As individuals or families hold a substantial share of a firm at the cost of less diversified portfolio, they specialize their portfolio and have better inside information. Does the market marker react to this fact and maintain higher level of asymmetric information cost for such family-controlled firms? We analyze the bid-ask spread and the probability of informed trading (PIN) of Canadian-based publicly traded firms cross-listed with NYSE/AMEX to test this notion. We find that although the market maker maintains higher average spread, he does not form higher PIN for family-controlled firms when the entire day is considered as an event period. <p>The assumption of constant arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders during the day in Easley et al (1996b) is rejected in the two periods per day analysis. In addition, the notion of information event occurrence prior to the day in Easley et al (1996b) is consistently rejected as higher (non-statistically) probability of information events is found in the afternoon (second session) in the two (three) periods per day analyses, respectively. Based on these findings, we have serious doubts about any existing findings (including ours) of PIN based on one period per day. As such, we consider the possibility of several periods per day.<p>Though it remains an empirical question to choose how many periods should be considered, we find our results using two and three periods per day to be very interesting. We consistently reject the hypothesis that the PIN is higher for family-controlled firms. Since the market maker does not need to maintain high spread for firms with very high number of uninformed traders and very low number of informed traders, we do not perceive our findings to be either surprising or contradictory to the present literature. By developing a different formulation of PIN, we also show that this is empirically less than that developed by Easley et al (1996b).

Community pharmacists are unique amongst professionals as they practice their profession in a commercial environment. This environment, where the dichotomy between the professional and business aspects of community pharmacy practice intersect, can place the professional objectives of pharmacy at odds with the business objectives. At the same time, ownership of community pharmacies is transitioning from pharmacist-owned and -operated establishments, to corporate-owned and -operated.<p>The objective of this study was to investigate whether ownership type influences the pharmacists, or in this case the pharmacy managers, organizational behaviour, role orientation and professional autonomy. Specifically, exploring whether ownership type (independent, franchise, corporate) impacts the professional, business and environmental (organizational) aspects of community pharmacy practice.<p>This study employed both quantitative and qualitative research methods. A cross-Canada, self-administered postal survey of community pharmacy managers was conducted in the spring of 2007. Contact information was obtained from individual provincial regulatory bodies across Canada and a stratified, random sample of community pharmacy managers was compiled. Items centred on professional and employer authority, manager autonomy, level of managerial control, orientation to professional and business aspects of practice and the manager role, affinity to professional and business characteristics of community pharmacy practice, and innovation. The survey was followed by semi-structured, in-depth telephone interviews with select self identified respondents from the survey portion of the study.<p>The random, stratified sample consisted of 2,000 community pharmacy managers. Of the 2,000 questionnaires mailed out, 39 were returned as undeliverable. A total of 646 responses were received, for a response rate of 32.9 percent (646/1,961); while the response rate may not be ideal, the sample size was purposely made larger to account for the possibility of a low response rate. Seven interviews were conducted following the survey.<p>Ontario, as the largest province, had the most responses with 289 (44.7%), and the majority of respondents were male (393, 60.8%). The greater part of respondents indicated their sole degree was their Bachelor of Pharmacy practice degree (499, 77.2%). A larger majority of respondents were either the pharmacy manager (398, 61.6%) or owner (215, 33.3%). Just under half of respondents practiced in independent pharmacies (44.6%), while 35.4 percent practiced in corporate pharmacies and 18.4 percent practiced in franchise pharmacies.<p>As a whole, respondents were more likely to have access to information required for making clinical rather than business decisions. One quarter (24.4%) of respondents were never or rarely willing to go against company policies to carry out their professional duties, while one third (33.4%) were often or always willing to do so. Less than one-fifth (17.4%) of respondents had to follow policies(professional and business) developed by non-professionals, while 42.6 percent had to follow policies only with regard to business practices. The majority (89.5%) agreed that it is possible to be both a good professional and a successful businessperson.<p>Fifteen distinct constructs emerged regarding (1) professional and (2) employer authority, (3) manager autonomy, (4) decision-making, (5) managerial control, (6) professional characteristics, orientation to (7) professional and (8) business aspects of the manager role, affinity to (9) professional and (10) business characteristics of community pharmacy practice, (11) connection to the employer,(12) role conflict, (13) innovation, (14) bureaucracy and (15) manager requests. The main independent variable was ownership structure: independent, franchise, or corporate. In analyzing the independent variable by the above constructs, significant differences (p < 0.05) arose for all constructs except for three related to the professional nature of practice: professional practice standards, professional orientation and professional affinity. <p>Independent and franchise respondents were more likely to agree that the employer should influence practice standards than corporate respondents (p < 0.001). When exploring the level of autonomy respondents had in their pharmacy, significant differences arose among all three respondent types (p < 0.001); respondents in independent pharmacies felt they had the highest level of autonomy followed by franchise respondents and then corporate respondents, with more than one standard deviation difference between independent and corporate respondents.<p>Significant differences also emerged among the three respondent types with regard to the amount of control the respondent had in their pharmacy (p < 0.001); independent respondents felt they had the most control followed by franchise respondents and then corporate respondents, with almost one standard deviation difference between independent and corporate respondents. With regard to business orientation and affinity to business related aspects of practice, independent and franchise respondents were significantly (p < 0.001) more likely to place higher importance on such activities than corporate respondents. Results of the interview portion of the study were used to bring a greater understanding to the survey portion of the research. <p>There were a total of seven interviews conducted, with each interview lasting between 30 and 90 minutes in length. A total of nine themes emerged from the interviews: (1) autonomy, (2) behaviour, (3) environment, (4) future, (5) human resources, (6) image, (7) incentives, (8) professional standards and (9) role as manager.<p>Finding of this study suggest that regardless of ownership structure, respondents emerge as professionally orientated and focused. Independent respondents appear to have more autonomy, control and decision-making capabilities than corporate respondents. Despite being professionally orientated and focused, corporate respondents appear cognizant of the restrictions placed on pharmacy practice in their pharmacy. On top of ownership structure, the dependent variables of age, gender, geographic region and years with employer appear to play a role in answers provided by community pharmacy managers.<p>As ownership of community pharmacy continues to transition from pharmacist controlled to corporate-owned, managers, owners and the profession must acknowledge the professional implications that may result. While this study adds to the community pharmacy practice literature, there is recognition that additional research is necessary pertaining to the dynamic nature and culture of community pharmacy practice.

