Since the end of the Cold War, private military and security companies have gained a prominent place on the international battlefield. In an attempt to reduce monetary and political costs, states have not only outsourced some of the defense functions previously performed by uniformed personnel; they have also partly privatised the provision of security. Traditional accounts of the rise of private military and security companies have explained this evolution in terms of changing demand and supply of military force after the Cold War, in a neoliberal ideological environment. This rationalist account, however, overlooks the role of norms, which, as the constructivist research tradition has demonstrated, constrain state behaviour even in the domain of national security. From this constructivist point of view, the rise of private military and security companies is surprising given the existence of an anti-mercenary norm and a norm on the state monopoly on violence, both of which have precluded the private exercise of violence. How, then, should the rise of private military and security companies be understood in light of this hostile normative environment? Against a realist-constructivist background, this text draws upon models of norm change and epistemic communities to show that private military and security companies have used their pragmatic legitimacy and epistemic power to decisively shape the discursive construction of a new regulatory framework that legitimises the exercise of non-state violence.

This study delves into the conflict landscape in the form of a case study of the Central African Republic, with a specific focus on the involvement of the private military company Wagner Group, framed within Mary Kaldor's theory of New Wars. The theory emphasises that since the 1990s wars have been carried out in the name of identity politics, are between the state and non-state actors, that violence is directed at civilians and that the global economy is a driving condition. These characteristics are generally true for the conflict in CAR. The Wagner Group's role remains largely unexplored within academic circles, necessitating a closer examination of its impact on conflict dynamics to better understand the broader implications for regional stability and global power dynamics. Since CAR became independent in 1960, CAR has been imprinted by armed conflict and widespread violence against civilians. In 2018 the government ceded parts of its monopoly on violence to the Wagner group through an agreement where the group protects the state in exchange for access to natural resources. The Wagner group's presence also contributes to increased regional conflict dynamics and can lead to increased violence and criminal activity.

Utbildningen av officerare är omdiskuterad och har kanske alltid varit det. Men de senaste årens förändringar av officersutbildningen och akademisering av yrket samt ändrade befälsstrukturer i Försvarsmakten (FM) har återigen satt fart på diskussionen. Det handlar bland annat om FM får den officer som man behöver för att kunna bygga starka krigsförband och om officeren har de kvalifikationer som detta kräver? Men vad är officersyrket för något och vad är det egentligen FM vill ha? Studien undersöker just det, vad en officer är och vilka egenskaper som en officer förväntas att ha med sig in i yrket.  Utbildningen vid Försvarshögskolan (FHS) Officersprogrammet (OP) är det som skall leda till en officer med rätt kvalifikationer och egenskaper vilket leder till den andra delen av studien, där bilden av vad en officer är jämförs med de examensmål som programmet har. Dessa examensmål framgår av förordningen för FHS och med de 17 examensmålen examinerade så skall kadetten vara klar att påbörja sitt yrke som officer. Frågan är om den förutsättningen verkligen finns?   För att kunna göra denna jämförelse har studien, genom intervjuer, tagit fram en modell av en officer från det unika med officersprofessionen, våldsmonopolet, via antagningskrav för utbildningen till egenskaper som officeren måste ha och roller som officeren utövar. Modellen har två portalparagrafer som är att betrakta som en sammanställning, vilka studien anser är nödvändiga för att hantera de mest allvarliga frågor som i förlängningen kan innebära beslut om liv eller död.  Portalparagraferna är mångsidighet och en väl utvecklad inre kompass.   I jämförelsen mellan modellen och examensmålen har studien funnit att examensmålen är avmilitariserade och har en teoretisk slagsida. Den väpnande striden har kommit i skymundan och officerares ansvar för det statliga våldsmonopolet inte finnsmed. De tydliggör inte heller en del av de egenskaper och kvalifikationer, som studien har visat, är nödvändiga för att officeren som ledare ska kunna hantera yrkesprofessionen och axla det ansvar detta kräver. Det gör att kadetten inte fullt ut får den möjlighet att bli den officer som FM behöver.   Studien visar bland annat att examensmålen bör ses över och kanske även till del skrivas om. / The training of military officers is well debated and has always been. But the recent years' changes in officer training and the academisation of the profession and also changed command structures in the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) have once again set the stage for discussion. Among other things, it is about SAF getting the officer they need to build strong units and whether the officer has the qualifications that this requires? But what is the profession as an officer and what does the SAF really wants? The study examines just that, what is a military officer and what qualities an officer is expected to bring into the profession.  The education at the Swedish National Defense University (SDU) and the military officers’ program (OP) is the education, which should lead to a profession as an officer with the right qualifications and characteristics. This leads to the second part of the study, where the image of an officer is compared to the exam objectives for the program. These exam objectives are stated in the ordinance for SDU, and with the 17 exam objectives examined; the cadet should be ready to begin his profession as an officer. The question is whether this condition really exists?  In order to make this comparison, the study, through interviews, has developed a model of an officer from the unique with the profession, the monopoly of violence, via admission requirements for the education, to characteristics that the officer must have and roles that the officer exercises. The model has two portal paragraphs that are a compilation of the model, which the study considers necessary to deal with the most serious issues that may ultimately involve decisions on life or death.   The portal paragraphs are versatility and a well-developed inner moral guidance.  In the comparison between the model and the exam objectives, the study found that the objectives are demilitarized and have a theoretical approach. The armed battle is overshadowed and the officers' responsibility for the state monopoly of violence is not included. Nor do they clarify some of the characteristics and qualifications that the study has shown are necessary for the officer to be able to manage the profession as a leader and shoulder the responsibility this requires. This means that the cadet does not fully get the opportunity to become the officer that SAF needs.  The study shows, among other things, that the exam objectives should be reviewed and perhaps even partly rewritten.