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During the year of 2007, the world has experienced historically high oil prices both in nominal and in real terms, which has reopened discussions about energy sustainability. We therefore found it interesting to research oil dependencies and elasticities for Brazil, China, Norway, South Korea, Sweden and USA; and their possible oil consumption response to a Peak Oil phenomenon. Peak Oil in this thesis, implies that oil production will reach its climax and decline thereafter. To help draw conclusions, appropriate statistical analysis on macroeconomic variables was used as well as the modified Nerlove’s partial adjustment equation to calculate price and income elasticities both in the short and long-run. Regression results have shown that short-run price elasticities were low in all countries; in addition income elasticities were also inelastic but more elastic in relation to oil price elasticities. This indicates that oil consumption is more sensitive to changes in income than to changes in oil price. It was concluded that oil dependencies among nations differ and the trend is that developing countries are increasing their oil dependency while developed countries tend to decrease their oil dependency over time. Peak Oil will lead to higher oil prices, which in the short-run will change developing countries oil consumption to a greater extent than developed countries, but in the long-run their response are more similar. It was also noticed, that when GDP decreases in net-oil-importing countries, oil consumption will decrease even further. The opposite could be true for net-oil-exporting countries like Norway and Brazil. / Under år 2007 har världen upplevt historiskt höga oljepriser, både i nominella och reala termer, vilket återigen har lyft upp energiförsörjningen på agendan. Vi fann det därför intressant att undersöka oljeberoenden i Brasilien, Kina, Norge, Sydkorea, Sverige, USA och se hur dessa länders oljekonsumption kan påverkas av Peak Oil. Peak oil betyder att oljeproduktionen når sitt maximum och minskar därefter. För att kunna dra slutsatser har lämpliga statistiska verktyg använts på olika makroekonomiska variabler och applicerat ”Nerlove’s partial adjustment model” på data har pris-och inkomstelasticiteten av olja i varje land både på kort och lång sikt kunnat utvinnas. Från regressionen har framträtt; priselasticiteten var låg på kort sikt i alla länder och detta gäller även för inkomstelasticiteten, dock var inkomstelasticiteten relativt mer elastisk i alla länder. Detta indikerar att oljekonsumtionen är mer känslig för förändringar i inkomst än för förändringar i pris. Slutsatsen från studien är att olika länder har olika nivåer av oljeberoende och att utvecklingsländer tenderar att öka sitt relativa oljeberoende över tid medan de industrialiserade länderna tenderar att minska sitt relativa oljeberoende över tid. Peak Oil leder till högre oljepriser vilket på kort sikt kommer att påverka utvecklingsländernas oljekonsumtion mer än de industrialiserade ländernas, dock minskar skillnaden på lång sikt. En observering från denna forskning är att när BNP minskar hos olje-importörerna kommer även oljekonsumtionen att minska. För oljeexportörer som Brasilien och Norge kan oljekonsumptionen öka när BNP inkomsterna ökar från Peak Oil.

<p>During the year of 2007, the world has experienced historically high oil prices both in nominal and in real terms, which has reopened discussions about energy sustainability. We therefore found it interesting to research oil dependencies and elasticities for Brazil, China, Norway, South Korea, Sweden and USA; and their possible oil consumption response to a Peak Oil phenomenon. Peak Oil in this thesis, implies that oil production will reach its climax and decline thereafter. To help draw conclusions, appropriate statistical analysis on macroeconomic variables was used as well as the modified Nerlove’s partial adjustment equation to calculate price and income elasticities both in the short and long-run. Regression results have shown that short-run price elasticities were low in all countries; in addition income elasticities were also inelastic but more elastic in relation to oil price elasticities. This indicates that oil consumption is more sensitive to changes in income than to changes in oil price. It was concluded that oil dependencies among nations differ and the trend is that developing countries are increasing their oil dependency while developed countries tend to decrease their oil dependency over time. Peak Oil will lead to higher oil prices, which in the short-run will change developing countries oil consumption to a greater extent than developed countries, but in the long-run their response are more similar. It was also noticed, that when GDP decreases in net-oil-importing countries, oil consumption will decrease even further. The opposite could be true for net-oil-exporting countries like Norway and Brazil.