This essay will examine how two Swedish newspapers from two different political wings reported the Troubles in Northern Ireland (1968-1998) in the early 1970’s. There was a very specific line of thought present in the general discourse about political violence in Sweden during the 1970’s. The study found that the two newspapers had different approaches to both this Swedish line of thought and the Troubles itself. The social democratic newspaper Arbetet had a rather emotional tone in their articles about the conflict.  In the moderate Borås Tidning the discourse was vastly different. The emotions present in Arbetet were missing and exchanged with an objective view of the conflict with a hardline neutrality embossing the articles. No sympathies for either side of the conflict was shown in any of the newspapers. Arbetet was however more passionate about the conflict while the interest for the conflict dwindled in Borås Tidning with smaller and smaller articles as a result.

Many post-conflict societies, even those which have been free from active conflict for decades, continue to be heavily divided along the same lines on which the conflict was once fought. While active conflict might be a distant memory, the legacy of conflict ensures the group identities which either caused or were borne out of the conflict remain strong. Achieving a situation where a society truly lets go of the anger and resentment that fuels its divisions has proven to be an allusive prospect, however, it’s a goal many post-conflict states continue to reach for. The effort a state uses to try to deconstruct these potentially harmful social identities and to deal with the conflict-related grievances which strengthen them can be loosely understood as post-transitional justice. Part of the reason why effective reconciliation has proven so difficult is that post-transitional justice typically requires societies to reopen old wounds and publicly address challenging memories. Thus, in the context of divided post-conflict societies, post-transitional justice, if not properly implemented, can itself be a divisive procedure and one that risks heightening tensions rather than reducing them. Despite this clear risk, little research has been conducted to understand what factors are likely to make the difficult process of introducing post-transitional justice more or less successful. This thesis addresses this research gap. It uses a social identity approach to examine how socio-political context influences group identification and inter-group behaviour in divided societies and how these behaviours subsequently impact how those groups perceive post-transitional justice mechanisms. This thesis draws on the timely case of Northern Ireland, which is in the process of introducing a wide-reaching post-transitional justice mechanism at a time when the socio-political context has been markedly challenged by Brexit and other socio-political events. Through a mixed methods approach which used both questionnaires and key informant interviews, this thesis demonstrates how the recent socio-political context in Northern Ireland has significantly heightened nationalist and unionist identification with their groups and has concurrently heightened tensions between the two groups. This thesis shows how this environment has subsequently made these groups less likely to accept the terms of the post-transitional justice mechanism, thus limiting its ability to reach its goal of creating an enabling environment for reconciliation, trust, and peacebuilding.

This thesis examines the British army and its legacy of counterinsurgency from the 20th century. It analyses the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency and the army’s ability to learn from previous counterinsurgency conflicts to create new doctrine from earlier examples that could have had lessons for the UK forces in southern Iraq. Doctrine (both official and unofficial) ranges from endorsed army field manuals to theory written by experts while on defence fellowships. The army’s ability to create new doctrine from previous campaigns lessons and how it is diffused across the armed forces is also assessed. The conflicts used as post-colonial counterinsurgencies scrutinise Oman and Northern Ireland. These two case studies provide mixed lessons, that should advance and expand British counterinsurgency theory and models. The previous historical occurrences of counterinsurgency have created a British approach which has established a four-pillar framework which encompasses minimum force, civil-military co-operation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility. This approach could identify lessons for a modern British army deployed to Iraq. If lessons and previous outcomes are analysed to create new doctrine, strategy and tactics that encompass the four pillars framework, what went wrong in southern Iraq? Could lessons from earlier campaigns have assisted British efforts?

