This study examines the changes in the inside ownership structure of companies after undergoes initial public offering in Taiwan. After initial public offering, the company¡¦s shares are in public possession while inside shareholders only possess part of its shares. To maximize their own interests, inside shareholders¡¦ ownership policies may vary due to different factors. Literature review shows that after IPOs the inside shareholders¡¦ share tends to be dropping but previous research focuses mostly on the changes in operating performance and ownership structure after IPOs. DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) believe that the changes in inside ownership structure are due mainly to the trade-off between monitoring incentives and diversification. My study aims at companies which undergoes IPOs in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation or at GreTai Securities Market between Jan. 1st 1998 and Dec. 31st 2000. The article investigates how such factors as, corporate value, corporate risks, inside/outside shareholders¡¦ risk tolerance and the ownership structure of companies which undergoes IPOs, have effects on inside shareholders¡¦ share-holding adjustment speed, long-term share holding equivalence level as well as the long-term share holding differences between inside/outside stockholders and little investors. My findings substantiate my assumption that risk factors and monitoring incentives do have effects on the shareholders¡¦ ownership policies and that factors mentioned above do have different effects on the inside ownership structure of IPO companies. The more inside stockholders avert risks, the higher the share-holding adjustment speed becomes. In contrast, the more share inside shareholders possess during IPO, the lower the speed. Inside shareholders¡¦ optimal ownership policies are positively relevant to the corporate value and negatively relevant to corporate risks. They are also positively relevant to the risk aversion of investors. The degree of risk aversion on the part of both investors and inside shareholders also influences ownership structures of various shareholders.

In this study, we examine the impact of political factors in corporate governance on the performance of firm. The major difference between this study and other corporate governance studies is use of three stage least square method, which can estimate the cause and effect between endogenous variable. Our sample consists of 100 firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange. We find that the political directors harm the performance of firm.

Abstract Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation is a potent instrument through which people and investors can improve their understanding of organization substance and symbol. Good compensation package can not only improve the performance of worker but also lift employees¡¦ commitment to work. However, we are not so sure about the positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance because of the existing of ¡§agency theory¡¨. The degrees of alignment of interests with those of the agents in the firm who control the major decisions in the firm are also different. This gives rise to potential conflicts among the stakeholders, and these incentive conflicts have now come to know as ¡§agency (principal-agent) problem¡¨. Being desirous of the problem, this thesis reviews and integrates the literature on CEO compensation, focusing on both determinants and consequences of this complex, often controversial phenomenon. Thus, a model of the determinants of CEO compensation is presented and investigated. Based on a sample of 422 from Taiwan listed companies, I investigated the data both from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and the annual report of each listed company to combine in order to examine the compensation model. The definition of CEO in this thesis is one of the following three identities: chairmen of the board, general managers, and people who serve as both positions, that is, CEO duality. Hypotheses are tested and the study finds that CEO compensation has complex links to several factors: firm sizes, performance, stock return, and board stock ownership. The main factors for deciding CEO compensation are economic determinants and the only significant board control variable is board stock ownership. Contrary to some foreign literature, the index of duality is not significant at all since that people who serve as both chairmen and general manager obtain below average compensation level than others. In summary, the thesis provides the different results of a matrix of different identities and industries, and hopes to have some contribution to following research.

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Abstract Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, several researches for the East Asian have found that concentration of ownership higher than other areas and weak corporate governance have been important reasons of financing crisis. Therefore, the study adopts the method developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), which traces the chain of ownership to find who has the most voting rights, identifies their ultimate control patterns, finds the controlling shareholders of firm, and then calculates each ultimate owner¡¦s control rights and cash flow rights. We also try to find the relationship between those ways of controlling shareholders to the voting rights, cash flow rights, and the degree of control rights deviating from cash flow rights. In Addition, we regress to the Proxy Q on controlling shareholders¡¦ control rights deviating from cash flow rights, then examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders. This paper investigates whether the board construction on corporate governance mechanism effectively discharge its monitoring function and mitigate central agency problem. The research data are collected from the publications of those companies that stocks are openly traded on the Taiwan Stock Market between 2000 and 2003 April. There are 183 validated observations which are obtained. Empirical result suggests¡G 1. The high concentration of ownership is more common in Taiwan publicly listed companies and those firms are typically controlled by families. 2. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights because they through the use of pyramids, cross-holdings, paper company and participation in management. And the condition of family control company is the worst. 3. The more the controlling shareholders¡¦ cash flow rights, the better performance of the firm. 4. For Taiwan publicly listed companies, the corporate governance mechanism could not effectively discharge its monitoring function and mitigate central agency problem.

In Alternext, companies could choose two different kinds of IPO mechanisms; one is Public Offer, and the other is Private Placement. In fact, Private Placement in Alternext means 100% book-building. This article focused on what kind of companies would intend to choose Private Placement other than Public Offer, and compared their IPO discounts and market performance with companies using another mechanism. Companies with low profitability and no family holding would prefer to use Private Placement. However, companies with highly information asymmetry and profitability would also choose Private Placement. From the view of post-IPO liquidity, we infer that companies that choose Private Placement may be due to their preference for long-term investors. Referring to IPO indirect cost, we found that companies choosing Private Placement pay higher IPO discount cost. However, their post-IPO cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) are higher than companies using Public Offering.

