M.S.

The purpose of this study is to collect information on the significant philosophies of the mind and make a comparison of these concepts and their relation to education, religion, and morals.

The central purpose of this dissertation is to develop and test a theoretical model of mind wandering in a technological setting by integrating the emerging work and theory on mind wandering—a shift of attention from the primary task to the processing of internal goals. This dissertation is intended to advance our understanding on the costs and benefits of mind wandering in information systems (IS) research and in turn, contribute to the literature of cognitive IS research. Understanding the consequences of mind wandering in a technological setting is imperative because mind wandering plays a vital role in influencing various outcomes associated with technology use and/or technology learning, such as technology anxiety, software self-efficacy, and task performance. This dissertation is composed of three essays which examine the determinants and consequences of mind wandering and focus of attention on a number of emotional and cognitive outcomes. A multi-method approach (i.e., online survey and laboratory experiment) across three essays is used to test the research models. Essay 1 focuses on developing the measurement items and estimating the impact of mind wandering on users' emotional outcomes (i.e., technology anxiety and users' satisfaction). Drawing upon the content regulation hypothesis of mind wandering, the content of thoughts are differentiated into two categories—technology-related thought (herein IT) and non-technology related thought (herein non-IT). The results show that whereas mind wandering (non-IT) is a major determinant of technology anxiety, focus of attention (IT) is the main predictor of users' satisfaction. Essay 2 focuses on the effect of mind wandering and focus of attention in the IS learning context. The study begins by exploring the hypotheses concerning the roles of executive functions (i.e., inhibition, switching, and working memory) and task complexity in influencing the occurrence of mind wandering and focus of attention, and in turn, cognitive outcomes (i.e., software self-efficacy and learning performance). Essay 2 integrates the use of psychological testing to measure executive functions and self-report to measure mind wandering and focus of attention. The interaction effects between mind wandering and focus of attention are also tested. The findings reveal that the costs and benefits of mind wandering in IS learning depend, in part, upon its content, whether it's technology-related or non-technology-related. Specifically, the results suggest that the congruence between the content of mind wandering experience and focus of attention determines the outcomes of such experience. Essay 3 examines the extent to which individuals' focus of attention and mind wandering influence IS decision making performance at different levels of task complexity. The research model is tested using a laboratory experiment in the context of B2C e-commerce. Drawing upon unconscious thought theory and executive control theory of mind wandering, the results show that under a low task complexity condition, focus of attention and mind wandering do not have any significant effects on performance accuracy. Under a medium task complexity condition, focus of attention leads to higher performance accuracy, but mind wandering does not have a significant effect on performance accuracy. However, under high task complexity, both focus of attention and mind wandering lead to higher performance accuracy. Mind wandering also negatively influences performance efficiency under all levels of IS task complexity.

Chalmers (2007) has argued that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail, given that phenomenal concepts will either fail to explain our epistemic situation, or fail to be physically explicable themselves. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have offered a response, arguing that zombies do share our epistemic situation. In the following paper I aim to show that philosophical-zombies do not share our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness. I will begin with some background material regarding the general dialectic I am addressing in section (I) before outlining the debate between Chalmers (2007) and Carruthers and Veillet (2007) in more detail and its relevance for mind-body considerations in section (II). Next, in section (III) I will suggest a worry related to Carruthers and Veillet’s position: that phenomenal concepts fail to refer in zombie worlds in the first place. Finally, in section (IV) I will argue that even if a zombie’s phenomenal concepts successfully refer, there is still good reason to think that zombies will fail to share our epistemic situation. I will defend this claim by explaining three asymmetries between me and my zombie twin’s corresponding epistemic situations. / Master of Arts / In the following paper I defend the position that philosophical zombies don’t share our epistemic situation. Philosophical zombies are hypothetical creatures that are identical to humans concerning all physical and functional properties, yet lack any phenomenal experiences. While zombies have identical brain states compared to non-zombies, they lack any felt, private, and subjective experiences. Next, I understand epistemic situation in this paper as the justificatory status of one’s beliefs. So, I am arguing that the beliefs of a physical duplicate of me who lacked experiences would not be equally justified as mine. Specifically, I am responding to Carruthers and Veillet (2007) who argue that philosophical zombies do share our epistemic situation, so long as we allow the zombies’ beliefs to differ in content. That is to say, if we understand zombie beliefs to be about different states (other than phenomenal states), then there is an available physical referent for the zombie belief that will ensure all his beliefs are as equally justified as their non-zombie twin. I suggest a difficulty for the existence of such a referent, and point to a collection of asymmetries in justificatory status between the beliefs of zombies and non-zombies to argue that the Carruthers and Veillet (2007) strategy is unavailable.

