京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第18753号 / 経博第504号 / 新制||経||272(附属図書館) / 31704 / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 柴田 章久, 教授 佐々木 啓明, 教授 神事 直人 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

The objective of this thesis is to investigate and describe components of pricing system which influence the dynamic performance of a price leader manufacturing firm in an oligopoly capital intensive industry producing an identical intermediate product (s). The synthetic fibre industry is chosen as an illustrative case upon which the discussion is built. However, this work could generally be applied to a wide variety of organizations and situations. After discussing the suitability of system dynamics to the formulation of long-run pricing strategy, a model of the pricing system is constructed by using this technique. The behaviour of this system is examined in terms of feedback loops. That is to illustrate how the characteristics of these loops and the interaction among them affect the dynamic behaviour of the system, and how this behaviour can be improved via changing the components of these loops and/or their structures. The improved system is simulated under different external disturbances, certain parameter changes, and different pricing control policies. The simulation shows that the design of a set of robust pricing policies makes the system insensitive to external disturbance and error in parameters. It also shows that the ability of the firm to attain its growth and profitability objectives is affected by the chosen control pricing policies. Some potential applications of the model, particularly, as planning and training tools are highlighted. It is concluded that System Dynamics is an appropriate approach to the formulation of the long-run pricing strategies.

Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In the field of Economics, the term “competition” refers to the method involved in steering an increase in supply, which leads to a decrease in equilibrium price and an increase in equilibrium quantity. However, competition involves more than just an increase in supply. In any economy, competition can affect factors, such as innovation, efficiency and the accessibility to goods and services. In some cases, the effect might not be positive, if the goods and services only benefit certain parties involved, rather than the general population. Traditionally, there are four basic types of market structure, with each structure displaying unique market power characteristics, which are initiated by an organisation’s profit motives. All market structures, other than that of perfect competition, are forms of imperfect competition. One such imperfect market structure is oligopoly, which has certain unique characteristics (Doyle, 2005:198). In the private health care sector, cost increases can be related to the increased market concentration, due to the increase of market power by hospital groups. Therefore, the prevalence of competition in the private health care sector should be monitored. That health care functions in a dynamic environment has been historically proven and can also be seen in the latest trends. A bundle of factors, rather than a single factor, determines success. Any overview of the international health care industry should demonstrate the rapid development of the industry. The industry, compared with the relatively elementary and experimental health care system of a few decades ago, is currently super specialised. A shift has taken place in the market from the role of the industry as a government-funded health care provider to that of a private hospital provider. In South Africa, the complexity of the health care sector is made even more complex by the many role-players and the interaction between the different private and public health providers. The cost of access to hospitals should be prioritised. Research shows that the private health care sector caters for the health needs of almost seven million people, who comprise only 15% of the total population. However, the sector has spent more money than the entire public sector, with the per capita expenditure exceeding that of the public sector eightfold. The increase in the cost of private hospitals in South Africa has been caused by changes in the market concentration. Such expenditure has given the private hospitals greater market power and has influenced their behaviour. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In ekonomie verwys die term “kompetisie” na die metode betrokke om ’n toename in aanbod te veroorsaak, wat weer ’n verlaging in die ewewigsprys en ’n verhoging in die ewewigshoeveelheid tot gevolg het. Kompetisie behels egter meer as net ’n verhoging in aanbod. In enige ekonomie kan kompetisie faktore soos innovasie, doeltreffendheid en toegang tot goedere en dienste beïnvloed. In sommige gevalle is die effek egter nie positief nie, soos wanneer goedere en dienste slegs sekere belanghebbendes bevoordeel in plaas van die algemene publiek. Daar is, tradisioneel gesproke, vier basiese markstrukture wat elkeen unieke markbeherende eienskappe toon wat deur die organisasie se winsmotiewe geïnisieer word. Alle markstrukture, behalwe volmaakte kompetisie, is vorms van onvolmaakte kompetisie. Een so ’n markstruktuur is oligopolie wat sekere unieke eienskappe toon. In die privaat–gesondheidsorgsektor, is kosteverhogings gekoppel aan verhoogde markkonsentrasie as gevolg van die toename in privaat hospitaalgroepe. Kompetisie in die privaat-gesondheidsorgsektor moet dus gemonitor word. Dat gesondheidsorg in ’n dinamiese omgewing funksioneer is reeds bewys en kan ook in die nuutste tendense gesien word. Dit is egter ‘n hele groep faktore, nie slegs een faktor nie, wat sukses waarborg. ’n Oorsig van die internasionale gesondheidsorgindustrie toon dat ontwikkelinge in die industrie baie vinnig vorder. Vandag is gesondheidsorg uiters gespesialiseerd in vergelyking met dekades terug, toe dit relatief elementêr en eksperimenteel was. Die rol van die industrie het verskuif van ’n staats-gesubsidieerde diens na waar dit vandag grootliks deur privaat instansies gelewer word. In Suid-Afrika word ’n reeds komplekse gesondheidsorgsektor meer gekompliseer deur die baie rolspelers in die sektor asook die interaksie tussen die verskillende privaat- en staatsgesondheidsorgvoorsieners. Die koste van toegang tot hospitale behoort ’n prioriteit te wees. Navorsing toon dat die die privaatgesondheidsorgsektor dienste aan sewe miljoen mense bied wat slegs 15% van die totale populasie is. Hierdie sektor spandeer egter baie meer as die met ’n per capita uitgawe byna agt keer meer as staatsgesondheidsorg. Die oorsaak van koste verhogings in privaatgesondheidsorg in Suid-Afrikaanse hospitale is veroorsaak deur veranderinge in die konsentrasie van die privaatgesondheidsorgsektor. Dit gee privaathospitale groter markmag en beïnvloed dus hul optrede.

