The branch Logistics is often given lower priority during field exercises when combat units are supposed to be trained. In wars, conflicts and operations do the interest increase remarkably of being delivered ammunition, fuel and food. Without logistical support it is hard to advance on the scene, but is it even so hard that the lack of logistics can generate the own culmination? The purpose with this Bachelor’s thesis is to show the logistics importance during the planning and transaction phases for an operation. On June 6 1944, the Allied forces invaded Normandy, in order to defeat Hitler’s imperium and reach the end of the Second World War. The operation was called Overlord, and was both in the number of men and combat power, as well as, in a logistical manner an enormous achievement. In consideration of answering the research questions, the author has by literature studies analyzed operation Overlord and its impact on the culmination of the Second World War. Research questions: How does logistics affect the culminating point in warfare? What logistical maneuvers during Operation Overlord can be referred to reasons for the Second World War’s culmination point? The results manifests how the logistical maneuvers, like Mulberry Harbour, Red ball Express and PLUTO, caused a possibility to advance through Normandy, France and thereafter against Germany. Although that, it is hard to automatically say that innovations like these are the absolute reason for the culminating point. By using the factors in Mårtensson’s model, that is increasing or decreasing the speed towards the culmination, the analysis shows that logistics has a huge impact on the outcome.

Strategic bombing was introduced as an idea in the early 20th century and became debated in its first use during the first world war. John Warden, a modern proponent for strategic bombing, puts forth the idea that the introduction of precision-guided-munitions allows for strategic bombing to be a viable and more importantly the optimal use for airpower in armed conflicts today. Warden markets his theory, the enemy as a system, as a method that allows airpower to be deployed and alone be able to achieve strategic effects and win wars. Skeptics to this idea argue that empirical evidence shows that modern strategic bombing does not produce strategic effects that wins wars therefor making it inferior to other methods of employing airpower. Because the debate is heavily focused on the strategic level, the lower levels becomes neglected. This essay will test Wardens theory on the operational level of war with the purpose to examine what effects, if not strategic, are generated at the operational level and how it affects an offensive and defensive actor of a war. The results will aim to answer whether John Wardens theory of strategic bombing generates effect and is a viable method for airpower for the operational level of warfare.