This dissertation includes three studies, devoted to trying to understand inequality in health between people from different social groups in a democratic society. In the U.S., social inequality in health takes various forms and the key to understanding how democracy solves the problem of inequality lies in a complex set of political and social factors. I take an institutional approach and focus on examining how political and policy institutions, their administrative processes, and the policy implementation environment are linked to social inequality in health. The first essay, Whose Baby Matters More, uses a theoretical framework for evaluating heterogeneous group responses to public health policies and depicts how racial disparities in health are rooted in group heterogeneity in policy responses. The second essay, Anxious Girls and Inactive Boys, focuses on how state-level policy interventions and social capital interactively affect gender differences in health. The third essay, Responsibility for Equity, explores the link between publicness of state healthcare systems and social equity in healthcare access. In the first essay, I focus on racial disparities in infant mortality rates and pool state-level data from 1990 to 2006. The empirical analysis suggests that enhancing the capacity of state healthcare systems is critical to improving population health. Blacks and whites, nevertheless, exhibit different responses to the same policy. Racial disparities could be reduced only when policy interventions generate more relative benefits for Blacks. In the second essay, I find that social capital conditions the effect of public health policies with regard to managing childhood obesity. There are gender differences, moreover, in health outcomes and behavioral responses to state and local-level obesity policies. In the third essay, I find that different institutional factors exhibit different impact on inequality in healthcare access. While public finance resources may reduce inequality in healthcare access, public ownership and the public healthcare workforce do not have significant association with inequality in healthcare access. State Medicaid eligibility rules exhibit moderate impact on inequality in healthcare access.

The dissertation analyzes why legislators fail to use their oversight powers over bureaucracy in democratic Mexico. While dominant institutional theories assume a unidirectional flow of authority from politicians to bureaucrats, in Mexico there is a bidirectional negotiation process; as such, principals have formal rights to control the agents, but agents have informal leverage over principals, as well. Due to the absence of a Weberian state and extensive state intervention, bureaucrats are able to control resources that legislators require in order to advance their careers. By distributing resources that politicians can use for patronage purposes, bureaucrats obtain legislators’ consent to design and implement programs as they wish. Consequently, members of Congress renounce their control powers in exchange for securing resources for their constituents or cronies. Furthermore, informal mechanisms of influence neutralize the formal control powers that legislators have over bureaucrats. Public officials’ power and the lack of legislative control over bureaucracy are documented by analyzing the budgetary process and health policy in Mexico between 1997 and 2006. The main implication of the dissertation is that although democratization produced changes that gave more formal powers to Congress, it has not eliminated the informal mechanisms used by bureaucrats to influence legislators. As a result, public officials continue to enjoy ample leeway in implementing public policies and programs. / text

No description available.

As an advanced society of industrialized capitalism has an ever-tighter grip on our everyday lives, I ask if rebellion is possible in the current context. To this end, I formulate a model of rebellion based on my readings of Marcuse and Camus; from Marcuse, the idea that a person can formulate a rebellious subjectivity through the consumption of art in the creation of the aesthetic dimension, and from Camus, an individual placing limits on what oppression he will take from an existing order and at what point she will say "no" to that order and giving a concurrent "yes" by acting in such a way that fosters Camus' human community. I argue after the Cold War especially, the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption closes down spaces for meaningful rebellion. As we have moved from hip consumerism to market populism, the goal of the existing order is for the citizens thereof to legitimate the order. I analyze various groups to see if they are engaging in rebellion, such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, the Earth and Animal Liberation Fronts, and analyze their methods. I find that instead of labeling as terrorist or rebel, we should let the rebellious subjectivity guide our judgment of their actions. Ultimately, I conclude that rebellion is still a possibility even in the encroaching totality of the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, and that a preservation of the rebellious subjectivity can provide a basis for formulating a rebellious praxis not yet called into being. / Master of Arts

Government agencies exercise bureaucratic autonomy when they are able to pursue their goals independent, and sometimes in defiance, of political superiors. Over the last three decades, research in the area of bureaucratic autonomy has provided numerous examples of relatively autonomous agencies and has generally recognized the desire of administrators to carve out greater autonomy for their organizations, but the question of how administrators consciously or unconsciously pursue autonomy remains a rich and largely unexplored area of research. Most theories of bureaucratic autonomy typically fall into two categories: an autonomy based on task-specificity that is contingent on the function and expertise of the organization and the ability of the agency to accept or reject new tasks; and a reputation-based autonomy contingent on the ability of the agency to build and maintain a constituency and to secure a reputation for effectiveness that makes it politically difficult for elected officials to influence agency action. This study applies a discourse analytic approach to the study of autonomy in two agencies established during the Cold War whose primary function is the distribution of federal grants-in-aid: the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Institute of Mental Health. Drawing on the theory and practice of discourse analysis, this study seeks to expand upon existing perspectives by better understanding how storylines help administrators to define the agency's mission and tasks and to develop its reputation for effectiveness. The findings suggest that storylines serve as causal drivers toward autonomy, operating in complex ways to influence individual decisions such as the scope of agency services and appropriations. They also suggest that storylines operate over time to both construct the circumstances that lead to greater autonomy and are simultaneously made more or less persuasive by those circumstances. / Ph. D.

