Bibliography: leaves 290-311. / xiii, 354, 14 leaves : ill. (chiefly col.) ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / This study investigates the roles and experiences of "women warriors" in Zimbabwe's anti-colonial national liberation war, and reveals certain glorifications which have served to obscure and silence the voices of thousands of young girls and women involved in the struggle. The problems associated with the inclusion of women in an armed/military guerrilla force are discussed, and the (re)presentation of women in discourses of war, fictional accounts, public and national symbols and other multiple discursive layers which have re-inscribed the women back into the domestic examined. The Zimbabwean film Flame highlights the political sensitivity of the issues, including accusations of rape by male comrades in guerrilla training camps. An overview of women's involvement in Zimbabwean history, anti-colonial struggle, and the African nationalist movement provides the background for a critique of western feminist theories of nationalism and women's liberation in Africa. Historical records are juxtaposed with the voices of some women ex-combatants who speak their reasons for joining the struggle and their experiences of war. White Rhodesian women's roles are also examined in light of the gendered constructions of war. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Politics, 1999

Originally issued as a Ph. D. thesis from the University of Oxford, 1993. / Title from introductory page (SAHO website, viewed July 28, 2005). Includes bibliographical references. HTML version of the print thesis.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Riverside, 2009. / Includes abstract. Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Title from first page of PDF file (viewed March 23, 2010). Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, February 2008.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts in fulfillment of the requirements for degree Master of Arts in the Department of History at the University of Zululand, 1991. / It is imperative to take cognizance of the fact that no study of this nature has ever been undertaken in the field of history in South Africa. This justifies the necessity of undertaking a comparative study of the aims, structure and strategies of the NP and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the crucial decade 1975-1985. It was during that decade that these two political groupings moved closer to the political centre of gravity of South Africa. By this time the NP, in spite of preserving hegemonic principles on behalf of the White electorate and amid increased international isolation, had proved itself the invincible doyen in the body politic of South Africa. Inkatha cadres argued that their movement was born from the turbulent first half of the 1970's, spawned by Black resistance to apartheid and had authentic roots in the core of the liberation struggle. The principles and aims of the NP and Inkatha were devoid of discernible dissimilarities. One may assert, however, that it was enigmatic that such principles and aims could not compel the two groupings to solve the socio-economic and political problems facing South Africa in that decade. Such a dismal failure to seek solutions that would benefit all the people of South Africa reflected negatively on both the NP and Inkatha. In 1985 this emerged as a harbinger for the state of morass in South Africa's political scenario. The organisational structures of the NP and Inkatha remained by far the best organized in South Africa, capable of overwhelming any challenge mounted by other groups. In 1975 the NP as a party was organisationally functioning by means of the Congress, Head Council, Ward Councils, District Councils, Constituency Councils, Branches and Provincial leaders, while Inkatha had a bureaucratic structure from Branches, Regions, individual members to different conferences and decision-making bodies. The National Council (NC) was the policy-making body and represented all national leadership formations of Inkatha. It was not possible to stipulate how many members of Inkatha at any one time belonged to the NC. This was due to the fact that organizations were constantly affiliating to - the movement. The Congress was the supreme authority of the NP in each province. It discussed the draft resolutions submitted by the District Councils, the proposals submitted by the Head Council and the Federal Council, and motions submitted by members of the Congress. The organisational policies of the NP and Inkatha had vestiges of commonality. Both groupings accepted and respected the poly-ethnic nature of South Africa's population. They both endorsed the notion of a multi-party democracy, although the NP comprehended this in the context of separate development. Inkatha noted this as taking into account the fact that no single organisation, from whatever quarter, would be the sole determinant of the future of South Africa. Disinvestment, sanctions and violence were abhorred by both groupings as a strategy to dismantle apartheid. They favoured negotiation politics and non-violence both as objectives and strategies. Both groupings conveyed assurance to achievements of a political apparatus that could satisfy the political aspirations of all the country's communities through negotiations. The key to both the NP and Inkatha's organisational successes was their commitment to the traditions of constituency politics. They both believed that the ideal of constituency politics was best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which had its own specific objectives, but all of which had a basic common goal. It could be mentioned, however, that the different situations and platforms from which they