Bergson's Matter and Memory presents original conception of perception which is developed on the grounds of dualistic ontology. So, Bergson's solution to mind-body problem is not an attempt to explain it as an isolated phenomenon, it is rather ambitious project which puts perception into world where the order of perception and the order of mathematical science coexist. In this dissertation, I will try to determine methods which govern solutions to problems of Matter and Memory. I will also deal with Time and Free Will in outline.

In this dissertation, I argue for the philosophical consistency of Aquinas’ hybrid view of human souls - that is, the idea that human souls, and only human souls, are at once substantial forms and subsistent things. I contend that the best way to understand the ontological status of human souls according to Aquinas is by means of the concept of ‘subsistent parts’. Since Aquinas characterizes souls as parts of substances, I propose a mereological analysis of the different types of part in Aquinas, and I conclude that souls should be seen as metaphysical parts of substances. An influential contemporary view holds that Aquinas’ doctrine is inconsistent on the grounds that nothing could be an abstract (form) and a concrete (subsistent) at the same time. I respond to this view by denying the widespread notion that substantial forms are purely abstract entities. I hold that the best way to make sense of Aquinas’ twofold approach to human souls is by saying that substantial forms possess an element of concreteness which is accounted for by the fundamental relationship between form and being. Finally, I address the question of taxonomy: how can we classify Aquinas’ view of the soul-body relation in light of the concepts that are currently used in philosophy of mind. I argue that the notion of a subsistent part entails the concept of ‘part-dualism’, which I present as standing midway between substance-dualism and nonreductive materialism, and also as being ontologically richer than property-dualism. I conclude this dissertation with a refutation of the idea championed by some prominent scholars that the existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of the person.

Le sujet du parcours est l'esprit, l'axe de recherche est le concept de causalité. Il s'agit d'abord de relever les déclinaisons de ce concept afin de souligner ces applications dans les travaux des philosophes de l'esprit. Après avoir vu des approches de la causalité (productif et pour dépendance), on parcourt la voie du fonctionnalisme et du physicalisme en philosophie de l'esprit, en voyant les notions de cause et leurs problèmes. On voit aussi d'un point de vue plus empirique la recherche du corrélat neuronal de la conscience. On souligne que la question de la " conscience phénoménale" peut être individuée en tant que problème philosophique et scientifique parce qu'elle s'impose comme inaccessible à une connaissance intersubjective et que le concept productif de cause ne peut pas être appliqué. Le problème principal, c'est la possibilité de détecter une corrélation mais pas un rapport asymétrique de relation causale. En cherchant un point de vue qui part de la conscience et un concept relationnel pour la corrélation psycho-physique (interrelation), on voit les thèses phénoméniste de Mach, de Carnap et de la pensée boudhiste (Ancienne/ Moyen-Age) avec leurs problèmes et leurs intuitions. On peut comprendre que la corrélation ne peut pas être dégagée d'un point de vue métaphysique mais qu'une conception épistémologique s'avère possible. C'est dans la méthode phénoménologique et la recherche neurophénoménologique qu'on peut trouver les moyens concrets d'exploration de la conscience. Cela permet d'appliquer un concept causal actionniste sur le plan épistémique et la notion d'interrelation pour décrire la corrélation psychophysique et son contexte d'individuation. / The debate is on the notions of cause impact on theory of mind and consciousness. First of all, I explore two notions of causality as defined by Ned Hall (2004) : production and dependence, and other related positions among which the actionist theory. After, I see the use of the notion of cause approaches to mind-body problem and to problem of consciousness (functionalism, physicalism and the NCC research) and two experimental examples (blindsight ans neurofeedback), I argue that neither production nor dependence are useful because there is a correlation and not an asymetrical causal relation, but that actionist theory of cause can be a good descriptive approache to our epistemic point of view. After I explore the phenomenalist point of view (Mach, Carnap and the Buddhist philosophy of Middle Age) on consciousness and psychophysical relation and the notions of cause and interrelation. It emerges that an epistemic description is useful and possible. I find in phenomenological and neurophenomenological methods the specific ways to detailing aspects of consciousness and mental phenomena, this allows to apply the actionist concept of cause for the epistemic point of view and to describe the psychophysical relation with the notion of interrelation.