Many previous studies suggest that agency costs and information asymmetry are signifi-cant factors that affect the relationship between the investment expenditures of firms and the availability of cash from internal operations. Some other studies show that dividing firms in terms of the degree of ownership concentration further explains the relationship. However, the findings of previous studies are not consistent suggesting that other firm characteristics may be affecting the results. We propose that additional attention to the nature of ownership control of firms may explain the inconsistency. In this study, we examine the investment behaviour of family-controlled firms, institu-tion-controlled firms and widely-held firms. We distinguish between these three kinds of firms as they represent different levels of market imperfection. Therefore, we expect diverse investment behaviours among the three groups. Compared with family-controlled and institution-controlled firms, widely held firms have dispersed ownership structures. The greatest weakness of a widely-held ownership structure is the lack of shareholder monitoring due to the unmatched benefit and cost of control for small shareholders. The existence of at least one large shareholder will reduce the agency costs and asymmetric information. On one hand, enhanced monitoring will decrease the waste of free cash flows by managers. On the other hand, large shareholders are willing to spend time and effort to collect more information on management performance or to estimate the firms investment projects and thus reduce the information asymmetry. Both family-controlled firms and institution-controlled firms have large shareholders. However, whether or not the shareholders are playing an active monitoring role is still an important issue. From the point of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, the family-controlled group is superior to the institution-controlled group as family-controlled firms generally assign influential positions to family members whose focus is in line with that of the family group. Even though a non family member may be appointed as the manager, the level of monitoring is significant given the high ownership concentration by the family. On the other hand, significant family ownership may lead to agency costs of its own. The main disadvantage of owner-managers is that they may lack the expertise to manage their firms although their position in the family may make it natural for them to be the manager. Another advantage of the family-controlled firm is that the family may divert company resources for its own benefit despite the presence of a manager who may or may not be a family member. Essentially, the family and the manager can all collude to spend on perks and personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, as we move from widely-held to institution-controlled the level of agency costs may decrease but as we move further into higher control, as may be suggested by family ownership, the level of agency costs may increase again. Although previous studies have noticed the influence of ownership structure, no analysis has been carried out to explore the investment behaviour of firms controlled by the three differ-ent kinds of shareholders. Our first motivation is to fill this gap. Splitting our sample into three representative groups enables us to study the financing constraints and investment behaviour of firms that are family-controlled, institution-controlled, and widely held. The focus of this study is on Canadian firms. The Canadian evidence is worth particular attention because the Canadian business environment is similar to the US business environment in terms of legal, regulatory, and market institutions but it is similar to European or Asian firms in terms of ownership structure. Therefore, a study of Canadian firms can provide a useful and rational assessment of the investment behaviour of firms that follow the ownership structures of Europe and Asia but operate in a business environment and institutional setting similar to those of the US. Further, a large number of Canadian firms have controlling shareholders and a large proportion, approximately 60%, of Canadian firms can be categorized as having concentrated ownership structure. Among the firms with concentrated ownership, over 1/3 of them can be dis-tinguished as family-controlled. This dataset provides an ideal setting to study the investment behaviours of firms according to the nature of their controllers. Our results illustrate that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is higher than the intensity of investments of concentrated ownership firms and that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is positively and significantly affected by the availability of funds from internal sources. In contrast, for concentrated ownership firms the intensity is positively and significantly affected by the availability of growth opportunities. These observations suggest that in comparison with the concentrated ownership firms, the widely-held firms face higher levels of financing constraints and exhibit less value maximizing behaviour. However, once we separate the family-controlled firms from the institution-controlled firms, we find that the investment expenditures of the family-controlled firms and the institution-controlled firms are not significantly different in terms of their dependence on internal cash flows or on the market-to-book ratios. We also find that widely-held firms tend to invest in projects that payoff quickly. This preference may be the result of these firms desires to ease their external funding constraints by generating funds internally.

