Forskning visar på att adaptiv musik har positiva effekter på spelupplevelsen och att det föredras över linjär musik. Denna studie undersöker därför de dynamiska aspekterna som skiljer adaptiv från linjär musik genom att explorativt undersöka hur spelare beskriver skillnader i spelupplevelse i ett FPS-spel som baseras på adaptiv musik i jämförelse med dynamisk musik vars musikaliska förändringar sker baserat på slump. Fyra respondenter fick spela ett FPS-spel med två musikscenarion som följdes av en semistrukturerad intervju om deras upplevelser. Resultatet visar att respondenter upplever skillnader mellan ett adaptivt musikscenario och ett slumbaserat men att upplevelserna tenderar att variera mellan individer. Två respondenter upplevde att musiken var starkare i det adaptiva scenariot vilket var den enda upplevda skillnaden i musiken samt endast en respondent uttryckte skillnad i musiken innan de tillfrågats om det. Intresse inom framtida forskning finns i att undersöka vid vilken dynamisk bredd spelare märker av skillnader i musiken.

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Children’s interests are often used as a rationale in child-centered approaches to build emergent curriculum that is tailored to young children’s motivations for learning. Against a neoliberal backdrop of standardized learning objectives, emergent curriculum appeals to children’s interests to foster children’s agency through building curriculum alongside teachers. However, research on children’s interests calls for further development of theory regarding children’s interests as the concept may be conceptualized narrowly in research and practice. This study explored the concept of children’s interests within a child-centered preschool classroom at a private university-based school that implements emergent curriculum. I used critical childhoods studies and Actor Network Theory as analytic and theoretical frames for conceptualizing children’s interests as socially and materially constructed among networks of both human and nonhuman actors. The findings are presented as a case study of a Store project that was developed based on children’s interests in money, stores, and ice cream. Fieldnotes and memos from participant observation, artifacts, and teacher documentation were used to map actor networks acting upon one another in the development of the Store project. Through the tracing of the material and semiotic transformations of money, stores, and ice cream, I argue that children exhibited agency through expressions of resistance that were made viable in network with material and other nonhuman actors. Children sought free interests that circulated outside the frames of the Store project’s currency by networking with red shoes, emptied bookshelves, and lollipops. Even as teachers supported and sustained the interest-based Store project toward real learning goals through eliciting children’s feedback and sense of duty, children offered silence as well as critique of the shopkeeper/customer dichotomy as resistance. As such, I propose that children exhibit agency through resistance in the process of redefining their interests within the contexts of their particular childhoods. Implications of the findings explore ways that children’s interests are situated within and propulsive toward particular childhoods and markets of labor futures. Though non-publicly funded child-centered settings that adopt emergent curriculum are partially sheltered from neoliberal demands on proffering real learning outcomes, they are networked within a neoliberal context through their positions within markets of schooling.

Arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility sometimes make use of various transfer of non-responsibility principles. These principles purport to specify conditions in which lack of moral responsibility is transmitted to the consequences of things for which people are not morally responsible. In this paper, after developing what I take to be the most serious objections to extant principles of this sort, I identify and defend a new transfer of non-responsibility principle that is immune to these and other objections. This new principle says, roughly, that if you are not morally responsible for any of the circumstances that led to a particular outcome, and if you are not morally responsible for those circumstances leading to that outcome, then you are not morally responsible for the outcome either. After defending this principle against a number of objections, I use it to argue for the conclusion that no one is even partly morally responsible for anything, if determinism is true.

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The purpose of this paper is to investigate if semi-compatibilism can neutralize the skeptical arguments from hard determinism and prove that justified moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. I aim to prove that this cannot be done without an account of free will. I argue that hard determinism and its skeptical arguments pose a relevant and significant threat to semi-compatibilism by highlighting and defending the justice aspect of Galen Strawson's and Bruce Waller's skeptical arguments. Through a skeptical justice argument, I argue that a key element of semi-compatibilism generates unjust systems of moral responsibility. This is put to the test by carefully examining the semi-compatibilist theories of Harry Frankfurt and John Martin Fischer and analyzing how their theories holp up to the justice argument. The result indicates that their theories of moral responsibility result in seriously unfair judgements, showing that their accounts of moral responsibility cannot be justified, due to unfairness. I argue that the unfairness of semi-compatibilism is a result of the semi-compatibilist need to remain coherent with determinism.

The idea that free will may be an illusion has been a source of great concern. It has led to suggestions that it may be wise to avoid public discussion of this topic lest it lead to a general moral decay. This concern has seemingly been supported by research demonstrating that individuals, when primed with the notion they lack free will, tend to cheat more and prefer less retributive punishment. The current research suggests that these effects can be moderated by the introduction of a second prime. In experiment one, participants believed they were being tested on note-taking and the subsequent recall of the content of two articles when, in fact, the dependent measure was actually the degree to which, after being primed with the articles, they cheated on a math task. It was hypothesized that the cheating effect noted in prior research would be moderated by the introduction of a second prime – one that extends the concept of self beyond our dualistic intuitions. In a second experiment, it was hypothesized that this prime would also moderate the reported reduction of preference toward retributivist punishment. In each experiment, the results trended in the direction hypothesized but in neither case were they statistically significant. The difficulties surrounding methodology and reproducibility in this type of research is discussed and suggestions for improvements in experiment design are offered.

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