I argue in this thesis that Aristotle’s hylomorphic metaphysics, supported by his theory of causality and his theory of the soul (De Anima), holds the key to solving the problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind. A core aspect of the contemporary mind-body problem is the problem of mental causation (how does the mind interact with the body to cause actions in humans). Without mental causation, in the realist sense of the word, it is difficult to see how humans are held responsible for their actions. There have been different approaches to solving the mind-body problem, but each has met with its own set of problems, except, I argue, Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Jaegwon Kim argues that Davidson’s anomalous monism cum supervenience renders mental causation epiphenomenal, and that a mental state is causally efficacious only when reduced to the physical properties. I argue that it is the phenomenal consciousness that accounts for our actions, and while neither Davidson’s nor Kim’s accounts of action can adequately deal with phenomenal consciousness, Aristotle’s metaphysics can. I argue that the ancient and neo-Aristotelian notion of self-knowledge is akin to our contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness and that Aristotle saves the notion of autonomous mental causation through his theory of hylomorphism that holds every substance is a composite of matter (body) and form (soul). My thesis is thus a novel invitation to rethink Aristotle’s psychology and philosophy of mind in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria 2020. / University of Pretoria(Postgraduate Bursary (2017-2018) / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted

Russellian panpsychism is often regarded as a theory of mind that bears promise of integrating conscious experience into the physical causal order. In a recent article by Howell, this is questioned. I will argue that failure to address Howell´s challenge properly has deeper consequences than it might initially appear; epiphenomenal micro-qualia means that we have lost a unique opportunity to gain insight into necessities in nature. In order to make use of this opportunity, however, some initial assumptions commonly made must be dropped: most crucially, the assumption of mind-body distinctness. In what follows, I try to provide a sketch of how a slightly different version of Russellian panpsychism can be formulated that builds around identity instead of mind-body distinctness. This version of panpsychism can meet Howell's challenge, but what is more, it can be met in a way that fully makes use of the special place occupied by panpsychism regarding the mysterious nature of the “necessary connection” between cause and effect.

Jean-Paul Sartre is not traditionally thought of as a philosopher of the body and, until very recently, little critical attention has been paid to this aspect of his work. Nevertheless, since 2005 a number of articles have begun to appear which suggest that Sartre‘s account of the body in L’Être et le Néant may be worthy of more consideration than it has thus far received – perhaps most notably Joseph Catalano‘s 2005 article suggesting that the chapter on the body is central to a proper understanding of Sartre‘s philosophy. Simone de Beauvoir is often criticised for her writing on the body in Le Deuxième Sexe, with much of the criticism suggesting that Beauvoir‘s use of existential philosophy is to blame for her failings. Yet Toril Moi argues that Beauvoir‘s claim that the body is a situation, a claim that arises from existential philosophy, is a valuable contribution to feminism. In light of these developments, it seems pertinent to look again at Sartre‘s chapter on the body in L’Être et le Néant and at Beauvoir‘s work to try to understand exactly what is meant by the body as a situation and how this concept relates to Sartre and Beauvoir‘s well-known ideas on freedom and responsibility. The aim of this thesis is to examine the importance of the chapter on the body in L’Être et le Néant and to demonstrate its relevance to Sartre‘s philosophy as a whole, to look at how Beauvoir has used Sartre‘s philosophy in her own writing and to consider the relevance of that philosophy to more contemporary writing on the body. The thesis will focus on L’Être et le Néant, Le Deuxième Sexe, and La Vieillesse with references also made to both authors‘ fictional works, to Beauvoir‘s autobiographical writings, and to more contemporary work on the body.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2153.pdf: 1061927 bytes, checksum: d375ec4ebfe571daaa867f73b5808e95 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-09-03 / It is well known by all those who study psychology that an undisguisable difficulty shows up whenever its object of study is called upon. Of all epistemological problems that a science may face, a fragmented definition of its object is certainly the hardest to deal with. This is the cornerstone of the statute of psychology. No matter what explanation shows up to justify such fragmented state, the fact is that the different research communities, known as schools , don t share the same basic notions to form a concept of what they re studying. We understand basic notions as models that precede the object s own definition. In the lack of a model for the psychological object that is wide enough to place the orbits of these schools around a cohesive axis, each one of them elects their own conception of their object of study, which will be consider as psychology s minor objects . If a science is capable of such diversity within its corpus, to the point of making any attempt of unity of its parts a difficult task, for sure there must be a characteristic that makes it sui generis. Such characteristic may only be understood within the nature of the object itself, whose phenomenology may be qualified as double-faced , sometimes describing physical properties (belonging to the field of the nature sciences ), sometimes circumscribing abstract properties (belonging to the field of the spirit sciences ). That s what we call imponderable , for such versatility, intrinsic to the psychological object, also translates its paradoxical character. Throughout this thesis, it will be demonstrated, based upon this character, the intimate dependency of psychology in respect to mind philosophy, for an epistemological solution of the first goes through the mind-body problem of the latter. Carefully examining certain lines of the works of four great thinkers, namely, R. Descartes, G. Ryle, S. Freud and C. G. Jung, this philosophical problem becomes evident under different expressions, something that, even though there are differences among them, points to a common link, that can also be pointing to a possible wider model to the psychological object, that coincides with what this thesis considers to be psychology s major object . To such a hypothetical model, the following work offers the term hybrid to elucidate it, using, for such, an intertwined historical and epistemological reflection, leading to a phenomenological hermeneutics. / É bem conhecido por todos os estudiosos do campo psicológico uma indisfarçável dificuldade que surge toda vez que o objeto de seus estudos é evocado. De todos os problemas epistemológicos que uma ciência possa enfrentar, certamente uma conceituação fragmentada de seu objeto é o mais comprometedor deles. Eis aí o ponto crucial do estatuto psicológico. Independente de qual explicação se apresente para justificar tal estado de fragmentação, o fato é que as diferentes comunidades de pesquisa, tidas por escolas , não comungam das mesmas noções de base para conceituarem aquilo que estão estudando. Por noções de base entenda-se modelos que antecedem a própria definição do objeto. Na falta de um modelo para o objeto psicológico que seja amplo o bastante para situar as órbitas das escolas em torno de um eixo coeso, cada uma delas elege sua própria concepção de objeto, o que passaremos a considerar como os objetos menores da psicologia. Se uma ciência é capaz de tanta diversidade em seu corpus, a ponto de tornar temerária qualquer tentativa de coesão de suas partes, por certo deve possuir alguma característica que a faça sui generis. Tal característica só pode ser entendida na própria natureza de seu objeto, cuja fenomenologia pode ser qualificada de dupla-face , ora circunscrevendo propriedades físicas (próprias do terreno das chamadas ciências da natureza ), ora circunscrevendo propriedades abstratas (próprias do terreno das chamadas ciências do espírito ). Isto é o que chamamos imponderável , pois esta versatilidade, intrínseca ao objeto psicológico, traduz também o seu caráter paradoxal. Ao longo desta tese, pretende-se demonstrar, com base neste caráter, a íntima dependência da psicologia com respeito à filosofia da mente, pois a solução epistemológica daquela passa pela dissolução do problema mente-corpo refletido por esta. Examinando minuciosamente certos traços das obras de quatro grandes pensadores, a saber, R. Descartes, G. Ryle, S. Freud e C. G. Jung, este problema filosófico se evidencia sob diferentes roupagens, algo que, não obstante as diferenças entre eles, aponta para um elo problemático comum, o qual também pode estar apontando para um possível modelo mais amplo para o objeto psicológico, que coincida com o que esta tese considera ser o objeto maior da psicologia. A este hipotético modelo, o trabalho a seguir oferece a terminologia do híbrido para elucidá-lo, empregando, para tal, um entrecruzamento de reflexões históricas e epistemológicas, desembocando em uma hermenêutica fenomenológica.

