The political ideas of Auberon Herbert are usually associated with the late Victorian Individualist thinkers primarily influenced by the philosopher Herbert Spencer. Although Herbert derived his political philosophy of Voluntaryism from Spencer’s thinking it also owed much to J. S. Mill. Voluntaryism was based on a Lockean-Spencerian conception of individual natural rights that asserted self-ownership and the moral obligation for individuals to respect the rights of other people. Rights protection against force and fraud constituted the primary purpose of government. Herbert, aptly describing Voluntaryism as the system of liberty, peace and friendliness, applied these principles to a range of situations from street maintenance, to collective property purchase, and, finally, to the voluntary support of the state. Voluntary taxation was the most controversial component of Herbert’s theory, emphasising its distinctiveness. Although Herbert resisted socialist and new liberal attempts to expand the role of the state, his reasons for doing so shared little in common with conservative critics of this direction. Herbert, a republican and democrat, repeatedly attacked privilege, seeking widespread change including land reform and universal suffrage. His position represented that of a radical reformer seeking to promote Voluntaryism as the basis for friendly co-operation among free individuals at home and abroad. An internationalist, Herbert opposed aggressive imperialism, but also supported national self-determination, including Irish Home Rule. The notion of the voluntary state has led to claims of Herbert’s anarchism, but research indicates a greater complexity to his political ideas. Overall, Herbert was an extreme libertarian who never completely lost sight of the state, although he greatly limited its role. While Herbert’s political theory was idealistic, it avoided the social prescription usually associated with utopianism. Herbert’s commitment to an ethos of radical progressivism was one he shared with other contemporary socialist and anarchist thinkers who, like Herbert, attempted to live the politics they espoused. For his political philosophy and activism, Herbert warrants acknowledgement as one of the most prominent English libertarians of the nineteenth century.

The political ideas of Auberon Herbert are usually associated with the late Victorian Individualist thinkers primarily influenced by the philosopher Herbert Spencer. Although Herbert derived his political philosophy of Voluntaryism from Spencer’s thinking it also owed much to J. S. Mill. Voluntaryism was based on a Lockean-Spencerian conception of individual natural rights that asserted self-ownership and the moral obligation for individuals to respect the rights of other people. Rights protection against force and fraud constituted the primary purpose of government. Herbert, aptly describing Voluntaryism as the system of liberty, peace and friendliness, applied these principles to a range of situations from street maintenance, to collective property purchase, and, finally, to the voluntary support of the state. Voluntary taxation was the most controversial component of Herbert’s theory, emphasising its distinctiveness. Although Herbert resisted socialist and new liberal attempts to expand the role of the state, his reasons for doing so shared little in common with conservative critics of this direction. Herbert, a republican and democrat, repeatedly attacked privilege, seeking widespread change including land reform and universal suffrage. His position represented that of a radical reformer seeking to promote Voluntaryism as the basis for friendly co-operation among free individuals at home and abroad. An internationalist, Herbert opposed aggressive imperialism, but also supported national self-determination, including Irish Home Rule. The notion of the voluntary state has led to claims of Herbert’s anarchism, but research indicates a greater complexity to his political ideas. Overall, Herbert was an extreme libertarian who never completely lost sight of the state, although he greatly limited its role. While Herbert’s political theory was idealistic, it avoided the social prescription usually associated with utopianism. Herbert’s commitment to an ethos of radical progressivism was one he shared with other contemporary socialist and anarchist thinkers who, like Herbert, attempted to live the politics they espoused. For his political philosophy and activism, Herbert warrants acknowledgement as one of the most prominent English libertarians of the nineteenth century.

