This research was designed to investigate the potential mediating role of personal power and of trust in the relationship between servant leadership and affective organizational commitment. The research responds to calls for increased understanding of the mechanisms at work between leadership models and outcomes. Especially unique in the available literature is the quantitative study of the relationship between servant leadership and personal power. All of the constructs in the research model are based on existing instruments, including those developed for personal power (PP; Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989; Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998), trust (T; Mayer & Gavin, 2005), servant leadership (SL; Winston & Fields, 2015), and affective organizational commitment (AOC; Allen & Meyer, 1990), and were measured as follower perceptions and attitudes. Social exchange theory was used as the theoretical basis of the proposed model (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962). This includes the perspective of social power and trust being characteristic of exchange relationships as opposed to attributes of an individual. Linear regression was performed using IBM® SPSS® (SPSS), and mediation was evaluated using the approach from Baron and Kenny (1986). The hypotheses for the positive relationship between SL and AOC, and for mediation of the SL-AOC relationship by PP were supported. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used in confirmation analysis. The hypothesis for T as a mediator in the relationship between SL and AOC was not supported. Further ad hoc analysis suggests SL and PP as serial mediators in the relationship between T and AOC. Implications for academic and practitioner applications are discussed.

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La présente thèse éclaire l’intelligibilité du régime politique gabonais sous Omar BONGO (1968-2009). Plus précisément, elle relève que la domination personnelle et l’analyse élitiste sont deux approches complémentaires dans la compréhension du politique au Gabon et partant, en Afrique subsaharienne. Elle montre à cet effet qu’Omar BONGO n’a pas pu compter que sur lui-même pour se maintenir au pouvoir pendant près d’un demi-siècle. Il a dû également s’appuyer sur un groupe d’acteurs, appelé élite politique, dont l’organisation et le fonctionnement étaient néanmoins empreints de son pouvoir personnel. En effet, l’accès à cette élite était régi par le clientélisme et le népotisme, deux rapports d’échange qu’Omar BONGO avait érigés en principe de gestion du personnel supérieur de l’État. Le premier lui permettait de se constituer une clientèle capable d’œuvrer par délégation ou de façon autonome à sa longévité politique. De ce fait, les acteurs qui composaient cette clientèle étaient dotés chacun d’un capital de ressources variées qu’ils activaient et faisaient fructifier de façon à l’aider à conserver son sceptre. La valorisation de ce capital auprès d’Omar BONGO les conduisait d’ailleurs à se livrer une lutte acharnée dans laquelle la fin justifiait les moyens. Quant au népotisme, il amena à Omar BONGO de faire des membres de sa famille officielle et ceux de sa famille officieuse ses proches collaborateurs dans le gouvernement, l’administration présidentielle et le Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG). Politique de l’affection, il lui permettait ainsi d’avoir une emprise plus importante sur l’élite politique et sur l’appareil d’État car, en faisant de son pouvoir une affaire de famille, Omar BONGO savait pouvoir compter sur des acteurs dont la loyauté et la détermination seraient également un atout pour sa longévité politique. / The present thesis lights the intelligibility of gabonese political regime under OMAR BONGO (1968-2009). More precisely, it notices that personal domination and elitist analysis are two supplementary approaches in the understanding of politics in Gabon and in sub-Saharan Africa. It shows with this effect that OMAR BONGO could not count that on itself to stay in power during almost half a century. He must also have leaned on a group of actors, called political elite, of which the organization and functioning being imprinted by its personal power. Indeed, access to this elite was governed by clientelism and nepostism, two reports of exchange which OMAR BONGO had established in principle of management of the upper personnel of the State. The first allowed him to build up clients able of working on the instructions or in an autonomous manner in his political longevity. Because of that, the actors who composed these clients were endowed to each of a capital of various resources which they activated and made bear fruit in order to help him to keep its scepter. The promotion of this capital to OMAR BONGO led them besides to devote themselves a persevered conflict. As for nepotism, it brought to OMAR BONGO to make members of its official family and those of its semiofficial family his close collaborators in the government, the presidential administration and the PDG, the party in power. Policy of affection, it allowed him so to have a more important hold on political elite and on State apparatus. Because, by making of his power a family business, OMAR BONGO knew how he will count on actors among whom fidelity and determination would be also a trump for his political longevity.

Private deck of cards created during six-month survey and documentation of daily experiences. The package contains 49 cards and it is inspired by a set of 78 tarot cards. Text content - reverse side of the card was created using diary notes. Face side of the card was chosen as a representation of processes taking place usually in days when the card was read.