yes / The proliferation of irregular armed actors which defy simplistic definition has caught public and academic attention alike, not least in the pages of this journal. To move the debate on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) forward, this article seeks to enhance our conceptual understanding of parochial armed groups which are not primarily driven by ideological or religious objectives. Thus, this article clarifies similarities as well as differences between subtypes of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) on the one hand, and between CBAGs and other NSAGs, on the other hand. By doing so, a typology is developed that classifies militias, gangs and vigilantes on the basis of their political, economic and security-related dimensions. The resulting ideal types are discussed through the lenses of different explanatory frameworks and policy debates in the field of contemporary security studies. A major typological issue is the tendency for CBAGs to ‘turn bad’ and become threats to the stability they were expected to transform, becoming a serious problem in countries where they operate. It is concluded that the challenge of CBAGs ultimately needs to be addressed by putting in place a functioning state that can tackle the underlying woes that led to their proliferation in the first place.

Shortly after the February 2014 Euromaidan revolution which ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia orchestrated a rapid and mostly bloodless annexation of the Crimea. Following the removal of Ukrainian authority from the peninsula, the Kremlin focused simultaneously on legitimizing the annexation via an electoral reform in Crimea and fermenting political unrest in the Donbas. As violence broke out in the Donbas, anti-Ukrainian government militias were formed by defecting Ukrainian security forces members, local volunteers, and volunteers from Russia. The Kremlin provided extensive support for these militias which sometimes even came in the form of direct military intervention by conventional Russian forces. However, the use of state-sponsored militias by Russia is not a new phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation has been relying on militias to help stabilize local security environments, and more recently, achieve foreign security policy objectives in the Near Abroad. By tracking the history of Vostok (East) Battalion during its two distinctly different iterations, first as a militia for the Yamadayev family which operated primarily in Chechnya as well as briefly in South Ossetia and Lebanon and then as separatist formation in Eastern Ukraine, my thesis seeks to examine why Russia uses militias. Using the theoretical frameworks of principle-agent relations and organizational hierarchy, my thesis examines post-Soviet military reforms to contextualize the Kremlin's rationale for utilizing militia groups as well as analyzing the costs and benefits Moscow ultimately incurs when it leverages militias as force projection assets domestically and in the Near Abroad. / Master of Arts / This thesis is an examination of Russia’s relationship with its proxy militias. Proxy militias are paramilitary formations comprised of a mix of civilians and military veterans which states use to carry out acts of coercive violence without having to rely on regular military forces. Specifically, the thesis is divided into two case studies of a unit known as Vostok Battalion. Vostok has existed in two distinctly different iterations; first as a Chechen based militia operating throughout the Caucuses and later as a rebel militia fighting the Ukrainian government in the Donbas region. In both cases, Vostok received support and varying levels of guidance from Russia. The case studies of this thesis are attempting to contextualize why Russia utilizes proxy militias and identify the challenges Russia faces when its ability to control them is degraded.

La récurrence des crises politiques et sécuritaires dans la région sahélo-saharienne continue de mettre en lumière les multiples facteurs d'instabilité qui la touchent. Plaçant l'État au centre de notre réflexion, nous verrons que, si ces fragilités peuvent être le fruit de facteurs exogènes, elles constituent surtout le résultat de décisions endogènes. Partant de ce constat, cette étude analysera les politiques mises en place par les autorités du Burkina Faso, du Mali et du Niger, le cadre régional dans lequel elles s'inscrivent et les interdépendances qu'elles contractent. Face à la faiblesse de ces pays, la solution d'une approche régionale a été plébiscitée mais son efficacité se heurte à la défense des intérêts particuliers des États et de leurs gouvernants. / The repetition of political and security crisis in the Sahel region highlights the multiplicity of factors of instability. The State being at the center of our study, we will observe that, despite exogenous threats, its fragility is mostly the result of endogenous decisions. This said, our work will analyze policies implemented by the authorities of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the regional frame in which they place themselves and the mutual dependence they contracted. To counter the weakness of these countries, the regional approach has benne praised. Its effectiveness must, however, face the defense of rulers' and States' particular interests.