The political ideas of Auberon Herbert are usually associated with the late Victorian Individualist thinkers primarily influenced by the philosopher Herbert Spencer. Although Herbert derived his political philosophy of Voluntaryism from Spencer’s thinking it also owed much to J. S. Mill. Voluntaryism was based on a Lockean-Spencerian conception of individual natural rights that asserted self-ownership and the moral obligation for individuals to respect the rights of other people. Rights protection against force and fraud constituted the primary purpose of government. Herbert, aptly describing Voluntaryism as the system of liberty, peace and friendliness, applied these principles to a range of situations from street maintenance, to collective property purchase, and, finally, to the voluntary support of the state. Voluntary taxation was the most controversial component of Herbert’s theory, emphasising its distinctiveness. Although Herbert resisted socialist and new liberal attempts to expand the role of the state, his reasons for doing so shared little in common with conservative critics of this direction. Herbert, a republican and democrat, repeatedly attacked privilege, seeking widespread change including land reform and universal suffrage. His position represented that of a radical reformer seeking to promote Voluntaryism as the basis for friendly co-operation among free individuals at home and abroad. An internationalist, Herbert opposed aggressive imperialism, but also supported national self-determination, including Irish Home Rule. The notion of the voluntary state has led to claims of Herbert’s anarchism, but research indicates a greater complexity to his political ideas. Overall, Herbert was an extreme libertarian who never completely lost sight of the state, although he greatly limited its role. While Herbert’s political theory was idealistic, it avoided the social prescription usually associated with utopianism. Herbert’s commitment to an ethos of radical progressivism was one he shared with other contemporary socialist and anarchist thinkers who, like Herbert, attempted to live the politics they espoused. For his political philosophy and activism, Herbert warrants acknowledgement as one of the most prominent English libertarians of the nineteenth century.

Cette thèse a pour but de comprendre si les droits humains contemporains sont les équivalents des droits naturels affirmés à l’époque moderne. En un premier temps, les conceptions contemporaines sur la nature des droits humains sont étudiées, en particulier les conceptions qui reconstruisent le sens des droits de l’homme à partir des positions ontologiques. En un second temps, une reconstruction de cette comparaison est mise en évidence sous trois perspectives : l’idée des droits naturels, le concept des droits naturels et les théories des droits naturels. Enfin, une fois mis en évidence les aspects significatifs de ces catégories, on procède à leur comparaison, en soulignant les points de continuité entre droits humains et droits naturels et les différences qui séparent leur chemin. / The aim of this work concerns the relation between human rights and natural rights, in order to understand if human rights are those natural rights affirmed in the modern age. First of all, we analyse the contemporary conceptions about human rights nature, especially those which find their meaning from ontological positions. Secondly, we reconstruct the term of this comparison from three perspectives : the idea of natural rights, the concept of natural rights, the theories of natural rights. At last, after the individuation of relevants aspects between both categories, we compare them, highlighting the common points and the differences that separate their path.

Substantive due process is one of the most cherished and elusive doctrines in American constitutional jurisprudence. The understanding that the Constitution of the United States protects not only specifically enumerated rights, but also broad concepts such as “liberty,” “property,” and “privacy,” forms the foundation for some of the Supreme Court’s most impactful—and controversial—decisions. This thesis explores the constitutional merits and politicizing history of natural rights jurisprudence from its application in Dred Scott v. Sandford to its recent evocation in Obergefell v. Hodges. Indeed, from slavery to same-same sex marriage, substantive due process has played a pivotal role in shaping our nation’s laws and destiny: But was it ever intended to? This paper first examines the legal arguments in favor of substantive due process to determine whether the judiciary was designed to be the “bulwark” of natural as well as clearly scribed law. Then, employing a novel framework to measuring judicial politicization, the thesis tracks the doctrine’s application throughout its most prominent case studies. Often arriving at nuanced conclusions, we observe that the truth is more often painted in some gradation of grey than in black or white.