A política comercial brasileira e o arcabouço institucional em que é coordenada e formulada passaram por importantes transformações a partir da abertura econômica em 1990. Suas estruturas administrativas foram completamente remodeladas. Estas mudanças incentivaram a politização e pluralização da política comercial de forma que a sua tomada de decisão e implementação passaram a ocorrer em um novo contexto, marcado por novos condicionantes e demandas num ambiente de comércio exterior muito mais complexo e competitivo. A complexificação da agenda comercial mobilizou novos atores burocráticos que não haviam participado da política comercial desenvolvimentista, tornando evidente o aumento do seu grau de politização. Posto isto, analisamos o processo de construção das instituições que regem a política de comércio exterior pós-abertura econômica, tendo como foco analítico as relações entre a mudança institucional e a dinâmica político-burocrática interna do Poder Executivo. Analisamos aqui o conflito interno ao Poder Executivo entre as diferentes agências e órgãos burocráticos que tinham ou tenham competências e interesses envolvidos neste campo mais complexo no qual a política comercial atual foi e é disputada e produzida e como foi a ação da Presidência da República em termos de seu grau de envolvimento efetivo em cada uma dessas alterações. Optamos por analisar as instituições que compõem o quadro de coordenação desta política. O primeiro corte de estudo foi o processo de extinção da Carteira de Comércio Exterior do Banco do Brasil (Cacex), principal símbolo e a síntese da institucionalidade do modelo desenvolvimentista de industrialização por substituição de importações sobre o comércio exterior. O segundo estudo analisa a formação, reformas e consolidação da institucionalidade do modelo da Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Camex) adotado no início do governo Cardoso e, após algumas transformações, consolidado no governo Lula. A pesquisa foi dividida em duas etapas distintas, mas com interconexões mútuas. A primeira etapa consistiu na proposição de um quadro teórico que permitisse a derivação das hipóteses utilizadas na pesquisa empírica a partir de uma avaliação crítica do que já foi produzido sobre a influência e as implicações da participação da burocracia no jogo político. Na segunda parte 7 foi realizada a pesquisa empírica na qual se avaliou o impacto da política burocrática na construção das instituições da política comercial brasileira. Para a execução empírica da pesquisa foi feito um levantamento dos dispositivos legais que alteraram o aparato institucional, das preferências reveladas dos atores e percepções de atores e pesquisadores que participaram dos processos decisórios e, finalmente, de outros instrumentos analíticos mais objetivos e menos sensíveis a questões subjetivas. Por fim, a partir do exame dos dados obtidos, ponderou-se ao final da pesquisa que o conflito interno no Poder Executivo foi uma variável importante, embora não tenha sido a única determinante do processo de construção institucional da política comercial brasileira pósabertura econômica, e que o quadro analítico forneceu conceitos fundamentais para a análise e explicação das interações entre a política burocrática e esta construção institucional. / The Brazilian trade policy and its institutional framework have undergone major changes since the economic opening in 1990. Its administrative structures have been completely rebuilt. These changes have encouraged the politicization and pluralization of the trade policy so that decision making and policy implementation have begun to occur in a new context, characterized by new constraints and demands in a foreign trade environment more complex and competitive. The complexity of the new trade agenda has mobilized bureaucratic actors who had not participated of the developmentist trade policy, demonstrating the increase in its degree of politicization. We analyze the building process of the institutions that conduct the post-economic trade policy liberalization, focusing on the analytical relationships between institutional change and the bureaucratic politics dynamics inside the executive branch. Here we analyze the internal conflict in the executive branch among the different agencies that have competences and interests involved as well as how was taken the Presidential action in terms of its actual degree of involvement in each of these changes. We choose to study the institutions that compose the coordination framework of the Brazilian trade policy. In the first cut, we study the process of extinction of the Carteira de Comércio Exterior do Banco do Brasil (Cacex), the main symbol and synthesis of the developmentist institutional model of industrialization through import substitution in the foreign trade. In a second step, we study the process of formation, reforms and consolidation of the Camex model, adopted in the beginning of Cardoso\'s government and, after some transformations, consolidated under Lula\'s government. The research strategy was divided in two distinctive stages, but with mutual interconnections. The first one consisted of the proposition of a theoretical framework that would allow the derivation of the hypothesis used in the empirical research from a critical assessment of what had been produced about the influences and implications of the bureaucratic participation in the political process. In the second one, it was conducted an empirical research in which it was assessed the impact of the bureaucratic politics in the trade policy institutional building. In order to implement the empirical research, the legal devices that changed the institutional 9 apparatus has been surveyed as well as the revealed preferences of actors and perceptions of actors and researchers who have had a participation in decision making processes and, ultimately, other objective analytical tools less sensitive to subjective issues. Finally, from the obtained data, it was pondered that the internal conflict within the Executive Branch was an important variable, although not the sole determinant of the process of institutional building of the Brazilian trade policy after the economic opening, and that the analytical framework has provided fundamental concepts for the analysis and for the explanation of the interactions between politics and bureaucracies and this institution-building process.

