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Historically, there have been two moral theories which have dominated the analysis of 'intellectual property': Natural law theory and Utilitarianism. The former argues that authors have an inalienable right to control the products of their minds while the latter argues that the moral status of a law establishing 'intellectual property' is inextricably tied to the attempt to maximize societal well-being. In this thesis I argue that few justifiable natural rights to the products of our minds can be found and, subsequently, the justification of such rights must stem from the latter theory. I argue that Utilitarianism places many strong limitations on the extensiveness of the powers granted to 'intellectual property' right-holders by a moral law. Finally, I argue that independent of a given societal state-of-affairs, we have two moral obligations: to follow the trend set by moral authors, and to lend them our support.

This thesis addresses the conflict between Anna Stilz and specific liberal political philosophers regarding the nature of duties and obligations owed by individuals to the state. First, I will analyze Stilz’s argument about the nature and grounds of obligation, then address the case against such obligations, particularly as presented by the philosophical anarchist A. John Simmons. Finally, I address what I believe to be the root of the disagreement.

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In this paper the concept of a ?human right? is analysed and clarified. Some justifications for human rights ? such as natural rights theory, contractarianism, utilitarianism and rights as vital interests ? are explored with respect to their emphasis on rights as protected choices or protected interests. Finally, a vital interests view is defended in which the rights to subsistence, security, and liberty of movement and political participation form the set of our basic rights without which we cannot enjoy our other rights.

Os estudos da obra de Hugo Grotius apontam a sua importância para a constituição de um conceito moderno de direito natural. A análise do conteúdo de suas principais obras políticas, De Jure Praedae Commentarius e De Jure Belli ac Pacis, permitiu a identificação de noções inspiradas no estoicismo e no ecletismo romano, principalmente de Sêneca e Cícero, sobretudo no que diz respeito ao direito natural. Além disso, a abordagem jusnaturalista do autor serve de base para fundamentar seus argumentos em defesa da possibilidade de se empreender uma guerra justa. Deste modo, uma análise do direito natural grociano requer a reflexão sobre estes dois aspectos. Com vistas a compreender a origem dos conceitos de lei natural e direito natural e as consequências que Grotius retira deles, a presente dissertação investigou a possível influência estoica e eclética na concepção de direito natural formulada por Groitus e o vínculo existente entre esta formulação e a teoria grociana da guerra e da pena. / Studies of Hugo Grotius\'s work suggest its relevance for the constitution of a modern concept of natural law. The analysis of the content of his main political works, De Jure Praedae Commentarius and De Jure Belli ac Pacis, opened space for the identification of concepts inspired by the Roman stoicism and eclecticism, specially from Seneca and Cicero, mainly regarding the natural law. Moreover, the author\'s jusnaturalistic approach serves as a base to support his arguments in defence of the possibility to wage a just war. Therefore, an analysis of the Grotian natural law requires a reflection upon these two aspects. Aiming at comprehending the origin of the concepts of natural law and natural rights and the consequences Grotius retrieves from them, the present dissertation investigates a possible stoic and eclectic infuence on the conception of natural rights formulated by Grotius and the link between this formulation and the Grotian\'s theory of war and punishment.

Esta tese trata da noção de direitos que informa o pensamento político dos colonos e líderes revolucionários na América britânica do século XVIII. Derivada de uma visão de mundo influenciada por fontes e tradições diversas, essa noção combina, de forma inusitada, duas escolas do pensamento jurídico; ambas herdadas de uma longa tradição. A primeira se baseia nos direitos históricos dos súditos ingleses na América, derivada do constitucionalismo inglês; a segunda é claramente inspirada na doutrina dos direitos do homem, formulada pela escola do direito natural moderno. A tese central deste trabalho é que a afirmação dos direitos e liberdades fundamentais do homem no Novo Mundo não se dá pela substituição absoluta de um paradigma por outro, mas pela conjunção das duas tradições jurídicas, coexistindo no pensamento colonial. Essa combinação contribuiria mais tarde para a formulação de um modelo republicano democrático liberal constitucionalista inovador. Contudo, esse modelo inovador não foi uma criação ex-nihilo. Os colonos e líderes revolucionários não abandonaram as tradições, as doutrinas e os princípios herdados, mas souberam combiná-los, articulá-los, modernizá-los e adaptá-los às exigências e às circunstâncias de um Novo Mundo e de um novo tempo. Vale sempre lembrar a grande contribuição que esse trabalho ofereceu para a formulação posterior dos direitos humanos e do direito internacional público. / This thesis deals with the notion of rights that informs the political thought of colonists and revolutionary leaders from the 18th century British America. Derived from a world view influenced by distinct sources and traditions, this notion unexpectedly combines two schools of legal thought; both inherited from a long tradition. The first one is based on the historical rights of English subjects in America, derived from English constitutionalism; the second one is clearly inspired by the doctrine of the rights of man postulated by the modern natural right school. The central thesis of this paper is that the affirmation of the fundamental rights and liberties of men in the New World is not through the absolute replacement of one paradigm by another, but by the conjunction of the two legal traditions coexisting in colonial thought. This combination would later contribute to the formulation of an innovative constitutional liberal democratic republican model. However, this innovative model was not an ex-nihilo creation. Colonists and revolutionary leaders did not abandon their inherited traditions, doctrines, and principles, but they knew how to combine, articulate, modernize, and adapt to the demands and circumstances of a New World and a new time. It is always worth remembering the great contribution that this work has made to the subsequent formulation of both human rights and public international law.

In this paper the concept of a ?human right? is analysed and clarified. Some justifications for human rights ? such as natural rights theory, contractarianism, utilitarianism and rights as vital interests ? are explored with respect to their emphasis on rights as protected choices or protected interests. Finally, a vital interests view is defended in which the rights to subsistence, security, and liberty of movement and political participation form the set of our basic rights without which we cannot enjoy our other rights.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.