In the first chapter of this paper I focus on the general overview of Occam's Razor, and develop several interpretations and adaptations of Occam's Razor as a principle of simplicity. In the second chapter I apply these different interpretations in the Physicalism/Dualism debate, and critically assess the validity of these implementations of Occam's Razor in philosophy of mind. In the final chapter I give an overview of my discussion thus far, and make assertions about what my paper means for the usage of Occam's Razor's as a whole.

Works of fiction do things to us, and we do things because of works of fiction. When reading Hamlet, I mentally represent certain propositions about its characters and events, I want the story and its characters to go a certain way, and I emotionally respond to its goings-on. I might deem Hamlet a coward, I might wish that Hamlet stabbed Claudius when he had the chance, and I might feel sorrow at Ophelia’s senseless suicide. These fiction-directed mental states seem to resemble the propositional attitudes of belief, desire, and emotion, respectively — the everyday attitudes that represent and orient us toward the world. These mental states constitute our engagement with fiction, and the way in which they hang together is central to understanding our engagement with fiction. In that aim, this thesis hopes to provide an analysis of our belief-like attitudes about works of fiction. I argue that a folk psychological theory of fictional engagement should call upon belief, not imagination, to serve as the primary cognitive attitude with which we engage fictions.

David Rosenthal, in his Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, argues that it is a higher-order thought to the effect that the subject is in a conscious state that makes one conscious of his or her own mental states. In this paper, I argue that since phenomenal consciousness can be vague and Rosenthal’s HOT cannot, HOT is not a necessary condition of phenomenal consciousness. I use primarily Ned Blocks’ refrigerator hum case and Sartre’s example of non-positional awareness to argue that the threshold which determines the degree of first-person awareness necessary for a mental state to be conscious is vague itself, therefore consciousness is a vague concept. HOT cannot accommodate for borderline cases of phenomenal consciousness, therefore it cannot be a necessary condition of all conscious mental states. This is especially relevant in the discussion of non-human animal consciousness, as HOT theories such as Carruthers have been used to deny non-human animal consciousness on the basis of the on/off feature of such representational theories.

This paper explores and evaluates the famous Mary case put forward by Frank Jackson in support of what he calls the knowledge argument against physicalism. After laying out Jackson’s position, I set out to determine whether certain previous physicalist attempts at undermining it have been successful. Finding that they have not, I use their shortcomings to inform the construction of a new position, one which I argue renders the Mary case at odds with itself and frees physicalism from the knowledge argument’s grasp.

Thesis (Revise). / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Undergraduate honors paper--Mount Holyoke College, 2007. Dept. of Philosophy. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-107).

As technology becomes more sophisticated, it becomes increasingly important to understand how we should ethically use technology. One question within this area of study is whether we should treat certain types of technology, like artificial intelligence, with more respect. If we do owe these machines some sort of moral status, another question is what level of moral status they have. In order to answer these questions, I argue that machines can be considered as minds under the view of machine functionalism. A significant problem for machine functionalism is whether it can account for emotions within the system it suggests. First, I argue that emotions are able to fit within the system using Martha Nussbaum’s framework for emotions. Second, I address Craig Delancey’s objections to Nussbaum’s view, and I suggest friendly amendments to Nussbaum’s framework. Third, I look at how Nussbaum’s view fits within the theory of machine functionalism. And finally, I consider the implications of the view that machines can have minds like humans can, and how we should treat machines in light of this argument.

<p>One of the central questions in the philosophy of sounds and hearing is the question of space: what spaces or locations, if any, do sound perceptions make one aware of? When I hear a sound, do I perceive the direction of the sound? The direction (or distance) of the sound's source? The boundaries or dimensions of the space the sound is produced in, or of the source itself? And if sound perceptions do make one aware of space, then with what level of determinacy?</p> <p>In the first chapter of this essay, I describe my approach to sounds and hearing, and state what I take to be the fundamental challenges for any view of sound perception. For one, I take the everyday experience of sounds to be one of the most significant obstacles to an account of sound perception, and one that has scarcely been recognized as such. In everyday hearing, we are not the least bit concerned with sounds. We use sounds to gather information about the behaviour of their sources, which are typically the object of our attention whenever we perceive a sound. If I hear the sound of a car honking or a person speaking, I immediately pay attention to the car and how I can avoid it, or to the person and the meaning they intend to communicate. In everyday hearing, our awareness of sounds is similar to our awareness of windowpanes while watching the goings on outside. Consequently, the everyday experience of sounds is problematic as a model of sound perception.</p> <p>In the second and third chapters, I discuss the two most popular views of sound perception in the philosophical literature, the remote view and the non-spatial view. Since these views have received much attention in the literature, I spend more time raising objections to them in chapter III than describing them in chapter II. One of the principle aims of this essay is to make the case that both of these views are mistaken, despite the valuable insights contained in each.</p> <p>In the fourth and fifth chapters, I discuss the medial view. While the idea that sounds are sound waves located in a medium is the predominant view of sounds themselves in auditory science and the history of philosophy, the view that we hear sounds to be located in the medium has received little attention. Some objections to the medial view have been raised, which I address in chapter V, but very little has been said to defend or even describe the medial view. Part of the motivation for this essay is that I am struck by the fact that the medial view, which would seem to follow naturally from auditory science and the history of philosophy, has been so little discussed. Consequently, the bulk of this essay is dedicated to a description and defence of the medial view.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

A particularly intriguing aspect of personal identity is the staying power of the first arguments. Many of the earliest arguments have remained influential to contemporary theories, even if they sometimes go unacknowledged. One of the most prominent of those long-lived theories comes from Descartes. In this paper I establish the intellectual background, framework, and implications of Cartesian dualism. With this theory in mind I examine Derek Parfit’s We Are Not Human Beings. Despite his denial dualism’s relevance, Parfit’s argument for personal identity contains Cartesian Dualism within it. His examples, definitions, and “intuitions” are compatible, if not more supportive of the Cartesian philosophy. To have the strongest argument that we are not human beings Parfit needs dualism - even if he will not directly acknowledge it.