L'objectif de notre étude sur le concept de «civil» dans la pensée de Montesquieu consiste à établir, dans un premier temps, le contexte dans lequel, après Adam Smith en particulier, et dans le cadre du processus de la séparation des sciences économiques et des sciences juridiques, le domaine du «civil», plus tard désigné comme «société civile», devient l'objet des sciences économiques, et, en second lieu, à voir comment, en même temps, cette notion de «civil» perd la connotation de «société politique et juridique» (c'est-à-dire « civitas »). Pour aborder cette question, nous nous intéressons tout d'abord à l'accroissement de l'intérêt pour l'histoire de I'Antiquité romaine qui connaît un renouveau avec l'humanisme en Europe. Les interprétations portant sur l'histoire romaine reflètent les intérêts des intellectuels aux prises avec leur propre société contemporaine, et la diversité de ces interprétations nous permet de retracer l'évolution des moyens analytiques employés pour penser la société en général. Dans cette perspective, nous étudions Montesquieu en référence à Machiavel qui a vécu à une période cruciale dans le Nord de l'Italie entre la fin du 15e et le 16e siècle, puis, à Harrington qui a vécu à l'époque de la 1ère révolution anglaise au milieu du 17e siècle et, finalement, à David Hume qui a défendu le régime établi après la Glorieuse révolution en 1688. À partir de ces analyses, nous rendront compte des causes de l'évolution des sciences sociales au cours de ces siècles, qui constituent la période historique dans laquelle s'est établi graduellement le système étatique moderne. / The objective of our study on the concept of "civil" in the thought of Montesquieu consists at first in presenting the context in which, especially after Adam Smith, and in the process of the separation of economical sciences from legal sciences, the sphere of the "civil", la ter called "civil society", becomes the object of economical sciences, and second, in understanding how, at the same time, the notion of "civil" lost the connotation of "political and legal society", that is "civitas". To approach this question, our first concern focuses on the increasing interest on R.oman antiquity which begin as renewal in huamnist thought in Europe. lntepretations of Roman history actually reflect the interests of intellectuals preoccupied with their own contemporary society. Nonetheless the divcrsity of these interpretations helps to understand the evolution of the analytical means used to analyse the society in general. ln this perspective, we compare Montesquieu with Machiavelli who lived in an incisive period in North of ltaly in the 15th, and the begging of the 16th, century, along with Harrington who lived in the time of the Civil War in England in the middle of the 17th century and, fïnally, with David Hume who defended the govemement established after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. From these analyses, we show the causes of the progressive sophistication of the social sciences matching the historical period during which the modern state system has gradually been established.

Thèse univ. : Paris : Lettres : 1929. / Bibliogr.: p. 296-303.

Texte remanié de: Th. / Bibliogr. p. 305-329.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 2004. / Bibliogr.: p. 93-95. Publ. aussi en version électronique.

The author's Habilitationsschrift--Freie Universität Berlin. / Includes index. Bibliography: p. 303-318.

