Nearly every decision must be made with a degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome. Decision making based on modeling and simulation predictions needs to incorporate and aggregate uncertain evidence. To validate multiscale simulation models, it may be necessary to consider evidence collected at a length scale that is different from the one at which a model predicts. In addition, traditional methods of uncertainty analysis do not distinguish between two types of uncertainty: uncertainty due to inherently random inputs, and uncertainty due to lack of information about the inputs. This thesis examines and applies a Bayesian approach for model parameter validation that uses generalized interval probability to separate these two types of uncertainty. A generalized interval Bayes’ rule (GIBR) is used to combine the evidence and update belief in the validity of parameters. The sensitivity of completeness and soundness for interval range estimation in GIBR is investigated. Several approaches to represent complete ignorance of probabilities’ values are tested. The result from the GIBR method is verified using Monte Carlo simulations. The method is first applied to validate the parameter set for a molecular dynamics simulation of defect formation due to radiation. Evidence is supplied by the comparison with physical experiments. Because the simulation includes variables whose effects are not directly observable, an expanded form of GIBR is implemented to incorporate the uncertainty associated with measurement in belief update. In a second example, the proposed method is applied to combining the evidence from two models of crystal plasticity at different length scales.

This thesis examines the effects of linguistic input on the development of children’s epistemic concepts. It draws upon two fundamental questions in the field of cognitive development: (a) whether distinctions between automatic and controlled forms of cognitive processing are indicative of underlying conceptual differences, and (b) whether language is critical to the process of concept development. To establish the background of the current research, a summary of how these theoretical questions have been addressed in other fields of cognitive psychology is first provided (Chapter 1). These questions are then re- examined within the specific domain of epistemic concept development (Chapter 2). Changes in false-belief processing that occur between infancy and the early preschool years are discussed in relation to two competing theories of false-belief development. A framework to explain how language promotes children’s transition between automatic and controlled forms of processing is then provided. It is suggested that language facilitates change by both reducing the cognitive demands associated with controlled response tasks as well as assisting with the formation of robust epistemic representations. An empirical study that was designed to examine the effects of epistemic language (i.e., verbs and syntax) on children’s automatic and controlled processing of belief is then described (Chapters 3 to 5). Eighty-four children (Mage = 3;5 years), who initially failed elicited measures of false-belief, were trained with visual contexts of true- and false-belief. The critical manipulation across three conditions was the linguistic input presented in conjunction with these contexts. Children heard narrations that contained either (a) the description of an agent’s actions without an epistemic verb, (b) a familiar epistemic verb (thinks) across both contexts, or (c) the familiar epistemic verb in contexts of true-belief and a novel epistemic verb (gorps) in contexts of false-belief. Results demonstrated a significant advantage for children who were trained with epistemic verbs on spontaneous measures of false-belief (i.e., anticipatory gaze). Significant effects of epistemic verb exposure were also demonstrated in novel contexts of belief induction. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to theories that make distinct predictions about the role of language in epistemic concept development (Chapter 6).

In learning language, children have to acquire not only words and constructions, but also the ability to make inferences about a speaker’s intended meaning. For instance, if in answer to the question, ‘what did you put in the bag?’, the speaker says, ‘I put in a book’, then the hearer infers that the speaker put in only a book, by assuming that the speaker is informative. On a Gricean approach to pragmatics, this implicated meaning – a quantity implicature – involves reasoning about the speaker’s epistemic state. This thesis examines children’s development of implicature understanding. It seeks to address the question of what the relationship is in development between quantity, relevance and manner implicatures; whether word learning by exclusion is a pragmatic forerunner to implicature, or based on a lexical heuristic; and whether reasoning about the speaker’s epistemic state is part of children’s pragmatic competence. This thesis contributes to research in experimental and developmental pragmatics by broadening the focus of investigation to include different types of implicatures, the relationship between them, and the contribution of other aspects of children’s development, including structural language knowledge. It makes the novel comparison of word learning by exclusion with a clearly pragmatic skill – implicatures – and opens an investigation of manner implicatures in development. It also presents new findings suggesting that children’s early competence with quantity implicatures in simple communicative situations belies their ongoing development in more complex ones, particularly where the speaker’s epistemic state is at stake. I present a series of experiments based on a sentence-to-picture-matching task, with children aged 3 to 7 years. In the first study, I identify a developmental trajectory whereby word learning by exclusion inferences emerge first, followed by ad hoc quantity and relevance, and finally scalar quantity inferences, which reflects their increasing complexity in a Gricean model. Then, I explore cognitive and environmental factors that might be associated with children’s pragmatic skills, and show that structural language knowledge – and, associated with it, socioeconomic status – is a main predictor of their implicature understanding. In the second study, I lay out some predictions for the development of manner implicatures, find similar patterns of understanding in children and adults, and highlight the particular challenges of studying manner implicatures experimentally. Finally, I focus on children’s ability to take into account the speaker’s epistemic state in pragmatic inferencing. While adults do not derive a quantity implicature appropriately when the speaker is ignorant, children tend to persist in deriving implicatures regardless of speaker ignorance, suggesting a continuing challenge of integrating contextual with linguistic information in utterance interpretation.