</p> / <p>Under år 2007 har världen upplevt historiskt höga oljepriser, både i nominella och reala termer, vilket återigen har lyft upp energiförsörjningen på agendan. Vi fann det därför intressant att undersöka oljeberoenden i Brasilien, Kina, Norge, Sydkorea, Sverige, USA och se hur dessa länders oljekonsumption kan påverkas av Peak Oil. Peak oil betyder att oljeproduktionen når sitt maximum och minskar därefter. För att kunna dra slutsatser har lämpliga statistiska verktyg använts på olika makroekonomiska variabler och applicerat ”Nerlove’s partial adjustment model” på data har pris-och inkomstelasticiteten av olja i varje land både på kort och lång sikt kunnat utvinnas. Från regressionen har framträtt; priselasticiteten var låg på kort sikt i alla länder och detta gäller även för inkomstelasticiteten, dock var inkomstelasticiteten relativt mer elastisk i alla länder. Detta indikerar att oljekonsumtionen är mer känslig för förändringar i inkomst än för förändringar i pris. Slutsatsen från studien är att olika länder har olika nivåer av oljeberoende och att utvecklingsländer tenderar att öka sitt relativa oljeberoende över tid medan de industrialiserade länderna tenderar att minska sitt relativa oljeberoende över tid. Peak Oil leder till högre oljepriser vilket på kort sikt kommer att påverka utvecklingsländernas oljekonsumtion mer än de industrialiserade ländernas, dock minskar skillnaden på lång sikt. En observering från denna forskning är att när BNP minskar hos olje-importörerna kommer även oljekonsumtionen att minska. För oljeexportörer som Brasilien och Norge kan oljekonsumptionen öka när BNP inkomsterna ökar från Peak Oil.</p>

More than 95% of fuel used for personal transportation is petroleum-based (Environment and Development Division (EDD), 2005). The peak and decline of world oil production is producing price and uncertainty pressures that may cause significant travel behaviour change in the future. Current travel behaviour has developed during conditions of low cost fuel and government investment in private vehicle mobility. Current urban forms and land use have also been developed during a period of growth in vehicle travel demand. Research that explores the long term (permanent oil supply reduction period) implications of reduced fuel demand on private travel behaviour is needed. Local and national government investments in transport infrastructure and urban development will be used and require maintenance for decades. Research is needed to assess long-term mode choice and car travel demand as a function of urban form and demographic indicators. This type of travel behaviour adaptive potential should be relevant to transport planning decision making. Literature review shows that there are a few available long-term planning methods, models, or tools in transportation engineering for future oil depletion. Transportation engineers need information of how current travel demand patterns may change over the lifetime of infrastructure investments in response to oil supply depletion. Behaviour change data for long term future situations would be difficult to obtain using traditional survey methods because most people have never experienced oil depletion situations. This research proposes that immersing people into the situation of oil depletion through sharp price rise would be necessary to generate relevant behaviour change decisions. The thesis is that the long term behaviour change can be assessed by characterising current adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity is defined in this thesis as the travel demand pattern with maximum fuel reduction without reducing participation in activities. The reasons why people might change travel demand to reduce fuel use is not part of the definition. This research also proposed that an immersive sim game environment could be used to prompt behaviour change decisions relating to fuel price shocks. Research into sim game surveys and travel behaviour surveys was used to inform the design of a Transport Adaptive Capacity Assessment (TACA) Sim survey tool. The TACA Sim survey was designed to assess capacity to adapt travel behaviour to reduce fuel use, and to characterise the potential for mode change. Participants experience the TACA Sim survey as a self assessment or transport energy audit. The survey provides a personal feel, focuses on the usual weekly activities, and provides feedback to participants about their fuel use and car dependence. Participants supply their normal travel activities over a week, and three weeks of sim play includes a steep fuel price rise while people are allowed to change their travel behaviour in response. The TACA Sim survey was evaluated through a case study of surveys of staff and students at the University of Canterbury. A second version of the TACA survey was developed that surveyed the one week of normal travel, but then probed adaptive capacity by asking a simple question after each travel activity was entered “Could you get to the activity another way?” The sim game travel adaptive capacity is compared with the available alternative adaptive behaviour for participants in a case study at the University of Canterbury. The results of the case study show that the participants responded well with the simulated situation. This reflects that the TACA Sim is successful in helping participants to perceive the situation of fuel price rise and think about their alternatives to car travel. Asking people “Could you get to the activity another way?” was found to effectively probe their adaptive capacity which agreed well with the virtual reality survey. The virtual reality survey yields more details of what people can do such as moving house, chaining trips, combining trips and buying a more efficient vehicle. The web-based TACA survey has been developed and deployed in two further research projects.