We consider the problem of capacity expansion in telecommunication networks under uncertain economic conditions with various market structures. We assume that the demands for network capacity have constant price-elasticity, and demand functions are parameterized by an economic condition that is modeled by a discrete time Markov process. We apply dynamic programming to obtain a state-dependent capacity expansion strategy that maximizes expected total discounted cash flow. We incorporate partial reversibility of investment by differentiating the purchasing cost and the salvage value of the capacity. This partial reversibility makes the value function non-differentiable and divides the solution space into BUY, KEEP, and SELL regions. By identifying certain structural properties of the optimal solution, we perform sensitivity analyses on the optimal investment decisions with respect to market parameters. Under the condition that the level of cost depreciation is larger than that of the downside movement of the economic condition in each time period, we are able to obtain an analytical expression for the optimal capacity level and reduce the multi-period investment decision problem into a single-period myopic problem. As a result, optimal capacity increment depends only on the current economic condition. We study this problem under both monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures. In particular, we investigate investment decisions by two firms in a duopoly setting with Cournot competition. We prove the existence and the uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium strategies in the duopolistic capacity investment problem. In addition, we show how competition between firms affects total available capacity in the market, capacity price, consumer surplus, expected time to a certain level of price reduction, and expected time to the first investment. We perform an empirical analysis to test a theoretical prediction obtained from our model through linear regression utilizing historical market data. By examining several alternative indices as a proxy to the economic condition considered in our model, we show that the Civilian Employment is the best proxy to use in validating the linear relationship between telecommunications capacity expansion and the economic indicator.

Este trabalho procurou encontrar a hipótese correntemente veiculada de um modelo ou mesmo de políticas soltas keynesianas, durante as duas administrações presidenciais de Lula (2003-2010). O estudo observa que, embora adotando políticas sociais novas e includentes que podem conduzir a um Estado de Bem Estar Social, os governos de Lula utilizaram políticas keynesianas apenas de forma tática, para aliviar os defeitos do modelo neoliberal, no auge da crise (2008-2009). Os governos de Lula na visão desta pesquisa se caracterizaram por políticas de curto prazo imediatistas e conciliatórias, que ao contrário dos modelos keynesianos, não priorizaram o emprego e a elevação de renda dos trabalhadores. / This study sought to find a commonly circulated hypothesis of a model or even loose Keynesian policies during the two presidential administrations of Lula (2003-2010). The study notes that while adopting new and inclusive social policies that can lead to a state of Social Welfare, the governments of Lula used Keynesian policies only tactically, to alleviate the shortcomings of the neoliberal model, the height of the crisis (2008 - 2009). The governments of Lula - the vision of this research - were characterized by short-term policies immediacy and conciliatory, which unlike the Keynesian models, not prioritized employment and increased income workers.

Este trabalho procurou encontrar a hipótese correntemente veiculada de um modelo ou mesmo de políticas soltas keynesianas, durante as duas administrações presidenciais de Lula (2003-2010). O estudo observa que, embora adotando políticas sociais novas e includentes que podem conduzir a um Estado de Bem Estar Social, os governos de Lula utilizaram políticas keynesianas apenas de forma tática, para aliviar os defeitos do modelo neoliberal, no auge da crise (2008-2009). Os governos de Lula na visão desta pesquisa se caracterizaram por políticas de curto prazo imediatistas e conciliatórias, que ao contrário dos modelos keynesianos, não priorizaram o emprego e a elevação de renda dos trabalhadores. / This study sought to find a commonly circulated hypothesis of a model or even loose Keynesian policies during the two presidential administrations of Lula (2003-2010). The study notes that while adopting new and inclusive social policies that can lead to a state of Social Welfare, the governments of Lula used Keynesian policies only tactically, to alleviate the shortcomings of the neoliberal model, the height of the crisis (2008 - 2009). The governments of Lula - the vision of this research - were characterized by short-term policies immediacy and conciliatory, which unlike the Keynesian models, not prioritized employment and increased income workers.