This thesis is about the relationship between a belief being justified and it being true. It defends a version of the view that the fundamental point of having a justified belief is to have a true one. The particular version of that view it defends is the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm – i.e. a norm or standard that says that one should believe something if and only if it’s true. It claims that belief being subject to such a truth norm can explain which beliefs count as justified and which do not. After introducing the idea of a truth norm (Ch. 1), the argument of my thesis involves two main stages. Part One of the thesis (Chs. 2-3) contains the first stage, in which I argue that my way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in epistemology, is much more likely to be successful than a more popular way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in the philosophy of mind. Part Two (Chs. 4-7) contains the second stage, in which I argue that the truth norm can indeed explain justification in the way I’ve outlined. I do this by answering four criticisms that have been made of the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm. These criticisms claim that a truth norm should be rejected because, in turn, a truth norm cannot guide belief formation (Ch. 4), because a truth norm prescribes believing all the truths (Ch. 5), because a truth norm never prescribes suspending judgement (Ch. 6), and because a truth norm in some cases prescribes making problematic trade-offs of having one false belief for the sake of having many true beliefs (Ch. 7). I argue that all of these criticisms fail. But it is through answering these criticisms that we can see the contours of a defensible explanation of justification in terms of the truth norm.

Feminist epistemologists have often argued that our relationships with structures of power shape the content, expression, and social force of what we know. While feminist standpoint theorists have often maintained that experiences on the margins of social power can lead to better understandings of the roles of systems of oppression in society, more recent writings on epistemologies of ignorance examine the reverse, how experiences from positions of social power limit our understandings. In this project, I draw on the concept of epistemic privilege as it has been formulated by feminist standpoint theorists, criticisms of objectivity and fixed, transcendent truths, and analyses of the relationships between structures of power and concepts of knowing. By considering the works of Sandra Harding, Lorraine Code, and Patricia Hill Collins, among others, I argue that knowledge is situational and contingent and that some individuals possess privileged understandings due to their positions on the margins of power structures. However, I also argue that, in order for feminist epistemology to utilize the concept of epistemic privilege successfully, it must incorporate a concept of error into its considerations of constructions of knowledge. Thus, throughout this dissertation, I examine how a concept of error could bolster efforts to subvert the dominant approaches to knowledge that have upheld male privilege and undermine the patriarchal power structures that rely on them. I propose a form of feminist inquiry that incorporates a method of error sensitivity, which will enable inquirers to recognize when institutions of power, individual limitations, and cultural myths are restricting knowing subjects' perspectives and leading them to commit errors. This concept of error, and the related approach to error-sensitive inquiry, relies upon a commitment to continuous and ever-expanding inquiry by a community, rather than an isolated individual. Thus, I derive much of my conceptual framework from the work of Josiah Royce and his concepts of the Beloved Community, loyalty to loyalty, and communities of interpretation.

