Many philosophers tend to defend the view that there is a significant relation between the problem of determinism / indeterminism and the problem of free will. The belief that there exists such a significant relation is supported by our intuitions / however, in this thesis, I defend just the opposite view: free will has no significant dependence on the deterministic or indeterministic character of causal relations. In the same way, I propose that the question, whether or not determinism is true, cannot be answered based on observations about the problem of free will. I believe that the genuine question whose answer would illuminate the darkness surrounding free will is whether or not will supervenes on anything other than itself. Therefore, in order to decide whether or not we are free, the question we should ask is &ldquo / Does will supervene upon something other than itself?&rdquo / Moreover, I defend the position that no matter whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, if physicalism is true, i.e. if properties of free will supervene upon physical properties, then we cannot enjoy genuine freedom. The position of the thesis has some important ethical implications: If we cannot be genuinely free, we cannot be genuinely responsible for our actions either. This implies that retributive and admirative desires towards other persons are rationally untenable. I defend the view that only practical attitudes like reinforcement and punishment or isolation and inclusion are rationally tenable.

The two questions that motivate the present inquiry are: is it possible that human beings will freely, and what does free will make possible? John Duns Scotus and William James are two defenders of the possibility of free will, although each has a very different notion of the will. First, I present the accounts of the will articulated by Duns Scotus and James, with attention to the context in which the accounts were developed and the reasons each philosopher gives for the possibility of free will. Next, I briefly consider the picture of human action each account of the will makes possible. Then, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each account. Finally, in response to a weakness of both accounts, I argue that in order to widen the possibilities of human moral agency, it is necessary to reflect not only on our strengths but also on our physical and moral frailty.

Thesis--Giessen. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 188-193).

Thesis--Halle-Wittenberg. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-75).

The purpose of this study is to investigate (1) how mathematics instructors develop their students’ metacognitive abilities concretely within mathematics instruction and (2) whether these teachers feel adequately prepared to develop their students’ metacognitive abilities. Qualitative email interviews with credentialed secondary school mathematics teachers in Sweden were used. Analysis of the participants’ interview responses indicate that the participants reported a limited use of the metacognitive teaching strategies described in the research. Although teacher responses indicated stress, frustration, and irritation and their responses indicated limited proficiency in their intuitive declarative metacognitive knowledge of thinking skills, whether or not teachers feel adequately prepared to develop their students’ metacognitive abilities cannot be completely answered by this study.

Depression is the leading cause of disability around the world, and in Canada, 8% of adults will experience depression in their lifetimes. Nearly half of those with depression will not seek treatment, one of the major barriers being the social stigma associated with depression and other mental illnesses. Some of this stigma results from a mistaken understanding of free will and agency and the degree to which these are compromised in mental disorders. This thesis aims to show that free will in both psychologically healthy and pathological cases can be understood in a scientific causal deterministic way based on recent findings in neuroscience and psychology. The ‘will’ can be understood in terms of the normal range functioning of mechanisms for control, choice, and valuation. There is no ‘free’ will that is uncaused, but only relative freedom when these mechanisms are not internally damaged and there is no external coercion. Evidence that depression and mental illness can also be understood in a causal, deterministic way is also presented, and it is argued that this understanding can work back to reinforce the scientific understanding of the will in non-pathological cases. The understanding of free will based on healthy function and that based on pathological function are mutually reinforcing. The thesis concludes by showing that, based on a causal deterministic picture of the will, the stigma surrounding mental illness is unfounded, and that this view can lead to more compassion, understanding, and acceptance of both those with mental illness and the mentally healthy.

An argument for the compatibility of causal determinism and free will. Draws on recently conducted philosophical experimentation related to intuition and development of the intuition of agent-causal accounts of free will in children. Argues that regardless of the intuition held, the manner in which people arise to these intuitions shows that the working definition of free will is different than people posit. Lays groundwork for why the working definition of free will is compatible with causal determinism.

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University (Division of Society, Culture, Media & Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy), 2006. / Bibliography: p. 218-228. / Free will and nature -- Metaphysical free will -- Incompatibilism -- Causal closure of the physical domain -- Free will and physics -- Free will within nature. / There is more than one problem of free will. Many philosophers approach the free will question seeking a foundation for systems of ethics or a justification for societal practices of praise and blame. ... Rather, I address the metaphysical question of how to accommodate free will within the natural world. I conclude that the natural world is not identical with the physical world and that it must contain entities or influences that are not physical in any current sense of that word. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / x, 228 p

Thesis (M. Div.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-51).