Orientador: Paulo Celso Miceli / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campionas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T20:01:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Martins_AdiltonLuis_D.pdf: 5243947 bytes, checksum: b6e1c40da217620640b1599cb78896e3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: O resumo poderá ser visualizado no texto completo da tese digital / Abstract: The abstract is available with the full electronic document / Doutorado / Historia Cultural / Doutor em História

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The notion of “convenance” has only recently attracted the attention of Montesquieu scholars, who have repeatedly stated its centrality to the author's thought, as well as a certain inherent ambiguity. This thesis firstly explores the history of the concept, starting from some existing studies that have laid the foundations for a research in this direction. In its Latin version (“convenientia”), the concept’s first philosophical appearance is due to Cicero, as a translation of certain notions from Stoic philosophy. The notion acquires then a non-secondary place in scholastic thought, finding application in different fields, from logic to theology and morality. In the Modern Age, the concept of “convenientia” becomes of great relevance in the moral and legal spheres: among others, Grotius, Pufendorf, Malebranche or Leibniz develop or rework differently the scholastic and stoic traditions where it was employed. Through these channels the notion of “convenientia” can reach the young author of the Persian Letters, who employs it in his ambiguous definition of justice as a “rapport de convenance” (letter 81). The study of the sources and the analysis of the major issues linked to this definition of justice singularly benefit from this retrospective look at the possible philosophical traditions where this notion of “convenance” is employed. On the basis of this examination of the texts, the thesis advanced is that the expression “rapport de convenance” denotes only the a priori or formal aspect of justice, which elsewhere the author designates as “rapport d’équité”. If “convenance” designates the universal and invariable aspect of justice, a study of its content, which is variable and relative, must lead to the various orders of law: natural, civil, political. The investigation thus crosses a second axis of relevance of the concept of “convenance” in Montesquieu’s work, namely the question of the relativity or “convenance” of laws to the people for whom they are established, on which the entire structure of the Spirit of Laws rests. This second (and very much Aristotelian) axis is the subject of a classification in the thesis. Human laws and institutions can be understood according to different planes of “convenance”: general, structural, local. Pivotal concepts in Montesquieu’s work, such as political freedom, moderation, “esprit général”, nature and principle of government, can then be understood in this articulation between “convenance à la société” in general and “convenance à chaque société” in particular, according to a structural or typological logic or according to a singular and local one. The scholastic usages inherited and reworked by the moderns include one that some french scholars have recently designated as the “argument de convenance”, i.e. the idea that God works in the simplest ways and always chooses the best. The thesis investigates the presence of this argument in Montesquieu, suggesting that the author conceives it above all as a principle of the “economy of nature”. Moreover, it is argued that this principle, while secularizing the traditional “argument de convenance”, acquires a fundamentally political significance: the art of legislation exiges to govern men by economising on violent means, that is, without doing violence to the natural inclinations of citizens and their freedom. In general, the study of Montesquieu’s thought through the lens of the notion of “convenance” allows one to better grasp the connection between the method of the art of legislation and the political and ideological objectives of his work, first and foremost the opposition to a despotic exercise of power.