Esta pesquisa se baseia em dados obtidos a partir do registro das interações comunicativas entre monitor e alunos, dos ensinos fundamental e médio, envolvidos em atividades realizadas em duas saídas de campo, uma para Cananeia-SP e outra para Paraty-RJ. Entre as várias atividades realizadas, investigamos aquelas mais similares às aulas formais na escola, que compreendem os momentos em que os monitores interagem com os alunos para desenvolver determinados conteúdos, nesse caso, conteúdos relacionados ao ambiente visitado. Esses momentos são denominados de aula de campo. Nosso objetivo foi analisar e caracterizar as diferentes formas em que o conteúdo científico foi trabalhado pelos monitores em trechos de três aulas de campo, considerando os enunciados produzidos (operações epistêmicas) e os objetos introduzidos no discurso. Para isso, investigamos aulas de dois monitores diferentes. Para a análise, foram utilizados três conjuntos de categorias que compreendem a dimensão epistêmica de um sistema analítico proposto por Mortimer, Massicame, Tiberghien e Buty, e adaptado por Silva, sendo feitas algumas alterações para este trabalho. A formulação das categorias foi baseada em concepções como Gênero do Discurso e Linguagem Social de Bakhtin, sendo considerado também o conceito de Práticas Epistêmicas proposto por Kelly. Essas categorias epistêmicas caracterizam alguns aspectos do discurso e da linguagem empregados durante o desenvolvimento do conteúdo; o conjunto operações epistêmicas diz respeito aos enunciados produzidos, designa ações como descrever, generalizar e exemplificar. O conjunto modelagem indica se o discurso está tratando de um objeto ou evento capaz de ser reconhecido no meio material, ou se faz uso de elementos criados por meio do discurso científico. E o nível de referencialidade caracteriza o uso de um referencial específico ou uma classe de referentes. Os dados foram coletados por meio de gravadores de áudio, sendo transcritos para a análise e codificação das categorias. As análises foram organizadas em Mapas de Categorias Epistêmicas e em Mapas de Percentuais de Tempo, por episódio. Os resultados obtidos mostraram que, independentemente do conteúdo trabalhado e da operação epistêmica empregada, o mundo dos objetos e eventos predominou em praticamente todo o tempo de discurso; assim, mesmo conteúdos como a adaptação dos organismos foram trabalhados quase que exclusivamente a partir de objetos e eventos, que podem ser, de alguma forma, observados, percebidos ou mensurados. Na maior parte do tempo, o discurso também permaneceu fazendo referência a sistemas específicos, principalmente aos sistemas visitados, mesmo quando os monitores fizeram uso de generalizações conhecidas para descrever elementos daqueles sistemas. De todos os episódios analisados, apenas um teve o objetivo de alcançar uma generalização sobre um evento, e outro tratou de dois eventos a partir de situações hipotéticas que poderiam ser consideradas para qualquer ecossistema similar ao visitado. No entanto, mesmo nessas duas situações, a caracterização geral do ecossistema ou do fenômeno específico foi necessária para o desenvolvimento do conteúdo. A descrição foi a operação epistêmica mais empregada, formando a base da caracterização dos ambientes visitados. / This research is based on data obtained from the recording of communicative interactions between field trip educators and middle to high school students involved in activities on two field trips, one in Cananeia- SP and another in Paraty- RJ. Among the various field trip activities, we investigated those most resembling formal lessons at school, which are the moments in which the educators interact with students in developing a given subject, in this case, related to the visited environment. These moments are called field classes. Our aim was to analyze and characterize the different ways in which the scientific content was developed in three field classes, considering the utterances produced (epistemic operations) and the objects introduced in the discourse. To do this, we investigated classes from two different educators. For the analysis, three sets of categories were used, comprising the epistemic dimension of an analytical system proposed by Mortimer, Massicame, Tiberghien and Buty, and adapted by Silva, with some changes having been made for this work. The formulation of the categories was based on concepts such as Gender Discourse and Social Language, proposed by Bakhtin. We also considered Kelly\'s concept of Epistemic Practices. These \"epistemic categories\" characterize some aspects of the discourse and language employed during the development of content; epistemic operations refer to the enunciations produced, designating actions such as to describe, to generalize and to exemplify. Modeling indicates whether the discourse deals with an object or event that can be recognized in the material medium or uses elements created by the scientific discourse. The level of referentiality pertains to the use of a specific reference or a class of references. Data were collected by means of audio-recordings, which were transcribed for analysis and the coding of categories. Analyses were organized into Maps of Epistemic Categories and Maps of Percentage of Time, per episode. The results showed that regardless of the content and epistemic operation employed, the world of objects and events was prevalent in almost all discourse time, even content such as the adaptation of organisms were dealt with almost exclusively based on objects and events, that could be, somehow, observed, perceived or measured in the material world. Most of the time, the discourse also kept to specific systems, especially the visited ones, even when the educators used known generalizations to describe elements of those systems. From all the analyzed episodes, only one had the goal of achieving a generalization about an event, and another addressed two events from hypothetical situations that could be considered similar to that of any ecosystem. However, even in these two situations, the general characterization of the ecosystem or the specific phenomenon was necessary for the development of content. Description was the predominant epistemic operation, forming the basis of the characterization of the visited environments.