Les philosophes français des Lumières se sont évertués, notamment dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle, à préciser les cas où l’inégalité et les limites de la liberté seraient conformes aux lois naturelles afin de proposer les préceptes permettant une vie sociale épanouie. Ce faisant, ils ouvrirent la voie à la formation des absolutismes éclairés qui trouvent leurs racines juridiques dans la théorie du droit naturel. Elaborée pour une large part par Voltaire qui la mettait directement en relation avec l’idéologie des absolutismes « classiques », l’idéologie des absolutismes éclairés avait pour but principal la création d’un Etat fort. Ayant accepté les propositions des philosophes les « rois philosophes » ou « monarques éclairés » fondèrent les justificatifs d’une telle politique sur la langue, la mode, et surtout sur la confiance dans un progrès que la France avait su promouvoir. / The French philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment, especially in the second part of the eighteenth century, endeavoured to specify the cases in which inequality and the limitations of freedom would be in accordance with natural laws in order to propose precepts for a blossoming life. By doing so, they opened the way to the formation of enlightened absolutism, a model of government that finds its legal foundations in the Natural Law Theory Developed largely part by Voltaire, who put it in the direct relation with the ideology of “classical” absolutism, the ideology of enlightened absolutism had as its principal goal the creation of a strong state. Having embraced the philosophers’ precepts, the “enlightened monarchs” or “philosopher kings” founded the evidence of such a policy on language, fashion, and especially on the confidence in a progress that France had been able to promote.

Cette recherche vise à fonder les droits des animaux non humains (ou humains) d’une manière hobbesienne. Cette manière est celle du droit naturel (ou jusnaturalisme). Nous montrons tout d'abord pourquoi le droit naturel est un cadre normatif spécifique qui doit être distingué de tout autre système normatif, en particulier de la morale ou de l’éthique. Dans un contexte hobbesien, les droits des animaux non humains ne sont pas des droits moraux mais des droits naturels. Nous montrons ensuite comment on peut écarter grâce au droit naturel toute morale défavorable aux animaux non humains. En fondant les droits naturels des animaux non humains, cette recherche poursuit des travaux déjà engagés sur la voie hobbesienne. Mais nous relions plus particulièrement la question des droits naturels des animaux non humains à la question de savoir quel type de protection juridique doit leur être accordé en vertu d’arguments de type hobbesien. Nous montrons finalement pourquoi l’égalité animale est une nécessité juridique dans le contexte d’une défense jusnaturaliste des animaux non humains, ce qui se traduit en droit positif par leur personnification juridique anthropomorphique. / This research aims to ground nonhuman (or human) animal rights in a Hobbesian way. This is that of natural law (i.e., jusnaturalism). First, we show why natural law is a specific normative framework that should be distinguished from any other normative system, especially morals or ethics. In a Hobbesian framework, nonhuman animal rights are not moral rights but natural rights. We show then how any morals detrimental to nonhuman animals can be eliminated through natural law. By grounding nonhuman animals’ natural rights, this research pushes forward works already engaged in this Hobbesian manner. But we relate more particularly the nonhuman animals’ natural rights issue to the question of what kind of legal protection they should be granted on the basis of Hobbesian-like arguments. Finally, we show why animal equality is a legal necessity in the context of a jusnaturalist defense of nonhuman animals, which legally results in their anthropomorphic legal personification.