operated, polarised them against each other. The NP and Inkatha's relations with both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groupings created a hiatus in terms of their aims and strategies. This crippled the evolvement of consensus politics in South Africa. In the decade 1975-1985 the Parliamentary political groupings were the United Party (UP), the Progressive Reform Party (PRP), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) , the New Republic Party (NRP) , the South African Party (SAP), the Conservative Party (CP), and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) . In principle, they agreed with the NP and Inkatha in standing for the just and equal treatment of all parts of South Africa and for the impartial maintenance of the rights and privileges of every section of the population, with due regard to the multi-ethnic reality and that of the existence of minorities in South Africa. The NP and Inkatha had unfavourable relations with the extra-parliamentary political formations. These were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black People's Convention (BPC), the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), the Afrikaner weerstandsbeweging (AWB) or Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the National Forum (NF), and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Their relations with both the NP and Inkatha in terms of their aims and strategies were marked by what one may convoke "timorous digressions." Most of them referred to the NP Government as illegitimate while viewing Inkatha as perpetrating political tribalism which to them was the greatest enemy of African freedom. By 1985 this intricate structure of political groupings and different aims and strategies, characterized a divided South Africa. / University of Zululand and Standard Bank

Thesis (MA )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The issue of democratic consolidation has become an important field of study in relation to developing states, especially with regards to Southern Africa. The region’s history of liberation struggles and the emergence of liberation movements as ruling parties are vital factors to take into account when investigating democracy and, more specifically, democratic consolidation in these countries. However, there are only a few comparative studies that have looked at the effects of liberation movement governance on democracy. Therefore, in this study two case studies – Zimbabwe and South Africa – are compared in an effort to offer more insight into this topic. The focus of the study was placed on how the behavior of liberation movement governments has affected the rule of law in order to assess their impact on democratic consolidation in general. This study follows the premise of studies in political behavior that actors’ attitudes (in this case, liberation movements’ political cultures) affect their behavior or actions that in turn have an influence on democratic institutions that eventually impacts democratic stability. In order to investigate this, the two case studies were compared and discussed in terms of the following themes: firstly, the respective liberation struggles and transitions to majority rule; secondly, the political cultures that have developed within ZANU-PF and the ANC during the liberation struggles; and lastly, the effect of the two parties’ behavior – informed by the political cultures – on the rule of law, a central feature of democratic consolidation. The findings indicate that in Zimbabwe, the rule of law disintegrated and democracy faltered largely due to the behavior of ZANU-PF. In South Africa, on the other hand, the rule of law has so far been upheld and the prospects for democratic consolidation seem more positive than in the case of Zimbabwe. In the last few years, though, the ruling ANC has shown tendencies that could prove to be detrimental to the future of democracy in South Africa. The ANC and ZANU-PF have both exhibited an authoritarian political culture, a desire to capture the state, tendencies towards centralization of power and the delegitimation of opposition. However, perhaps the key explanation for the protection of the rule of law in South Africa and the disintegration thereof in Zimbabwe has less to do with the political culture than the constraining influence of the international context with a renewed focus on democracy and human rights and internal factors such as the constitution, civil society and a robust media. Furthermore, Zimbabwe experienced a watershed moment in the 2000 with the constitutional referendum which the Mugabe regime lost. With the loss of the referendum, ZANU-PF’s democratic credentials were tested and it failed. In South Africa, such a watershed moment has not happened yet – the ANC’s democratic credentials have yet to be tested like this. Therefore, the future of democracy is still uncertain even though in comparison with Zimbabwe, the prospects of democratic survival seem to be more positive. In conclusion, it is not possible to claim that liberation movement governance in general negatively affects democratic consolidation. The findings of the study indicate that this has definitely been the case in Zimbabwe, but so far not in South Africa. