[pt] Neste trabalho, defendo a tese de que o livre arbítrio, entendido como o controle necessário para a responsabilidade moral baseada no mérito, não existe, pois é impossível. A tese é um desenvolvimento da visão de Galen Strawson que baseia a impossibilidade da responsabilidade última na impossibilidade da autodeterminação. Aqui, defendo uma abordagem ao problema que conecta os seguintes temas: livre arbítrio, sorte moral e autocriação, mantendo que o fato necessário da sorte constitutiva é o que torna impossível de satisfazer a condição de fonte última do controle necessário para a responsabilidade moral. Minha estratégia argumentativa é mostrar como as tentativas de satisfazer e de rejeitar essa condição falham. / [en] In this work, I defend the thesis that free will, understood as the control necessary for merit-based moral responsibility, does not exist, for it is impossible. The thesis is a development of Galen Strawson’s view, which bases the impossibility of ultimate responsibility on the impossibility of self-determination. Here, I defend an approach to the problem that connects the following themes: free will, moral luck and self-creation, holding that the necessary fact of constitutive luck is what makes the ultimate sourcehood condition for the control required for moral responsibility impossible to satisfy. My argumentative strategy is to show how attempts both to satisfy and reject this condition fail.

In his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment," Peter Strawson attempts to reconcile incompatibilism and compatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. First, I present the error committed by the proponents of both these traditional views, which Strawson diagnoses as the source of their standoff, and the remedy Strawson offers to avoid the conflict. Second, I reconstruct the two arguments Strawson offers for a theory of moral responsibility that is based on his proposed remedy. Third, I present and respond to two proposed problems for the Strawsonian theory: moral luck and revisionism. I conclude with a summary of my defense of Strawsonian “expressivism” about moral responsibility, and offer suggestions for further research.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / In the present work, we seek to elucidate the relations between the problem of moral luck and our assignments of responsibility. The problem of moral luck emerges from two dimensions of human life. On the one side, we are autonomous and rational beings, we have control over our actions and are moral agents. On the other side, we are vulnerable to every sort of external contingency that eliminates the complete control we have over our actions and their results. The contingency, also, has a significant weight on the formation of our character and personality. Therefore, the problem of moral luck takes a real importance: how can we assign responsibility to the agents, given that a lot of what configures a moral action are contingent elements? The research was elaborated based on Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel s articles on Moral luck. Williams, in his article, seeks to show that morality, as we conceive it, is (in fact) distant from our moral evaluations. Williams introduces the role of regret and recognizes the need to understand moral justification as retrospective. Nagel, in turn, finds the center of the moral luck problem in the control principle. In trying to understand how we assign responsibility to an agent for things beyond his control, Nagel defines four methods in which luck influences our moral judgements, and lists the kinds of moral luck: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal luck. Finally, we take a look at critiques pertinent to the moral luck and responsibility problem, both negating and accepting the influence of luck in moral responsibility. From the epistemic argument and Zimmerman s postulates to Walker s pure agency critique and Otsuka s strawsonian considerations about reactive attitudes. / No presente trabalho, buscamos elucidar as relações entre o problema da sorte moral e nossas atribuições de responsabilidade. O problema da sorte moral emerge a partir de duas dimensões da vida humana. Por um lado, somos seres autônomos e racionais, temos o controle sobre nossas ações e somos agentes morais. Por outro, somos vulneráveis a toda espécie de contingência externa que elimina o controle total que temos de nossas ações e de seus resultados. A contingência, também, tem um peso significativo na formação de nosso caráter e personalidade. Por isso, o problema da sorte moral assume importância real: como podemos atribuir responsabilidade aos agentes, visto que muito do que configura uma ação moral são elementos contingentes? Elaboramos esta pesquisa a partir dos artigos Moral luck de Bernard Williams e Thomas Nagel. Williams, em seu artigo, busca mostrar que a moralidade, como a concebemos, mostra-se distante de nossas avaliações morais. Williams introduz o papel do arrependimento e reconhece a necessidade de entendermos a justificação moral como retrospectiva. Nagel, por sua vez, encontra no princípio do controle o centro do problema da sorte moral. Na tentativa de entender como atribuímos responsabilidade a uma agente por coisas além de seu controle, Nagel define quatro meios pelos quais a sorte influencia nossos juízos morais e elenca os tipos de sorte moral: sorte resultante, circunstancial, constitutiva e causal. Por fim, procuramos as críticas pertinentes ao problema da sorte moral e responsabilidade, as quais neguem ou aceitem a influência da sorte na responsabilidade moral, indo do argumento epistêmico e os postulados de Zimmerman à crítica da agência pura de Walker e as considerações strawsonianas de Otsuka sobre as atitudes reativas.

This paper provides an analysis of Bradshaw and Colleagues' model of military healthcare professionals' moral distress experiences. Using novel interview data collected from Canadian Forces healthcare professionals, the steps of the model are validated or potential refinements are suggested. / Military healthcare professionals (HCPs) may experience moral distress during international deployment. Moral distress is experienced when a HCP faces a moral dilemma, e.g., knows the morally correct course of action but is blocked from taking it, or where all available courses of action require something of moral significance be given up. While the literature indicates that moral distress often negatively impacts the mental health of the individual and the effectiveness of the organization, limited research has examined moral distress amongst military HCP. Many similar stressors and psychological health problems are present for both civilian and military HCP; however, the unique context of deployment necessitates further examination. This thesis explores the military HCP experience with moral distress by using Bradshaw and colleague’s model of progression from the encounter with a moral dilemma to the impact on individuals and organizations. Through the analysis of novel interviews collected by the Ethics in Military Medicine Research Group (EMMRG), Bradshaw and colleague’s model of military moral distress is compared to participant’s experiences and qualitatively analysed, with the results outlining where the model is supported and where refinement is recommended. These challenges were then supported by a literature review from the disciplines of virtue and feminist ethics, moral psychology, bioethics, and civilian HCP moral distress research. Two novel and significant revisions to the model are suggested: representing and integrating the cumulative experience of moral distress, and re-conceptualizing the resolution process based on the consideration of contextual controllability on moral responsibility. / Thesis / Master of Science (MS) / This thesis examines the experience of moral distress in military healthcare professionals (HCPs) while working abroad, where a HCP faces a moral dilemma, e.g., knows the morally correct course of action but is blocked from taking it or it requires something of moral significance be given up. This thesis analyses the most recent model of military HCP moral distress (Bradshaw, et al., 2010) by comparing it to the experiences described by participants in the Ethics in Military Medicine Research Group (EMMRG) study. The results outline support for the model as well as novel suggestions for revision, which are supported by literature from a variety of disciplines. Two adjustments to Bradshaw and colleague’s model are suggested: clearer representation of the cumulative nature of moral distress as well as a reconceptualization of the resolution process to consider the influence of the immediate and extended environment on moral responsibility.