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在＜經驗主義的五個里程碑＞一文中，蒯因描述了經驗主義從近代到當代的五個重大發展：(1)從觀念(idea)轉向字詞；(2)語意學的焦點從語詞轉向語句；(3)語意學的焦點再從語句轉向語句的系統；(4)方法上的一元論--放棄分析╱綜合區分；(5)自然主義--放棄先於自然科學的第一哲學目標。其中第三個里程碑即是所謂的「整體主義」。從蒯因對五個里程的描述看來，整體主義在其思想中顯然居於一個關鍵性的地位。因為第一和第二個里程碑都可說在蒯因之前即已完成了，第三個里程碑之後，則主要是蒯因自己的貢獻。而且除了「方法上的一元論」和「自然主義」外，整體主義也在不同的程度上支持了蒯因其他重要的學說。是故對蒯因而言，整體主義實扮演了哲學理論上一個承先啟後的角色。 　　本文對整體主義的討論分為四章十節。第一先舖陳蒯因在＜經驗主義的兩個教條＞中，否定分析╱綜合區分的論證過程，並對其中的部分細節作較詳細的補充，然後透過蒯因反對還原論的論述，勾勒出整體主義的大要。第二章就開始進行對整體主義所衍生之概念、問題的初步討論。第三章對「整體主義之強度問題」的研究，是本文最重要的部分。在3.1中，所針對的問題是：整體主義除了是一個證實理論外，是否也可以是一個語意學論題﹖另外3.2所討論的「溫和的整體主義」即是蒯因所提出的折衷立場。在＜經驗主義的兩個教條＞後，蒯因似乎為了某些不甚清楚的理由，而修改他對整體主義的態度。不過本文希望能做出一個比較大膽的論證，以說明：溫和的整體主義既與蒯因其他方面的觀點不合，而且也沒有什麼真正的好處；相反地，堅持＜經驗主義的兩個教條＞中的整體主義，既不會造成實質的困難，也能支持蒯因的整個理論體系。最後一章是對整體主義所衍生之問題的進一步探究。在4.1我們將回頭檢視：蒯因究竟是如何論證整體主義的﹖4.2則試圖釐清蒯因對「邏輯真理」的看法，而這可以徹底地去除任何「依約定為真」的陳述。至於4.3便是討論經驗主義的最後一個里程碑--自然主義，並期望能分辨出「作為知識論論題的自然主義」和「作為本體論論題的自然主義」。

This is a study of how expository information is presented in the metatext (title, subtitle, prefaces, dedications, the dramatis personae, announcements of act and scene, stage directions etc.) and the dialogue in seven one-act plays by August Strindberg: The Stronger (1889), Pariah (1889), Simoom (1889), Debit and Credit (1892), The First Warning (1892), Facing Death (1892), and Motherly Love (1892). Exposition in this study is defined as a semiotic temporal-structural element that: (1) is not restricted to any specific part of the drama; (2) is present in both the metatext and the dialogue; (3) transfers information about the prescenic time/action (time/action preceding the scenic time/action), interscenic time/action (scenic and non-scenic time/action between scenes), simultaneous scenic time/action (non-scenic time/action that takes place simultaneously with the scenic time/action, and postscenic time/action (time/action that follows the scenic time/action). The study shows that the expository information is presented gradually in the dramas, in both metatext and dialogue, and in all the four categories of time/action presented above. One important result is that the seven one-act plays, despite their naturalistic qualities, also contain components pointing towards Strindberg’s more expressionistic drama. It is possible to talk about a naturalistic or an expressionistic period in Strindberg’s authorship. It is, however, impossible to regard Strindberg as a naturalist or an expressionist in a stricter sense. Strindberg’s drama is too complex and rich to be placed in a certain theoretic doctrine. It is clear from the dissertation that the study of expository information is useful in dramaturgic analyses, and generates various discussions about for example themes, motives, and metaphors. A complete analysis of the exposition, therefore, must also consider elements such as language and imagery.