Louise Dupin (1706-1799), illustre salonnière à son époque, est une auteure « féministe » dont la pensée reste aujourd’hui méconnue : ses manuscrits – de la main d’un secrétaire qui a pour nom Jean-Jacques Rousseau – ont effectivement attendu un siècle et demi avant de sortir des mains de ses héritiers. Ils sont ensuite restés soixante ans inédits en raison de leur dispersion géographique. Nous proposons ici au lecteur, pour la première fois, une transcription des parties historique et éducative de son Ouvrage sur les femmes. On lira aussi la partie féministe de sa « Critique de l’Esprit des lois ». La châtelaine de Chenonceau a en effet été l’une des premières à risquer une réfutation du livre de Montesquieu. Voltaire en a été un lecteur attentif. Comment donc s’articulent chez elle réflexion féministe et réflexion politique dans le cadre d’une pensée aux prises avec les grands philosophes de son temps ? En quoi son monarchisme est-il en partie bousculé par des convictions dont le maître-mot est l’égalité ? C’est au coeur de sa pensée historique, politique et morale – à la fois équilibrée, érudite et pugnace – que nous souhaiterions entraîner le lecteur. / In her day Louise Dupin (1706-1799) was a famous salon holder and a "feminist" author whose writings are still relatively unknown. It took a century and a half for her manuscripts – written by her secretary, a certain Jean-Jacques Rousseau – to leave the hands of her inheritors. Then, due to their geographical dispersion, they remained unpublished for a further sixty years. For the first time, readers can now consult a transcription of the historical and educational parts of her Ouvrage sur les femmes. We shall also explore the feminist part of her "Critique de l’Esprit des lois". The chatelaine of Chenonceau was in fact one of the first to risk a refutation of Montesquieu's work. Voltaire read it attentively. How did she articulate her feminist and political thought in her encounters with the great philosophers of her day? To what degree was her monarchism troubled by convictions whose keyword was equality? We would like to introduce readers to the balanced, erudite and pugnacious character of her historical, political and moral thinking.

This study aims to investigate how, in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters (1721), religion and religious structures are presented to influence women’s position in French society. In Persian Letters Montesquieu presents a dogmatic religious life, which proceed from a literal interpretation of the bible. Such a reading raises critical questions concerning the nature of women, and subsequently places man over woman. Persian Letters show how this male dominance gets institutionalized in marriage. The religious life depicted is also distinguished by a non-genuine religious conviction and by acts which take on a simulation form. The compliance with the religious order has little to do with religious conviction and more to do with fear of punishment and social stigma. Montesquieu also shows how Christianity can be said to battle against human nature and especially her sexual passion. Montesquieu calls the divine origin of the bible into question, and instead suggests it was written by human hand. Subsequently, by means of rational thinking, a humanist perspective and a utilitarian principle, he questions a world order founded on a dogmatic interpretation of the bible. Fear as a central part of the religious life, the subjects complete subordination to the religious structures, the suppression of the human passions and simulating modes of actions are all central parts in what Montesquieu calls despotic structures. In Persian Letters he exposes parallels between religious despotism, political despotism and despotic family life. Montesquieu further links women’s situation directly with the political life. Within the family, Montesquieu tells us, citizens first developed a relationship to power, and power structures. These experiences later come to influence the individual’s behaviour in society, and constitute the foundation for the political life.

This study provides an in-depth account of the practices of the Bordeaux parlement for the years 1714-26 as a background and prelude for an understanding of Montesquieu's political theory. The first chapter demonstrates that the discipline of jurisprudence in early eighteenth century France was in a state of transition and was to a large degree unreflective of new political realities. The discipline did not offer the intellectual resources needed to construct a compelling account of contemporary developments in the growth of the state and of its tools. In contrast, it is shown in chapters two and three that the magistrates of the Bordeaux parlement rejected standard principles of Roman law, constitutionalism and patriarchalism and fashioned their own particular form of political argument. This new form of argument, called 'associational discourse' by the author, has significant resonance in the work of Montesquieu. Chapter four shows how this theoretical disposition was developed more fully in Montesquieu's early writings. Chapter five in turn shows how this was articulated in its fullest form in his major work, L'Esprit des lois (1748). Chapters six and seven show how this new form of political thinking was to have an important effect on Montesquieu's comprehensive theory of criminal justice. In conclusion, it is suggested that this early-modern form of associationalist thinking points to an alternative to liberalist and communitarian positions, by the consideration that governments should be concerned for the moral strength of subordinate associations in their communities, while not being fully responsible for the exact content of the beliefs fostered within them.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Leipzig. / Issued also in the sieres: Leipziger historische Abhandlungen ; Heft 37. Vita. Bibliography: p. [v]-viii.

Thesis (doctoral)--K.B. Julius-Maximilians-Universität, Würzburg, 1916. / Cover title. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [4]-6).