abstract: Why and when do political actors use violence? This project answers these questions by exploring the dynamics of the interactions between state authorities and political dissidents. Both the state and the dissidents face the dilemma of using violence to achieve their political goals. While structural factors influence state violence and dissident violence, I contend that we need to examine how the dynamics of the state-dissident interactions shape these actors’ political behavior. This project first asks if nonviolent methods of resistance are effective--and perhaps even more successful than violent methods--why do opposition movements ever resort to violence? I argue that the efficacy of nonviolent resistance changes over time. When the likelihood of demobilization increases, dissident movements doubt the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance and weigh violence as an alternative tactic. The first chapter of this dissertation shows that the failure in expanding the size of a movement over several periods provides increases the risk of demobilization, and so dissident violence. I also argue while the expansion of the movement decreases the risk of dissident violence, a sudden and large expansion in the size of the movement overburdens its monitoring and sanctioning capacities, which raises the risk of dissident violence. These arguments are supported empirically using two different datasets. In the second theoretical part of this project, I examine the effects of foreign interventions on the dynamics of state repression and dissident violence. I find that the diplomatic statements and efforts such as disapproving state behavior, asking for political reform, and threatening to impose economic sanctions and to deploy military forces either did not have a significant effect, or increased state repression and decreased state concession during the Arab Spring. Finally, the last part of this project contributes to the literature on the formal modeling of dissent-repression by developing a recursive model of political violence dynamics. In addition to addressing several drawbacks in the literature, this model endogenizes the mobilization and demobilization of the movement and explains how these changes affect dissident violence. Due to the complexity of the developed mathematical model, I use a computational model to find the optimal outcomes. This computational model also can be used for simulating the state’s and the dissidents’ behavior under different scenarios. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Political Science 2018

This study aims to shed light on the gendered dynamics of nonviolent resistance and democratisation. Illuminating the role that women can play in the democratisation processes can help underline the importance of women's empowerment.  Therefore, this study aims to answer the research question How can female participation in nonviolent resistance movements lead to a higher likelihood of successful democratisation? I theorise that nonviolent resistance movements enable 1) the elevation of pro-democratic female leaders, and 2) the development of political skills and networks of female participants and women’s organisations. These two factors allow women and women’s groups to continue mobilisation and fight for the institutionalisation of egalitarian democratic norms, which influences democratisation. Using the methods of structured, focused comparison and process tracing, the hypotheses were tested on Brazil’s 1984 Diretas Já Movement and the Philippines' 1986 People Power Revolution. This study found no support for the elevated leader argument, but some support for the development of political skills and networks influencing democratic outcomes. Extra research is warranted to confirm this correlation.

This thesis examines how patriarchal dystopian societies attempt to control their citizenry through the homogenization of discourse and the employment of Foucauldian panopticons. In the context of these power structures, I argue that nonviolent storytelling and restorative memory are more effective in resisting oppression than violent, openly subversive forms of rebellion. In my discussion of The Handmaid’s Tale, I examine how Gilead’s manipulation of public discourse through religious hegemony and restrictions on literacy suppresses the efficacy of individually heroic acts by characters such as Ofglen and Moira. I assert that Offred’s playful deconstruction of language, defiant remembering of her past experiences, and insistence on bearing witness to Gilead’s atrocities without the promise of a listener allows her to successfully resist power and maintain a distinct self. In the analysis of Salt Fish Girl that follows, I study how the Big Six employ a series of cooperative hegemonies to promote neoliberal policies, dehumanize Othered bodies, and rob people in diaspora of cultural memory. Though protagonist Miranda fails in a conventional sense, I conclude that she succeeds due to her remixing of Western texts, hybridization of histories and values, and role in birthing a new, more hopeful future. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Previous research has found that nonviolent campaigns are conducive for democratization, but variation in democratic outcomes still remains a puzzle. I address this research gap by analyzing whether democracy assistance that promotes political participation, civic political culture, and enabling environment for civil society before and during nonviolent campaigns can help explain why some countries democratize after regime changes initiated by nonviolent campaigns while other countries do not. I argue that sustained democracy assistance help maintain mass mobilization and build democratic institutions after the old regime has been removed. By using the method of structured focused comparison, I investigate based on data from USAID and OECD what kind of democracy assistance Tunisia and Egypt received before and during their nonviolent campaigns. I find that neither Tunisia nor Egypt to any great extent received the kind of sustained democracy assistance I hypothesized could impact democratization. I therefore conclude that it seems unlikely that democracy assistance had the kind of significant impact that could explain the different outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt. Lastly, I discuss how research on nonviolent campaigns could inform policymaking and contribute to designing more strategic democracy assistance in the future.