This thesis develops and refines a term used initially by Bill Buford to refer to works of contemporary realism. Dirty realism characterises a strain of realism first appearing in American and Canadian writing during the 1960s and increasing in prominence through the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. The study focuses on the scholarship surrounding both the term and the works of particular authors, and applies the theories of Fredric Jameson and Michel de Certeau to develop a basic critical vocabulary for engaging the fiction and poetry of Charles Bukowski, Raymond Carver, Richard Ford, and Mark Anthony Jarman, as well as other writers treated with less intensity, such as David Adams Richards, Helen Potrebenko, Al Purdy, and Bobbie Anne Mason. In particular, the dissertation attempts to develop a critical terminology through which to discuss dirty realist texts. The most prominent of such terms, the "hypocrisy aesthetic," refers to dirty realism's aesthetic of contradiction, discursive variance, and offsetting of theory against practice. The chapters of the dissertation deal with the emergence of the hypocrisy aesthetic through a study of literary genealogy, history, and theory. The second chapter, "Dirty Realism: Genealogy," traces the development of major currents in twentieth-century American realism, particularly naturalism. Arguing for dirty realism as a variant of naturalism, the chapter traces the transmission of ideas concerning dialectics, determinism, and commodity production from Theodore Dreiser and Frank Norris, through James T. Farrell and John Steinbeck and ending with an extensive discussion of Charles Bukowski's Factotum. The third chapter, "Dirty Realism: History," addresses the impact of the Cold War on the development of dirty realism. Referring to major critics on the period, this section of the dissertation follows the development of hypocrisy as a form of discourse eventuated by Cold War contradictions, particularly between that of democratic freedoms proclaimed abroad and the atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia on the domestic scene (as—in the USA—in the HUAC hearings chaired by Senator Joseph McCarthy).

La réflexion morale de Theodor Adorno est manifestement traversée par une tension : l’exigence paradoxale d’enraciner pleinement la morale à la fois dans les impulsions les plus vives et dans la raison la plus lucide. Plus qu’une excentricité parmi d’autres de la figure de proue de l’École de Francfort, le présent mémoire donne à penser que ce problème pourrait être une des principales charnières de son éthique. L’objectif de ma recherche est de dégager une voie pour articuler conjointement, «sans sacrifice aucun», ces deux exigences. Pour ce faire, je tenterai d’étayer l’hypothèse suivante : l’analyse du problème de la liberté et de la non-liberté que développe le premier des trois «modèles» de Dialectique négative permet de comprendre à la fois le lien et l’écart entre la dimension impulsive et rationnelle de l’éthique d’Adorno. L’argument qui sera déployé se penchera d’abord sur le problème de la non-liberté et son incarnation à travers le phénomène concret de l’antisémitisme ainsi que de la peur et de la rage animale dans lesquelles il s’enracine, pour ensuite examiner la conception adornienne de la liberté dans ses deux dimensions de «pleine conscience théorique» et «d’impulsion spontanée», et pour finalement tenter d’apprécier la portée plus générale pour la compréhension de l’éthique d’Adorno de cette interprétation du problème de la liberté en tentant de comprendre sur cette base son «nouvel impératif catégorique». / Throughout Theodor Adorno’s moral thought runs a paradoxical demand : that morality should be fully rooted in both the liveliest impulses and the keenest reasonings. More than a quirk among Adorno’s many, this essay suggests that this problem plays a pivotal role in his ethics. The current research seeks to develop a strategy to conjointly articulate these two demands. To this end, I will try to expound the following hypothesis : the analysis of the problem of freedom and unfreedom set forth by the first of the ‘models’ in Negative Dialectics enables making sense of both the bond and the disparity between the impulsive and rational constituents of adornian ethics. This study will first focus on the problem of unfreedom and its embodiment in the concrete phenomena of anti-Semitism as well as the animal fear and rage that it builds upon. It will then go on to examine Adorno’s conception of freedom in its two facets : «full theoretical consciousness» and «spontaneous impulse». It will finally try to ascertain the more general relevance of this interpretation of the problem of freedom for making sense of Adorno’s ethics, by trying to make sense on that basis of his «new categorical imperative».

