While there is an abundance of philosophical literature on justice, there is far less literature within political philosophy on the topic of injustice. I think one common assumption these approaches share is that injustice is simply the absence of justice; call this the absence thesis. This assumption becomes more peculiar juxtaposed to social and political struggle for justice, which quite commonly begins with cries of injustice. Injustice is an importantly distinct philosophical notion from justice – it can explain how justice fails to be realized in interesting and sophisticated ways, and, I argue, track our efforts to realize just social worlds, in ways that paradigmatically ideal and nonideal approaches to justice by themselves cannot. In this essay, I focus specifically on the question of how theories of justice can guide action in social worlds with systematic oppression. I ultimately argue that action-guiding theories of justice that evaluate worlds with systematic oppression must represent features of injustice. If a theory fails to represent features of injustice, it will fail to guide action in these worlds. That representation of such features is necessary gives us reason to think, in certain circumstances, that the absence thesis is false. / Master of Arts / While there is an abundance of philosophical literature on justice, there is far less literature within political philosophy on the topic of injustice. However, I think that injustice is an importantly distinct philosophical notion from justice – it can explain how justice fails to be realized in interesting and sophisticated ways, and, I argue, track our efforts to realize just social worlds. In this essay, I focus specifically on the question of how theories of justice can guide action in social worlds with systematic oppression. In answering this question, I argue that we must take knowledge about particular phenomenon of injustice and oppression seriously when thinking about how we can progress from nonideal worlds ripe with injustice – like our actual world – to more just worlds. I bring into conversation more traditional ideal theory in political philosophy with theory that focuses more on the nonideal – the actual conditions of injustice – especially the thought of W.E.B DuBois. When thinking about what makes our societies just, or thinking about what is important to know when we attempt to go from our own nonideal circumstances to create a more just world for ourselves, knowledge of justice or what an ideally just society will look like is not enough to guide us to those circumstances. Until we understand the circumstances of injustice, we will not know what ideals can guide us to more just circumstances.

Consider the following scenario: A mother chooses to marry off her 10 year-old daughter, not because she doesn’t know the harmful effects of child marriage, nor because she thinks that it is good that her daughter marries when she is 10 years old. Rather, she is unable to feed her daughter and realizes that her daughter’s survival depends upon her marrying a financially stable man. This is an apparent example of what human development practitioners and political philosophers call an adaptive preference (AP): a preference, formed under oppressive circumstances, that seems to perpetuate the agent’s own oppression. Prevailing opinion is that forced tradeoffs—especially following Serene Khader’s taxonomy—, like the case presented above, are a type of AP: one in which a person makes a decision because of a limited option set. In this paper I argue that no paradigm cases of forced tradeoffs should not be classified as APs. Instead, I offer a revised definition of adaptive preferences where I argue that adaptive preferences are psychological traits that cause the agent with adaptive preferences to make irrational or uninformed decisions that perpetuate their own oppression. I defend this new definition by exploring the implications of changing the definition. In particular, forced tradeoffs involve different kinds of interventions from other kinds of adaptive preferences and including forced tradeoffs risks committing testimonial injustice against those who have limited option sets. / Master of Arts / Abstract: Consider the following scenario: A mother chooses to marry off her 10 year-old daughter, not because she doesn’t know the harmful effects of child marriage, nor because she thinks that it is good that her daughter marries when she is 10 years old. Rather, she is unable to feed her daughter and realizes that her daughter’s survival depends upon her marrying a financially stable man. Most philosophers and workers in human development think of this as an example of an adaptive preference. An adaptive preference is a preference that a person has that is formed under oppressive circumstances that seems to perpetuate that person’s own oppression. In this paper I show that this is a form of a forced tradeoff adaptive preference: one in which a person makes a decision because they don’t have other options. I argue that forced tradeoffs should not be considered adaptive preferences. I then offer a revised definition of adaptive preferences where I argue that adaptive preferences are psychological traits that cause the agent with adaptive preferences to make irrational or uninformed decisions that perpetuate their own oppression.

No / This paper aims to open a debate about the impact of reflective practice questioning whether reflective frameworks and models argued to facilitate the education of highly skilled reflective practitioners can be oppressive rather than emancipatory in outcome. Contemporary education focuses on evidence based and effective practice with reflection at its core leading to empowerment and ultimately emancipation of the profession as independent and equal to medics and other health care professionals. Models and frameworks have therefore been developed to facilitate the education of highly skilled reflective practitioners; able to recognise the need to draw on evidence based practice in order to challenge out-dated methods and engage in new ways of working. This paper however questions the current focus on reflective practice suggesting that reflection in itself can be oppressive and support the commodification of nursing as a ‘workforce’, the profession at the beck and call of current governmental policy and control.