À la fin du XVIIe siècle, la dissolution du pacte allégorique semblait avoir à tout jamais disjoint la fable et le conte, la première prenant en charge seule un but didactique et le second se définissant comme un récit pur, sans intention de transmettre un quelconque message. Paradoxalement, de la fin du XVIIe siècle jusqu’aux années 1775, un nombre important de contes affichent, dès leurs seuils (titres, épigraphes, frontispices, préfaces), une fonction cognitive : on assiste à l’émergence d’une nouvelle catégorie du conte, qui se réconcilie avec les savoirs. Cette thèse vise à montrer que la portée philosophique et morale de ce sous-genre réside moins dans le message transmis que dans le mode de déchiffrement qu’il induit et dans la singularité de l’expérience qu’il fait vivre au lecteur. Les contes à visée morale et philosophique ne sont pas des illustrations d’une thèse préalable, ils déclenchent la réflexion du lecteur grâce à un dispositif narratif particulier, qui repose sur un pacte de lecture non plus allégorique, mais analogique : le lecteur est amené à faire des liens entre ce qui a priori est sans rapport, à prendre une posture critique à l’égard de tous les discours (notamment religieux, politiques, pseudo-scientifiques et même fictionnels), et à s’interroger sur lui-même, en somme à être philosophe, au sens où l’entendait le XVIIIe siècle. Après avoir repéré les constantes structurelles et thématiques de ces textes, aussi divers soient-ils, nous étudions l’entremêlement des discours philosophiques et moraux et de la fiction, dans les contes de Fénelon, Montesquieu, Saint-Hyacinthe, Crébillon, Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire et Marmontel. / At the end of the seventeenth century, the dissolution of the allegorical pact had seemed to separate the fable from the tale for ever, the first supporting only a didactic purpose while the second is defined as pure storytelling, without intending to convey any message. Paradoxically, from the end of the seventeenth century to the 1775s, a large number of tales claim straight away - in their titles, epigraphs, frontispieces, prefaces- to have a cognitive function: we are witnessing the emergence of a new category of tales, which is reconciled with knowledge. This thesis aims to show that the philosophical and moral implications of this sub-gender are not so much the message conveyed as the type of deciphering that it induces and the uniqueness of the experience it brings to life. Tales which have a moral and philosophical aim are not illustrations of a prior thesis, they trigger the reflection of the reader with a particular narrative device, based on a reading pact that is not allegorical, but analogical: the reader is led to make connections between what is a priori unrelated, to take a critical stance towards every kind of speech (including religious, political, pseudo-science and even fiction itself), and to question himself, in short to be a philosopher, in the sense understood in the eighteenth century. After identifying common thematic structures of these texts, while taking into account their differences, we study the entanglement of philosophical and moral discourse and fiction in the tales by Fenelon, Montesquieu, Saint-Hyacinthe, Crebillon, Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire and Marmontel.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabiano Stefanoni Redondo.pdf: 528934 bytes, checksum: 8c12328dd5aa339df2c262010954dc47 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-20 / Certain that has received a review Montesquieu adapting it to the aspirations and social dynamism, so that the division of powers can respond with greater agility and speed expectations of the Company, however, emphasize the need to maintain a fair balance between the powers, fundamental point, to ensure that national and perpetuate democracy; However, we are faced with the political scene, whose Democracy was built based on precepts and fears of a totalitarian recent past, whose effects were perpetuated during the Constituent Assembly and, consequently, the Constitution of 1988 which brought in its wake traces of control and concentration of power primarily to the Executive, with emphasis on the legislative process, and especially with the adaptation of the Institute of decree-Law, Constitutional Law, originating in Brazil in 1937, resumed in 1965 and resurfaced in the mold of Italian decree-law in Federal Brazilian Constitution dated 1988, identified an atrophy of the national legislative power in the legislature; Faced with this scenario, confronted the historical development of the country, both in the doctrinal, legal and social, highlighting the importance of the Legislature for Democracy and proposing, in an attempt at least to minimize the effects of the supremacy of the Executive time as can be observed during the study, this trend is over by proving inevitable media aimed at strengthening the Congress. / Certo que a teoria de Montesquieu tem merecido uma reanálise adequando-a aos anseios e ao dinamismo social, para que a divisão dos poderes consiga responder com maior agilidade e presteza as expectativas da sociedade, no entanto, ressalta-se a necessidade de manter um justo equilíbrio entre os poderes, fundamental ponto, para que garanta e perpetue a democracia nacional. Ao nos deparamos com o cenário político brasileiro, cuja democracia foi construída embasada em preceitos e receios de um passado recente totalitário, cujos efeitos se fizeram perpetuar no decorrer da assembleia constituinte e, consequentemente, na constituição de 1988 que trouxe no seu bojo resquícios de controle e concentração de poder primordialmente para o executivo, com ênfase no processo legislativo e, sobretudo, com a adaptação do instituto do decreto-lei, originário no direito constitucional brasileiro em 1937, retomado em 1965 e ressurgido nos moldes do decreto-legge italiano na constituição de 1988, identificamos uma atrofia do poder normativo no legislativo nacional. Diante de tal cenário, confrontou-se a evolução histórica do país, tanto na esfera doutrinária, legal e social, evidenciando a importância do poder legislativo para a democracia e propondo, na tentativa, ao menos, de minimizar os efeitos da supremacia do executivo, vez que conforme pode ser observado no decorrer do estudo, tal tendência acaba-se por provar inevitável, meios que visem o fortalecimento do congresso nacional.