L’objectif central du présent mémoire consiste à interroger les implications générales de l’interprétation taylorienne de la sécularisation, telle que déployée dans ‘A Secular Age’ (2007), pour la philosophie de la religion. Nous soutenons que l’approche herméneutique de notre auteur, reposant sur son anthropologie philosophique, a pour effet d’arrimer de façon indissociable et originale le problème de la sécularisation avec le questionnement philosophique sur la religion. À cet effet, nous présentons la critique du naturalisme déployée par Taylor ainsi que les grandes lignes de sa ‘dialectique’ afin de clarifier l’orientation générale de sa démarche. Nous passons ensuite à une analyse de son interprétation de la sécularisation ainsi que des implications de cette dernière pour les questions constitutives de la philosophie de la religion, touchant notamment la nature de la religion, le statut épistémologique des croyances religieuses, les rapports entre foi et raison ainsi que la relation entre la religion et la science moderne. Nous terminons sur un ton plus critique en interrogeant le ‘réalisme métaéthique’ de notre auteur et en soutenant que sa position pourrait constituer la base d’un ‘récit soustractif’ plus robuste et pénétrant. / The central aim of this work is to assess the most general implications of the interpretation of secularization by Charles Taylor, as it is deployed in ‘A Secular Age’ (2007), for the domain of philosophy of religion. We argue that the hermeneutical approach of Taylor, resting on his philosophical anthropology, binds together in an original and indivisible fashion the problem of secularization and the philosophical reflection on religion. To this effect, I describe his critique of naturalism and the broad lines of his ‘dialectic’ in order to clarify the general orientation of his work. I then move to an analysis of his interpretation of secularization and its implications for the constitutive questions in philosophy of religion, notably regarding the nature of religion, the epistemological status of religious beliefs, the relations between faith and reason as well as between religion and modern science. I conclude on a more critical note with an examination of the ‘metaethical realism’ of our author and by showing that his position might best be understood as the basis for a deepened and reinforced ‘subtraction story’.

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.

According to the dominant tradition in Christianity and many other religions, human beings are both knowers and actors: beings with conscious beliefs about the world who sometimes act intentionally guided by these beliefs. According to philosopher of mind Robert Cummins the “received view” among philosophers of mind is epiphenomenalism, according to which mental causation does not exist: neural events are the underlying causes of both behavior and belief which explains the correlation (not causation) between belief and behavior. Beliefs do not, in virtue of their semantic content, enter the causal chain leading to action, beliefs are always the endpoint of a causal chain. If that is true the theological anthropology of many religious traditions is false. JP Moreland draws attention to two different ways of doing metaphysics: serious metaphysics and shopping-list metaphysics. The difference is that the former involves not only the attempt to describe  the phenomena one encounter, it also involves the attempt of locating them, that is explaining how the phenomena is possible and came to be given the constraints of a certain worldview. For a physicalist these constraints include the atomic theory of matter and the theories of physical, chemical and biological evolution.   Mental properties are challenging phenomena to locate within a physicalist worldview, and some physicalists involved in “serious metaphysics” have therefore eliminated them from their worldview. Most however accept them, advocating “non-reductive physicalism” according to which mental properties supervene on physical processes. Even if one allow mental properties to supervene on physical processes, the problem of mental causation remains. If mental properties are irreducible to and therefore distinct from physical properties, as the non-reductive physicalists claim, they cannot exert causal powers if one accepts the causal closure of the physical domain – which one must, if one is a “serious physicalist” according to physicalist philosopher of mind Jaegwon Kim.   Alvin Plantinga, in his Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, shows that if mental properties, such as the propositional content of beliefs, are causally inefficacious, then evolution has not been selecting cognitive faculties that are reliable, in the sense of being conducive to true beliefs. If the content of our beliefs does not affect our behavior, the content of our belief is irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint, and so the content-producing part of our cognitive faculties are irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint. The “reliability” – truth-conduciveness – of our cognitive faculties can therefore not be explained by evolution, and therefore not located within the physicalist worldview. The only way in which the reliability of our cognitive faculties can be located is if propositional content is relevant for behavior.   If we however eliminate or deny the reliability of our cognitive faculties, then we have abandoned any chance of making a rational case for our position, as that would presuppose the reliability that we are denying. But if propositional content is causally efficacious, then that either – if we are non-reductive physicalists and mental properties are taken to be irreducible to physical properties – implies that the causal closure of the physical domain is false or - if we are reductive physicalists and not eliminativists regarding mental properties - it shows that matter qua matter can govern itself by rational argumentation, in which we have a pan-/localpsychistic view of matter. Either way, we have essentially abandoned physicalism in the process of locating the reliability of our cognitive faculties within a physicalist worldview. We have also affirmed the theological anthropology of Christianity, in so far as the capacity for knowledge and rational action is concerned. Keywords: Philosophy of mind, mental causation, reductionism, physicalism, the evolutionary argument against naturalism, the myth of nonreductive materialism, Alvin Plantinga, Jaegwon Kim