Resumo: O presente trabalho pretende delinear uma possível interpretação do behaviorismo radical como teoria da mente, o que significa, em outros termos, contextualizá-lo no âmbito da filosofia da mente. Para tanto, primeiramente apresentaremos as principais teorias que figuram na filosofia da mente contemporânea, incluindo suas teses centrais e seus respectivos problemas. Em seguida, trataremos dos fundamentos do behaviorismo radical enquanto filosofia da ciência e enquanto teoria do comportamento. Esses dois passos servirão ao propósito de estabelecer os parâmetros da discussão subseqüente entre behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente. Nesse sentido, o primeiro problema que pretendemos responder é: o que é a mente? Trata-se de um problema conceitual que envolve o mapeamento dos fenômenos normalmente caracterizados como mentais. Veremos que, para o behaviorismo radical, a mente é comportamento. Já o segundo problema que pretendemos responder é: qual a natureza da mente? - problema que, no contexto do behaviorismo radical, deve ser substituído pelo seguinte: qual a natureza do comportamento? Discorrer sobre a natureza de um fenômeno implica investigar quais são as características essenciais à sua existência. Trata-se, portanto, de um problema ontológico. Sugeriremos que as características essenciais para a existência do comportamento podem ser contempladas pelo posicionamento metafísico denominado relacionismo substancial. Em tempo, além dessas duas questões principais, discorreremos ao longo do trabalho sobre diversos problemas levantados pelas teorias da mente contemporâneas, tais como o problema da subjetividade, o problema do fisicalismo, o problema dos limites da ciência, o problema mente-corpo, o problema da causalidade mental, o problema do significado, o problema do reducionismo, o problema das qualidades das experiências, o problema do conhecimento ... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The aim of this work is to delineate a possible interpretation of radical behaviorism as a theory of mind. That means putting radical behaviorism in the context of philosophy of mind. To do so, firstly we will present the main theories of contemporary philosophy of mind, including its central thesis and its respective problems. Next, we will present the principles of radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science and as a theory of behavior. Those steps will serve to establish the parameters for subsequent discussion between radical behaviorism and the problems of philosophy of mind. The first problem with which we pretend to deal is the conceptual problem of mind: what is mind? As we will see, for radical behaviorism the mind is behavior. The second problem with which we pretend to deal is the ontological problem of mind: what is the nature of mind? In the radical behaviorist context, the question must be substituted by this: what is the nature of behavior? Discussions about the nature of things demands investigating what characteristics are essential to its existence. We will suggest that the essential characteristics of the existence of behavior can be contemplated by the metaphysical view denominated substantial relationism. Moreover, in addition to our two principal problems, we will discuss through this work several problems of philosophy of mind, such as the problem of subjectivity, the problem of physicalism, the problem of science limits, the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation, the problem of meaning, the problem of reductionism, the problem of qualitative character of experiences, the problem of privileged knowledge, the problem of qualia, and others. In the end, we hope that this work may represent a step toward the construction of a radical behaviorist theory of mind / Orientador: Jonas Gonçalves Coelho / Coorientador: Kester Carrara / Banca: Tereza Maria de Azevedo Pires Serio / Banca: João de Fernandes Teixeira / Mestre