Cette recherche porte sur le rôle joué par la lecture de Montaigne dans la philosophie de Rousseau.Il convenait d’abord de repérer les traces de cette lecture et les différents témoignages qu’en donnent son œuvre publiée ainsi que ses manuscrits, d’établir les éditions dans lesquelles Rousseau lit les Essais et les perspectives dans lesquelles il le fait. Il fallait établir également les médiations qui ont joué un rôle dans la réception de Montaigne par Rousseau. Les Essais sont édités et lus au XVIIIe siècle selon des perspectives auxquelles il ne cesse de se confronter. Nombre d’auteurs du XVIIe siècle sur lesquels il s’appuie dialoguent avec Montaigne. L’étude de la relation que Rousseau entretient avec lui demande donc l’examen de toute une tradition philosophique qui s’appuie elle-même sur Montaigne.Cette dimension de l’héritage conduit à trianguler les références, implicites ou explicites, que Rousseau fait à Montaigne dans son œuvre philosophique. Il lui sert de point d’appui pour dialoguer avec Diderot traducteur de Shaftesbury et pour prendre parti, dès le premier Discours, en faveur de la religion naturelle. La lecture politique des Essais qu’il produit nourrit son opposition à toute forme de domination et lui permet de critiquer la position de Montesquieu sur le luxe. Cette lecture politique se développe dans le second Discours, pour dénoncer les effets de l’intérêt particulier, qui détruit le lien politique. Rousseau s’appuie encore sur les principes de La Boétie qu’il trouve dans les Essais pour penser la dépravation de l’homme en société. Le lien social ne demande pas de suivre une morale opposée à l’intérêt, mais de poursuivre l’intérêt universel qui nous lie aux autres hommes. Montaigne occupe aussi une place déterminante dans le dialogue que Rousseau entretient avec des auteurs comme Barbeyrac, Mandeville ou Locke.Cette thèse montre ainsi que la référence à Montaigne met en jeu les principes fondamentaux de la philosophie politique et morale de Rousseau. / The aim of this study is to analyze the role of Montaigne’s legacy in Rousseau’s philosophy.First, evidences and views of Rousseau’s reading of Montaigne have been examined in his published works and in his manuscripts. Editions in which Rousseau was reading Montaigne have also been identified.Then, mediations between Rousseau and Montaigne’s reception have been reviewed. Rousseau reads the Essais with the 18th century points of view. He relies on 17th century authors who judge Montaigne. Therefore, thanks to this philosophical tradition who deals with Montaigne, links between Montaigne and Rousseau are analysed.The implicit and explicit references to Montaigne in Rousseau’s work are triangulated. Rousseau quotes Montaigne to deal with Diderot, – translator of Shaftesbury, to defend natural religion as early as in his First Discourse on the Sciences and Arts.Rousseau has a political reading of the Essais. He denounces all kind of domination, and criticizes Montesquieu’s apology of luxury. The political reading of Montaigne increases in the second Discourse : the possessive individualism destroys the social link.Rousseau underlines the La Boétie’s principles in the Essais, which show the political depravation of society. The social link does not demand to follow moral rules against citizen’s interests. Humanity has to pursue a universal interest, which establishes a relationship between each human being and the whole humanity.Montaigne has a central position to understand the dialogues between Rousseau and Barbeyrac, Mandeville, and Locke. Rousseau refers to Montaigne when he defends his moral and politic fundamental principles.

Ce mémoire tente d'exposer les politiques de Montesquieu et Rousseau, qui sont généralement opposées l'une à l'autre par les commentateurs et qui ont encore beaucoup d'influence aujourd'hui. Sans s'attarder aux traditions qu'elles incarneraient, selon plusieurs d'entre eux, nous nous proposons de retourner dans les textes de ces deux auteurs des Lumières pour voir en quoi leurs pensées se ressemblent et se distinguent. Puisqu'elles sont le fruit d'une vision de la Modernité et d'une anthropologie, nous consacrons deux chapitres à ces questions, avant d'étudier leurs politiques à proprement parler, telles qu'elles figurent dans l'Esprit des lois et le Contrat social, mais aussi dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre de ces deux penseurs.