My aim in this dissertation is to analyze Black oppression and White domination. I attempt to show how social systems unjustly diminish Black Americans’ opportunities to form and pursue their conceptions of good lives and unjustly strengthen White Americans’ opportunities for the same. I believe that the accounts of Black oppression and White domination I offer are more adept at identifying the expansive and varied wrongs of Black oppression in America, analyzing the relationship between theorizing oppression and addressing oppression through social and political change in America, and demonstrating the ways that Whites benefit from and are incentivized to maintain oppressive systems in America, than the accounts put forward by other theorists. In Chapter 1, I begin by discussing why I frame my project in terms of oppressive “wrongs” rather than “harms”. I worry the term ‘harm’ may be taken to imply that one has experienced subjective suffering or a measurable loss, whereas I am concerned with instantiations of oppressive systems even when they don’t cause the person subject to the oppressive system to experience a measurable loss or subjective suffering. In an effort to describe how I identify wrongs, I then argue that in virtue of the deep importance of freely pursuing one’s chosen life plan, any barriers one faces in pursuing his or her life plan must be justifiable. Barriers one experiences in virtue of his or her race are typically not justifiable. On this basis, I argue for my principle of racial injustice, which states that individuals are prima facie wronged by socially constructed barriers to their abilities to form and seek their conception of a good life if those barriers exist in virtue of their race. The “prima facie” nature of the wrongness is significant, I argue, because correcting the injustices of Black oppression will require that Whites face some barriers to pursuing our life plans that we do not currently face; it is not the case, then, that every race-based barrier is truly wrongful. I then discuss my understanding of race, arguing that race’s mutability across contexts and how one’s race is intimately tied to systems of subordination and domination support my view that race is socially constructed. I end with a brief history of White domination and Black subordination in the U.S. In Chapter 2, I outline general experiences of racism as espoused by Black writers and the statistical data that support these accounts. I then take a deep look at mass incarceration, including a history of the system, its disproportional impact on Black Americans, and the many resulting injustices inflicted largely on incarcerated Black Americans, their families, and their communities. I specifically highlight the recognition-wrongs inflicted on Black Americans through mass incarceration, where recognition-wrongs are acts that function primarily as a mode of dehumanizing individuals. Recognition-wrongs include verbal degradation through things like slurs, but also epistemic injustices, a concept developed by Miranda Fricker and others to identify injustices that wrong individuals in virtue of their status as knowers and communicators of knowledge. I then discuss kinship-wrongs, a concept I develop to identify wrongs that impact people’s ability to form and maintain relationships. I highlight and conceptualize these wrongs in an attempt to draw attention to their significance in racial subordination. In Chapter 3, I develop an account of oppression that is particularly responsive to race-based wrongs. I begin by showing why the influential accounts authored by Iris Marion Young and Ann Cudd are unsatisfactory for capturing Black oppression. I attempt to develop an account that is sensitive to the experiences of subordination detailed by Black Americans, equipped to address the material harms of oppression, and also able to make sense of the recognition- and kinship-wrongs raised in Chapter 2. I ultimately determine that a member of a c-group is subject to an oppressive wrong when, in virtue of his or her or their membership in that c-group, he or she or they suffer wrongs that are systematically perpetrated through social, political, or legal norms, conventions, or practices. A c-group is any collection of persons who share (or would share in similar circumstances) some set of constraints, incentives, penalties, and the like. I end the chapter by carefully describing my commitments to each clause of the definition of oppression, beginning by analyzing c-groups, describing systematically perpetrated wrongs, explaining what it means to be wronged in virtue of one’s c-group membership, and showing that my account of oppression is sensitive to both material and recognition-wrongs. In Chapter 4, I argue that we ought to understand oppression in the framework of a capabilities approach. I begin by explaining the concept of capabilities, which are real opportunities to function in particular ways. I then argue that securing capabilities is a better aim for justice than ensuring that people function in certain valuable ways because a focus on capabilities protects people’s opportunities to pursue the kinds of lives they want to live, respecting their interest in freely determining their life goals, while a focus on protecting valuable functionings inappropriately prescribes life goals to them. I show how capabilities can be utilized as part of a theory of justice, and argue that my utilization of capabilities, combined with the other moral commitments I defend throughout the dissertation, comprises a rectificatory theory of racial justice aimed at eliminating Black oppression (i.e. a theory that analyzes the current racial injustices of oppression and offers guidance on how we should approach redressing these injustices). I argue that through the framework of capabilities, I can analyze both the material and recognition-wrongs of oppression, avoid the kinds of bad idealizations that often skew our understanding of oppressive systems and their impact, and make judgments about modern day society without developing an account of perfect justice. I next show that to avoid inflicting further recognition-wrongs, it is essential that oppressed peoples are the primary arbiters of which capabilities and oppressive systems should be prioritized in policy and advocacy. I conclude Chapter 4 with a brief sketch of how we can turn the priorities of the oppressed into public policy, moving from the prioritization process, to policy development, to implementing policies, and finally to monitoring and revising them. My final chapter, Chapter 5, shows how my account can also be used to analyze the norms of White domination that coincide with Black oppression. I begin by discussing “correlative capabilities,” which are those capabilities that are strengthened for Whites in virtue of the fact that Whites are not subject to oppression as Black Americans are. My discussion of correlative capabilities maps closely onto the advantages typically described as White privilege. I then turn to more insidious advantages Whites gain from Black oppression. I argue that oppressive norms advantage Whites by creating a social structure that empowers us with the capabilities to dominate racial narratives and ignore our racialized identities. The capability to dominate racial narratives consists in Whites’ abilities to pontificate on racialized events without justification for our views and still have our perspectives treated as mainstream, worthy of debate, and often as nearly definitive. I demonstrate this capability in action by examining Colin Kaepernick’s protest in the NFL, the coverage it received, and his resulting treatment. I then discuss Whites’ capability to ignore our racialized identities, showing how we establish Whiteness as a central, unconditioned perspective. Whites see ourselves as “simply people,” while seeing non-Whites as raced. This leads to Whites promoting color-blind conceptions of justice, which move us farther from true justice by ignoring social norms’ impact on policy development and implementation. I then show how Whites may go one step further and argue that we are victimized by “reverse racism” when efforts are made to eliminate oppressive systems. Finally, I end Chapter 5 with a discussion of how Whites are also disadvantaged by Black oppression, particularly in our capabilities to perform our jobs well, live morally, and establish and maintain relationships. I then conclude the dissertation by discussing how we might teach race-sensitive virtues in an effort to change White-favorable social norms.

