizophrenic organisational culture may be the primary cause of it moving ever closer to reneging on its constitutional mandate. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Gewapende magte wêreldwyd het drie primêre funksies — magsontwikkeling, magsontplooiing en magsaanwending. Verdedigingsbeleid vervul ‘n rigtinggewende rol in al hierdie funksies, maar is veral belangrik om die skepping van die militêre vermoëns, wat deur magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite daargestel word, te regverdig. Gevolglik beoog hierdie tesis om die mate van ooreenkoms tussen die voorskrifte van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid en die werklike militêre vermoëns van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag te beskryf, soos dit ontwikkel het tussen 2000 en 2011. Die einde van die Koue Oorlog (samelopend met die totstandkoming van ‘n nuwe bedeling in Suid-Afrika) het geboorte gegee aan nuwe denke betreffende veiligheid, wat ook ‘n afname in die nuttigheid van militêre mag en ‘n aanpassing in die aanwending van militêre magte tot gevolg gehad het. Hierdie verskynsel het die omgewing waarbinne moderne state verdedigingsbeleid ontwikkel verander, maar nie die kousale verband tussen beleidspublikasies en die uitkomste van ‘n weermag se magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite aangeraak nie. Gewoonlik veronderstel ‘n verdedigingsbeleid die ontwikkeling van gewapende magte wat doeltreffend en doelmatig is in die uitvoering van hul mandaat — ‘n toestand wat meetbaar is in terme van die organisasie se vlakke van integrasie, vaardigheid, kwaliteit, en hul vermoë om toepaslik op omgewigsinvloede te reageer. Die tesis gebruik hierdie konsep, beide as ‘n vertrekpunt en as ‘n strukturele ordeningsmeganisme, en om die verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid en militêre vermoëns te beskryf. ‘n Algemene ontleding van Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleidspublikasies toon dat, met die skryf van die Witskrif (1996) en Verdedigingsoorsig (1998), beleidmakers wel deeglike oorweging geskenk het aan die weermag se doeltreffenheid; so ook die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër, wat teen 2006 sy eie toekomsstrategie die lig laat sien het. Desnieteenstaande getuig verdere ontleding van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasional Weermag se werklike vermoëns van diepgaande verskille tussen verbandhoudende beleidspublikasies, die weermag se ontwikkelingsuitkomste, en die huidige eise van die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsomgewing. Dit wil voorkom asof daar ernstige integrasie-leemtes is, komende hoofsaaklik vanuit die politieke omgewing; verder is die gewapende magte se kwaliteit onder druk, hoofsaaklik vanweë die weermag se onvermoë om ‘n strategie te formuleer wat gelyktydig aanvaarbaar, geskik en uitvoerbaar is. Die gewapende magte mag dalk vaardig genoeg wees om hul huidige (vredestydse) take te verrig, maar dit is te betwyfel of hulle suksesvol sal wees in die voer van die tipe operasies soos beleid voorgeskryf. Ter opsomming dui die studie aan dat die groot verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid, militêre vermoëns en werklike operasionel eise voor die deur van ‘n gebrek aan doelmatige aanpassing by hulpbrontekorte en operasionele werklikhede gelê kan word. Die tesis maak dus die gevolgtrekking dat die weermag grootliks onsuksesvol was om aan die vereistes van verdedigingsbeleid te voldoen, ongeag die feit dat verdedigingsbeleid op sigself verouderderd en/of ontoepaslik binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks mag wees; verder, dat militêre effektiwiteit ter voldoening aan huidige operasionele eise tans ook verdag is. Ten slotte is die weermag se tweeslagtige organisasiekultuur moontlik die belangrikste oorsaak van die neiging na die versaking van verdediging se grondwetlike mandaat.

Formation movement is vital to preserve security among its units during military operations. We plan movement of a military formation over real, or simulated terrain, maximally preserving the relative positions of units in formation while it avoids barriers, and while its units avoid obstacles. Terrain is divided into homogeneous cells (say, squares), and a pair of neighboring cells is adjacent if the formation can transit between these cells while avoiding barriers with sufficient clearance. We induce a graph from these adjacencies, and determine the movement cost on each arc with a fine time-step simulation that finds local movement vectors to preserve relative formation position while avoiding approach too close to barriers or obstacles (this emulates solving differential equations with Euler's method). We then nominate an origin and a destination, select a shortest path, and repeat the time-step simulation over this path to determine the individual positions of each unit as the formation makes its transit. Game designers and robot controllers have published schemes to guide formation movement, but their movements can penetrate barriers, and myopically get caught in cul-de-sacs. By contrast, we guarantee that if a path exists that avoids these pitfalls, we will find it.

The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, finding success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war. Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in "irregular wars" and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments. In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / During the Gulf War, millions of people around the globe, courtesy of CNN, witnessed the seemingly massive use of precision-guided weapons against Iraqi targets in the largest air campaign since World War II. Most of the missions were flown against Iraqi targets with no friendly forces on the ground. This type of air campaign is known as Deep Air Support, or 'DAS'. Equally as important, but receiving less spectacular news coverage, is Close Air support, or 'CAS'. When conducting CAS missions, the chance for 'Friendly Fire' incidents, injuring or killing your own troops on the ground, increases dramatically as compared to DAS missions. This may seem to be an obvious deduction since there are no friendly troops on the ground during a DAS mission but when small, specialized units, such as SEALS, Special Operations Forces (SOF), or reconnaissance forces find themselves in the deep battlespace, operating in a low intensity conflict (LIC) environment, these simple doctrinal distinctions can sometimes lead to confusion, or worse, friendly fire fatalities on the battlefield. It could be argued that there is a disconnect between joint doctrine and joint training which creates an environment on the LIC battlefield, as well as in training, that can lead to faulty execution of CAS missions, and potentially disastrous results, jeopardizing the safety of the very same ground personnel we are trying to support. / Major, United States Marine Corps

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis presents two prescriptive models for approaching challenges to special operations forces with regard to personnel recovery in an urban environment. It begins by developing a model for overt recovery methods, using McRaven's model of Special Operations as the foundation. This model is then tested against three different case studies from operations in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. The original six principles proposed by McRaven are complimented with four newly-prescribed principles that account for the interactions of the isolated personnel. Following this analysis, a nonconventional assisted recovery model is presented for clandestine personnel recovery methods. This model borrows the relative superiority concept from McRaven's theory, but proposes six different principles. This model is evaluated using three case studies from the World War II era through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. These cases support the idea that while the urban operational environment may vary across time and space, the principles supporting successful personnel recovery operations endure. / Major, United States Army / Major, United States Air Force

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Borer, Douglas A. Second Reader: Rothstein, Hy S. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 26, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, International Security and Assistance Force, U.S. Special Operations Forces. Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-116). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): James A. Russell, Gregory K. Mislick. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-69). Also available online.