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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
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Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 61 to 65 of 65 (0.069 seconds)| 61 |
The crime threat analysis process, an assessmentKrause, André 30 November 2007 (has links)
The study investigated the application of the crime threat analysis process at station level within the Nelson Mandela Metro City area with the objective of determining inhibiting factors (constraints) and best practices.
Qualitative research methodology was applied and interviews were conducted with crime analysts and specialised investigators/intelligence analysts. The research design can be best described as descriptive and explorative in nature.
The crime threat analysis process embroils the application of various crime analysis techniques and the outcomes thereof intends to have a dual purpose of generating operational crime management information in assisting crime prevention initiatives and crime detection efforts, mainly focussing on the criminal activities of group offenders (organised crime related), repeat offenders and serial offenders.
During the study it became evident that crime analysts understand and thus apply the crime threat analysis process indifferently, which impeded on the relevancy and the utilisation thereof as an effective crime management tool. / Criminology / M.Tech. (Policing)
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Aspects of money laundering in South African lawVan Jaarsveld, Izelde Louise 04 1900 (has links)
Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired
through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money
laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the
benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of
schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the
premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the
benefits of their criminal activities.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s
anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties
on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of
crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates
civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the
idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards
recommendations aimed at improving its structure.
To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated.
The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen
consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud
or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example,
the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction
report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank
parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be
entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover
loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank.
Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South
Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned
and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time
contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.
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| 63 |
Marijuana Australiana: Cannabis use, popular culture and the Americanisation of drugs policy in Australia, 1938-1988Jiggens, John Lawrence January 2004 (has links)
The word 'marijuana' was introduced to Australia by the US Bureau of Narcotics via the Diggers newspaper, Smith's Weekly, in 1938. Marijuana was said to be 'a new drug that maddens victims' and it was sensationally described as an 'evil sex drug'. The resulting tabloid furore saw the plant cannabis sativa banned in Australia, even though cannabis had been a well-known and widely used drug in Australia for many decades. In 1964, a massive infestation of wild cannabis was found growing along a stretch of the Hunter River between Singleton and Maitland in New South Wales. The explosion in Australian marijuana use began there. It was fuelled after 1967 by US soldiers on rest and recreation leave from Vietnam. It was the Baby-Boomer young who were turning on. Pot smoking was overwhelmingly associated with the generation born in the decade after the Second World War. As the conflict over the Vietnam War raged in Australia, it provoked intense generational conflict between the Baby-Boomers and older generations. Just as in the US, pot was adopted by Australian Baby-Boomers as their symbol; and, as in the US, the attack on pot users served as code for an attack on the young, the Left, and the alternative. In 1976, the 'War on Drugs' began in earnest in Australia with paramilitary attacks on the hippie colonies at Cedar Bay in Queensland and Tuntable Falls in New South Wales. It was a time of increasing US style prohibition characterised by 'tough-on-drugs' right-wing rhetoric, police crackdowns, numerous murders, and a marijuana drought followed quickly by a heroin plague; in short by a massive worsening of 'the drug problem'. During this decade, organised crime moved into the pot scene and the price of pot skyrocketed, reaching $450 an ounce in 1988. Thanks to the Americanisation of drugs policy, the black market made 'a killing'. In Marijuana Australiana I argue that the 'War on Drugs' developed -- not for health reasons -- but for reasons of social control; as a domestic counter-revolution against the Whitlamite, Baby-Boomer generation by older Nixonite Drug War warriors like Queensland Premier, Bjelke-Petersen. It was a misuse of drugs policy which greatly worsened drug problems, bringing with it American-style organised crime. As the subtitle suggests, Marijuana Australiana relies significantly on 'alternative' sources, and I trawl the waters of popular culture, looking for songs, posters, comics and underground magazines to produce an 'underground' history of cannabis in Australia. This 'pop' approach is balanced with a hard-edged, quantitative analysis of the size of the marijuana market, the movement of price, and the seizure figures in the section called 'History By Numbers'. As Alfred McCoy notes, we need to understand drugs as commodities. It is only through a detailed understanding of the drug trade that the deeper secrets of this underground world can be revealed. In this section, I present an economic history of the cannabis market and formulate three laws of the market.
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| 64 |
The crime threat analysis process, an assessmentKrause, André 30 November 2007 (has links)
The study investigated the application of the crime threat analysis process at station level within the Nelson Mandela Metro City area with the objective of determining inhibiting factors (constraints) and best practices.
Qualitative research methodology was applied and interviews were conducted with crime analysts and specialised investigators/intelligence analysts. The research design can be best described as descriptive and explorative in nature.
The crime threat analysis process embroils the application of various crime analysis techniques and the outcomes thereof intends to have a dual purpose of generating operational crime management information in assisting crime prevention initiatives and crime detection efforts, mainly focussing on the criminal activities of group offenders (organised crime related), repeat offenders and serial offenders.
During the study it became evident that crime analysts understand and thus apply the crime threat analysis process indifferently, which impeded on the relevancy and the utilisation thereof as an effective crime management tool. / Criminology and Security Science / M.Tech. (Policing)
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| 65 |
Aspects of money laundering in South African lawVan Jaarsveld, Izelde Louise 04 1900 (has links)
Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired
through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money
laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the
benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of
schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the
premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the
benefits of their criminal activities.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s
anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties
on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of
crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates
civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the
idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards
recommendations aimed at improving its structure.
To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated.
The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen
consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud
or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example,
the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction
report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank
parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be
entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover
loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank.
Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South
Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned
and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time
contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.
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