In scholarship discussing Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God, Janie’s self-realization is central to her identity, and many scholars view and discuss her as a cultural hero. But her success is conditional on circumstance rather than composition of character, a fact this essay explores through a careful comparison between Janie and Tweet, a character from Ellen Douglas’ Can’t Quit You, Baby; specifically, while Janie ultimately succeeds in her world—even while confronting gender oppression—she improbably avoids the additional, crippling subjugation of racial prejudice that Tweet endures. Through this and a discussion of definitions and Hurston’s work as a folklorist/writer, I attempt to show that Janie can be more effectively described as a folk hero, a title that: (1) accurately identifies her functions in her fictional society and in literary fiction and (2) satisfies Hurston’s goals in the novel while also accurately reflecting Janie’s journey to self fulfillment.

Thesis (M.S.W.)--Smith College School for Social Work, Northampton, Mass., 2007 / Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Social Work. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 55-57).

abstract: This paper is seeking to use exploratory factor analysis to construct a numeric representation of Hill Collin's matrix of domination. According to Hill Collins, the Current American matrix of domination, or the interlocking systems of oppression, includes race, gender, class, sexual orientation, religion, immigration status, disability, and age. The study uses exploratory factor analysis to construct a matrix of domination scale. The study launched an on-line survey (n=448) that was circulated through the social network Facebook to collect data. Factor analysis revealed that the constructed matrix of domination represents an accurate description of the current social hierarchy in the United States. Also, the constructed matrix of domination was an accurate predictor of the probability of experiencing domestic abuse according to the current available statistics. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Social Justice and Human Rights 2011