Freight transportation is an integral element of various supply chains and has a complex and dynamical interrelationship with human economic activities. Modern logistical strategies paved way to the current supply chain organisation and logistics network design resulting in a more global economy and huge economies of scale. Recent trends of volatility of oil price have major implications in the movement of commodities across the supply chains. Likewise, climate change issues have presented urgent challenges in reducing carbon emissions for the transport and logistics sector. Pressure on the sector comes from both governments and consumers alike, demanding future sustainability as well as corporate environmental and social responsibility. The original contribution of this research is to investigate the system-wide dynamics of freight transportation and production in the context of supply chains. A theoretical framework called the ‘Geographic Adaptive Potential’ or GAP is built to understand how constraints in energy and emissions affect the production and distribution of commodities. The changes in the supply chain were investigated in four different components, namely a) the potential to shift to less energy and emissions intensive modes for long-haul freight, b) logistical strategies in the last leg of the chain or urban freight and c) local production and distribution, and d) the accessibility of potential customers to the markets. The design of the GAP components is in correspondence with the links of the supply chain. The analyses yielded an evaluation of the adaptive capacity of the freight transport and production system. For long-haul freight, a GIS-based model was created called the ‘New Zealand Intermodal Freight Network’ or NZIFN. It is an optimisation tool integrating the road, rail and shipping network of New Zealand and calculates that minimum time, operating costs, energy and emissions routes between 2 given locations. The case studies of Auckland to Wellington and Auckland to Christchurch distributions of non-perishable products established that even a marginal increase of rail and coastal shipping share produced around 10% reduction in both freight energy and greenhouse gas emissions. In the study of the last leg of the supply chain, the truck trip generation rates of different food stores were investigated. The strongest factors influencing the trip rates to a store are its size and product variation, the latter being a new parameter introduced in the dissertation. It is defined as the total number of brands for 6 chosen commodities commonly found in the stores. The trip rates together with the truck type and distance travelled were used to compute the freight energy usage of the stores. Results revealed that supermarkets consume the most energy for their delivery operations but relative to its physical size, they are more energy efficient than smaller stores. This is due to the utilisation of advanced logistical strategies such as freight consolidation and the effective use of distribution centres. The localised production chapter was explored in the context of Farmers’ markets and their difference with the conventional supermarket distribution system. Using a freight transport energy audit, the energy intensities of both systems were compared. The findings showed that Farmers’ markets were more energy-intensive than supermarkets owing to the low volumes of goods delivered to the market and the lack of freight consolidation effort in the system. The study on the active mode access of potential customers to both Farmers’ markets and supermarkets captured the interplay between freight and personal transport and is the final component of GAP. The results of the ArcGIS based model called ‘Active Mode Access’ or AMA demonstrated that both Farmers’ markets and supermarkets have the same level of accessibility for walking or biking customers. However, the calculations also showed that almost 87% of New Zealanders have no AMA to stores and are at risk for fuel price increase. Finally, the key result of this dissertation is the assessment that there is actually limited adaptive capacity of the freight transport and production system. This is due to network infrastructure and geographical constraints as well as commodity type and mode compatibility and other operational concerns. Due to these limitations, the GAP model assessed that reduction in energy and allowable emissions will ultimately reduce the amount of commodities moved in the system.