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The Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985 represented a watershed in Anglo-Irish relations. Its specific aim has been the removal of the unionist veto which has frustrated attempts to settle the Irish Question since the partition of Northern Ireland from the rest of the island in 1921. Heralded initially by many as the "solution" to the "troubles", the Agreement had much to live up to. To an extent initial accolades were functions of wishful thinking and condemnation that of knee-jerk reaction based upon instinctive fear. One can only hope that a path to resolution had been created despite such misgivings and high expectations. One thing has been evident, there has been a general confusion among nationalists and unionists as to what the Agreement allows for. This paper attempts to analyze where the Anglo-Irish Agreement fits into the scheme of things in the political context of Northern Ireland. In the third year since its passing there seems to be little external sign of resolution to the conflict, certainly nothing that might justify the grand expectations of those who would have seen it realize the ultimate withdrawal of Britain from Ireland. The Agreement remains as contentious now after three years as it was in the days after its passing. This raises the necessity of a re-appraisal of the situation and forces the question, can there ever be a peaceful solution if there continues to be such a fundamental disagreement as to what is at stake? One of the few certainties about Northern Ireland is that if the parties involved continue to approach the problem from opposite and intransigent perspectives, no agreement reached between Britain and Ireland on the future of Northern Ireland which "threatens" to succeed will be allowed to do so peacefully. / Master of Arts

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Zooplankton assemblages were examined from waters off the west coast of Scotland encompassing the Firths of Lorn and Clyde, the North Channel, and the Malin Shelf. Size fractionated samples (coarse, >1000μm; medium, 1000μm-330μm; fine, 330μm-180μm) were collected with a submersible pump from 10m and 30m depth in March (1987) and May (1986) providing a composite picture of the fauna in early and late spring conditions, respectively. The feasibility of using image analysis as a method for processing zooplankton samples was examined. Although a programme was successfully operated to obtain individual measurement data, much work is still required before a fully automated programme for routine use by planktologists is available. Total zooplankton numbers and biomass, and species distributions and relative abundances were examined. Species assemblages were identified using multivariate analyses. Biomass and abundance spectra by size were examined for the major station groupings. In general, meroplankton dominated the fauna in the Firth of Lorn while large numbers of Calanus spp. occurred in the Firth of Clyde. Small copepods such as Oithona spp. were characteristic of the assemblage on the Malin Shelf. Salinity, followed by temperature, showed the strongest association with the observed station clusters. Chlorophyll a and depth did not generally appear to influence station groupings. The potential for the mixing and exchange of zooplankton between the regions of the study area was evaluated. The results suggest that zooplankton may be entrained from the Firth of Clyde by the Scottish Coastal Current during the spring period. The Malin Shelf may also be an important source of zooplankton for the Firth of Lorn during winter months when an onshore flow of Atlantic water occurs.

