Thesis (Revise). / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-105).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Capital Bible Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-70).

Thesis (M.A.)--Brigham Young University. Dept. of English, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 155).

In this paper I examine the contemporary debate over Derk Pereboom’s Manipulation Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. After considering the argument in its entirety, I entertain a Hard-Line compatibilist reply given by Michael McKenna, based on an improved reworking of Pereboom’s cases. In evaluating McKenna’s reply I begin with several objections raised by Ishiyaque Haji and Stephan Cuypers before arguing that the reworking of cases is unsuccessful due to a lack of freedom-undermining manipulation. I redefine the conditions for what satisfies as freedom-undermining manipulation based on a revised understanding of the process whereby agents come to evaluate their desires independently. In conclusion, I maintain that Pereboom’s argument succeeds only insofar as it satisfies an evaluative account of manipulation. However, upon doing so, Pereboom’s strategy of accounting for all desired CAS conditions fails, given that authentic evaluation cannot be manipulatively accounted for. As a result, the Manipulation Argument fails to prove the incompatibility of free will and determinism.

Ma thèse développe le problème de la compatibilité de responsabilité morale et des thèses causales (déterminisme et indéterminisme.) Ce problème est traité en analysant l’importance supposée de deux conditions de la responsabilité: le pouvoir d’agir autrement et le contrôle sur les sources causales du comportement. La condition de possibilités alternatives est envisagée en faisant référence aux exemples à la Frankfurt, tandis que la condition de la source est supportée par les exemples de manipulation. Mon analyse refuse ces deux conditions. L’examen des œuvres de P.F. Strawson et de J. Feinberg montre, à mon avis, qu’il est impossible de définir les conditions de la responsabilité sans prendre position dans le champ de l’éthique normative. Ainsi, j’en viens à analyser la notion d’obligation morale, et je propose finalement un approche contractualiste, basé sur la théorie de T.M. Scanlon. / My thesis develops the problem of the compatibility between moral responsibility and the physical causation of human decisions. This problem is dealt with the supposed relevance of two different conditions of responsibility: the power to choose otherwise and the control over the source of behaviour. The alternative-possibilities condition is examined by reference to the Frankfurt-type examples, while the source-condition is supported by the manipulation examples. My analysis rejects both of those argumentations. The examination of P.F. Strawson’s and J. Feinberg’s works show, in my opinion, that it is impossible to define the conditions of responsibility without embracing some sort of normative ethical theory. So I came to analyse the notion of moral obligation and finally I propose a contractualist approach, based on the works by T.M. Scanlon.

No description available.

Carl Hoeferʼs “freedom from the inside out” is a compatibilist account of freedom that claims that we can have a robust kind of freedom even if the world is deterministic. The key insight is that determinism belongs in tenseless B-series time in the block universe, not in our everyday notions of the world where time is experienced in a tensed way with a past, a present, and a future, where the past is viewed as fixed and the future as open. The block universe is time symmetric, i.e., determination can go in both temporal direction, and no particular part of the block universe is determined or fixed prior to any other part. Therefore,we do not have to think of deterministic logical relations as placing constraints on our actions in advance. Instead, we are free to view our actions as primary explainers that very partially determine both the future and the past. Since our actions are thought to place constraints on the microscopic past, it will be argued that Hoeferʼs account can question the Consequence Argument, the well-known incompatibilist argument that claims that if the past and the laws are not up to us, the consequences of the past and the laws cannot be up to us either, which includes our present actions. Hence, it will be argued that by rejecting that the past is not up to us, Hoeferʼs account can refute the Consequence Argument, which removes one possible threat to our freedom. / Carl Hoefers “frihet från insidan ut” är en kompatibilistisk teori om frihet som hävdar att vi kan ha en robust sorts frihet även om världen är deterministisk. Den centrala idén är att determinism hör hemma i den statiska B-seriens tid i blockuniversumet, inte i världen såsom vi upplever den med ett förflutet, ett nu, och en framtid, där det förflutna upplevs som fixerat och framtiden som öppen. Blockuniversumet är tidssymmetriskt, vilket innebär att determinationen kan gå både framåt och bakåt, och ingen specifik del av blockuniversumet är determinerad eller fixerad före någon annan del. Därför behöver vi inte tänka på de deterministiska logiska relationerna som någonting som i förväg begränsar hur vi kan agera. Vi är istället fria att betrakta våra handlingar som primära förklarare som är delaktiga i att determinera både det förflutna och framtiden. Eftersom Hoefer menar att våra handlingar begränsar hur det mikroskopiska förflutna kan vara, så kommer det att argumenteras för att Hoefers teori kan ifrågasätta konsekvensargumentet, vilket är ett välkänt inkompatibilistiskt argument som säger att eftersom det förflutna och naturlagarna inte är upptill oss, så kan inte heller konsekvenserna av det förflutna och naturlagarna vara upp till oss, således kan inte våra handlingar vara upp till oss. Genom att förneka att det förflutna inte är upp till oss, så kan Hoefers idéer avvisa konsekvensargumentet, vilket tar bort ett möjligt hot mot vår frihet.

No description available.

Though philosophers have invested great amounts of time and energy probing the dimensions of freedom as it relates to the human situation, psychologists have tended to avoid the topic. However, the relevance of freedom to the empirical investigations of psychology does not reside in an extension of its philosophical roots. The pertinent aspect of freedom for psychology is the freedom a person perceives himself and others to possess. Thus, it is the perception of freedom, be it valid or invalid, and how it influences behavior, that is relevant to psychology.