<p>Several scenarios point toward a future where we are far more people on Earth than today, where most of those people will live in cities and where oil no longer dominates in the transport systems and in agriculture as an energy source and where less energy will be available to us. The report investigates what areas in traditional ecological knowledge that can contribute to the transition that follows a future with less energy and establishes three areas with the potential of becoming important:</p><p> </p><ol><li>areaspecific biological knowledge in societies that are more dependent upon its surrounding environment and its natural prerequisites</li><li>the local management of these biological resources, which often means a fair sharing and sustainable handling of the resources and which has been observed in Nobel price awarded Elinor Ostrom’s research</li><li>the world views that lie behind how the environment is considered and managed, world views that can inspire and point toward how we in the future should formulate world views that do not give the destructive modern management of the environment</li></ol><p> </p><p>It is also noted that the magnitude of the city living in the future is a historical news and that very little research has been done in how traditional knowledge can be transferred into this kind of living.</p>

<p>Av två anledningar anses det som mycket viktigt att bryta beroendet av olja, naturgas och kol. Den första anledningen är de uppmärksammade klimatförändringarna. Förbränning av fossila bränslen anges idag som huvudorsak till växthuseffekten. Den andra mindre uppmärksammade orsaken är att oljan och naturgasen snart inte räcker till för att föda en allt energihungrigare värld. Utvinningen ser dessutom ut att ha nåt sin kulmen. Efter denna kommer en oundviklig produktionsnedgång. Med det stora beroendet som finns av oljan inom i stort sett alla sektorer är det ytterst viktigt att hitta andra alternativ. Speciellt gäller detta inom transportområdet. Förhoppningen står idag till ”gröna” drivmedel som etanol och biodiesel. IEA (International Energy Agency) har uppmanat de västerländska nationerna att satsa stort på biobränslen. I denna studie görs en analys av de förutsättningar som finns att bygga ut produktionen av denna i USA, Brasilien och Malaysia/Indonesien. Syftet har varit att ta reda på om det är möjligt att göra detta utan att inkräkta på andra näringar, inte skada miljön samt vara oberoende av fossil energi? Den bakomliggande teorin är att detta inte låter sig göras i den omfattning som krävs för att bibehålla de nuvarande samhällsstrukturerna. Detta visar sig också stämma med de uppgifter som står till buds. Endast en fraktion av det nuvarande drivmedelsbehovet går att försörja med biodrivmedel om det inte ska uppstå en allvarlig konkurrens om odlingsmarken eller orsaka stora ekologiska skador.</p>

<p>This is a tale about energy and power. It describes the geographer Halford Mackinder’s geopolitical theories and compares them with current views outlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Michael T Klare, among others. With a critical approach it also provides a historical account of a Europe that stands in front of an energy struggle so severe that the current world order seems destined to fall. Oil and natural gas, has since the beginning of the 20th century, been used as a geopolitical tool in order to create dependence, control and even sometimes overthrow empires. USA has for example dominated the “protectorates” Europe and Japan by controlling the flow of oil in the Middle East. But this seems to change. It can’t be ruled out that the cities of Europe in the long run will be shrouded in darkness. The background is that Europe’s own deposits of fossil energy are decreasing at such vast speed that almost the entire demand will have to be imported by the year 2020. Awareness of this forecast, and the undertaking to reduce the carbon emissions in accordance with the Kyoto treaty, led to a grand proclamation in March 2007 to reduce the need for fossil fuels. This commitment seems however to be insufficient if independence towards other regions shall be maintained. Only a small part of the demand can be met by domestically produced fuels. Neither will the proposed energy reducing measures increase the energy security. The conclusion is that there is no time to develop new technology in order to save Europe from its difficult situation.</p><p>The dependence on Russia will instead grow stronger. The current geopolitical order, where the United States has acted as a military protector and guarantor of the energy security, looks like it is going to fall. The US is bogged down in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars at the same time as Europe’s dependence on energy from the East grows. The US also has economic troubles and their own energy security dilemma. Russia has on the other hand acted with greater self confidence and purposefully built alliances with China, the Middle East and its former republics in Central Asia. Russia may soon dictate the future of Europe with its energy trump card. If Europe keeps its alliance with US and tries to challenge or subjugate Russia into its “unipolar” order it will deepen the risk for conflict. In such a conflict, Moscow has the power to darken and cool down the European room. Since every country is dependent on the dwindling energy resources for their survival, it may escalate into a full blown war. But the new order may be short. Within two decades there will probably be no surplus of energy to export for Russia, or any other nation for that matter. Europe will by then be without it’s own energy resources and simultaneously lose the option to import.