The concept of autonomy underlies many other issues in moral and political philosophy. This dissertation states that contemporary debates within Shi’i thought view autonomy as individualistic, and that this individualism brings it into conflict with tradition. It then argues that autonomy is not equivalent to individualism, and argues for an understanding of autonomy that is socially and historically embed- ded and discursive. This makes it possible to rethink the relationship between autonomy and tradition. This rethinking is done through a method of reflective equilibrium, where various ideas from various fields are brought into a coherent whole. There are two phases to this rethinking. The first is in clarifying the concept of autonomy and the second is bringing this concept of autonomy and Shi’i tradition into equilibrium. The dissertation begins by stating that Shi’i thought has already made room for autonomy, but that the concept of autonomy that is dominant is individualistic. An understanding of autonomy as socially and historically embedded is defended. The second phase is to reconcile this embedded notion of autonomy with Shi’i tradition. It is argued that autonomy is important for both the internalisation of tradition and the formation of tradition. Empirical evidence is provided through positive psychology that shows that the most effective means of internalising a belief is through contexts that support autonomy. This understanding of internal- isation is brought into equilibrium with the Shi’i concept of forbidding wrong. It is argued that one of the conditions of forbidding wrong is the condition of efficacy. Approaches to forbidding wrong that support autonomy meet this condition, while those that deny autonomy generally do not. Finally, it is argued that autonomy should be considered within the process of ijtihād because it has an epistemic gain. Autonomous individuals gain a certain level of expertise through their life experiences that are necessary to be incorporated in the ijtiḥād.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric undermines Latinx parents' epistemic legitimacy as producers of valued parental knowledge, irrespective of immigrant status. Little is known about the epistemic harm to Latina mothers who must negotiate their maternal scripts against the backdrop of a parenting discourse steeped in deficit thinking. This study used testimonio to explore the experiences of Latina mothers of young children living in the borderlands of South Texas via a Chicana/Latina feminist epistemological framework that conceptualizes the self as multiplicitous and responsive to the straddling of multiple cultures, nationalities, races, languages, and physical borders. The research questions guiding the study included: (1) How do Latina borderland mothers experience epistemic harm in the context of mothering knowledge? and (2) What strategies do borderland mothers employ to nurture strength and counter epistemic harm? Two theoretical constructs emerged from data analyses. First, the borderland was a site of recurring credibility battles as well as a site of "in-the-flesh" encounters that deepened human connection. Supporting themes included "Brown-on-Brown conflict vs. like-me counters" and "situating injustice vs. denying injustice." The second theoretical construct asserted that borderland mothers' ways of knowing are polyvocal and reflect a Brown body ethic of care. Its two supporting themes included "co-family as sources of epistemic strength vs. credibility denying authorities" and "powerless childhoods vs. what the Brown body knows."

Maria Lucia Miotto Master Thesis Abstract in English Although more and more works are showing convergence between the many documents regarding the ethics of artificial intelligence, none of them has tried to explain the reasons for this convergence. The thesis here proposed is that the diffusion of these principles is due to the underlying action of an epistemic community that has promoted the spread and the adoption of these values. Then, through network analysis, this thesis describes the AI ethics epistemic community and its methods of value diffusion, testing for the most effective. Then, to test the first result, two case studies, representative of political opposites, the United States and the People Republic of China have been analysed to see which method of diffusion has worked the most. What seems evident is that scientific conferences remain a primary factor in the transmission of knowledge. However, particular attention must also be given to the role played by universities and research labs (also those of big tech-companies) because they have revealed to be great aggregators for the epistemic community and are increasing their centrality in the network.

No description available.