This thesis examines informal and corruptive activities agents may pursue within organisations. Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the general theme and the related literature. Chapter 2 develops a simple theory of non-monetary collusion, where agents collude by exchanging favours. It examines the optimal use of supervisory information in a simple hierarchy under potential collusion. It is shown that when only the supervisor's information about the agent is used, collusion does not arise, since favours can not be exchanged. Secondly, it is analysed whether the agent's information about his superior should be used. In this case collusion is possible, and there is an interesting trade-off between the benefits of using additional information and the costs of collusion. It is then shown that sometimes the principal may be better off when using less than all available information. Chapter 3 considers task assignment and whistle-blowing as measures a principal may use to break collusion. The principal's response to potential collusion is to allocate less time to monitoring, and he breaks collusion with money. It is shown that the principal may also break collusion by hiring a third worker, and the decision how to break collusion optimally is endogenously determined. Breaking collusion by task assignment is costly, and therefore we consider whistle-blowing as a collusion breaking device. It provides the principal strictly higher welfare than the collusion-proof solution. It is also shown that under reasonable conditions, the collusion-free outcome will be achieved with no further cost. Chapter 4 develops a model of blackmail, where a piece of information an agent prefers to keep private may facilitate blackmail when another agent, namely a blackmailer, threatens to reveal that information. The crucial feature of the blackmail game is the commitment problem from the blackmailer's side. The blackmailer can not commit not to come back in future to demand more despite the payments received in the past. The chapter outlines conditions under which successful extortion may arise, and shows that there is a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, which gives a precise prediction how much money the blackmailer is able to extort from the victim. It is also shown that the blackmailer receives a blackmail premium that compensates the blackmailer for not taking money from the victim and revealing information anyway.

Diplomová práce se snaží poskytnout ucelený pohled na známé poznatky z oblasti teorie opakovaných jako části teorie her. Teoretická část se zabývá předpoklady, výpočetními principy a rovnovážnými strategiemi pro opakované hry. V praktické části je teorie aplikována na oblast petrochemického průmyslu, konkrétně na konkurenci dvou čerpacích stanic v rámci prostorově vymezeného trhu.

付記する学位プログラム名: グローバル生存学大学院連携プログラム / 京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第22111号 / 経博第604号 / 新制||経||291(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 依田 高典, 教授 岡 敏弘, 講師 五十川 大也 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

This thesis consists of three self-contained essays dealing with different aspects of macroeconomics and political Economy. The Relative Price of Investment Goods and Sectoral Contract Dependence I develop a quantitative model to explain the relationship between TFPs at the aggregate and sector levels and contracting institutions across countries. The incomplete contract enforcement induces distortions in the production process which come from the “hold up” problem between a final goods firm and its suppliers. Because investment goods sector is more contract dependent, its productivity suffers more from the distortion. In turn, countries endowed with weaker contract enforcement institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods. A Ricardian Model of the Labor Market with Directed Search I analyze how search friction affects the allocation in a Ricardian model of the labor market. The equilibrium shows that the matching pattern is partially mixed: Some tasks are only performed by skilled workers; some are only performed by unskilled workers; the remaining tasks are performed by both skilled and unskilled workers. The mixed matching pattern implies a mismatch in equilibrium. It turns out that the reason for the mismatch has its roots in search friction. In addition, I show labor market institutions have interesting implications for the unemployment rate and mismatch. A Dynamic Analysis of the Free-rider Problem I argue that special interest groups overcome their free-rider problem thanks to distorted government policy. As policy confers monopoly privileges on a group, it can also preserve and promote group’s organization. The key to sustaining the organization of the group is a dynamic incentive: when distorted policy generates rents for a group, each member of the group wish to make contributions not just to raise their rents today; they want to sustain their cooperation so that they will be able to influence policy in the future.

