My dissertation is a collection of three essays that study various aspects of non-price competition among firms using fully microfounded general equilibrium models. The first two chapters, both coauthored with Benedetto Molinari, introduce advertising expenditures by firms into a dynamic and stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE), in order to address the question of whether and how aggregate advertising expenditures provide important effects upon the aggregate economy. In particular, the first chapter provides a short-run analysis, by focusing on the implications of aggregate adverting expenditure upon the business cycle. The second chapter, in turn, focuses on long-run effects of advertising, by analyzing the implications upon the steady-state equilibrium of aggregate advertising expenditures by firms. The last chapter, by using a modified version of the canonical New Keynesian model, investigates the effect upon inflation dynamics of non-price competition among firms. / Esta tesis contiene tres ensayos que estudian varios aspectos de la competencia no en precio entre las impresas, utilizando modelos de equilibrio general micro-fundados. En los primeros dos capítulos, ambos coautorados con Benedetto Molinari, se introducen gastos en publicidad de las empresas en un modelo dinámico y estocástico de equilibrio general, a través del cual, se estudian las implicaciones de la publicidad en la economía agregada. El primer capítulo se focaliza en los efectos de corto plazo de la publicidad, analizando las implicaciones con respecto al ciclo económico. El segundo capítulo, estudia los efectos de largo plazo de la publicidad, con el objetivo de analizar las implicaciones sobra el estado estacionario del economía. En el último capítulo se utiliza una versión modificada del modelo Neo-Keynesiano que estudia los efectos de la competencia no en precio en relación la dinámica de la inflación.

The privatisation and liberalisation of telecommunications throughout the world has resulted in the growing involvement of competition authorities in telecommunications regulation, alongside telecommunications sector-specific regulators. The existence of both sector specific rules and competition rules has brought about a critical institutional challenge. The increased role of competition authorities in the telecommunications sector raises the issue of inconsistent jurisdiction in the sector. Conflicts are therefore inevitable in the absence of clear delineation of jurisdiction. The South African model for regulation in the telecommunications sector entails a sharing of jurisdiction between the sector-specific regulator, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), and the competition-wide regulator, the Competition Commission. The study thus determines the interplay between the Competition Commission and ICASA as well as the competitiveness of South African telecommunications. / Communication Science / M.A. (International Communication))

The privatisation and liberalisation of telecommunications throughout the world has resulted in the growing involvement of competition authorities in telecommunications regulation, alongside telecommunications sector-specific regulators. The existence of both sector specific rules and competition rules has brought about a critical institutional challenge. The increased role of competition authorities in the telecommunications sector raises the issue of inconsistent jurisdiction in the sector. Conflicts are therefore inevitable in the absence of clear delineation of jurisdiction. The South African model for regulation in the telecommunications sector entails a sharing of jurisdiction between the sector-specific regulator, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), and the competition-wide regulator, the Competition Commission. The study thus determines the interplay between the Competition Commission and ICASA as well as the competitiveness of South African telecommunications. / Communication Science / M.A. (International Communication))