In this study I explore how security sector reform affects the likelihood of democratization after a nonviolent resistance campaign in order to better understand the role of core security services during regime changes and the mechanisms of SSR. By using literature on nonviolence resistance, security sector reform, and by borrowing the concept ofspoilersfrom policy and peace-making literature, I hypothesise that SSR will likely increase the ability of core security actors to manage security problems in the transition after a nonviolent resistance campaign, as well as reduce spoiler capabilities among core security actors, thereby increasing the probability of democratization.I used the method of structured, focused comparison on the regime changes in Tunisia 2011-2014 and Egypt 2011-2013, and found some evidence contrary to the first, while limited support for the second.

This paper investigates the decline in success of nonviolent conflicts. While nonviolent conflicts are known to have higher efficacy compared to violent conflicts, this disparity has decreased since the 1990s. Previous scholars have divided the causes behind the success of nonviolent conflict into three categories: (1) mobilization; (2) resilience; and (3) leverage. The hypothesis is that one or more of these factors have changed and is the cause behind the decline. The research uses a largeN quantitative method, comparing the two time periods of 1945 – 1999 with 2000 – 2013. The resulting descriptive statistics, regression analysis, and likelihood ratio tests show that mobilization has decreased alongside a decrease in how successfully nonviolent campaigns utilize leverage over their opponents. These findings invite further investigation into why this decrease has occurred.

Nonviolent campaigns often extend beyond national boundaries, attracting the attention and involvement of international actors. However, our understanding of the effects of external support on the outcomes of nonviolent protests remains limited. Existing research mainly focuses on internal factors of success or concentrates on one or few cases. This paper aims to provide a generalizable theory of the effects of Black Knights – foreign powers supporting an incumbent government against opposition at home – on movement success. Through a large- N, quantitative analysis based on cross-sectional time-series data from 1980 to 2013, I find support for the hypothesis that foreign sponsorship negatively impacts the prospects of nonviolent victory. Additionally, this paper tests the mechanisms theorized against the case of the Belarusian uprising of 2020-2021. By formulating an extensive theory of the effects of Black Knights and adding depth to the measurement of external assistance by taking into account different types of support, my research expands the current knowledge base on the impacts of support to regimes.

The study investigates the relationship between state repression and mass mobilization in resilient autocratic regimes. Using qualitative methods, I examine the question: How can state repression lead to mass participation of society in the nonviolent resistance movement? Developing Brian Martin’s (2012) theory, I hypothesize that framing of state repression by the regime and the opposition influence public perception and, in turn, participation levels. Four contemporary cases are analyzed: The Belarus Election Fraud Resistance 2020-2021, the Belarus Antiwar Resistance 2022, the Russia Navalny Resistance 2021, and the Russia Antiwar Resistance 2022. The findings acquired through the Structured Focused Comparison generally support the theory, demonstrating that well-organized and present opposition can effectively counter state strategies and encourage people with divided and negative perceptions of repression to take risks and join the nonviolent movement. Yet, the negative perception of repression alone is not enough to mobilize the masses in the face of high levels of repression. The magnitude of repression might affect people's motivations to join the nonviolent movement. The study emphasizes the importance of supporting opposition figures and organizations in repressive regimes to strengthen their capacity to mobilize the masses and suggests further research on the deterrent effect of repression.

Corporations in the resource extraction industry are frequently criticized and their operations opposed by local communities demanding more benefits, compensation for negative consecuences or oppose resource extraction altogether. Research has focused extensively on nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns that target state and quasi-state actors attempting regime change or self-determination. However, campaigns targeting corporations have received little attention so far. This thesis addresses this gap. I argue that nonviolent campaigns have a strategic advantage over violent campaigns in building leverage and forcing corporations to fulfill their demands because they are able to mobilize more numerous and diverse support and have a higher tactical diversity. I test the hypothesis that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed in achieving their objectives and the expected causal mechanism in a qualitative comparative case study using the structured focused comparison method and aspects of process tracing. Applying a most- similar case selection, I select nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns targeting (multinational) corporations in Nigeria and Colombia. I find partial support for the hypothesis. However, limited data availability does not allow for a conclusive evaluation of the theorized causal mechanism. Findings indicate the value of studying resistance campaigns targeting corporations. In particular, future research should use a more fine-grained analysis of causal mechanisms linking the type and outcome of campaigns in this context. Additionally, applying large-n research designs allowing for greater generalizability of findings would be a valuable contribution in the future.

Abstract: What explains the use of violence in extra-institutional political campaigns? Domestic groups challenge host states using both nonviolent and violent tactics. While Gandhi’s struggle for India’s independence is perhaps the most famous example of nonviolence, many of today’s bloody civil wars also started out as nonviolent movements. In a world eager to support the self-determination of marginalized groups, both nonviolent and violent groups receive support from foreign actors. Despite this, theories on the use of violence by these groups remain untested empirically.  This paper uses panel data to quantitatively investigate the proposition that external support of extra-institutional political movements causes an increase in the use of violence. A logistic regression model finds no statistically significant relationship between the provision of external support and an increased use of violence in primarily nonviolent campaigns. An additional test on a sample of violent non-state groups finds that battle-related deaths increased when external support was provided in the previous year, a result significant at 99% confidence.