在贓物所有權歸屬問題之下，本文承繼 Rose (2010) 的設定，使用賽局模型分析贓物不適用善意取得 (即無條件歸還原持有者) 及適用善意取得的法律規定，並討論我國實際贓物所有權的制度，並比較三種制度下的參賽者的聯合效用大小。透過本研究可發現，原持有者擁有物品所有權的效用相對較高時，社會上應偏向贓物不適用善意取得較有效率；當潛在買方擁有物品所有權的效用相對較高時，社會上應偏向贓物適用善意取得較有效率。而我國現有制度不管在何種情況之下，皆不是最有效率的，故我國對贓物所有權歸屬的法律從效率面而言有重新檢討之必要。 / This paper which continues the study from Rose (2010) focuses on the question whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. We use game model to analyze three different regulations - a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer, and the real regulation in Taiwan. Finally, in discussing social utility, we compare efficiency among the three regulations, and reach our conclusion that when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are higher than the owner’s, a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant is the most efficient. On the contrary, when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are lower than the original owner’s, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer is the most efficient. Considering efficiency, the regulation in Taiwan is not the best to the society so the government may amend the regulation.

Cette dissertation de doctorat développe des contributions importantes à la littérature sur la négociation salariale. Nous introduisons des taux d’actualisation variant dans le temps pour les modèles de négociation salariale afin de modéliser des situations réelles d’une manière plus précise. Dans le Chapitre 1, nous présentons les objectifs principaux de cette dissertation. Dans le Chapitre 2, nous offrons un bref aperçu de la littérature sur les modèles de négociation, plus précisément des modèles de négociation salariale. Nous rappelons les approches axiomatiques et stratégiques des modèles de négociation et étudions en détail l’approche stratégique des modèles de négociation salariale. Dans le Chapitre 3, nous étudions le modèle de négociation salariale avec des préférences qui varient dans le temps. Tout d’abord, nous analysons les équilibres en sous-jeu parfait dans le modèle, d’autre part, nous déterminons les gains d’équilibre en sous-jeux parfaits des parties. Par ailleurs, nous étudions les équilibres inefficaces dans le modèle. Dans le Chapitre 4, nous étudions quelques extensions du modèle de négociation salariale généralisé. Premièrement, nous analysons les négociations salariales avec les actions de “go-slow” et étudions les gains d’équilibre en sous-jeux parfaits. Par ailleurs, nous étudions un modèle de négociation salariale où la firme a l’option de “lockouts”. Dans le Chapitre 5, nous appliquons les modèles de négociation de salaires généralisés aux problèmes de la vie réelle, comme les négociations de prix. Dans le Chapitre 6, nous présentons les conclusions et donnons de nouvelles perspectives à nos recherches futures. / This Ph.D. dissertation develops important contributions to the literature on wage bargaining. We introduce discount rates varying in time to the wage bargaining models in order to model real life situations in a more accurate way. In Chapter 1, we state the main objectives of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, we deliver a brief literature overview of bargaining models, more precisely wage bargaining models. We recall axiomatic and strategic approaches to bargaining and then describe in details strategic approach to wage bargaining models. In Chapter 3, we investigate the wage bargaining model with preferences varying in time. First, we analyze subgame perfect equilibria in the model and then determine the subgame perfect equilibria payoffs of the parties. Furthermore, we study the inefficient equilibria in the model. In Chapter 4, we investigate some extensions of the generalized wage bargaining model. First, we analyze wage bargaining with the go-slow actions of the union and study the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. Next, we investigate a wage bargaining model where the firm has the lockout option. In Chapter 5, we apply the generalized wage bargaining models to real life problems, such as price negotiations. In Chapter 6, we present conclusions and give new insights to our future research.