</p> / <p>Det här är en berättelse om energi och makt. Den beskriver geografen Halford Mackinders geopolitiska teorier från början av 1900-talet och jämför dem med moderna uppfattningar från bland annat Zbigniew Brzezinski och Michael T Klare. Med en kritisk utgångspunkt ges även en historia om ett Europa som står inför en så svår energiutmaning att den nuvarande ordningen ser ut att falla. Sedan oljan och senare naturgasen började nyttjas har energin använts som ett geopolitiskt verktyg för att skapa beroenden, kontroll och även för att störta imperier i sank. USA har exempelvis dominerat sina ”protektorat” Europa och Japan genom att kontrollera oljeflödet från Mellanöstern. Men detta ser ut att förändras. I förlängningen går det inte utesluta att mörkret permanent lägger sig över Europas städer. Bakgrunden är att de egna lagren av fossil energi minskar i en sådan takt att i stort sett hela behovet måste importeras inom 20 år. Medvetenheten om detta, samt åtagandet att minska koldioxidutsläppen i enlighet med Kyotoavtalet, gjorde att EU i mars 2007 proklamerade att en stor satsning skulle vidtas för att reducera behovet av fossila bränslen. Denna satsning visar sig dock vara otillräcklig för att upprätthålla ett oberoende från andra regioner. Endast en mindre del av behovet kan tillgodoses med inhemskt producerade bränslen. Inte heller de energisparande åtgärderna kan dramatiskt höja energisäkerheten. Tiden är alltför knapp för att ny fantastisk teknik ska kunna rädda Europa ur sin besvärliga situation.</p><p>Istället blir beroendet av Ryssland allt större. Detta leder till att den rådande geopolitiska ordningen, där USA både har agerat som Europas militära beskyddare och garant av energisäkerheten, riskerar att falla ihop. Samtidigt som Europa blir mer beroende av energin från öst går USA:s krig i Irak och Afghanistan allt sämre. USA har även ekonomiska bekymmer och ett eget energisäkerhetsproblem. Ryssland har i sin tur agerat med allt större självaktning och målmedvetet byggt allianser med Kina, Mellanöstern och sina forna delrepubliker i Centralasien. Med energin som trumfkort kan Ryssland komma att diktera EU:s framtid. Om EU bibehåller sin allians med USA och försöker utmana eller inlemma Ryssland i sin ”unipolära” ordning ökar risken för en allvarlig konflikt. Moskva har i ett sådant läge makt att både mörklägga och kyla ner det europeiska rummet. Eftersom alla behöver energin för sin överlevnad finns en risk att en marsch inleds mot ett fullskaligt krig. Den nya ordningen kan dock bli kort. Inom två decennier kan troligtvis inte längre Ryssland – eller någon annan region – exportera ett överskott. Europa kommer då att sakna både egna energiresurser samt importmöjligheter för att driva sina energisystem. Vad som då händer med det gamla Europa återstår att se.</p>

<p>Since the 1950s, oil has been the dominant source of energy in the world. The cheap supply of oil has been the engine for economic growth in the western world. Since future oil demand is expected to increase, the question to what extent future production will be available is important. </p><p>The belief in a soon peak production of oil is fueled by increasing oil prices. However, the reliability of the oil price as a single parameter can be questioned, as earlier times of high prices have occurred without having anything to do with a lack of oil. Instead, giant oil fields, the largest oil fields in the world, can be used as a parameter.</p><p>A giant oil field contains at least 500 million barrels of recoverable oil. Only 507, or 1 % of the total number of fields, are giants. Their contribution is striking: over 60 % of the 2005 production and about 65 % of the global ultimate recoverable reserve (URR). </p><p>However, giant fields are something of the past since a majority of the largest giant fields are over 50 years old and the discovery trend of less giant fields with smaller volumes is clear. A large number of the largest giant fields are found in the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf. </p><p>The domination of giant fields in global oil production confirms a concept where they govern future production. A model, based on past annual production and URR, has been developed to forecast future production from giant fields. The results, in combination with forecasts on new field developments, heavy oil and oil sand, are used to predict future oil production.</p><p>In all scenarios, peak oil occurs at about the same time as the giant fields peak. The worst-case scenario sees a peak in 2008 and the best-case scenario, following a 1.4 % demand growth, peaks in 2018.</p>