This study examines the interactive effects of family and minority ownership on small business debt financing. On one hand, family involvement in ownership has an influence on small firms financial decision. On the other hand, racial disparities in small business ownership make these firms experience differently in credit markets. In the context of family and minority involvements, this study measures two dimensions of small business debt financing, one for its use, a financing issue directly related to the capital structure, and the other for its cost, an agency issue related to the firms ability to borrowing and repayment. By using the unique data from the 1993, 1998, and 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, our empirical results show significant evidence that family involvement has an impact on both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing in small businesses. That is, family ownership are negatively related to both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing, and when the firms are all non-visible minority owned, family firms have a lower level of debt and pay a lower interest rate than non-family firms. The results also show that the firm owners visible minority are positively related to the cost of debt financing, and when these firms are all family owned, visible minority owned firms pay a higher interest rate than non-visible minority owned firms. These results of our study also have important implications for both small business and family business research. For small business owners, it is important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of family as well as minority involvements to finance their businesses. And for policymakers and institutional lenders, understanding the family and minority effects also assists small businesses in obtaining debt financing.

There has been nothing written, as far as we researched, about the decision-making when a family manager decides upon the advice of an external consultant. With this research we tried to build an understanding on the topic with a special focus to the role of emotions in the process. Five family managers of five different family businesses in Sweden were interviewed. The interviews were semi-structured so that the factors that play a role in the decision-making could be explored. The factors that were identified were coded and afterwards further analyzed, together with the help of new gathered theory. In other words an abductive approach was used. We found that emotions in the decision-making mainly arise when the advice is given in the field of expertise of the family manager concerned. The emotions arise from a psychological ownership of the family manager over a pre- formed solution or approach to the issue the consultant is hired for. In order for the advice to be accepted, the advice has to be in the line of the preformed solution or approach. We believe these findings to be valuable to encourage more research on the topic, but also the findings can contribute to the everlasting field of research to find the optimal technique to consult to family businesses.

When managers face the choice of decision-making financing tool, how to assess the status of the selected company's corporate profit and shareholder equity of the financing tool for maximizing. This study focused on the Taiwan Listed electronic industry, ownership structure and the different financing tools on the issue of the impact of corporate performance The data are using Taiwan Stock Exchange Market Observation Station of the company's financial number, Taiwan Economic Journal database of financial information of listed companies and various listed electronics company Annual Reports. The use of statistical analysis methods, including: t test, one way analysis of variance, and correlation and regression analysis. The results as below: 1. Electronic industry financing tool for the proportion of ownership structure and financing impact; 2.Electronic industry financing tool have an impact on business performance; 3. Electronic industry financing ratio will be part of the performance indicators impact; 4. Electronic industry financing tool part of the index change over time; 5. Electronic industry and mostly the equity structure will change with time; 6. Electronic industry financing percentage change over time.