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kwessie van demokratiese konsolidasie het ‘n belangrike veld van studie geword in verband met ontwikkelende lande, veral met betrekking tot Suider-Afrika. Die gebied se geskiedenis van bevrydingstryde en die opkoms van vryheidsbewegings as regerende partye is belangrike faktore om in ag te neem wanneer demokrasie en, meer spesifiek, demokratiese konsolidasie ondersoek word. Tog is daar sover net ‘n paar vergelykende studies wat gekyk het na die effekte van bevrydingsbewegings se regeerkunde op demokrasie. Gevolglik, in hierdie studie is twee gevallestudies – Zimbabwe en Suid-Afrika – vergelyk in ‘n poging om meer insig te bied met betrekking tot hierdie onderwerp. Die fokus van die studie is geplaas op hoe die gedrag van regerende bevrydingsbewegings die oppergesag van die reg beïnvloed in ‘n poging om te bepaal hoe hulle demokratiese konsolidasie in die algemeen affekteer. Die studie volg die veronderstelling van studies in politieke gedrag dat akteurs se houdings (in hierdie geval die politieke kulture van die bevrydingsbewegings) beïnvloed hul gedrag of aksies wat weer ‘n invloed het op demokratiese instellings wat uiteindelik ‘n effek het op demokratiese stabiliteit. Om dit te ondersoek is die twee gevallestudies vergelyk en bespreek met betrekking tot die volgende: eerstens, die onderskeidelike vryheidstryde en oorgange tot meerderheidsregerings; tweedens, die politieke kulture wat ontwikkel het binne ZANU-PF en die ANC gedurende die vryheidstryde; en laastens, die effek van die twee partye se gedrag – geïnspireer deur die politieke kulture – op die oppergesag van die reg, ‘n sleutel kenmerk van demokratiese konsolidasie. Die bevindinge dui daarop dat die oppergesag van die reg in Zimbabwe in duie gestort het en demokrasie gefaal het grootliks as gevolg van ZANU-PF se gedrag. In Suid-Afrika, aan die anderkant, is die oppergesag van die reg sover gehandhaaf en die vooruitsigte vir demokratiese konsolidasie blyk om meer positief te wees as in die geval van Zimbabwe. Tog het die ANC oor die laaste paar jaar tendense getoon wat skadelik kan wees vir die toekoms van demokrasie in Suid-Afrika. Die ANC en ZANU-PF het beide ‘n outoritêre politieke kultuur geopenbaar, ‘n begeerte om beheer oor die staat oor te neem, tendense tot die sentralisering van mag en om opposisie te ondermyn. Alhoewel, die moontlike sleutel verklaring vir die beskerming van die oppergesag van die reg in Suid-Afrika en die disintegrering daarvan in Zimbabwe minder te doen het met die politieke kultuur as die beperkende invloed van die internasionale konteks met ‘n hernude fokus op demokrasie en menseregte en interne faktore soos die grondwet, die burgerlike samelewing en ‘n robuuste media. Verder, Zimbabwe het ‘n keerpunt beleef in 2000 met die konstitusionele referendum wat die Mugabe regime verloor het. Met die verlies van die referendum, is ZANU-PF se demokratiese getuigskrifte getoets en dit het gefaal. Suid-Afrika het nog nie so ‘n keerpunt beleef nie – die ANC se demokratiese getuigskrifte moet nog op so ‘n wyse getoets word. Daarom is die toekoms van demokrasie steeds onseker, maar in vergelyking met Zimbabwe, blyk dit dat die vooruitsigte vir demokratiese oorlewing meer positief is. Ter slotte, is dit nie moontlik om te verklaar dat bevrydingbewegings se regeerkunde demokratiese konsolidasie oor die algemeen negatief beïnvloed nie. Die bevindinge dui daarop dat dit definitief die geval in Zimbabwe is, maar sover nie in Suid-Afrika nie.

After its banning in 1961 the ANC, together with the South African Communist Party, adopted the armed struggle. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was formed and had its debut in December of the same year. When the MK command was arrested at Rivonia outside Johannesburg most of the remaining members went into exile. The banning of the ANC forced the members not just to go underground but also to go into exile and their first haven was the newly independent Tanzania. The 1960's witnessed the flight into exile of most members of the organisation. In Tanzania, members of the ANC and MK came into contact with members of other liberation movements, including the liberation movements [Tom Portuguese Africa. As the 1960's progressed MK was responsible for training recruits in various African countries, most notably in Tanzania and Zambia. In 1967 they launched their first major campaign, together with the Zimbabwe People's Union (ZAPU), into southern Rhodesia in an effort to reach South Africa. The campaign failed and several members were put in prison in Bechuanaland. On their release some of the cadres, amongst them Chris Hani, voiced criticism of the leadership. This criticism was expressed just as the leaders of the organisation gathered for their first major conference in exile, the Morogoro conference in Tanzania At Morogoro the emphasis on armed struggle was affirmed, and it was agreed that the other pillar supporting the struggle would be international relations. After the Morogoro conference MK continued to train recruits in Zambia and Tanzania, but the situation was increasingly difficult as internal problems in these countries led to the expulsion of several liberation movements. In 1974 a new wave of South Africans went into exile, and at the same time the liberation war in Portuguese Africa entered its last phase. When Angola became independent the ANC began negotiating with the new government about the possible establishment of new training facilities for MK in Angola. When the students of Soweto went into revolt, reacting against the introduction of Afrikaans as the main language in their schools, the ANC, the MK command and their rivals the PAC were taken aback. The first wave of new recruits was flown to Tanzania before they were re-routed to Luanda In Angola they were sent to the southern parts of the country, to Benguela and later to Nova Katengue. By 1979 nine camps had been established in Angola: there was a transit camp outside Luanda, and camps at Benguela, Nova Katengue, Gabela, Fazenda, Quibaxe, Pango, Camp 32 (Quatro) and Funda The main camp was Nova Katengue. The camp got the nickname of University of the South because of the emphasis there on ideological, political and academic courses. But one episode of attempted food poisoning and later the bombing by the