A política comercial brasileira e o arcabouço institucional em que é coordenada e formulada passaram por importantes transformações a partir da abertura econômica em 1990. Suas estruturas administrativas foram completamente remodeladas. Estas mudanças incentivaram a politização e pluralização da política comercial de forma que a sua tomada de decisão e implementação passaram a ocorrer em um novo contexto, marcado por novos condicionantes e demandas num ambiente de comércio exterior muito mais complexo e competitivo. A complexificação da agenda comercial mobilizou novos atores burocráticos que não haviam participado da política comercial desenvolvimentista, tornando evidente o aumento do seu grau de politização. Posto isto, analisamos o processo de construção das instituições que regem a política de comércio exterior pós-abertura econômica, tendo como foco analítico as relações entre a mudança institucional e a dinâmica político-burocrática interna do Poder Executivo. Analisamos aqui o conflito interno ao Poder Executivo entre as diferentes agências e órgãos burocráticos que tinham ou tenham competências e interesses envolvidos neste campo mais complexo no qual a política comercial atual foi e é disputada e produzida e como foi a ação da Presidência da República em termos de seu grau de envolvimento efetivo em cada uma dessas alterações. Optamos por analisar as instituições que compõem o quadro de coordenação desta política. O primeiro corte de estudo foi o processo de extinção da Carteira de Comércio Exterior do Banco do Brasil (Cacex), principal símbolo e a síntese da institucionalidade do modelo desenvolvimentista de industrialização por substituição de importações sobre o comércio exterior. O segundo estudo analisa a formação, reformas e consolidação da institucionalidade do modelo da Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Camex) adotado no início do governo Cardoso e, após algumas transformações, consolidado no governo Lula. A pesquisa foi dividida em duas etapas distintas, mas com interconexões mútuas. A primeira etapa consistiu na proposição de um quadro teórico que permitisse a derivação das hipóteses utilizadas na pesquisa empírica a partir de uma avaliação crítica do que já foi produzido sobre a influência e as implicações da participação da burocracia no jogo político. Na segunda parte 7 foi realizada a pesquisa empírica na qual se avaliou o impacto da política burocrática na construção das instituições da política comercial brasileira. Para a execução empírica da pesquisa foi feito um levantamento dos dispositivos legais que alteraram o aparato institucional, das preferências reveladas dos atores e percepções de atores e pesquisadores que participaram dos processos decisórios e, finalmente, de outros instrumentos analíticos mais objetivos e menos sensíveis a questões subjetivas. Por fim, a partir do exame dos dados obtidos, ponderou-se ao final da pesquisa que o conflito interno no Poder Executivo foi uma variável importante, embora não tenha sido a única determinante do processo de construção institucional da política comercial brasileira pósabertura econômica, e que o quadro analítico forneceu conceitos fundamentais para a análise e explicação das interações entre a política burocrática e esta construção institucional. / The Brazilian trade policy and its institutional framework have undergone major changes since the economic opening in 1990. Its administrative structures have been completely rebuilt. These changes have encouraged the politicization and pluralization of the trade policy so that decision making and policy implementation have begun to occur in a new context, characterized by new constraints and demands in a foreign trade environment more complex and competitive. The complexity of the new trade agenda has mobilized bureaucratic actors who had not participated of the developmentist trade policy, demonstrating the increase in its degree of politicization. We analyze the building process of the institutions that conduct the post-economic trade policy liberalization, focusing on the analytical relationships between institutional change and the bureaucratic politics dynamics inside the executive branch. Here we analyze the internal conflict in the executive branch among the different agencies that have competences and interests involved as well as how was taken the Presidential action in terms of its actual degree of involvement in each of these changes. We choose to study the institutions that compose the coordination framework of the Brazilian trade policy. In the first cut, we study the process of extinction of the Carteira de Comércio Exterior do Banco do Brasil (Cacex), the main symbol and synthesis of the developmentist institutional model of industrialization through import substitution in the foreign trade. In a second step, we study the process of formation, reforms and consolidation of the Camex model, adopted in the beginning of Cardoso\'s government and, after some transformations, consolidated under Lula\'s government. The research strategy was divided in two distinctive stages, but with mutual interconnections. The first one consisted of the proposition of a theoretical framework that would allow the derivation of the hypothesis used in the empirical research from a critical assessment of what had been produced about the influences and implications of the bureaucratic participation in the political process. In the second one, it was conducted an empirical research in which it was assessed the impact of the bureaucratic politics in the trade policy institutional building. In order to implement the empirical research, the legal devices that changed the institutional 9 apparatus has been surveyed as well as the revealed preferences of actors and perceptions of actors and researchers who have had a participation in decision making processes and, ultimately, other objective analytical tools less sensitive to subjective issues. Finally, from the obtained data, it was pondered that the internal conflict within the Executive Branch was an important variable, although not the sole determinant of the process of institutional building of the Brazilian trade policy after the economic opening, and that the analytical framework has provided fundamental concepts for the analysis and for the explanation of the interactions between politics and bureaucracies and this institution-building process.

