Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The overall objective of this study is to undertake a critical evaluation of Joyce's proposal for a moral fictionalism. In order to meet this objective, the thesis is divided into two main parts, the first devoted to the reconstruction of Joyce's proposal and the second reserved, properly, their critical assessment. The theme of the first chapter is the theory of moral error, focusing primarily on the defense of the same taken by Joyce. The main objective that we have to address this issue is to indicate the problem to which Joyce solution proposes its moral fictionalism, which is the question of what to do with the moral discourse after the acceptance of the theory of moral error. The second chapter is devoted specifically to the reconstruction of Joyce's proposal for a moral fictionalism. The third chapter is a summary of the main criticisms of Joyce fictionalism. In the fourth chapter, finally, it is carried critical evaluation which is the objective of this thesis. The conclusion that is reached with such assessment, which is the argument of this thesis, is that the moral fictionalism proposed by Joyce does not seem to be able to meet two specific objectives for which it was proposed, namely, (1) retain a significant portion of the practical benefits of moral beliefs and (2) prevent the one who accepts the error theory can be accused of irrationality. With this, Joyce would not able to show that adherence to error theory would not have devastating consequences, not thus fulfilling the broader objective of its proposal for a moral fictionalism. Faced with this failure, the most appropriate attitude to the theoretical error that shares Joyce s concerns and objectives appears to be intended to support here, that position that the author calls "propagandism", which seems to be the most able to meet the objectives of its proposal. / O objetivo geral do presente estudo é proceder a uma avaliação crítica da proposta de Richard Joyce de um ficcionalismo moral. A fim de cumprir tal objetivo, o trabalho é dividido em duas partes principais, a primeira dedicada à reconstrução da proposta de Joyce e a segunda reservada, propriamente, à sua avaliação crítica. O tema do primeiro capítulo é a teoria do erro moral, focando-se, principalmente, na defesa da mesma empreendida por Joyce. O principal objetivo que se tem ao tratar desse tema é indicar o problema para cuja solução Joyce propõe seu ficcionalismo moral, o qual consiste na questão sobre o que fazer com o discurso moral após a aceitação da teoria do erro moral. O segundo capítulo é dedicado, especificamente, à reconstrução da proposta de Joyce de um ficcionalismo moral. No terceiro capítulo, é apresentado um resumo das principais críticas ao ficcionalismo de Joyce. No quarto capítulo, por fim, é procedida a avaliação crítica que constitui o objetivo deste estudo. A conclusão a que se chega com tal avaliação, que constitui a tese defendida neste trabalho, é que o ficcionalismo moral proposto por Joyce parece não ser capaz de cumprir os dois objetivos específicos para os quais ele foi proposto, a saber, (1) conservar uma porção significativa dos benefícios práticos das crenças morais e (2) evitar que aquele que aceita a teoria do erro possa ser acusado de irracionalidade. Com isso, Joyce acabaria não conseguindo mostrar que a adesão à teoria do erro não precisaria ter consequências devastadoras, não cumprindo, assim, o objetivo mais geral subjacente à sua proposta de um ficcionalismo moral. Diante de tal fracasso, a atitude mais adequada para o teórico do erro que partilha as preocupações e objetivos de Joyce parece ser, pretende-se sustentar aqui, aquele posicionamento que o autor chama de propagandismo , o qual parece ser o mais apto a cumprir os objetivos de sua proposta.

The normative political theory problem of dirty hands (DH) concerns the troubling possibility that political leaders, from a (mostly) consequentialist perspective, might sometimes be morally required to make exceptions from sensitive rules like prohibitions of extremely harmful practices (e.g. torture) in order to avert catastrophic threats and crises, while such rules are still considered so important and such crises so rare that one nonetheless feels inclined to deem dirty exceptions categorically wrong so as to prevent their unnecessary proliferation through a slippery-slope type development.  How can we conceptualize such a problematic necessity? A latent but insufficiently explored idea in the DH literature is that the normatively preferrable approach to such a wicked problem might be to not try to conceptualize it at all, or at least not in our public work as academics. In this thesis, I introduce the straightforward suggestion that if the DH problem cannot be discussed without risking slippery-slope demoralization of the partaking deliberators and/or audience, we seem to be morally required to content ourselves with terming it an unspeakable, taboo subject in non-crisis times, as a meta-level ersatz solution to the core-level political problem conventionally centered in the DH literature.  I also discuss to what extent the mainstream, weak rule utilitarian (WRU) DH literature can themselves be understood as intentionally testing the limits of consequentialist reasoning in a search for a 'higher' moral truth than what their ethical position might entail at first glance.