South African Air Force focused attention on the need for internal security in the camps, and a Security Department took shape in the region. After the bombing which left Nova Katengue flattened to the ground, MK left their southern camps; a series of meetings took place in Luanda which resulted in a revised strategy outlined in "the Green Book". In 1979 MK participated in a second campaign together with ZAPU; as the attempt to reach South Africa was once again unsuccessful most of the participants found themselves back in the Angolan camps. This failure, together with the degrading conditions in which the cadres were living, fuelled a spiral of discontent in the camps. The food was sparse and the sanitary conditions were bad. A feeling of stagnation spread among the cadres, who were disillusioned at the bleak prospect of infiltrating back into South Africa. In the beginning of the 1980's the roads between Luanda and the eastern camps around Malanje, Caculama and Camalundi became unsafe as the South African-backed UNITA guerrillas increased their attacks. MK forces were deployed around the town of Cacuso to guard the railway line and secure the safety of the road, and this deployment aggravated the dissatisfaction of the cadres. At the end of 1983 some members of the security department beat a sick cadre to death. This triggered off a mutiny in some of the camps. The leadership defused this, the first in a series of mutinies. In 1984 a second mutiny took place in Viana The mutineers elected a Committee of Ten to forward a set of demands to the leadership. But the leadership was not ready to listen and the Angolan presidential guard quelled the mutiny. When a third mutiny erupted in Pango three months later no demands were made and no committee was elected, but the Pango mutiny was more violent. After the disturbances at Viana but before the Pango mutiny, a commission had been sent out from Lusaka to find the reasons for the uprising. The commission found that the main reasons were the deteriorating living conditions, the lack of proper health services and the deployment on the eastern front. Later reports came to similar conclusions regarding the reasons for the mutiny. However, the reports differ regarding the degree of punishment used in the region after the mutinies. The Committee of Ten was imprisoned after the mutinies. However preparations were made to meet their main demand, which had been for the calling of a national consultative conference and in 1985 the Kabwe conference took place in Zambia. Some restructuring of the organisation and army took place and the much criticised Security Department was made accountable to the leadership. Life in the Angolan camps continued much as before but efforts were made to provide some vocational training and better health services. The deployment on the eastern front came to an end, but soon MK came under attack on the roads between Luanda and their northern camps. The attacks intensified as other forces in Angola gathered around the south central town of Cuito Cuanavale, and eventually the siege of Cuito Cuanavale forced the South African regime to the negotiating table. After the siege the Namibia Agreement was signed. One of the terms of the agreement was that MK had to leave Angola and search for new havens, and in 1989 and 1990 most of the cadres were flown to Uganda. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

Abstract available in pdf file.

Bibliography: leaves 290-311. This study investigates the roles and experiences of "women warriors" in Zimbabwe's anti-colonial national liberation war, and reveals certain glorifications which have served to obscure and silence the voices of thousands of young girls and women involved in the struggle. The problems associated with the inclusion of women in an armed/military guerrilla force are discussed, and the (re)presentation of women in discourses of war, fictional accounts, public and national symbols and other multiple discursive layers which have re-inscribed the women back into the domestic examined. The Zimbabwean film Flame highlights the political sensitivity of the issues, including accusations of rape by male comrades in guerrilla training camps. An overview of women's involvement in Zimbabwean history, anti-colonial struggle, and the African nationalist movement provides the background for a critique of western feminist theories of nationalism and women's liberation in Africa. Historical records are juxtaposed with the voices of some women ex-combatants who speak their reasons for joining the struggle and their experiences of war. White Rhodesian women's roles are also examined in light of the gendered constructions of war.

There were no "Rebellions" in 1896-7. The concept of "risings" which is to be found in the European perspective of the escalated violence has distorted an understanding of the complex nature of the events. The events of 1896-7 must rather be explained through an examination of the details of the conflict. European pressure on the African people prior to 1896 was minimal and cannot be assumed to be the "cause" of the first "Chimurenga". There was no planned, organised or coordinated "rebellion" in Matabeleland in March 1896. Further, no distinction can be made between a "March" rebellion in Matabeleland and a June "rebellion" in Mashonaland. A European war of conquest in 1896-7 evoked the responce known now as the first "Chimurenga". It was the war of conquest of 1896-7 which saw the ascendancy of the European perspective over the African and thereby established the psychological foundations of the Rhodesian colonial state. The complex nature of the events of 1896-7 is to be understood through an appreciation of the different perspectives of those who became embroiled in the conflict.