Abstract With the current technological advancements, stage is being set for new ultra-responsive and robust 5G-enabled applications (e.g., virtual reality, Tactile Internet,…) to deliver critical real-time traffic. The emergence of such critical applications requires new networking models that can handle more connected devices with super high reliability and low latency communications. In the view of these research challenges, this thesis aims to propose new techno-economic models and networking paradigms needed in the redesign of wireless network architectures and protocols to support the connectivity requirements by which operators and users effectively benefit from new opportunities introduced by 5G-enabled applications. In this thesis, new paradigms in wireless network access are presented and analyzed. First, dynamic network architecture (DNA) is introduced, where certain classes of wireless terminals can be turned temporarily into an access point (AP) anytime while connected to the Internet. In this concept, a framework is proposed to optimize different aspects of this architecture. Furthermore, to dynamically reconfigure an optimum topology and adjust it to the traffic variations, a new specific encoding of genetic algorithm (GA) is presented. Then, a distributed user-centric spectrum sharing is developed based on DNA networks to enable user-provided access points pervasively share the unused resources. Next, a flexible cloud-based radio access network (FRAN) is proposed to offload traffic to DNA networks in order to provide low latency communications. In the sequel of the thesis, as a new paradigm, a context-aware resource allocation scheme based on adaptive spatial beamforming and reinforcement learning is proposed. In addition, semi-cognitive radio network (SCRN) as a new spectrum sharing model is developed to improve the utility of primary and secondary owners. / Tiivistelmä Nykyaikaisilla teknologisilla edistysaskeleilla mahdollistetaan uusien 5G-pohjaisien erittäin lyhyen vasteajan ja suuren luotettavuuden sovelluksien ilmestyminen kriittisen reaaliaikaisen informaation välittämiseen (esim. taktiiliset ja virtuaalitodellisuus-sovellukset). Näiden kaltaiset sovellukset vaativat uudenlaisia verkottumismalleja, jotka kykenevät käsittelemään enemmän laitteita suurella toimintavarmuudella ja matalalla latenssilla. Tämä väitöskirja ehdottaa näiden haasteiden valossa uusia teknis-taloudellisia malleja ja verkottumisparadigmoja, joita tarvitaan verkkoarkkitehtuurien ja -protokollien uudelleensuunnittelussa tulevaisuuden sovelluksien tarpeet huomioiden, joiden kautta operaattorit ja käyttäjät voivat hyödyntää tulevien 5G-sovelluksien tuomat mahdollisuudet. Tässä väitöskirjassa esitetään ja analysoidaan uusia paradigmoja langattomaan verkkoliityntään. Ensimmäisenä esitellään dynaaminen verkkoarkkitehtuuri (dynamic network architecture, DNA), missä tietyt langattomat terminaalit voidaan väliaikaisesti muuttaa liityntäpisteiksi milloin vain internetyhteyden ollessa käytettävissä. Tämän konseptin puitteissa ehdotetaan viitekehys sen eri osa-alueiden optimoimiseksi. Tämän lisäksi esitetään uusi spesifinen geneettisen algoritmin (GA) koodaus optimaalisen topologian dynaamiseen konfigurointiin ja sen säätämiseen tietoliikenteen määrän mukaan. Tämän jälkeen esitellään kehitetty hajautettu käyttäjäkeskeinen spektrinjako, joka perustuu DNA-verkkoihin ja joka mahdollistaa käyttämättömien resurssien kokonaisvaltaisen jakamisen käyttäjien kautta. Seuraavaksi työssä ehdotetaan joustavaa pilvipalvelu-pohjaista liityntäverkkoa (flexible cloud-based radio access network, FRAN) käyttäjädatan purkamiseksi DNA-verkoille matalalatenssisen tietoliikenteen tarjoamiseksi. Edellä mainittujen menetelmien seurauksena ehdotetaan uutta paradigmaa: Kontekstiriippuvaista resurssien allokointia perustuen adaptiiviseen spatiaaliseen keilanmuodostukseen ja vahvistusoppimiseen. Näiden lisäksi kehitetään uusi spektrinjakomalli puolikognitiivisille radioverkoille (semi-cognitive radio network, SCRN) ensisijaisien ja toissijaisien käyttäjien utiliteetin parantamiseksi.

寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具，為了維持市場競爭公平性，各國相繼將其引入法條之中，該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為，使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念，嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性，並由兩模型推論出：實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下，主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。 / The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidences to convict those firms of being cartel members. In this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.

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