In their famous paper on the "Big Push", Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show how the combination of increasing returns to scale at the firm level and pecuniary externalities can give rise to a poverty trap, thereby formalising an old idea due to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). We develop in this paper an oligopoly model of the Big Push that is very close in spirit to the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny (MSV) model, but in contrast to the MSV model it is easily extended to the case of an economy that is open to international trade. Having a workable open-economy framework allows us to address the question whether globalisation makes it easier or harder for a country to escape from a poverty trap. Our model gives a definite answer to this question: Globalisation makes it harder to escape from a poverty trap since the adoption of the modern technology at the firm level is impeded by tougher competition in the open economy.

The aim of the diploma thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the concept of collective dominance, in particular with reference to the evaluation of its applicability and utility in practice. The first chapter deals with the main features of the oligopoly market and Czech and European legal provisions on the abuse of a dominant position and mergers within which it has evolved. On base of the analysis of Court of Justice and General Court judgements the second chapter explains the notion of the collective dominance and examines the obligatory conditions of the collective dominance, as well as the factors which influence these conditions. The third chapter concerns the concept of collective dominance with regard to competition law taxonomy. It compares not only the test of collective dominance applied pursuant to the article 102 TFEU with the test applied according to the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, but also the concept of collective dominance with the agreements pursuant to the article 101 TFEU. It also deals with abusive practices typical for oligopolies. Beside the explanation of the UK legislation the last two chapters illustrate decisions of competition authorities in the Czech Republic and in the United Kingdom and analyse and compare them. The diploma thesis is concluded by the analysis of main shortcomings of the concept of collective dominance and the evaluation of actual state of the examined topic with the aim to abstractly summarize knowledge gained through the thesis.

En économie, l'analyse de la concurrence entre les firmes est d'une importance capitale. Cette thèse examine les interactions stratégiques sur les marchés différenciés en équilibre général tout en proposant les politiques publiques à mettre en œuvre afin de réduire les distorsions dues aux comportements imparfaits des firmes. La thèse prend en compte la différenciation des produits afin d'aboutir à de nouvelles conclusions ou d'étendre celles existantes et mises en avant dans la littérature. Elle vise ainsi, principalement deux objectifs. En premier lieu, la construction d'un modèle de concurrence imparfaite sur les marchés différenciés et ceci dans un cadre d'analyse en équilibre général. En second lieu, l'évaluation des conséquences du modèle en termes de politiques économiques. Les travaux ont débuté par une revue de littérature où sont abordés successivement les mécanismes de prix dans les jeux stratégiques de marché, les concepts de différenciation des produits et les modèles de théorie des jeux traitant des interactions stratégiques en équilibre général afin de modéliser les comportements imparfaitement concurrentiels. Le chapitre 2 a ainsi conduit au concept d'équilibre Cournot-Walras symétrique sur les marchés différenciés. Pour prendre en compte la différenciation des produits, il est affecté à chaque agent économique un vecteur fini de coefficients de différenciation qui exprime la préférence de l'agent pour la diversité. A la suite du modèle de différenciation, le chapitre 3 propose des mécanismes de politiques fiscales afin de réguler les pertes dues aux comportements imparfaits des firmes. Des exemples illustrent que le modèle de différenciation admet un équilibre trivial qui est nice et les prix et les allocations de l'équilibre Cournot-Walras symétrique sur produit différencié, sous certaines conditions, convergent vers l'équilibre walrasien. / In economy, the competition analysis among firms have a significance importance because of the complexity of some elements. This thesis examines the strategic interactions on differentiated markets in general equilibrium while proposing the public policies to reduce the distortions due to the imperfect behaviors. This thesis takes into account the differentiation of products in order to obtain the new conclusions and/or to extend those existing. We thus pursues two objectives. Fisrt, the construction of a model of imperfect competition on differentiated markets in a general equilibrium framework. Second, the evaluation of the consequences of the model in terms of economic policies. At beginning, we use literature review to tackle successively price mechanisms in strategic market games, product differentiation concepts and game theory models dealing with strategic interactions in order to model imperfect behaviors. This led in chapter 2 to the symmetric Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept on differentiated markets where we assign to each economic agent a finite vector of differentiation coefficients which expresses the agent's love for diversity. Following the differentiation model, chapter 3 offers tax policy mechanisms to control losses due to perfect behavior of firms. From the analysis, it appears that some examples illustrate that the differentiation model admits a trivial equilibrium which is nice and the price and allocations of symmetrical Cournot-Walras equilibrium on differentiated product, under certain conditions, converge towards the Walrasian ones.

In their famous paper on the "Big Push", Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show how the combination of increasing returns to scale at the firm level and pecuniary externalities can give rise to a poverty trap, thereby formalising an old idea due to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). We develop in this paper an oligopoly model of the Big Push that is very close in spirit to the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny (MSV) model, but in contrast to the MSV model it is easily extended to the case of an economy that is open to international trade. Having a workable open-economy framework allows us to address the question whether globalisation makes it easier or harder for a country to escape from a poverty trap. Our model gives a definite answer to this question: Globalisation makes it harder to escape from a poverty trap since the adoption of the modern technology at the firm level is impeded by tougher competition in the open economy.