This project studies how bureaucratic behavior influences policy implementation. It presents a novel bureaucratic access points and leverage theory, which help us understand how policies are successfully implemented in the midst of bureaucratic challenges resulting from organizational roles and responsibilities and contrasting assessments. The concept of access points has traditionally involved lobbyists and interest groups accessing elected officials and their staffs. I ask what is the effect of bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats directly in the policy implementation process and its subsequent evaluation. I argue that bureaucrats leverage other bureaucrats during policy implementation proceedings, which adds the notion of power to access points theory. The focus of this investigation is the relationship between humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) agencies and associated Department of Defense (DOD) components, particularly DOD medical components providing wellness intervention. Bureaucratic access and leverage enables a more unified implementation of over-arching HA/DR policy by disparate agencies with unique missions, resources, capabilities, and assessment measures. The existing literature does not fully capture how such agency differences are mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans multiple entities. Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory offers bureaucrats the analytical capability to know who is controlling policy implementation. It also presents a tool they can use to maintain and increase their own influence and power within a policy domain. / text

After many years of limited activity in the field of coordination research, new organizing forms with the aim to abandon managerial hierarchies have caused a renaissance in the research of new solutions to this universal organizing problem. An emerging stream of research about Self-Managing Organizations (SMOs) which eliminates formal hierarchies and managers completely, have left researchers wondering about SMOs new coordination solution as antecedent organizing forms have their coordination solution strongly dependent on managers. The aim of this thesis was to explore and identify the mechanisms that SMOs utilize to coordinate work output, how these mechanisms are configured and how they correspond to the settings of SMOs. Due to the nascent state of knowledge development within this field, the aim was operationalized with the help of coordination conceptualizations and theory from nearby fields. A multiple case-study was conducted, using deep, semi structured interviews, triangulated with internal documentation, external documentation and archival records. The study identified the mechanisms Planning based on ‘sense and respond’, Competence driven and partially fluent roles, the merged category of Familiarity peer-trust and transparency, Digital infrastructure, Cultural content and finally, Content of repeated procedures. Through a self-composed analytical approach, the study revealed that traditionally mechanistic coordination mechanisms were of less importance to SMOs and had an added organic and group-dependent dimension to their configurations, compared to similar mechanisms in hierarchies. Furthermore, the findings suggested that Digital infrastructure, Cultural content and Content of repeated procedures were configured in a way, particularly useful and important to SMOs. The reason was that the three mechanisms constituted a mechanistic but editable framing, which both aligned and encouraged organic efforts in a certain direction. They also corresponded well to SMOs settings as they could be exercised and edited by anyone, they facilitated coordination cross-teams without managers and they were scalable in theory.

This research is undertaken in response to the need to offer fresh insights to the number of models of organisational bureaucracy. The main aim of this thesis is to explore the bureaucratic factors related to governmental organisations that may influence their performance. Through conceptual and empirical research, several key factors have been identified which link organisational performance to social responsibility, job satisfaction, motivation, and decision quality. To support this research, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were used in connection with the performance dimensions and the bureaucratic factors. In this context, the case study design used multiple sources of evidence in a triangulation strategy to contribute to developing a perspective on bureaucracy and its impact to government organisations in the Kingdom of Bahrain. Thus, a conceptual framework has been developed and proposed as part of the study. This research adopted a semi-structured interview research design in order to elicit the views of individuals and in-depth qualitative information. The findings in the context of this research confirmed that Bahrainis are highly rule-oriented, risk averse and do not readily accept change. In addition, they have a high preference for avoiding uncertainty thus they maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour. The results of the empirical investigation have therefore enriched the growing literature of bureaucracy and performance of government organisations not only in the Kingdom of Bahrain but also in the global setting it used the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The result of this research may be of help to a range of human resource managers, public administrators, employees and other stakeholders in bureaucratic organisational context.