In this thesis, we want to establish a theory of "contractual egalitarianism". It depends on the assumption that all people are free and equal. If all people are free and equal and they want to find a principle to govern their society, they would adopt a modified version of Scanlon's contractualism. According to this version of contractualism, a social practice or institution is unjust if it would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of society that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. If we have good reasons not to adopt a certain kind of policies, then it is likely that any principles allowing such policies could be reasonably rejected, hence that they will be unjust. With this contractual framework, we argue that there are four kinds of reason---equal respect, fulfilling basic needs, fair political equality and fair equal opportunity---by which we can reasonably reject inequality. If we accept the contractual framework and adopt the four kinds of reason, then we can justify egalitarianism without appealing to the idea of substantive equality. This kind of egalitarianism is a moderate one. A more radical version of egalitarianism will be reasonably rejected for its conflict with our other important value, such as liberty and personal relationship. / 鄧偉生. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2006. / 參考文獻(p. 181-186). / Adviser: Yuen Kang Shih. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-02, Section: A, page: 0602. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / School code: 1307. / Lun wen (zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2006. / Can kao wen xian (p. 181-186). / Deng Weisheng.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Alberta, 2009. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on Nov. 16, 2009). "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, [Department of] Philosophy, University of Alberta." Includes bibliographical references.

Contractarianism with a Human Face reinterprets the social contract, not as a model to generate a unique set of rules of justice, but as a dynamic process for making comparative institutional evaluations. An institutional reorientation allows contractarians to abandon the untenable assumption of a homogeneous model of agency (be it austere rational choice or Rawlsian reasonableness), replacing it with diverse agents living under institutions all can rationally endorse, and to which they have different reasons to comply. Contractarianism With a Human Face is a contractarian theory that differs from all other contractarian theories because it rejects the search for a unique answer to the question of what is justice. It does not flee from diversity, but instead finds new solutions to old problems through broadening the contractual model and the agents that make it up. This version of contractarianism has a human face in the sense that it starts from the diversity, disorder, and complexity of human life and seeks to find rules that we can all live under. Not by eliminating that diversity, but by embracing it. In so doing, however, it fundamentally changes the shape of contractarian theory. By rejecting the search for a unique "solution" to what rules of justice are justified, Contractarianism With a Human Face becomes a project of evaluating contingent and evolving institutions and constitutional rules. Rationality and justice are reconciled, at least partially, though human history.

The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.

In his book The Limits of Morality, Shelly Kagan claims that contractarian approaches to ethics are incompatible with our common, everyday, "moderate" morality. In this thesis I defend a version of contractarianism that I believe leads to both deontological constraints and options; i.e., to a genuinely moderate morality. On my account, the parties to the agreement are conceived of as being motivated not only to promote self-interest, but also to formulate a code of ethics that gives proper respect to their moral status as persons. If such a picture of the bargainers' motivations is defensible, as I believe it is, then the 'moderate' may in fact have recourse to contractarianism in her defense of everyday morality, for - as my thesis argues - bargainers that are thus motivated will arrive at a moderate morality. / Master of Arts

Moral contractarianism, as demonstrated in the work of David Gauthier, is an attempt to derive moral principles from the non-moral premises of rational choice. However, this contractarian enterprise runs aground because it is unable to show that agents would commit to norms in a fairly realistic world where knowledge is limited in space and time, where random shocks are likely, and where agents can be arbitrarily differentiated from one another. In a world like this, agents will find that the most "rational" strategy is to behave "non-rationally," imitating the behavior of others in their vicinity and preserving a limited sort of ignorance.

Moral contractarianism, as demonstrated in the work of David Gauthier, is an attempt to derive moral principles from the non-moral premises of rational choice. However, this contractarian enterprise runs aground because it is unable to show that agents would commit to norms in a fairly realistic world where knowledge is limited in space and time, where random shocks are likely, and where agents can be arbitrarily differentiated from one another. In a world like this, agents will find that the most "rational" strategy is to behave "non-rationally," imitating the behavior of others in their vicinity and preserving a limited sort of ignorance.

Leader integrity is a virtue and is frequently associated with better company reputation, performance in organizations, and trust from followers. Integrity seems to be a desirable quality an organization leader wants to encompass. Nevertheless, research in implementing integrity for better leadership has been facing quandaries: the ambiguity in referral of integrity domains and definitions, and the dilemma that integrity calls for consistency yet in reality leaders have to be adaptive to cope with changes. In addition, it is not unusual that leaders in various contexts behaving inconsistently yet trust from their followers is retained. Will there be other characteristics that facilitate trust in leaders even if the perceived behavioral integrity (PBI) is low? This research tries to address these leader integrity issues¡Xambiguity, dilemma, and maintenance of trust in order to provide a leader with concrete and concise guidance in implementing integrity. From a perspective of Contractarian coupled with ancient Chinese notions, this research investigates the relationship between a leader¡¦s perceived behavioral integrity and trust from his/her followers and proposes that leaders hold the core¡Xmorality, and work accordingly to identify norms, tackle and solve problems, craft negotiations, yet maintain their awareness in essence. Two core values are identified of moderating effect that a leader with lower PBI is able to maintain a certain level of trust. Should a leader be perceived processing authenticity and righteousness, higher level of trust would be maintained even if he/she were perceived low in behavioral integrity. This research advances the theory of integrity research by clarifying the domains and frees the coercion of consistency issues by proposing a morality-based Contractarian integrity view versus the traditional consistency-based integrity. An empirical attempt to investigate and provide explanation for the phenomena why a leader perceived low in behavioral integrity still obtain trust by their followers is added to the moderated consequences of the framework of integrity research. For practical business practitioners to implement leader integrity, this research suggests they (1) understand the characteristics and domains of integrity, (2) uphold morality and work in harmony with the tides in accordance to the leaders immediate environs, and (3) be salient in authenticity and righteousness. This research believes leader integrity is not merely a personal virtue but a practice that could be learned and implemented. The reward this understanding is better trust from their followers and subordinates.

This thesis applies T.M. Scanlon's version of contractualism to the problem of future generations. I begin by analyzing Rawls' contractarian account of just savings and find that there is no plausible composition of the original position that can deal with the inclusion of future people. I then examine Scanlon's contractualism and some objections to it before moving on to applying it to future people. I argue that the disanalogies between the intra- and inter-generational contexts do not preclude including future people in the contractualist framework, and that the theory avoids the non-identity problem. Part II of the thesis applies contractualism to three intergenerational topics and develops principles governing them: resource conservation, procreation, and population size. To conclude, I address how to deal with the fact that, in the case of future generations, we often have imperfect knowledge of what they will need, how our actions will affect them, and how many of them there will be.

Although the literature in the field of criminal justice and philosophy is full of ideas of what constitutes "justice," little to nothing has been done to see where the average individual's opinion falls in relation to these ideas. This paper analyzes a cross-sectional convenience sample of students at UCF to determine their preference of six models of justice: utilitarianism, contractarianism, fairness, retributivism, moralism, and libertarianism. Correlating demographic factors are also discussed.