Anglo-Free State relations between the wars still awaits a comprehensive study ... This is in par a reflection of the larger failure of British historians to work on Anglo-Irish history '" the Right has been ill at ease dealing with Britan's greatest failure, whilst the Left has found tropical climes more suited for the cultivation of its moral superiority. When R.F.Holland made this apposite comment, just over a decade ago, he may have been adding to the very problems he identified. Writing within the context of the 'Commonweath Alliance', he was joining a distinguished list of British and Irish historians who have sought to fiter inter-war Anglo-Free State relations through the mesh of Empire-Commonweath development. Beginning with A. Berredale Keith in the 1920s, this usage continued in either direct or indirect form (by way of particular institutions of Commonweath) from the 1930s to the 1970s through the works of W.K. Hancock, Nicholas Mansergh and D.W. Harkness, and was still finding favour with Brendan Sexton's study of the Irish Governor-Generalship system in the late 1980s.2 But herein a contradiction has developed: cumulative study of the unnatural origins and performance of the Free State as a Dominion has moved beyond questions of function to ask whether the Free State was in fact ever a Dominion at alL. 3 As such, there seems ever more need to step back from inter-Commonwealth study and refocus on the precise nature of the Free State's central relationship with Britan in this period. It is of course acknowledged that outwith the established zones of internal Irish and Empire-Imperial study there is no home or forum for one of the most enduring quandares of modern Europea history. Even if it is accepted that 'pure' Anglo-Irish history did not end in 1922, the weight of research based on the ten yeas prior, as against the ten yeas subsequent, suggests an easy acceptance, on both sides of the Irish Sea, and Atlantic, of the absolute value changes in that relationship. Studies covering the transition to independence, such as those of Joseph M. CUITan and Sheila Lawlot, have taen only tentative steps beyond 1922, and may indeed have epitomised an approach that subsequent Irish studies have done little to dispel; in the 1980s, major overviews by RF. Foster and J.J. Le have been notably reluctant to evaluate the quality of that new found freedom with continuing reference to Ireland's giant neighbour. Though Foster, and others, have noted that the main aim of the Free State in the 1920s was 'self-definition against Britan', the point is the extent to which Britan was wiling to allow the same. There has then been little impetus for direct Anglo-Free State inter-war study, and although the tide has begun to turn since the mid-1980's, notably through the achievements of Paul Canning, Deidre McMahon and, shortly before his death, Nicholas Mansergh6, it is probable that we are stil a long way short of being able to produce a comprehensive and coherent review of the period. Apar from the crucial Anglo/Irish-Anglo/Commonwealth dichotomy,there remains the political chasm dividing the Cosgrave years of the 1920s from those of de Valera's 1930s; indeed the overwhelming preoccupation with post-1931 confrontations has often, as in the case of McMahon's fine study, taen as its contrasting staing point the supposedly compliant 'pro-Treaty' years of 1922-31. It is hard to bridge this gulf when the little direct work on these earlier years, mostly concentrating on the two fundamenta issues of Boundar and financial settlement, has tended not to question this divide. Although Irish historians have turned an increasingly sympathetic eye on the internal politics and problems of these early yeas, the apathetic external image, in contrast to the later period, has been persistent. Nowhere has this negativity been more apparent than on the, also vita, topic of defence relations. For a subject that has been given more than adequate attention in terms of the 1921 Treaty negotiations and the Treaty Ports issue of the 1930s, the period in between has had little intensive coverage. In this regard the negative response of W.K.Hancock in 1937, stating that Cosgrave did not bother to question British defence imperatives, was stil being held some fifty yeas later by Paul Canning.7 Thus an enduring and importt image has emerged of defence relations re-enforcing the above divide, an image that has had to stand for the lack of new reseach. This does not mea that the image is necessarly an entirely false one, but it does mean that many of the supposed novelties of the de Valera yeas have been built on largely unknown foundations. The Treaty Ports issue is also vita to this thesis, but then so are other defence related matters which had an impact specific to the 1920s. In other words, the human and political context of how both countries, but the Irish government in paricular, coped with the immediate legacy of centuries of armed occupation, with the recent 1916-21 conflct, and with the smaller scale continuity of British occupation, was bound to cast old shadows over a new relationship. But how big were these shadows? It was on the basis of placing some detaled flesh on the skeleton of known (and unknown) policies and events that this thesis took shape. Frustrations and resentments could tae necessarily quieter forms than those which characterised the 1930s, and in the end be no less significant. If the first objective is then to make solid the continuity of defence affairs, it is appropriate to begin with a brief evaluation of the Treaty defence negotiations before tang a close look at British operations in the South in 1922 - the year when a reluctant Cosgrave was to inherit a situation where British forces were close to the development of civil war. Despite our growing knowledge of Britan's part in the progress of that war, there is stil a general perception that its forces became peripheral to events after the Truce of July 1921, and that its Army was, and had been, the only British Service involved in the struggle against armed republicanism.This is simply not the case, and it is to be wondered whether the proper absorption of Irish historians with the internal dynamics of the period, together with the authoritative quality of Charles Townshend's history of the 1919-21 British campaign, have not produced inhibitions to wider inquiry. 8 In any event, as the Admiralty was to play a central par in later defence relations it seems right to introduce, for the first time, the Royal Navy's importt role in the events of 1922. The point here is to establish that the actions and perceptions of both Services were to have repercussions for later attitudes. After these chapters, the following two aim to look at the cumulative legacy of British involvement and how both countries adjusted to the many unresolved questions thrown up by the Treaty and the unplanned contingencies of 1922. Retaining the theme that neither country could escape the past, nor trust to the future, chapter six returns to the physical and political impact made by the continuing presence of British forces in and around the three Treaty Ports, and along and across the Border. The final two chapters explore how all these factors helped determine the conditions for, and consequences of, one of the most damaging episodes of the later 1920s - the complete failure of the joint coasta defence review scheduled for December 1926.In all, the cumulative emphasis on the politics of defence may ilustrate what it was to be a small aspiring country that had little choice but to accept Britan's version of what was an inevitably close relationship, and to endure what Britan claimed as the benign strategic necessity of continued occupation.