This study refocuses the current critical discussion of determinism and character identity development in Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie, a predominantly "urban" novel, by juxtaposing the ways in which the natural world functions deterministically in Thomas Hardy's The Return of the Native and Theodore Dreiser's The Bulwark. First, a close reading of The Return of the Native suggests that characters' interactions with the natural world determine their identities by forcing shifts in perception and complicating their abilities to assert an identity apart from their environments. Then, a reading of The Bulwark—a novel in which Dreiser deals with the natural world quite directly—allows an exploration of how these same patterns of perception, understanding, and identity formation take shape in a text by Dreiser. The final chapter of this study synthesizes these readings of The Return of the Native and The Bulwark as a means of entry into an analysis of Sister Carrie's deterministic forces. Ultimately, attention to how the natural world influences characters through its timelessness and infinite size, as well as to how the natural world shapes a character's perspective and sense of self, adds to our understanding of the novel's determinism. / Department of English

This project asserts that male Naturalist authors were not “hypermasculine” acolytes of strident manhood, but instead offer alternative constructions which they portray as less traumatic and more cohesive than prevailing social notions of normative male behavior. I maintain that the rise of the concept of manhood advocated by Theodore Roosevelt in the early decades of the twentieth century contributed to this misconception, for it generated a discourse of “manly” individualism which became equated with socially acceptable performances of masculinity for many Americans. My first chapter illustrates the gradual evolution of an individualistic, violent, and strident concept of manhood, which I label “strenuous masculinity,” through the rhetoric of Theodore Roosevelt. The second chapter explores the ways in which Stephen Crane’s fiction illuminates the trauma and confusion inherent in strenuous concepts of manhood. Many of Crane’s stories, like “Five White Mice,” demonstrate the failure of individualism, while others, like “The Open Boat,” document a more positive construction of what I call “homosocial manhood.” In my third and final chapter, I attempt to prove that Richard Wright’s early texts showcase a range of possible outcomes of black male attempts to stand up to racial oppression. I document that Uncle Tom’s Children and Native Son both depict a continuum of confrontation, with individual violence on one end of the spectrum and non-violent group protest on the other. Furthermore, because individual resistance is consistently equated with the suffering and death of the protagonists, my project implies that strenuous manhood also fails to provide a site for effectual and sustainable opposition to the negating forces of racial oppression. / Theodore Roosevelt and the transformation of American masculinity -- "The youth leaned heavily on his friend" : alternative constructions of masculinity in Stephen Crane's fiction -- Richard Wright's early fiction as a rejection of the racial oppression of strenuous manhood. / Department of English