One of the goals for an enterprise is to increase the operation performance. However, there are several factors may affect the operation performance. According to the reviews, we found that many researches are discussing the impact of capital investment and ownership structure on the operation performance under different industries. Iron and steel are the mother of industry and also the essential raw materials for production. The development of Taiwan¡¦s iron and steel industry has expanded overseas to enhance the competitive ability and operation performance. Therefore, this research focus on Taiwan¡¦s iron and steel companies which are already listed in the stock exchange and over-the-counter markets and we use regression to analyze the relationship between capital investment, ownership structure and operation performance of those companies. The ownership structure plays a role of interference factor to test the relation between capital investment and operation performance. According to the result, we found that the relation between shares of directors and supervisors and operation performance is positive. Also the effect of the capital investment on operation performance is remarkable when take the ownership structure into consideration. This result not only shows the different between iron and steel industry and other industries but also gives practical suggestions for company managers and investors. Before investment, both enterprise and investors could estimate the operation performance of a company base on two factors, the capital investment and shares of directors and supervisors.

The technology is changing fast in current business environment, today¡¦s success maybe will be gone by tomorrow. Therefore, the organization needs to keep learning and innovating to survive. To become a willing sharing and creation organization, the firm needs to gather all the knowledge in department, group and each employee. The key success of knowledge sharning is the employee¡¦s willingness of sharning knowledge. The knowledge is created through people¡¦s interation and the knowledge sharing is built on people¡¦s relation. The purpose of this rearch is to explor the employee¡¦s knowledge sharing willingness through social network approach. In the other hand, the psychological ownership could bring positive work attitude. Therefore the moderating effect of psychological ownership to social network and knowledge sharing willingness will be discussed as well. The target groups of this study are production or technology related departments of high technology companies. The samples are engineers, deputy engineers and supervisors. The total valid samples are 7 companies, 13 departments and 159 employees. Research method includes social network analysis software Ucinet and Hierarchical Regression Analysis. The result shows psychological ownership could raise the engineers¡¦ knowledge sharing willingness and moderate the relationship between in-degree centrality of advice network and knowledge sharing willingness. The findings are as follows: 1. Network degree centrality of internal advice network does not affect knowledge sharing willingness. 2. Psychological ownership positively and significantly affected knowledge sharing willingness. 3. Psychological ownership as the moderator positively and significantly affected the network degree centrality of internal advice network and knowledge sharing willingness partially.

This dissertation consists of three essays in corporate governance. The first essay, titled ¡§Control or Invest: Complex Interests of Managerial Stockholdings¡¨ examines the structural relation between managerial ownership and firm performance. By using simultaneous equation models and considering the complex interests of management, our results show that complicated mutual effects exist between managerial ownership and firm performance. In diffused ownership structure (0-13%), better firm performance may induce management to hold more stockholding, indicating possible investment purpose that is not addressed in previous studies. Management with mid-range of stockholdings (13%-50%), have positive effect on firm performance but not vice versa, which agrees with the ¡§convergence-of-interest hypothesis¡¨. For highly concentrated ownership structure (>50%), negative mutual effect exists, which agrees with the ¡§entrenchment hypothesis¡¨, giving notice to protect minority shareholders. The second essay, titled ¡§The Discrepancy of R&D Expenditure, Ownership Structure and Performance between Electronic and Non-electronic Industries¡¨ addresses on the mutual effects among R&D expenditure, ownership structure and firm performance in electronic industry. The characteristics of high research expenditure, high performance, and stock-based compensation plan of electronic industry may exaggerate the mutual effects between these three factors than companies in non-electronic industry. The empirical evidence first shows that better firm performance will result in higher managerial equity in both electronic and non-electronic industries. Another finding is that electronic industry has higher and more stable research expenditure, no matter firm¡¦s performance; while non-electronic industry spends more in research only when the firm is doing well. The third essay, ¡§The Adjustment and Determination of Ownership Change¡¨, is used to examine the equilibrium hypothesis regarding managerial ownership variation. The equilibrium hypothesis assumes that managers will continuously re-optimize their ownership to maximize firm¡¦s value. In this essay, instead of studying the cross-sectional relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, we use a dynamic setting to examine how managers adjust their ownership over time and what factors will determine the within firm variation. It is shown that there is small within firm variation in managerial ownership with strong mean-reversion adjustment the entire sample. The results also show that firm characteristics like debt ratio, R&D expenditure and operating income do not relate significantly to within firm variation, but firm performance and institutional parameters like the reselection of board members, stock turnover and ownership level do. This thesis contributes to provide investment purpose as an alternative explanation for insiders¡¦ stockholding, in addition to the expropriation activities that is major concern in prior studies. The change analysis further provides more understanding of within firm variation vertically that is still vague in the literature (HHP, 1999). These new findings add knowledge to managerial ownership in emerging market like Taiwan. The managerial implication is that investors may not fully depend on manager¡¦s self-discipline to solve agency problem. Outside supervision, including independent board member and supervisor, institutional investors and corporate governance evaluation, could be emphasized to reinforce corporate governance.

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