Cette thèse cherche à éclairer les représentations textuelles du « cauchemar », non pas considéré comme un mauvais rêve, mais comme un démon d'origine médiévale. Selon les sources, cet esprit envahit la nuit la chambre de ses victimes. Ensuite, il s'installe sur elles et oppresse leurs poitrines, en provoquant la paralysie, l'étouffement et même la mort des personnes endormies. Cet acte est un motif typique des traditions folkloriques européennes. Dans la tradition gréco-romaine, l' ephialtès et l' incubus semblent agir de la même manière. Notre étude se focalise sur les textes du Moyen Âge, où une abondance de textes divers (ecclésiastiques, littéraires et médicaux) témoigne d'une affinité entre les actions du cauchemar et celles d'un ensemble d'êtres fantastiques, comme les revenants, les elfes, les nains et les sorcières. A la lumière de ces premières constatations, cette étude examine les textes médiévaux en relation avec les traditions antiques, ainsi que les traditions qui apparaissent plus tardivement en Europe. La thèse contient trois parties: dans la première, elle met en évidence un démon -archétypique, qui révèle un substrat étymologique et descriptif commun dans les différents extraits étudiés. Sa relation avec le genius loci, dont le caractère est double, bienveillant et malveillant à la fois, a un intérêt particulier. Les sources dressent le portrait d'un cauchemar qui n'est pas seulement un être démoniaque. En effet, il s'agit également d'un être qui apporte des richesses dans la demeure et à ses habitants. Dans la deuxième partie, la relation du cauchemar avec certaines divinités nocturnes de nature dualiste est démontrée, ainsi que son lien avec les Douze Jours de Noël. Finalement, dans la troisième partie, la thèse étudie un lien général qui apparaît entre le cauchemar, la sorcellerie, le cheval, le carnaval et surtout le Double et les traditions extatiques - chamaniques européennes, afin de signaler en dernier lieu de quelle manière cette entité peut combiner des caractères multiples et différents. / The present Phd Thesis sets to shed light on the topic of the “nightmare”, considered not as a bad dream as it is commonly conceptualized, but instead as a demon of medieval origin. This spirit, said to intrude a room during the night hours, usually sits and exercises pressure on the chest of the alleged victim. This particular act, causing paralysis, drowning, and at times even death to the asleep, is a constant and common narrative motive in the folk stories of Europe. In the Greco-Roman tradition, the “ephialtes” and the “incubus” seem to function in a similar fashion. During the Middle Ages (the period which this study focuses on), an abundance of texts -ecclesiastical, literary, and even medical- suggests a close connection between the nightmare's actions and various super-natural beings, such as revenants, fairies, witches, elves, and dwarves. Drawing from this evidence, this study seeks to examine these texts' relation to the traditions of antiquity, along with the relevant traditions arising later across Europe. The Phd thesis is divided into three main sub-sections: the first part focuses on the relation between different variations of the appearance of an archetypal demon, as revealed by common etymological origins and similar actions. Furthermore, descriptions of the nightmare as a genius loci of two-fold nature, both benevolent and malevolent, are explored. Along with its depiction as a demonic being, the nightmare, is frequently presented as an entity offering treasures to the household and its inhabitants. The second part brings to the forefront nightmare's relation to certain nocturnal deities of dual nature, as well as to the holy season of the Twelve Days of Christmas. During the third and last part of the thesis, I scrutinize the relationship between the nightmare and the horse, the carnival, the witchcraft, and particularly the doppelgänger and the ecstatic-shamanistic practices of Europe.

If we want to take the agency of the oppressed seriously, we need to think about their normative situation. We need to understand what oppression does to victims, and what victims ought to do as a result. The first half of my dissertation develops a new account of oppression, one that identifies cases not by the wrongs that oppressors embody but by the burdens that victims suffer. The second half questions what kinds of moral and political actors victims can and should be. According to the prevailing "group relationship" of model of oppression, the members of a social group are oppressed when they're subordinated, marginalized, constrained, or displaced in a way that benefits the members of a different social group. In place of this prevailing view, I propose a new, effects-centered model: a person is oppressed when their autonomy or their life prospects are systematically and wrongfully burdened. I then use this account to understand the moral and political agency of the oppressed. I argue that victims have a self-regarding moral obligation to resist their oppression, grounded in considerations of objective well-being. And I develop Aristotle's account of political virtue to apply across ideal and oppressive circumstances alike, adapting it as a defense of nonviolent civil disobedience. This dissertation is the beginning of a larger research project concerned with the nature of victimhood, how injustice affects agency, and how obligations can be grounded in the absence of just institutions.

Piñata: A Dark Comedy is a dark comedy written to explore what an audience is willing to laugh at and what remains when the laughter has finished. Set in a tavern, Piñata showcases the comedic on goings of a few young adults. Stephen enacts an extensive scheme to show Marcy that her boyfriend is no good for her. Stephen’s friend Wick attempts to cope with haunting trauma as his sister, Lily, does what she can to get Stephen’s attention. The characters navigate each others desires and needs through witty banter and outrageous stories. These comedic antics build in intensity until the play reaches a shocking climax. This moment thrusts the audience into a state of discomfort. The play is prefaced with a critical chapter that explores the way in which the play deals with its audience and how the play utilizes audience laughter. / February 2016