Dans son œuvre, notamment dans The View From Nowhere, Thomas Nagel propose une réflexion unifiée sur certains problèmes philosophiques fondamentaux tels que la relation corps-esprit, l’identité personnelle, la liberté, la connaissance, la relation entre la raison et le réel. Il les comprend comme diverses formes d’un problème unique : le conflit entre certains aspects de notre conception subjective de la réalité, celle que nous développons spontanément depuis notre point de vue de créature particulière dans le monde, et certains aspects d’une conception objective de la réalité, indépendante de nos caractères particuliers, dont la recherche s’impose à nous et que nous tentons de développer. Nous avons mené un double travail : exposer les conceptions de Nagel à propos de la nature et de l’origine des problèmes philosophiques en question, prolonger ces réflexions. En effet, les conceptions de Nagel permettent de proposer une définition nouvelle et féconde de la métaphysique comme réflexion sur les conflits entre les points de vue interne et externe, d’élaborer une typologie a priori des solutions qui peuvent être apportées aux problèmes métaphysiques, de comprendre la nature et le ressort commun, de type idéaliste et anti-métaphysique, des courants dominants de la philosophie qu’ont été, durant la première partie du vingtième siècle, la phénoménologie et la philosophie de Wittgenstein. Enfin, cette typologie permet de clarifier la réflexion à propos des problèmes métaphysiques particuliers et de mesurer la portée des arguments en jeu. Nous avons établi ce point en abordant deux problèmes métaphysiques particuliers, celui de la relation corps-esprit et celui de la perception. / In his works, especially in The View From Nowhere, Thomas Nagel offers a unified reflection on some philosophical fundamental issues such as the mind-body link, the personal identity, the liberty, the knowledge and the relationship between reason and reality. He sees these matters as various forms of a sole issue: The conflict between certain aspects of our subjective understanding of reality - the one resulting from our spontaneous reflection as particular beings - and other aspects of an objective one - independent from our specific nature and which science facts imposed on us and that we try to develop. We have led a double task: first, to put forward Nagel’s conceptions of nature and of the origin of the philosophical issues at stake, then, to elaborate on these thoughts. Nagel’s conceptions allow, indeed, to give a new and fruitful definition of metaphysics as a reflection on the conflicts between the internal and external point of views. It also theoretically allows, to develop a typology of the possible solutions that can be brought to metaphysical concerns, to understand nature and the common responsibility - the idealistic and anti-metaphysical ones - of the main philosophical movements of the first part of the twentieth century. Wittgenstein’s phenomenology and philosophy that is. Eventually, this typology helps clarifying the reflection upon specific metaphysical issues and measuring the impact of the arguments at stake. We have came to this point by taking into consideration two specific metaphysical issues : the mind-body link and the perception.

This work is aimed at creating a single view in the field of cognitive processes. Namely it is analysis of providing importance of cognitive processes for the entire field of artificial intelligence. The whole area of cognitive processes is described through the analysis of biological cognitive processes and their subsequent comparison with the processes of artificial intelligence and also the overall analysis of their limitations and their use. The work also contains a brief overview of the architecture of artificial intelligence and philosophical essay focused on the relationship of mind and body. In the end we present a project from IBM workshop, which is very important for their ability to work with natural language and understanding the content of questions asked.