In the first chapter of this paper I focus on the general overview of Occam's Razor, and develop several interpretations and adaptations of Occam's Razor as a principle of simplicity. In the second chapter I apply these different interpretations in the Physicalism/Dualism debate, and critically assess the validity of these implementations of Occam's Razor in philosophy of mind. In the final chapter I give an overview of my discussion thus far, and make assertions about what my paper means for the usage of Occam's Razor's as a whole.

The aim of this research is to expand the framework of contemporary conflict resolution by constructing a complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and a Buddhist epistemology. Despite its evolution and development through self-reflexivity and self-critique, contemporary conflict resolution established upon Western epistemologies has confined the understanding of human mind to social/cultural orientations and left a comprehensive and qualitative analysis of the potential of individual human mind underdeveloped. Buddhist epistemology, the central theme of which is to address human suffering that is mainly psychological and subjective, makes a critical analysis of human subjectivity in terms of how it can be become a root cause of suffering including conflict and how it can be addressed by gaining an insight into the social/cultural construction of human subjectivity. The argument of the thesis is that when a socially/culturally-oriented view of human mind and a deeper and more profound view of human mind are combined together, we can engage in a qualitatively richer and deeper analysis of the psychological and subjective dynamics of conflict resolution.

Bacterial cell division requires formation of the cytokinetic cell division septum at the mid-cell position, a process that is determined by three Min proteins; MinC, MinD and MinE. Regulation of cell division by Min proteins occurs via a multi-step process involving interactions between various Min proteins, as well as the membrane. In this cycle, ATP-bound MinD binds to the membrane surface where it can recruit MinC to inhibit formation of the cell division septum. MinE binding to this complex displaces MinC and stimulates ATP hydrolysis, leading to the dissociation of MinD from the membrane. These interactions give rise to a dynamic pattern of Min protein localization that appears to involve a polymeric state that is designed to create a zone that is permissive to cell division at the mid-point of the cell. The interaction between MinD and the membrane is a critical aspect of this cycle, yet the role of the lipid bilayer in MinD activation, localization and polymerization is not well understood. To probe the role of membrane charge and fluidity on MinD activation and polymerization, we developed a kinetic assay of MinE-stimulated MinD ATPase activity. We found that membrane charge is essential for MinD activation and that differences in membrane fluidity give rise to changes in its activity. Moreover, a burst phase was also observed during the first few minutes of reaction, but only on the most fluid anionic lipid tested. To help determine if the observed membrane-dependent changes in MinD activity are linked to any changes in MinD polymer structure, we have begun to develop a method to identify surface exposed regions of MinD through a combination of covalent labeling and mass spectrometry. Optimization of various steps for the assay has been done, and the assay can be applied to the future characterization of MinD polymer structure. Results from this assay, in combination with those from the kinetic measurements described here, will help to improve understanding about how membrane properties modulate MinD ATPase activity, and how this can influence the Min protein oscillation that is required to ensure normal bacterial cell division.