Cette recherche porte sur le rôle joué par la lecture de Montaigne dans la philosophie de Rousseau.Il convenait d’abord de repérer les traces de cette lecture et les différents témoignages qu’en donnent son œuvre publiée ainsi que ses manuscrits, d’établir les éditions dans lesquelles Rousseau lit les Essais et les perspectives dans lesquelles il le fait. Il fallait établir également les médiations qui ont joué un rôle dans la réception de Montaigne par Rousseau. Les Essais sont édités et lus au XVIIIe siècle selon des perspectives auxquelles il ne cesse de se confronter. Nombre d’auteurs du XVIIe siècle sur lesquels il s’appuie dialoguent avec Montaigne. L’étude de la relation que Rousseau entretient avec lui demande donc l’examen de toute une tradition philosophique qui s’appuie elle-même sur Montaigne.Cette dimension de l’héritage conduit à trianguler les références, implicites ou explicites, que Rousseau fait à Montaigne dans son œuvre philosophique. Il lui sert de point d’appui pour dialoguer avec Diderot traducteur de Shaftesbury et pour prendre parti, dès le premier Discours, en faveur de la religion naturelle. La lecture politique des Essais qu’il produit nourrit son opposition à toute forme de domination et lui permet de critiquer la position de Montesquieu sur le luxe. Cette lecture politique se développe dans le second Discours, pour dénoncer les effets de l’intérêt particulier, qui détruit le lien politique. Rousseau s’appuie encore sur les principes de La Boétie qu’il trouve dans les Essais pour penser la dépravation de l’homme en société. Le lien social ne demande pas de suivre une morale opposée à l’intérêt, mais de poursuivre l’intérêt universel qui nous lie aux autres hommes. Montaigne occupe aussi une place déterminante dans le dialogue que Rousseau entretient avec des auteurs comme Barbeyrac, Mandeville ou Locke.Cette thèse montre ainsi que la référence à Montaigne met en jeu les principes fondamentaux de la philosophie politique et morale de Rousseau. / The aim of this study is to analyze the role of Montaigne’s legacy in Rousseau’s philosophy.First, evidences and views of Rousseau’s reading of Montaigne have been examined in his published works and in his manuscripts. Editions in which Rousseau was reading Montaigne have also been identified.Then, mediations between Rousseau and Montaigne’s reception have been reviewed. Rousseau reads the Essais with the 18th century points of view. He relies on 17th century authors who judge Montaigne. Therefore, thanks to this philosophical tradition who deals with Montaigne, links between Montaigne and Rousseau are analysed.The implicit and explicit references to Montaigne in Rousseau’s work are triangulated. Rousseau quotes Montaigne to deal with Diderot, – translator of Shaftesbury, to defend natural religion as early as in his First Discourse on the Sciences and Arts.Rousseau has a political reading of the Essais. He denounces all kind of domination, and criticizes Montesquieu’s apology of luxury. The political reading of Montaigne increases in the second Discourse : the possessive individualism destroys the social link.Rousseau underlines the La Boétie’s principles in the Essais, which show the political depravation of society. The social link does not demand to follow moral rules against citizen’s interests. Humanity has to pursue a universal interest, which establishes a relationship between each human being and the whole humanity.Montaigne has a central position to understand the dialogues between Rousseau and Barbeyrac, Mandeville, and Locke. Rousseau refers to Montaigne when he defends his moral and politic fundamental principles.

The justification of property ownership based on individual subjective rights is tightly bound to humanist moral perspectives. God is left out as irrelevant to the just grounds of ownership, which is established primarily on the basis of human self-referential, moral capacity. This thesis aims at developing an alternative justification, both for property as an institution and as a private holding, with a view to bringing God back into the centre stage and thereby placing property ownership on the objective concept of right. A tradition hitherto generally left unnoticed, yet uncovered here as the source of inspiration, vests the whole project with a moral-teleological tone. The tradition, enunciated by St. Augustine and developed by St. Bonaventure and John Wyclif, invites us to see property from the perspective of a moral end: it ought to be used for the love of God and neighbours, and as such it can be owned only by the just. In spite of important insights into the moral nature of property, the Augustinian thesis not only fails to spell out what ‘use for love’ means but also suffers from elitism. Nor does it offer an adequate justification of private property. Such weaknesses call for revision. When we reinterpret the Augustinian thesis through the concept of the divine imperative of service coupled with a proper understanding of human work, property acquires a distinctive justification. Property, as an institution, is justified as a requisite for carrying out God’s redemptive work towards the world. From this general justification ensues the particular justification. We hold property as specifically ‘mine,’ since each person’s ordained mission to participate in God’s work requires a uniquely personal material means, although the recognition and fulfilment of individual mission still demands communal efforts. The duty to carry out the God-commanded mission at first allows us to possess private property only in a non-proprietorial and non-exclusive manner. Yet in the prevailing condition of economic scarcity and human greed, civil jurisdiction must provide a structure of rights to enforce property institution. As God’s invitation for the transformation of the world is a universal command, everybody should have a minimum of property, and yet in differentiation of the scope and kinds commensurate with the particularities of individual mission.