In this article, I want to explain Michael Otsuka¡¦s idea of distributive justice, the latest theory of the left-libertarianism. Otsuka argued that self-ownership can be combined with a kind of egalitarian ownership principle and he critics that the conflict between self-ownership and equality is an illusion. I will examine Otsuka¡¦s theory about self-ownership, egalitarian proviso and the framework of political societies of voluntarism. And I will point out what is the wrong and right in his theory.

Financial statement quality can directly affect investor confidence. Corporate governance in well-functioning mechanisms can improve Financial statement quality. Recently, in order to enhance corporate governance performance, avoid financial fraud, and protect investors, the government constantly amend the related rules. Financial fraud is most through misstated financial reports, and even fraudulent misstatement may result from financial statement restatement. The purpose of the study is to examine whether ownership structure, board of director composition, and audit quality in corporate governance are associated with financial statement restatement. Empirical results show that in ownership structure the higher stock proportion of the institutional investors, the probability of financial statement restatement is higher. It is consistent with conflict of interest hypothesis. In audit quality, the enterprises have lower occurrence rates of financial statement restatement while they hire the big 4 accounting firms to audit their financial statements. Furthermore, when accounting firms provide non-audit services to their audit clients, the higher significance of non-audit fees, occurrence rates of financial statement restatement are higher.

<p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Denna magister uppsats undersöker huruvida ledarskap, ägarstruktur och kontroll påverkar svenska familjeföretags investerings prestation på marknaden. I undersökningen har 90 svenska företag analyserats inom en 15 års period (1990-2005).</p><p>Ledarskap har delats upp i tre olika strukturer, den första strukturen står för grundar ledarskap. Regressionsanalysen i denna uppsats visade att en grundare har en positiv påverkan på företagets investerings prestation då grundaren agerade som Verkställande Direktör (VD), Styrelseordförande (SO) eller båda. Detta kan förklaras utifrån teorier som gör tydligt att en grundare äger entreprenörskaps anda och utmärkande kunskaper inom området ifråga. Resultatet för den andra strukturen, ättlings ledarskap visade att då ättlingar till grunderaren verkade som antingen VD, SO eller båda i företaget förekom en negativ påverkan på företagets finansiella prestation. Detta kan förklaras utifrån teorier som menar att en ättling inte har samma kunskap eller ambitioner som grundaren till företaget. Ättlingar har oftast ärvt högre poster inom företagen på grund av sina familjerelationer till grundaren snarare än på grund av sina kunskaper inom området. Den tredje ledarskapsstrukturen är externa ledare. Externa ledare är antingen en VD, SO eller båda som har blivit inhyrda till företaget av ägarfamiljen. Regressionsanalysen visade ett insignifikant resultat.</p><p>När resultaten för ägarstruktur och andel röster av ägare analyserades i både företag med röstdifferensiering och utan röstdifferensiering visade det sig att när grundaren agerade som VD, SO eller båda i företag utan röstdifferensiering förekom ingen minoritets expropriation eller principal-agent konflikter inom företaget, vilket betyder att företagets finansiella prestation påverkades positivt. Liknande resultat hittades även för företag med röstdifferensiering som hade externa ledare i sin ledning.</p>

<p>I den här uppsatsen studeras skillnaderna i lönsamhet och sysselsättning under en treårspe-riod för 71 svenska företag som var mål för förvärv under perioden 1998-2001. Syftet är att undersöka om utlandsägda företag är bättre på att generera lönsamhet och sysselsättning än företag med inhemska ägare. Resultaten visar att det finns ett samband mellan nationalitet på uppköparen och lönsamhet. Utländskt ägande har ett positivt samband till lönsamhet i allmänhet och också till de högsta lönsamhetsökningarna i tidsperioden som studerats. Företag med inhemska ägare har ett positivt samband till minskad lönsamhet vilket betyder att företag med inhemska ägare har en högre tendens att generera en lägre lönsamhet under den tidsperiod som studerats. Inga statistiskt signifikanta resultat fanns för sambandet mellan nationalitet på uppköparen och skillnad i sysselsättning. Siffrorna visar dock på ett positivt samband mellan utländskt ägande och ökad sysselsättning. Tester gjordes också för att se om det finns något samband mellan nationalitet på uppköpare och den ekonomiska prestationen på målföretaget vid tiden för uppköpet. Resultaten visar att utländska uppköpare har en tendens att köpa målföretag som har en negativ lönsamhet medan inhemska uppköpare tenderar att köpa företag med en positiv lönsamhet.</p> / <p>This thesis studies the changes in profitability and employment during a three-year period for 71 Swedish firms that were targets of acquisitions in the years 1998-2001. The aim is to test whether foreign-owned firms are better in generating profitability and employment than domestically-owned firms. The results show that there is a relationship between the nationality of the acquirer and profitability. Foreign ownership has a positive relationship to profitability in general and also account for the highest profitability increases in the period studied. Domestically-owned firms have a positive relationship to decreased profitability which means that the domestically-owned firms have a greater tendency to generate lower profitability than foreign-owned firms in the period studied. No statistically significant results were attained when testing the relationship between nationality of acquirer and change in employment. Nevertheless the figures show a pattern of positive relationships between foreign ownership and increased employment. Tests were made to see if there is any relationship between nationality of acquirer and the economic performance of target firms at the time of acquisition. The results show that foreign acquirers tend to acquire targets with a negative profitability while domestic investors tend to acquire firms with a positive profitability.</p>