La France du XVIIIe rencontre plusieurs problèmes d'ordre religieux et politique qui ne manquent pas d'agiter la pensée critique des philosophes. Armés de leur plume, ces derniers engagent un combat contre l'intolérance religieuse et l'absolutisme à travers leurs œuvres. Étudiant différents régimes, les philosophes cherchent un modèle qui pourrait satisfaire une France en panne de ses institutions. Parmi les modèles éphémères qui leur parviennent, celui de la Chine, transmis de l'autre bout du monde par les missionnaires jésuites, éveille leur esprit et leur intérêt. Cet empire lointain est dépeint comme une terre de tolérance religieuse dirigée par un empereur bon et clément envers ses sujets. Un combat s'engage alors entre les sinophiles et les sinophobes, soit les admirateurs et les détracteurs de la référence chinoise. Parmi ces philosophes, deux figures de proue du Siècle éclairé s'affrontent, Voltaire et Montesquieu. Alors que Voltaire admire l'image de la Chine et l'utilise à plusieurs reprises pour critiquer la France, Montesquieu se montre plutôt sceptique avec les propos des jésuites et expose que cet empire ne doit pas être un modèle. Même si ces deux philosophes ont en main le même bassin de sources, leur interprétation et leur utilisation en sont complètement différentes. Entre despotisme et monarchie éclairée, entre athéisme, idolâtrie et déisme, la description de la Chine par le prisme missionnaire, puis philosophique, fait l'objet de plusieurs débats littéraires dans les milieux savants. Ceci ne manque pas d'éveiller la vieille querelle des rites chinois qui entraîne les jésuites à leur perte en même temps que le modèle chinois vers la fin du Siècle des Lumières.

Les historiens ont souvent interprété les relations entre le Parlement et la monarchie comme un combat qui devait amener à la Révolution. Par orgueil et égoïsme, le Parlement avait tenté de s’arroger les prérogatives royales. La réalité était bien plus complexe. Le Parlement n’était pas le bourreau de la monarchie. Il avait toujours cherché à l’aider dans ses choix, en lui montrant la voie qu’il trouvait la plus sage, au vu des circonstances et des enseignements du droit et de l’histoire. L’étude institutionnelle des rouages de la cour, la mise en perspective des revenus des conseillers à travers les épices et l’analyse de la recherche d’une justification de sa fonction à travers l’histoire, montrent le rôle de la cour dans l’évolution du XVIIIe siècle. / The fight between the crown and the Parlement of Paris has been seen as the origins of the French Revolution. The Parlement was guilty of trying to usurp the power of the King. In fact, the comprehension of the XVIIIth Century is more problematic because the Parlement of Paris had never been the executioner of the monarchy. The judges had tried to help the King in the making of the laws. The institutional study of the mechanisms of the Parlement, the analysis of the fees of the judges and of the theoretical justifications of the Parlement show the real place of the court in the evolution of the century.

This dissertation aims to contrast the differences between Montesquieu¡¦s and Quesnay¡¦s thoughts of China Despotism theory, to analyze the methodology and epistemology used by the two scholars to demonstrate and observe traditional China despotism, and, to expound and examine the description of traditional China despotism in Montesquieu¡¦s and Quesnay¡¦s thoughts. Montesquieu was a rare one among Enlightenment philosophers who profoundly discussed China Despotism in the eighteenth century. In the elaboration of Montesquieu¡¦s China Despotism, there were lots of contradictions in De L'espirt Des Lois. Traditional China government was depreciated by him. From the empirical induce methodology, positivism epistemology and ontology¡¦s point of view, this dissertation tries to deeply analyze and research Montesquieu¡¥s China Despotism. At the time, there were also some Enlightenment Philosophers who have a different view of China Despotism. The representative was a Physiocrat ¡V Francois Quesnay. In his Le Despotisme De La Chine, he marked traditional China government positively. Quesnay, who developed his view based on the same empirical facts about traditional China according to the eighteenth century¡¦s Jesuits, travelers and businessmen and with the same natural science methodology, had totally different views and thoughts about China Despotism from Montesquieu. This dissertation has a detailed study and review on these differences. Questions will be explored in this dissertation are as below. Did the natural science methodology and epistemology of Montesquieu¡¦s and Quesnay¡¦s China Despotism strengthen the judgment of how they valued traditional China government? Were there pre-judgments in their so-called neutral and objective denouncement about the way they researched China Despotism in the empirical induce methodology and epistemology? Were Montesquieu¡¦s and Quesnay¡¦s judgments about China Depotism enhanced by the natural science methodology and epistemology a kind of western centralism? Did they, in the name of neutral and objective empirical induce methodology and epistemology that could not reason non-western value, refuse and devaluate other non-western value? This dissertation has a deeply reflection on these from the ¡§paradigm¡¨ and ¡§incommensurable¡¨ methodological concepts of Thomas S. Kuhn¡¦s. If Montesquieu¡¦s China Despotism was the main point of western culture, was the way Quesnay observed traditional China government presenting a different value in the west culture and there were still some admiring this kind of value? Was this kind of evaluation neglected by recent Chinese intellects? This is a serious problem worthy of reconsideration and reflection. Keywords: Montesquieu, François Quesnay, Physiocracy, Despotism, enlightened despotism, China Despotism, natural science methodology, theory laden, Thomas S. Kuhn, paradigm, incommensurable