In 1936 the founders of PAX aimed at 'resistance to modern warfare on grounds of traditional morality'. Believing that 'just war' criteria could no longer be met, they called themselves pacifists. Although most members were Roman Catholic Pax did not claim to be a 'Catholic society' because the RC Church at that time took an opposing view, particularly of conscientious objection. Church authorities attempted to censor Pax literature and instructed clergy to resign from the society. Pax supported conscientious objectors during the Second World War. When membership declined afterwards it continued to publish the Pax Bulletin and to provide a forum where Catholics could debate theological and practical questions of war and peace. By the 1960s Pax had gained some distinguished sponsors and a branch in the United States - support which enabled it to influence debate at the Second Vatican Council in 1965. The Council endorsed the right to conscientious objection. In 1971 Pax merged with Pax Christi, the international Catholic peace organisation which began in France in 1944/45. This is the first detailed historical study of the Roman Catholic element in the British peace movement. The story of Pax demonstrates the part that even a small pressure group can play in changing public opinion through patient work. Eventually, despite apathy and opposition, Pax helped bring the RC Church to a recognition of the right to conscientious objection and played a crucial role in the development of a more widespread peace movement within the Church

Master thesis analyzes two NATO Member States, the Netherlands and Norway, and their approach to the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which was signed on 7 July 2017. Both countries decided not to support the TPNW by either voting against it or abstaining from the negotiations. Research aims to explain why some countries refuse to ban nuclear weapons and what factors influenced the positions of the States on the TPNW. For this purpose, a model-based approach with three models (security, domestic and norm model) developed by Scott Sagan is being applied in each case. These models reflect three international relations theories: neo-realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism. The security model takes into consideration the security environment that a state is in, whether regionally or globally. It considers security threats to be the fundamental cause of nuclear proliferation. The second model focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb, public society and domestic institutions. The last model examines the norms which prevail in the society and form state identity of the State. Based on these three different levels of analysis, the thesis explains what factors were critical in formulating the Dutch and Norwegian positions on...

Nuclear weapons remains in the security discourse of the United States for over 70 years. The threat of nuclear weapons changed its content several times since then. Our study examines how the nuclear threat was socially constructed and how different actors securitized the threat and to which purpose. Our Diploma thesis uses methodological framework of discourse analysis. We examine the political and social nuclear discourse in the U.S. along two levels of analysis: governmental level and nuclear disarmament level. The diploma thesis researches multiple governmental and societal sources in order to determine how different types of nuclear threat emerged within the discourse.

The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa's decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

My doctoral project investigates the impact of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative on transatlantic relations during the period 1983-86. The dissertation focuses on the three main European powers, namely Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and examines their reaction to SDI both individually and comparatively. The study exploits SDI’s position at the intersection of nuclear strategy, political ideology, Cold War diplomacy, and industrial politics to offer a multifaceted, multi-national, and primary source-based analysis of US-European relations during the Reagan Presidency. The picture of the transatlantic relationship which emerges from the dissertation is a complex and nuanced one. On the one hand, the analysis argues that relations across the Atlantic during the Reagan era cannot be reduced to a scenario of accelerating ‘drift’ between the United States and Western Europe. Instead, on SDI as well as on other matters, moments of acute friction alternated with a constantly renewed search for dialogue, cooperation, and compromise on the part of the Europeans and also, if to a lesser degree, of the Americans. On the other hand, the ‘exceptionalist’ ideology and worldview underpinning SDI, the prevailing indifference in Washington to its implications for NATO, and most importantly the persistent anti-nuclear rhetoric and ambitions associated with the initiative revealed a distinct lack of sensitivity to European interest by the Reagan administration. As the dissertation shows, the anti-nuclear drive inherent in SDI, which both reflected and reinforced Reagan’s deep-seated interest in nuclear abolition, constituted the most disruptive aspect of the initiative from the viewpoint of European leaders. In these respects, the SDI controversy epitomises the unilateral tendencies and increasingly divergent priorities from those of the European allies which characterised much of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy – making the 1980s a decade of recurrent tensions in transatlantic relations.

Abstract not available

The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa's decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The United States of America (USA) has a new president in the White House - a president whose rhetoric appears to distance himself from the policies of the previous administration. This also appears to hold true for his approach with regard to nuclear nonproliferation. The overarching research aim of this study is to explore whether the Obama administration’s policy with regard to nuclear non-proliferation will differ significantly from that of the Bush administration. The broader subject of nuclear non-proliferation will be subdivided into three themes, namely: disarmament, proliferation by non-nuclear states and nuclear terrorism. In order to sketch the international context within which the USA’s policy must be viewed, an overview of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is provided. This will be followed by an exploration of disarmament, proliferation by nonnuclear states (with Iran and North Korea as case studies) and nuclear terrorism. In each case, a comparison between the Bush administration and the Obama administration’s policies will be done. Finally, an analysis will be done of the main similarities and differences between the two administrations’ approaches, with a focus on the use of hard, soft and smart power. The study concludes that the primary difference between the Bush and Obama administration’s approaches is that Bush pursued only one policy option (hard power) at a time, while Obama intends to use many different policy options (smart power) at the same time, with a focus on increasing the use of soft power. This sort of pragmatism may just be what the USA needs right now in order to address the problem of nuclear proliferation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Verenigte State van Amerika (VSA) het ‘n nuwe president in die Withuis – ‘n president wie se uitsprake hom van die beleide van die vorige administrasie blyk te distansieer. Dit wil ook voorkom asof dit van toepassing is op sy benadering tot kernwapen versperring. Die oorhoofse navorsingsdoelwit van hierdie studie is om te ondersoek of die Obama administrasie se beleid ten opsigte van kernwapen versperring aansienlik van die van die Bush administrasie gaan verskil. Die breër onderwerp van kernwapen versperring kan in drie temas opgedeel word, naamlik: ontwapening, proliferasie deur nie-kernwapenstate, en kernwapen terrorisme. Ten einde die internasionale konteks te skets waarin die VSA se beleid moet geskied, begin die studie met ‘n oorsig van die kernwapen versperring regime. Dit word gevolg deur ‘n ondersoek van onderskeidelik ontwapening, proliferasie deur nie-kernwapenstate (met Iran en Noord-Korea as gevallestudies) en kernwapen terrorisme. By elkeen van die drie temas word ‘n vergelyking tussen die Bush administrasie en die Obama adminstrasie se beleide getref. Laastens word ‘n analise van die hoof verskille en ooreenkomste tussen die twee administrasies se benaderings onderneem, met die klem op die gebruik van harde, sagte en slim mag. Die bevinding van die studie is dat die hoof verskille tussen die Bush en Obama administrasies se benaderings behels dat Bush slegs een beleidsopsie (harde mag) op ‘n slag nagevolg het, terwyl Obama beoog om terselfdertyd van verskillende beleidsopsies (slim mag) gebruik te maak, met veral ‘n fokus op ‘n toename in die gebruik van sagte mag. Die soort pragmatisme mag dalk net wees wat die VSA tans nodig het om die probleem van kernwapen proliferasie aan te spreek.