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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
91

The interaction of motion and form in the perception of global structure a glass-pattern study /

Or, Chun-fai, Charles. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.
92

Effects of spatial frequency overlap on face and object recognition

Collin, Charles Alain. January 2000 (has links)
No description available.
93

Studies in visual search : effects of distractor ratio and local grouping processes

Poisson, Marie E. January 1991 (has links)
No description available.
94

Haptic information in minimally invasive surgery tools for use in simulation

Seehusen, Ashley Elizabeth January 2001 (has links)
No description available.
95

Representing experience

Leon, Mark January 1985 (has links)
No description available.
96

Categorisation effects on similarity judgements and object recognition

Archambault, Annie January 1999 (has links)
No description available.
97

Private worlds & public places : a philosophical examination of the nature of mental imagery

Hill, Paul E. January 1993 (has links)
No description available.
98

Human vision and the physics of natural images

Christou, Christakis Georgiou January 1994 (has links)
No description available.
99

Aristotle on the common sense

Gregoric, Pavel January 2003 (has links)
No description available.
100

Taking the World In

Busuioc, OCTAVIAN 29 May 2013 (has links)
It is natural to think that in order to learn about the world from perceptual experience, a person does not need to do anything. All that is required is that she has her eyes open, or her ears unplugged, so that she can receive sensory input from without. On the basis of this input, she can form justified empirical beliefs. This way of thinking about experience is central to many philosophical views about perception. It is my contention that the approach is mistaken, and that in fact it cannot explain how perceptual experience justifies belief. This dissertation argues, in contrast, that perceiving is not something that merely happens to us, but something we do. On my view, experience is a source of justification in virtue of being an activity which aims at knowledge. In Chapter 1, I present the topic of the dissertation and provide an analytical overview. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes John McDowell's account of perceptual experience. I argue that McDowell is faced with a dilemma, as his original account mischaracterizes perceptual experience, and his later, revised account cannot explain how perception justifies empirical belief. The solution is to deny a claim common to both: that in experience we are passive. In contrast, I argue that experiencing is a full-fledged activity that is teleologically structured. In Chapter 3, I begin to substantiate my position by drawing on Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. Chapter 4 supplements this claim by appeal to some features of Alva Noe's enactive view of perception. The resulting account portrays experience as an activity that has knowledge as its end. This explains how experience justifies belief, for it shows how perceptual knowledge cannot but be the result of experiencing going well for one. Chapter 5 argues that perceptual activity can take different forms, varying in complexity, as one aims at knowing features of one's environment. I argue, however, that keeping track of an object is the fundamental mode of perceptual activity. I conclude the dissertation by considering two objections to my account. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-05-29 10:01:52.496

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