Introdução: Dentre as diferentes manifestações de saúde que acometem os idosos, pode-se destacar os Transtornos Mentais Comuns (TMC). Sugere-se que a adesão a padrões alimentares específicos, como a dieta MIND (Mediterranean-DASH Intervention for Neurodegenerative Delay), possa atenuar ou reduzir os riscos relacionados ao envelhecimento. A Dieta MIND tem como princípio ingestão elevada de frutas vermelhas, vegetais verdes folhosos e demais vegetais, aves, peixes, oleaginosas, leguminosas, grãos integrais, azeite de oliva extra-virgem, vinho tinto, e por sua vez, uma ingestão baixa de carnes vermelhas, doces e massas, queijos, manteiga, margarina, além dos alimentos convencionalmente chamados de \"fast food\". Objetivo: este estudo tem como objetivo identificar, em idosos, a pontuação do padrão dietético MIND e investigar a associação entre essa pontuação e a presença de TMC. Métodos: a amostra para o presente estudo é derivada do Inquérito de Saúde - ISA Capital Nutrição, no período de 2015. Foram estudados, nessa amostra, 545 idosos (acima de 60 anos), de ambos os sexos. Os dados alimentares da amostra foram obtidos a partir de dois recordatórios alimentares de 24 horas, que foram corrigidos para identificação da dieta habitual, e calculados quanto à ingestão dos grupos alimentares que constituem a dieta MIND. Além disso, a pontuação à dieta MIND foi identificada a partir da mediana da ingestão dos grupos determinados. A presença de TMC foi avaliada por meio da aplicação do SRQ-20 (Self-Reported Questionnaire). Foram ainda consideradas algumas variáveis de ajuste (sexo, idade, raça, nível de atividade física de lazer, presença de doenças crônicas como hipertensão arterial sistêmica, dislipidemia e diabetes mellitus, renda familiar total, Índice de Massa Corporal e escolaridade). Resultados: os participantes avaliados eram em sua maioria mulheres, inativas, com presença de doenças crônicas. Não houve associação significativa quanto a adesão à pontuação da dieta MIND e TMC, contudo, alguns componentes da dieta, quando associados isolados, mostraram associação significativa e protetora (vegetais verdes folhosos, outros vegetais não folhosos e leguminosas). Por sua vez, o consumo de carnes vermelhas mostrou correlação negativa para TMC. Conclusão: O presente estudo não encontrou associação significativa entre a pontuação 7 da dieta MIND e TMC entre os idosos, entretanto, quando se analisou os componentes do padrão dietético MIND isolados em relação a TMC, encontrou-se correlação positiva para os grupos de vegetais verdes folhosos, outros vegetais e leguminosas e correlação negativa para o grupo de carnes vermelhas. Desse modo, estratégias nutricionais voltadas à saúde da função cerebral, com foco em um maior consumo de alimentos protetores e menor consumo de alimentos não-protetores presentes na dieta MIND, podem auxiliar beneficamente a população, especialmente os idosos. / Introduction: Among the different health manifestations that affect the elderly, we can highlight Common Mental Disorders (CMD). In turn, it is suggested that adherence to specific dietary patterns, such as the Mediterranean-DASH Intervention for Neurodegenerative Delay, may attenuate or prevent mental disorders related to aging. The MIND Diet has as a principle a relatively high intake of healthy foods such as red fruits, leafy green vegetables and other vegetables, poultry, fish, oilseeds, legumes, whole grains, extra virgin olive oil, red wine, a relatively low intake of unhealthy foods such as red meats, sweets and pasta, cheeses, butter, margarine, and food conventionally called fast food. Objective: This study aims at analyzing, in the elderly, the score of the MIND dietary pattern, and to investigate the association between this score and the presence of CMD. Methods: The sample for the present study is derived from the Health Survey - ISA Capital Nutrition, in the period of 2015. In this sample, 545 elderly (over 60 years) of both sexes were studied. The dietary data of the sample were obtained from two 24-hour dietary reminders that were corrected for intrapersonal variability to identify the usual diet and calculated for the intake of the dietary groups that constitute the MIND diet. In addition, adherence to the MIND diet was identified from the median ingestion of the previously determined groups. The presence of CMD was assessed by the application of SRQ-20. Some adjustment variables (gender, age, physical activity pattern, presence of chronic diseases, income and schooling) were also considered. Results: the participants were mostly female, inactive, with chronic diseases. There was no significant association with adherence to the MIND and CMD scores, however, some dietary components, when associated alone, showed a significant and protective association (green leafy vegetables, other no-leafy vegetables and legumes). In turn, the consumption of red meat showed a significant and harmful association. Conclusion: The present study did not find a significant association between the MIND and TMC diet scores among the elderly, however, when analyzing the components of the isolated MIND dietary pattern in relation to the TMC, a positive correlation was found for the leafy green vegetable groups, other vegetables and legumes and negative correlation for the red meat group. Thus, nutritional strategies focused on brain function health, with a focus on higher consumption of protective foods and lower consumption of non-protective foods present in the MIND diet, can benefit the population, especially the elderly.

Thesis advisor: Marilee Ogren / The suggestion of a mind-brain duality that emerges out of Descartes’ cogito argument is assessed in the context of twenty-first century neuroscience. The Cartesian texts are explored in order to qualify the extent to which the cogito necessitates such dualism and the functions that Descartes attributes to a non-corporeal soul are precisely defined. The relationship between the mind and brain is explored in the context of a number neuroscientific phenomena, including sensory perception, blindsight, amusia, phantom limb syndrome, frontal lobe lesions, and the neurodevelopmental disorder Williams syndrome, with an attempt to illuminate the physiological basis for each. Juxtaposing the two perspectives, the author concludes that Descartes hypothesis of a disembodied soul is no longer necessary and that a purely physiological understanding of the human mind is now possible, and that there is an underlying affinity between this assertion and Descartes theory of mind. / Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology.

This dissertation uncovers a strand in early twentieth century British literature that is currently missing from readings of modernism - a fascination with portraying meditative states of mind. Modernist authors were intrigued by the mind's capacity to be in constant movement between the present, past, and future - what they represented as a stream of consciousness. This study examines the potential of the "still," calm, and concentrated mind in modernist visions of consciousness by exploring how the meditative mind takes a different shape in theme and form in the writings of Virginia Woolf, D.H. Lawrence, and Aldous Huxley. Drawing from the works' preoccupation with physical practices such as spiritual and ritual dance, relaxation techniques, Yoga, the Alexander Technique, and meditative walking, this study highlights the role of the body in views on consciousness in modernist literature. This dissertation argues that looking at modernism through the lens of meditation allows us to see the period not only in terms of the split, wounded self in the fast-paced modern metropolis but reveals its yearning for what the authors in this study call "wholeness," "mind-body harmony," and "the spirit of peace" - a search for peace attainable within, if not without, an attempt to cure the self in the fracturing modern world through experiencing the mind at peace.